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THE CONSUMER SOCIETY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN TOWN OF
RETHEMNOS, CRETE, SOUTHERN GREECE

ATHANASIOS K. GKARAGKOUNIS

“Submitted to the University of Wales in fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy”

Swansea University 2010

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ABSTRACT

Fernand Braudel (1972) in his study *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* suggested, among other things, that the Mediterranean world despite its differences should be conceived of as a unit. The present study is not an attempt to challenge Braudel's entire work on historical, empirical or pragmatological grounds, but an effort to question the unitary and totalitarian conception of the Mediterranean region. Specifically, I explore how a small Mediterranean town, Rethemnos, Crete, Southern Greece, was theorized on the back of this widespread conception that wants the Mediterranean to be a unit, and how a differential reading of the town is possible once various theories and conceptions of postmodernism and poststructuralism are put forward with respect to Rethemnos. I will be drawing on theories of the consumer society (Jean Baudrillard's and Zygmunt Bauman's analyses) in an attempt to document that Rethemnos is a society that is currently organized by recourse to the internal contradictions of the consumer society and on theories of the event and the subject (Alain Badiou's analysis) in order to explain that the Rethemniot subject is undecidable and bound to truth procedures as long as there is an event named after an intervention. Prior to that, I will be challenging, with respect to how the Greek subject was depicted on the back of the unitary fashion of conceiving of the Mediterranean region, a variety of studies of anthropological origin, based on Greece; and I will be also criticizing with respect to how the Greek social formation was dissected, on the back of the same unitary fashion, a variety of other studies of politico-economic origin this time, based on Greece as well, by focusing and drawing on certain aspects of Jacques Derrida's deconstructive strategies and Gilles Deleuze's and Felix Guattari's geo-philosophy's lines of flight.

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INTRODUCTION

In one of his frequent visits to Rethemnos, Crete, Southern Greece in the early 1980s, the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, accompanied by his wife, was taking pictures of some abandoned properties, when a resident came out of a nearby house and asked him what was so important about the houses and why would anyone want to take pictures of them (Herzfeld, 1991: xii). The inquiry, according to Herzfeld, expressing both curiosity and anger, was a consequence of the ban imposed by the Greek state in the late 1960s over the entire Old Town of Rethemnos to every possible restoration the inhabitants might want to carry out with respect to their houses. I propose that the resident need not have asked what's with the pictures, but might equally have declared, 'There is nothing to see'.

That Herzfeld and his wife were taking pictures of the monuments, like so many others have done before them and will continue to do in the future no doubt, is probably unimportant, yet the fact that a resident wanted to find out why anybody would be interested in 'such things' is extremely interesting. For Herzfeld (1991), as he tells the story in his book, *A Place in History*, the resident meant to express his opposition to the Greek state declaring the town a 'scheduled monument'. My account of telling the story is rather different. What the resident wanted to say, and the way the resident felt about the two strangers taking pictures of the buildings did not have to do strictly with a kind of local curiosity about why the couple was showing such great interest in the Venetian buildings. The monuments Herzfeld photographed, after all, were to be held responsible for having made the town famous and economically prosperous over the last thirty years. The task in hand, however, in the following pages is to explain, make sense of and understand not the anthropologist's self-evident interest in the monuments, but the speculative statement, which was not spoken; that is, the meaning of the non-seen, invisible and hidden place the resident hints at by saying, but without actually saying it: *There is nothing to see*. And although Herzfeld produces a whole book out of the antithesis and opposition between the residents and the state, what I propose is that a more nuanced understanding of the Old Town and its recent transformation is still required with respect to the meaning of the speculative statement, 'There is nothing to see'.

The thesis unfolds another way of conceiving of Rethemnos by considering what one must not see or that which is not there, that is, the non-place and non-being from where the resident above was able to see both what he was seeing (that there is nothing to see) and that which Herzfeld and his wife were seeing (the Venetian buildings). The experience of Rethemnos, I argue, opens up new ways in conceiving of space, place and the subject amidst a highly changing world. Taking up on the event of Rethemnos allows a careful and radical reconstruction of the meaning of identity and space and of the manner in which these practices are currently negotiated, engaging in a perpetual movement that never rests but seeks relentlessly to re-inscribe and re-affirm difference.

Without further ado, I term Mediterraneanism the discursive formation which predicts, represents and orders Mediterranean societies according to a set of laws or rules, which fail to come to terms with the invisible and hidden place from where the resident above might have pronounced 'There is nothing to see'. Mediterraneanism is a term derived from Said's (1978) *Orientalism* but coined in Mediterranean studies by the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld. I do not intend, however, to produce an Orientalism of the Mediterranean – not that that would be an easy task. My scope is more modest. I use the term in a rather heuristic, idiosyncratic and symptomatic manner, that is, in order to show how Rethemnos can be taken as a case-study that brings into considerably sharp focus some of the thorny issues of theory regarding the processes of place, space, the subject and their transformations, as they are currently swept up by a full-blown consumer society.

But before that, it is worth taking some theoretical precautions. I argue that Mediterraneanist discourses are mostly of anthropological, geographical, and politico-economic origin, and produce a certain – biased and imperialist – picture of Greece. I do not, however, intend to discover the real Greece, nor do I think that such a formation exists. I want to shed light instead on a differential image of Rethemnos based on the baseless ground of a deconstructive and *echographic* (Derrida, 2002) writing of difference that depends on and materializes with reference to the non-seen and invisible non-place, from where the 'There is nothing to see' starts imperceptibly, becoming visible. To that extent, geography, the science *par excellence* dealing with and relying on spatial differentiation (though this is a pleonasm inasmuch as space is

already differential and difference in-itself), is important in forming and enabling such a deconstructive writing. The theory unfolded below is associated with what is often called postmodernism or poststructuralism and dissected by such theorists as Bauman, Baudrillard, Derrida, Deleuze, Guattari and Badiou. The thesis, however, is at pains to explicate and unpack how the above symptoms of difference come to terms with the metamorphic deformation of a certain Mediterranean society, Rethemnos in Crete, Southern Greece and its recent socio-spatial trajectory, constituting, in other words, a means to an end, that is, it brings theory to bear upon the event and experience of Rethemnos.

There are various models and hermeneutical attempts that set out to study the Mediterranean and even more intuitions that have sought to represent the various aspects of the Greek social formation on ethnographic, anthropological and politico-economic grounds. I do not have the ambition to produce an exhaustive analysis and criticism of all studies ever made on Greece. It is still nonetheless useful to develop and build up a theory taking up on the above symptoms of difference in order to reconstruct a variety of myths that have been put forward in making sense of Mediterranean societies.

The Greek social formation has been dissected on the basis, among others, of the following four forms of thought. First, social anthropologists in the 1960s and 1970s proposed to study the structure of Mediterranean societies by reference to the values of 'honour and shame' (Peristiany, 1965, 1967) that were heretofore taken to be imminent and inseparable from the structuration of the Mediterranean world. Second, another model was coined in the 1980s which set out to undo shame and honour, this time proposing a more sophisticated approach to the self-creative and rhetorical manliness of the Mediterranean subject on the basis either of a poetic/embedded placeness (Herzfeld, 1985, 1987), or in line with the notions of the 'friends of the heart' (Papataxiarchis, 1991) insisting on a reflexive construction of 'manhood' that had scarcely to do with the values of shame and honour. Third, another version of the same model also appeared, termed 'poetics of womanhood', this time taking 'mourning' and 'suffering' as the essential rhetorical practices of women against domestication (Dubisch, 1995; Herzfeld, 1991). Last but not least, a neo-Marxian theorization in terms of space was put forward in terms of a 'spontaneous spatiality',

conceiving of the Mediterranean city in terms of a transitional housing segregation (Leontidou, 1990). A number of other studies, associated with the above spatial model, will be also set in motion, such as Tsoucalas' (1977) conceptualization of a 'parasitic' Greece and Vergopoulos' (1975) theorization of 'capitalism without capitalists'; mainly because of their rationalist, productivist and poetic edifice – though, crucially, I reserve a differential reading for parasitism in that it starts, even if prematurely, to address the conditions pertinent to a fully-fledged consumer society.

My intention is neither to destroy Mediterraneanist representations of Greece, nor to prove them inadequate, even if as the thesis progresses, such a criticism will inevitably take hold. My main focus, however, is to deconstruct, affirm, negotiate, destabilize, and produce certain differential images of space and the subject that break systematically with and swerve away from the four models above. Mediterraneanism is susceptible to criticism on a number of grounds. I want, briefly, to refer to some of its main problems that may pave the way for a fuller appreciation of poststructuralism and postmodernism and the manner in which such understandings deliver and accomplish a radical re-conceptualization of Rethemnos. First, the shame-and-honour model forces difference into the straightjacket of the same, which is, a merely conceptual kind of 'difference' that represents objects, either as the other of a corrupted female nature (Mediterranean women under the value of shame/grace) or as the other of a disordered male honour (Mediterranean men under the value of honour). It fails, however, to reconsider *a* difference without concept or identity. Second, the dialectical poetic model takes difference either as separation (the one excluded from the other: the economy of gift excluded from 'commensality' as in Papataxiarchis' (1992) notion of the 'friends of the heart', or as negation (the one versus the other: local history against a bureaucratic centre) as in the case of Rethemnos' history sketched out by Herzfeld (1991), or as transcendence (the one over the other: poetics of manhood over the shame-and-honour model). Third, the poetics of womanhood is nihilistic and unbecoming, in that it conceives of women strictly as fully present in negative and reactive events of suffering and mourning (death or religious rituals), that is, as always having a negative, lacking and approximate (their identities not being fully incorporated or complete) status. And finally, the model of spontaneous housing segregation is a rationalist and productivist discourse, which takes spontaneity as a mirror or an 'alibi of exchange-value and the commodity form'

(Clarke and Doel, 2000: 221) objectifying and essentializing some absolute geographical characteristics that are supposedly imminently linked to the Mediterranean semi-periphery.

The present thesis unsettles and dislodges many of the above misunderstandings, which are symptoms of the discourse of Mediterraneanism rather than the Mediterranean itself. Specifically, my effort involves two separate but interrelated tasks. First, I explore the far-reaching implications a full-blown consumer society has for space, place and the subject beyond the Mediterraneanist traits roughly sketched out above. And second, I argue that, to the extent that the rearticulation of physical and social spaces transforms society and space in the face of a fully-fledged consumer society, a similar deformation should take place in the manner in which the meaning and experience of the subject is re-constructed. The transformation and restructuring of Rethemnos and the identification process of the Rethemniot subject may, accordingly, take the form of the following working-hypotheses: 1) The co-relation of society and space, which is historically expressed in Rethemnos through the contested meaning of the Venetian built environment can be grasped a) by a theory of the consumer society and the postmodern divide between the repressed and the seduced (after Baudrillard and Bauman) and b) by the art of origami, that is, the art of folding, unfolding and refolding social space (after Deleuze and Guattari's geophilosophy). 2) The processive subject formation can be taken as an affirmative (though ambivalent) and responsible (though always work in progress) multiplicity that takes flight from the traits of shame, honour and poetics, remaining deeply generic, indiscernible, undecidable, unanticipated and unexpected, that is, remaining irreversibly bound to truth procedures and the post-evental occurrences of radical otherness (Badiou, 2005).

The epistemological grounds on which these terms lie are partially explained directly below, yet suffice it to note that a fuller appreciation of them is offered as the thesis progresses in an operational way, that is, in relationship to the construction of the argument of each chapter and in accord with the overall scope of the thesis. Such a way of proceeding does not impose a great deal upon the reader, however, to the extent that I do not claim that I have been able to tell the story of the subject and map the conceptual vicissitudes of the co-relation of society and space in a final or ultimate manner. What I propose, nevertheless, is that one needs to proceed with caution in

unpacking the contested notions of postmodernity and poststructuralism and in bringing these theoretical peregrinations to bear upon the spatiality of an evental Rethemnos. Explaining everything at the outset presents and runs into a three-fold difficulty. First, it is impossible to tackle all the historical issues and transformations of Rethemnos in some kind of empirical or linear documentation of what takes place on the ground. Second, it is equally impossible to unpack all the contested aspects of *a* theory that falls under the jurisdiction of postmodernism and poststructuralism, simply because these theoretical practices do not arrange, accommodate or determine issues in any final manner. In other words, this is not *the* postmodern theory but only my take on what I think resonates with a way of thinking Rethemnos without wounding its differential and unassimilated status. And third, even if at first blush, it may appear problematic to reconcile theories of difference with the idiosyncrasy and historical specificity of the small coastal town of Rethemnos, for me this is exactly the challenge, that is, to explore the extent to which *a* theory unfolds and sets in motion a specific empirical problem. This should not be taken as naïve empiricism though, for there is a certain transcendence in bringing theory to bear upon the Old Town problem, in that ‘theory’ tries to integrate various aspects of difference with the specific historicity of an embedded ‘placeness’ without violating either deconstruction and schizoanalysis or the specificity and dynamics of place. I am not about to offer, in short, a detailed historical analysis of Rethemnos; neither do I simply intend to shed light on or offer an understanding of deconstruction. What I have found useful, however, as I was swept up by the undercurrents of deconstruction, schizoanalysis, consumption and the event of Rethemnos, is to bring these theoretical-practices together, without violating or downplaying their difference, dissemination and disjuncture. The present study is not, therefore, an attempt to theorize a problem but a mode of combination of two different accounts of events (poststructuralism and Rethemnos), and an effort to come to terms with the transformation and experience of space, place and the subject in the midst of such a combination.

Doreen Massey (1999: 271) in her discussion of the possible permutations and commonalities between physical and human geography, defines difference “as more than a place in a sequence, for understanding difference as place-in-sequence is, after all, a kind of temporo-spatial version of that understanding of difference that sees others as really only a ‘variation on myself’, where ‘myself’ is the one constructing

the imagination". Positionality, accordingly, the place I occupy while I judge or represent the Other, or in terms of the methods and techniques I deploy in getting to grips with the Other, is crucial in all sorts of social inquiries.

In undertaking the fieldwork that forms a vital component of the present thesis, I lived in Rethemnos for almost a year, from September 2006 until August 2007. But I also had the pleasure of going back from time to time, for shorter periods, throughout 2008. My central aim, while staying there, was effectively as simple as to become familiar with the present situation in the town; that is, with the place and the people of Rethemnos and, of course, the Old Town problem and the manner in which it is currently unfolding. In a certain way advanced by Actor Network Theory (Latour, 2005) I meant to follow the actors and subjects of Rethemnos in order to produce a really thick account of what they do rather than explaining why they do it and how they do it – especially because the latter has been the focus of the poetic model. I had decided in advance that employing orthodox anthropological or ethnographic methods of research, such as interviews and questionnaires, was not the path I wished to follow: the unequal power relations between the one who represents and the one who is represented would never diminish or dissipate if one resorted to these techniques. Given that I had read Johannes Fabian's (1983) exquisite work on *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, which had made a great impression on me, I was virtually in search of a way of getting to terms with the Rethemniot subject without marring or wounding its multifarious identity by simply charting his/her qualities, characteristics or inclinations.

In a somewhat different context, Massey (2001: 15) had defined a similar sort of positionality in terms of "situated knowledge", that is, the kind of knowledge one possesses once he/she is able to map out or acknowledge the lines of power that run through his/her own social positioning and symbolic experimentations and practices. In Rethemnos, Herzfeld (1991) has often excused the local population's suspicion of his own work, when they suspected him of being a spy in the late 1970s, by recognizing that under the peculiar conditions that prevailed in postwar provincial Greece, an American intellectual such as he, who was capable of speaking Greek fluently, could be nothing but a spy!

In my case I have never been accused of spying, given the length of time I spent in Rethemnos and the fact that I did have some genuine interest in local politics managing to meet the Head of the Old Town Office, to examine the archive and files of the Archaeology Service; and to talk briefly to the deputy mayor of the local council. People often tended to think of me, however, as someone who had something to do with Rethemnos. At the time, I thought of this as something advantageous, in the sense that I somehow seemed to belong to the wider context of the town or to be 'one of its people'. Actually, that feeling occasionally tended to become even stronger than I initially figured, since one of my friends lived in a nearby city, Herakleion, and during my stay in Rethemnos I had the chance to go back and forth to Herakleion many times, to use his car (with characteristic Cretan plates), even to tell stories that I heard from him, his friends or his family, to my new friends and acquaintances in Rethemnos. However, this could be also problematic, given that from the moment of such recognition I would no longer be excused for any wrongdoing, since by being recognized as potentially 'one of them', I should know all codes, meanings and manners of treating, addressing and responding to the Rethemniot lifeworld and of handling matters within this context. The point however of rejecting interviews and questionnaires was altogether different. My focus was to trace the links, the paths and the associations among those who had been somehow involved with one way or another in the Old Town problem and not simply to interpret them. The above could also generate the kind of thing Latour (2005: 160) termed "sociology of associations [which] tries to associate controversies".

The point, nevertheless, was not to explain Rethemnos but to follow its actors, events and undecidable features that might affect or not, the Old Town problem. My intention was not, in other words, to prove that Rethemnos had been this kind of problem that needed or required a specific kind of explanation, but that Rethemnos is not what you think. Yet Rethemnos should not, necessarily, be taken as a representative of the Mediterranean region but ought to be seen as a symptom of the way in which many Mediterranean towns have been subject to the cultural logic of late capitalism, by which I mean the commodification of almost everything in culture and society. Mediterranean towns have been facing their historical and cultural centres going through a phase of rapid socio-economic transformation and metamorphosis and thus the experience of space, place and the subject in Rethemnos

are submitted to complex trajectories that need considerable re-contextualization and re-conceptualization beyond the sedentary Mediterraneanist images that conceive of space as empty, inactive or objective. In order to map the construction of the subject I have chosen to focus on the analyses of both Lacan's and Deleuze's theorizations, an argument whose full implications are not readily appreciated however, unless one further draws on Badiou's (2005) non-ontological conceptualization of the event, stipulating and making sense of not only a relative or relational difference but, first and foremost, of what matters to differences and which truth underlies any generic procedure aligned with differences. In order to explore the first task, that is, the unfolding of the Old Town problem (the contested restoration project and the quarrels and struggles between the residents and the Greek bureaucracy) in line with the non-place and non-seen of the 'There is nothing to see', I picked up first, on the repressed/seduced division, that is, the postmodern divide of late modernity (Bauman, 1982, 1987), and second, on the art of spatial science embodied in origami, the folding, unfolding and refolding of social space (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 1987; Doel, 1999). In order to accomplish the second task (the unfolding of the subject beyond shame, honour and poetics) I have relied on Badiou's theorization of the event, which I thought of as one of the possible ways to come to terms not only with difference, identity and subject formation – something which I have done fundamentally with respect to the theorizations of Deleuze and Guattari (1988) in terms of becoming-woman, and the conceptualizations of Derrida (1992) in terms of the counterfeit – but also with a theory which calls forth a *true* or *generic* difference that matters to *subjects* beyond the 'poetic' and 'friendly' individuations of Mediterraneanism.

It should be noted that theory, at least in the way taken up by the present thesis, is not concerned with a linear progression from a 'superstructural' element to the concrete-real empirical world 'out there'. Moreover, I am not, strictly speaking, trying to impose or apply a western-based intellectual body of work on a reality that has nothing to do with it. For as Althusser would have it, one is never outside the contested terrain of knowledge in that theory regards differential modes of approaching the real-concrete and negotiating *other* ways to conceive of the evental Rethemnos, which in turn is no less dense or rich than the theoretical parts. The latter comes down to saying that what matters to my investigation and discussion of

Rethemnos is the innumerable differential relationships to the real and their mode of combination, permutation, displacement and transformation that refer to other relationships of composition, immanence and proximity, rather than the real itself. In other words, neither part of the thesis is to be considered privileged, inasmuch as they form 'allegories' in the sense intended by Clifford (1986: 100) or 'folds' in the sense Deleuze intends, which intervene from the off, leaking in all possible directions. Mediterraneanism, in other words, is *a* discursive formation of the Mediterranean but is not the Mediterranean region itself. And although my experience, as previously mentioned, draws mostly on Greece, Mediterraneanism can be taken primarily, as a theoretical articulation whose joints can be subject to an irresistible yet joyful and exhilaratingly liberating loosening.

If I am taking Rethemnos as an example of Mediterraneanism, therefore, this is neither because it constitutes a micrograph of Greek society, nor because it is a representative Mediterranean town; and thus Mediterraneanism in this and undoubtedly many other respects may not be appropriate. Yet it remains a heuristic term insofar as the studies that are susceptible to criticism on the grounds nourished by differential, postmodern and poststructuralist ideas of difference are only deconstructed, in a Derridean sense, by inhabiting them from within. In short, I do not mean merely to highlight the omissions, absences and misunderstandings of Mediterraneanism but, rather, to read this discourse according to a plan that refuses to nail down differences, simply by letting the Mediterranean go. Writing difference *otherwise* is an on-going process that does not claim that the original Mediterranean studies (Peristiany, du Boulay, Friedl, Campbell etc.) failed to deliver or that they simply misrepresented the Mediterranean basin. Rather, it is about a mode of thought that takes the ostensible success and truthfulness of a dogmatic Mediterraneanism seriously, challenging not only its methodological grounds, but also identifying and specifying what it presupposes, the grounds on which it is based and the philosophical underpinnings that accentuated its tremendous influence and success. Such a deconstructive reading has nothing to do with the true or real Mediterranean, but is inspired instead by Said's (1978) deconstruction of western conceptions of the orient. Let me briefly unpack, therefore, how the notion of Orientalism lays the groundwork for a thorough deconstruction of the Mediterranean.

Orientalism/Mediterraneanism

To begin with, Mediterraneanism is not immaterial. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is a discourse which has considerable material force and consequence and is not just a term, an idea, or a superstructure opposed to a dominant material infrastructure that rules over a superficial ideological domain. As Said avers, “the representation of Orientalism in European culture amounts to what we can call a discursive consistency, one that has not only history but material (and institutional) presence to show for itself” (Said, 1978: 308). Mediterraneanism, by the same token, is not simply an illusory representation. Rather than emphasising how the Mediterranean has been misrepresented, what matters to me is to contaminate and disjoint its original points and folds (shame and honour, poetics, spontaneity, parasitism, social and monumental history) of reassurance. On the other hand, the strength of Mediterraneanism, like that of Orientalism, lies, precisely, in the “cultural discourse, a strength too often mistaken as merely decorative or superstructural” (Said, 1978: 25). Our task, accordingly, is not to pursue or discover the real Mediterranean but to destabilise, set in motion and disadjust the sedentary thought that has turned the Mediterranean into a culturally predicted, prognosticated and commodified sign. As Said (1978: 12) pointed out in terms of Orientalism, it “has less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world”. Mediterraneanism is knowledge, therefore, exactly like Orientalism, “that places things Oriental [or, in this case, Mediterranean] in class, court, prison or manual for scripting, study, judgement, discipline or governing” (Said, 1978: 41). Orientalism and Mediterraneanism are both moral and political projects, having “no existence outside the discourse, the writing by which [they are] constantly produced and experienced” (Said, 1978: 146). This is why Mediterraneanism, exactly, like “Orientalism, which is the system of European or western knowledge about the orient” (Said, 1978: 197), is chiefly about domination, coercion and the exercise of power. For “The Orient that appears in Orientalism [is] a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into western learning, western consciousness and later western empire” (Said, 1978: 202–203). Mediterraneanism, by the same token, is an effect of theory in its relentless attempt to relocate the Oriental Other within the Mediterranean space. No small wonder then that the entity of the Mediterranean has no substantial meaning, for “such geographical designations are an odd combination of the empirical and the imaginative” (Said, 1978: 331). Deconstructing Mediterraneanism, therefore, does not

have to invent a new orthodoxy in the place of a previous one or to substitute one imagination for another. Rather, it is about the “reminder of the seductive degradation of knowledge, of any knowledge anywhere at any time. Now perhaps more than before” (Said, 1978: 328). Mediterraneanism thus is an attempt to classify, dispose, categorise and segregate everything that disseminates, dissipates and disintegrates. In fact, as we shall see, the models of shame-and-honour, poetics, friends of the heart, poetics of womanhood, and spontaneity are subject to the seductive play of deconstruction and schizoanalysis, whose polymorphously perverse strategy of writing space, place and the subject are meant to affirm a responsible, non-servile and indiscernibly undecidable Rethemniot multiplicity and a spatiality that is neither unbecoming, nor dialectical but conjunctive, supplementary and prosthetic.

Setting the Agenda

Be that as it may, moving beyond Mediterraneanist identifications (shame-and-honour, poetics, coffee-shop identifications, and poetics of womanhood) means to start conceiving of the Rethemniot multiplicity as a responsible subject, beyond servility, and as a process in progress beyond social atomism and egoism; in other words, as a social construct defiant of honour, shame and poeticity. Such a multiplicity should be made, invented and created, however, and not simply discovered or represented; it should be made, by subtracting from the n th dimension ($n-1$) or by changing dimension, drawing a line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). Moreover, moving beyond Mediterraneanist spatialities means to start opening the Old Town to first, the spatialization of the repressed/seduced division and the seduction of a full-blown consumer society (Bauman, 1987) and second, to the spatial art of origami (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; Doel, 1999) both of which transcend the Mediterraneanist configurations of spontaneity, parasitism, capitalism without capitalists and the historical dilemmas of social and monumental time (Herzfeld, 1991).

Without further ado I propose that Rethemnos is carried along the lines of a full-blown consumer society and that it is the social logic of the sign that transfigures and transmogrifies its geography. The restoration project, that is, the fact that the Old Town’s Venetian buildings was declared a monument that needed to be protected and carefully preserved, has been, as I have already noted, strongly opposed by the

residents because it prevented them from intervening and refurbishing their properties according to their own will and logic. The residents, however, fought tooth and nail against the bogging down of such a prescriptive restoration, instituting an Association and demonstrating against the preservation of the Venetian monuments. Things, however, have now changed, and the residents actively desire the state to intervene and protect them from the massive commodification and exploitation of almost everything in town, as they witness that certain parts of the Old Town that are beautifully reconstructed, are suitable now only for tourists and visitors who have the ability to learn and appreciate the history of the town, take pictures of the Venetian buildings, and most, importantly, spend money on food, drinks and entertainment, enjoying themselves, as they walk around the labyrinthine streets of the town. In the light of this unevenness generated and further perpetuated by the various twists and turns of the restoration project, the 'Old Town problem' seems to me to be indissolubly tied to a theory that takes seriously the consequences of a full-blown consumer society, bringing into sharp focus a variety of issues with respect to the uneven geographical development of late capitalism and the current mode of domination of consumption that go beyond territorial understandings of space, ontologies of absence and loss, epistemologies of scarcity and the misery and unitary conceptions of identity.

This is so because identity and space are processes that are inextricably and ceaselessly intermingled, formed and deformed along the lines of a consumer society. Mapping the trajectory of these experiences, does not necessarily mean defining or accepting a steady process that monolithically determines and sets out to explain the spatial structuration and social identification of Mediterranean societies in a manner which is beyond doubt or dispute or as means through which a manifesto of Mediterranean studies will come to materialize. Society and space are co-related and produced through uneven processes that vary spatially and are socially expressed and transformed in pluralistic and occasionally incongruent ways. Drawing on postmodernism and poststructuralism, therefore, is not meant to pin down such a heterogeneous, kaleidoscopic and fragmented social reality, but is instead a means to shed light on and make sense of the changing experience of space, place and the subject within a highly dynamic socio-spatial context, bearing always in mind that while one measures any possible change to which a given society succumbs, the

yardstick against or on the back of which such a measure lies, changes as much as the change he/she initially intended to measure. Hence pure becoming that prevents any sort of identification from 'bogging down'. As Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 236) put it "Becoming produces nothing other than itself".

One of the greatest and most conspicuous changes, therefore, that took place in Rethemnos over the last 30-40 years was by and large stemming from the way in which the restoration project had come to be viewed, to the extent that while originally the Rethemniots conceived of the Greek state as an external paragon that interfered in the Old Town, in recent days they have come to realize that only a constant demand for increasing state intervention will redeem or compensate for the fierce tourist exploitation to which their town is currently subject. To explore the extent to which the shifting attitude of the Rethemniots toward the Greek state is indicative of a transition and displacement, from a repressive social organization to a culture of seduction-based mechanisms, is thus, in the light of the above one of the tasks of the present thesis. A strong assertion can be made that the consumer society, which, as we shall see in subsequent sections, constitutes a new mode of domination that 'changes the tablecloth without actually changing the organization of the table', and which reflects a deeper change and conflict in society and space, namely the distinction between the 'repressed' and the 'seduced' (Bauman, 1987), is one of such theoretical 'yardsticks' that may provide for a reasonably reflexive interpretation in counting for what takes place presently in town. As contemporary societies are no longer based on relations of production but refer, primarily, and are above all, organized according to the logic of consumption, it is the latter's collective nature that can offer a more substantial hermeneutics of the dialectics of change between the subject and the city's current metamorphosis. The 'repressed' and the 'seduced', a fuller account of which is offered in Chapter 7, may be taken to correspond with the classification imposed and further spurred by the consumer society, hinting not, necessarily, at certain groups or professions or classes, but implying a social territory whose liquid ground is occupied by certain groups having a particular relationship to the mode of dominion nourished by consumption practices. And although the Greek state envisaged the Old Town in the world tourist-market exclusively on the grounds of its Venetian past, in the long run it only managed to promote and galvanize a consumerist ethos, if only by promulgating the need to preserve the Old Town as a

‘scheduled monument’. Not everyone, however, was able to comply with or benefit from the restoration imperatives insofar as those who were left out of the game of tourism and consumption witness now their properties to become, irreversibly, enmeshed in processes of unstoppable and rapid decay. For the restoration project was extremely effective in spending public money on the not-so-needy by promoting the image of the city and ultimately by widening the gap between those at the top of the hierarchy and those at the bottom. The ability to rebuild a house, for example, had to do with the many forms of capital a resident needed to possess and, to that extent, the conflictual reception of the restoration project was not restricted to one between the residents and the state, but involved also disputes between those socially disadvantaged people who could not renovate and fix their houses and those who were able to afford and, most importantly, to understand and make sense, so to speak, *ideologically* – in a certain Althusserian sense – of the restoration program.

What is more, the distinction between the repressed and the seduced does not involve, on the one hand, house owners and on the other hand, tenants who are unable to buy or afford a property. Rather the repressed/seduced social polarization has to do precisely with the distinction between those who can use and make something of the town in a sophisticated way, understanding its history, finding out about the buildings and their architectural style, taking pictures of the buildings, visiting museums, a type of elite that keeps relentlessly moving, transcending spatial barriers and all the rest of the residents who are, however unwittingly, stuck in their place, and cannot see how the ‘museumization’ of the town may deliver a better deal for their local immobility. The present study, therefore, is not meant to ‘point to’ a certain group of people, professions or social classes that live in Rethemnos, which from now on will be referred to as the ‘repressed’ or the ‘seduced’ (Bauman, 1987). As mentioned above, the division is primarily considered as a social territory, a space defined on the basis of some broader social characteristics that have, above all, to do with the place these people occupy with respect to the changing manner in which the restoration project is perceived, negotiated and understood and with respect to the role played by the same project in reinvigorating a full-blown consumer society. I shall be arguing that as the better-off had the right to enjoy the fruits of consumption and the goods offered by the market promotion of the Old Town and appreciate it as a space of historical importance and aesthetic beauty, constituting to a certain extent the people Bauman

(1987) describes as the seduced, the *kathelotic* (from the Greek *kathilonen*, doomed to immobility) status of the rest of the residents, may explain the more recent trend toward increasing state intervention, as these people are recently unable or unwilling to appreciate the restoration project and the concomitant fruits that derive from the latter's deep involvement in the ongoing identification problematizations that have come to blossom by way of consumption.

Deconstructing Mediterraneanist conceptions of the Old Town necessitates, therefore, a better grasp of consumption, which is a multifaceted and multidimensional practice that requires careful, thoughtful and considered theorization and examination. A radical inversion of the understanding and meaning of use-value as pure, neutral and natural (Baudrillard, 1975, 1981; Derrida 1994) is necessary, if one is to grapple with its richness and complexity. Capitalism does not simply signal the transition from one form of value (use-value), to another form (economic exchange-value), but requires, critically, a reconsideration of the meaning of the concept of value itself, to the extent that utility is as rational and commensurable as exchange-value is.

Rethemnos, however, has been theorized in terms of a strict historical clash between a socially based understanding of history (the fact that the residents' imaginary was not compatible and did not want to reckon with the Statist ideology promoted by a monumental and bureaucratic conception of time) and the nation-state ideology (the fact that the Greek state demanded that the identity of the town should be associated in a linear way with its glorious Venetian past expressed today through the need to conserving the Venetian monuments) that ignores the social dynamics of place (Herzfeld, 1991). Such theorizations, however valuable and useful, are nonetheless susceptible to criticism, especially to the extent that they miss the richness and complexity of social spaces and the effective power of spacing, remaining enmeshed in binary oppositions, contradictory and digestive theorizations of difference, failing, in short, to appreciate the motionless trips and voyages in place and the double movements of affirmative deconstruction (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 1988; Derrida, 1981; Doel, 1999). I shall return to these complex theoretical issues in subsequent chapters.

For the moment what is still required to take things further is to start mapping the affirmative, responsible and generic multiple subject, amidst the abovementioned transformations, stressing the need to take up on the importance of the ethics and event of Rethemnos by way of Badiou's (2005) *Being and Event*. These events, however, are not anthropocentric episodes but involve a-signifying, a-subjectifying and a-categorizing practices that are pertinent to the driftwork of a generic multiple and the truth procedure of an undecidable other. For an affirmative and responsible subject to be mapped, the individual of honour, sacrifice, poetics and shame must be, effectively, abandoned or swept away. En route from deconstruction and schizoanalysis to Badiou's glorious reconciling of continental philosophy and mathematics, the Rethemniot subject will be no longer poetic or honourific but will obey the ontological language of set theory taken up by the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the matheme of the indiscernible that interrupt the infinite regression of being due to the foundational ability of the event to genuinely proceed by means of errancy, chaos, osmosis and the void.

Chapters and Subsections

The thesis is divided in four parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1 and 2) opens up the problem of the Old Town offering, both a general introduction to Rethemnos and a more detailed and analytic account of the methodological and philosophical background with respect to the event. Chapter 1 offers some glimpses into the Old Town problem and portrays the dynamics of a place through a brief historical sketch. Chapter 2 is both methodological and theoretical and involves a general reading of the methodology setting out to explain why a theory of the event was selected and how it is used. Specifically, it explains the role of what I have termed the 'ethnography of the event', its underlining theory and philosophy and the manner in which the empirical findings are brought to bear upon the proposed theory. I proceed, accordingly, by offering a critique of traditional ethnography, which paves the way for Badiou's theorization of the event, introducing the mathematical formulas of set theory, and stipulating a certain ethics of the event. Meanwhile, I give details on my research fieldwork and sampling of the files of the Archaeology Service and the restoration data, which I thought of as a useful 'operationalization' of the division between the repressed and the seduced, with respect to the changing built environment of Rethemnos and the changing manner in which the restoration project is heretofore conceived.

Understanding and making sense of the social polarization between the repressed and the seduced through the alterations and restorations of the town's houses, as was already argued, is not an exegetical or foundational sociological formula but serves as a means to an end, that is, as an attempt to explicate how the Old Town problem unfolds and resonates with respect to the housing condition of the town.

Part 2 (Chapters 3 and 4) opens up the conceptual space for a deconstruction of Mediterraneanist identities. Chapter 3 argues that Mediterraneanist writings which set out to study Mediterranean societies appropriate difference using a naïve conception of space. Geography, however, is not about representation but, on the contrary, “concerns *real-ization* and not reality itself” (Doel, 1999: 121). Mediterraneanist writings, I argue, are susceptible to criticism because they are tied, first, to a Statist philosophy and geographical determinism of a transparent community, as in the ‘shame-and-honour’ model (Peristiany, 1962, 1965; 1968; Davis, 1977; Campbell, 1964; Friedl, 1962; du Boulay, 1974; Gilmore, 1987); second, because they obey dialectical machinations in coming to terms with the Other; and third, because they reduce difference to a sublated third term, whether in the form of the ‘friends of the heart’ or in the form of the ‘poetics of womanhood’ (Herzfeld, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1991; Papataxiarchis, 1990, 2005; Papataxiarchis and Loizos, 1991; Dubisch, 1986, 1995). Hence, Chapter 4 opens up Papataxiarchis’ (1991) notion of the ‘friends of the heart’ to Derrida’s (1992) non-reciprocal and non-economic counterfeit and submits the subject formation first, to Lacan’s theorization of the symbolic, and subsequently, to the schizoanalytic reflections of the Body without Organs and becoming-woman as dissected and disseminated by the Deleuzoguattarian nomadic and war-machines. Ultimately, such a theorization will pave the way for a reconceptualization of gender beyond the negativity and nihilism advanced by the domestication of women and the ‘poetics of womanhood’ (Dubisch, 1995).

Part 3 (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) opens up the conceptual space for a similar deconstruction of Mediterraneanist spatialities. Chapter 5 offers a radically different account of the notion of ‘parasitism’ coined by Tsoucalas (1977), and sets in motion the account of ‘capitalism without capitalists’ of Vergopoulos (1975), by offering, meanwhile a rigorous reconsideration of Leontidou’s model of ‘spontaneity’, and by opening up political-economic theories of space and production – like Harvey’s

(1990) 'time-space compression' and Herzfeld's (1991) 'nostalgia of place' – to the theoretical practices that pertain to the excessive thought of a theory of the consumer society. Chapter 6 submits the experience of the geography of Rethemnos to poststructuralist ideas of space and specifically to *origami* – (the Japanese word for folding paper) – that is, the geophilosophy developed by way of Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis, in order finally, to start to address in Chapter 7, a fuller appreciation of the systemic role of consumption taken up by Baudrillard's and Bauman's theories.

Part 4 (Chapters 8 and 9) brings the abovementioned theorizations to bear upon the *event* of Rethemnos, exploring the extent to which the shifting attitude of the Rethemniots toward the Greek state can be assigned to a broader socio-economic restructuring, namely the emancipation of capital from labour and the spatialization of the repressed/seduced division that are both features/elements that are pertinent to or can further explain the meaning of a full-blown consumer society. I will be arguing that the shifting attitude of the residents toward the Greek state necessitates a reconceptualization of the Mediterranean town, which highlights a historico-materialist transition which can be described as putative postmodern. Chapter 9, finally, explains and demonstrates how the Rethemniot subject is deformed and deconstructed through a three-fold conception of a *generic* and *true* difference and otherness (affirmative/responsibility; beyond servility and egoism; ambivalence and indiscernible undecidability) drawing on Badiou's mathematical ontology of set theory, and particularly, on the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the matheme of the non-being of the indiscernible, setting out to undo the certainty, unity and stability of the Mediterraneanist imaginary.

This is not the end of the story, of course, not least because poststructuralist philosophy and postmodern sociology insist on a perpetual regret, postponement and procrastination of any kind of dialectical resolution of difference. Space, place and the subject are irresistibly and irreducibly differential. I do not mean by this that all writings are meant to produce exotic images, appropriating difference according to their own digestive, one-dimensional and striated logic. On the contrary, my task is to problematize, complicate, potentialize and actualize certain strategies of writing difference in a manner that will take flight from all monstrosities of Mediterraneanist

thought that accommodate and situate difference on the plane of constancy, integrity and rigidity. The present thesis, therefore, is a means in order to draw a fuller picture of the Mediterranean region focusing on Rethemnos, which, without being necessarily true or false, will transform the uneven relationship between the one who represents and the one who is represented. Yet to confuse, complicate and problematize such a relationship, ascribing to it a meaning that would not erase, erode, annihilate or eradicate difference is neither easy nor uncontestable. It is, precisely this challenge opened up by poststructuralism and postmodernity, and the conceptualizations and symptoms of Derrida, Deleuze, Guattari, Badiou, Baudrillard and Bauman that makes Rethemnos such an interesting task. When all is said and done, I would only hope that in the following pages, the encounters I had with the above symptoms of difference do justice to their arguments grasping the intersecting mobilities of subject formation, social spacing and their spatial configuration in the Mediterranean town of Rethemnos in a manner which is simply *worthy*, in a certain sense that probably only Nietzsche has been able to fully appreciate.

PART ONE: THE OLD TOWN PROBLEM

CHAPTER ONE: THE OLD PROBLEM

1.1 Introduction

Since Rethemnos was declared a 'scheduled monument' in 1967, many properties have been beautifully reconstructed and restored, while a considerable number of other houses have been left unconverted; the latter forming a divided urban landscape that when seen in comparison to the newly constructed parts of the town constitutes but a striking paradox of a city image that seems to have little to do with the overall picture of the entire Rethemnos. My suggestion is that the ability to restore a house is not solely a problem lying with the local or embedded rebellious behaviour of the Rethemniots in their attempt to refuse to adjust to the restoration imperatives, but concerns, above all, a symptom of a new social division in the wake of a fully-fledged consumer society. Whilst it is true that Rethemnos has long been based on tourism, the recent massive touristification and commodification of almost everything in town, has produced an uneven geographical landscape that not only divided, exacerbated and intensified some already existing spatial inequalities, but also generated novel forms of inequity. As one of the residents of the Old Town bitterly stated in a local newspaper:

"If this process [of touristification] is going to be continued then why not 'lock' the town behind bars and open it only when the tourists are around" (RETHEMNIOTIKA NEA, 1984, pg11).

Exploring the extent to which the monumentalization of the Old Town is immanent to and a result of the antitheses and contradictions of the consumer society is useful in making sense of the reasons according to which, the residents' attitude toward the Greek State has radically changed over time. The reversal and radically different reception of the restoration project, unexpectedly expressed through and marked by the transition from a constant anti-interventionist period to a demand for increasing state intervention, illustrates the intensification of the unequal social relations and uneven geographical structures triggered by a rapid yet inevitable monumentalization and consummation of the geohistory of the Old Town.

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985: 140) have long ago argued, by way of the relatively autonomous role of the state, that "Plurality is not the phenomenon to be

explained but the starting point of analysis". Interestingly though such a formulation may equally be applied to the various superimposed identifications that I have come to notice in Rethemnos: between the Rethemniot identity, the Greek identity, the Mediterranean identity and the Greek state. The essence of such conceptualization is helpful in understanding not only the contested meaning of the identity-building process in Rethemnos, which is not easily assignable to any person or individual, but the role of the Greek state as well, which seems to be all pervasive with respect to Greek social life, and which tends to be in conflict with the more informal and pragmatic aspects of the Greek lifeworld.

For Herzfeld (1982, 1987), however, the way the Greek state operates seems to be totally rejected by the Greeks from the very beginning, that is, from the time the Greek nation-state was formally established in 1821. Yet, the tenor of the totality of Greek scholarly writing, as much as that of lay/popular travel writing, has invariably been about whether Greece had anything to do with the West, and whether it were possible for the Greeks to leave aside, forget or even escape the thrust of the 'Ottoman/Oriental' tradition that for almost 400 years ruled over the Balkans, a part of which the modern Greek nation-state machine had come to occupy by the 19th century. The Oriental influence and the role it played in harnessing anew and patching together the infinite threads of Greek identity was thus always a matter of dispute, as its persistent role, in both historical and cultural/hegemonic terms, could not easily be deflected sapping what was thought to be some unquestionable nationalist ideals (the Greek identity continuity throughout the centuries). For to be a Greek had, above all else, to do with a certain ambivalence in terms of what it meant to be a 'European', in a very peculiar though remarkable manner that only a deconstructive intuition might comprehend, an intuition of the kind advanced by Derrida (1995) in the *Khora*, that is, that Platonic space of *Timaeus* which "oscillates between two types of oscillation: the double exclusion (*neither/nor*) and the participation (*both this and that*)" (Derrida, 1995: 91) – or by the same token the *liminal geography* that is the place of the "*Limes*: mark, march, margin" (Derrida, 1981: 16).

Likewise, Bruno Latour (2005) in his various 'actor network' analyses proposed that a more truthful interpretation of sociology would be that of following the various actors in their 'physical' so to speak environment rather than interpreting or explaining their

actions. Following the actors maybe rather closer to the original meaning of the social (Latour, 2005: 6). Boggling down and pitching any identity formation (among the Greek, the Mediterranean and the Rethemniot) runs aground, therefore, on the various uncertainties with which Latour (2005: 28) associates any 'group formation'. Identity, therefore, should be made, especially if by identity one understands, as I do, something that is in a constant state of creation and construction.

Greek identification processes do not have to oppose Mediterranean identities or Cretan identities; the thread that ties together these permutations should be but "a movement in need of continuation" (Latour, 2005: 37). This is why I have chosen to focus on the event rather the structure or the dimension of the social. For any "action should remain a surprise, a mediation, an event" (Latour, 2005: 45), like Derrida's (1992) *counterfeit money*. I will have the opportunity to delve into these weighty issues in subsequent chapters, whence I venture to work out how Badiou's (2005) *Being and Event* might offer a substantially useful theorization in coming to terms with how the various aspects of identity among the stratified layers of the 'Greek', the 'Mediterranean' and the 'Cretan/Rethemniot' can be reconciled or eloquently brought to bear upon each other. Accordingly, the question shall not be which one of these traits is dominant, but rather how the infinite process and innumerable folds of any identification process bounces ideas off any established identity and redraws new lines of flight – not *one at a time* but *all at once*, that is, simultaneously and yet without denying the specificity and historicity of each of them. As the anthropologist David Gilmore observed almost 20 years ago, the "'Mediterranean' implies much more than geography" (Gilmore, 1982: 177) and thus it would be problematic to have the ambition to define once and for all whether the 'Greek' is an equivalent of the 'Mediterranean', and/or the 'Rethemniot' - in terms of hierarchy (which identity is stronger) or priority (which identity comes first).

It is nonetheless true that the Greek statehood, as Herzfeld (1982) argued, has been more than keen to represent the Greek people as heirs to the Hellenist culture, which, more often than not, is associated with the heritage and achievements of ancient Greece. On the other hand, the ethnographic tradition that set out to narrate the history of modern Greece has mostly focused on small and isolated communities – as we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4 – which arguably exhibit how modern Greece maintains

a conflictual and contested relationship with its past. Being Greek, therefore, as Herzfeld (1986: 218) would put it, was always about elaborating on conflictual images of “the two faces of Greek *national* identity that conform to the models of public pride and private intimacy”. Yet that sort of negotiation does not seem to be easily resolved, neither in practical nor in theoretical terms, inasmuch as it remains profoundly aporetic, undecidable and ambivalent. “When talking to a foreigner, for example, a Greek may well adopt a Hellenic pose [on the other hand] the Romeic model [acknowledges] the importance of Turkish and other non-Western influences on Greek culture” (Herzfeld, 1986: 218).

Now, while I would be to some extent sympathetic with the overall tone of such an intuition, I would also like to pursue the argument of the dualistic nature of Greek identity beyond Herzfeld’s prescriptive prerogative briefly described above. It is in a similar tone, however, that Herzfeld (1985: 4) has already argued that “Glendi’s [a pseudonym for the village he conducted a major ethnographic study in Crete] relationship to the rest of Crete resembles that of the island as a whole to the Greek nation-state”. As he put it, with reference to this unsolved differentiation of Greek identity, but also by means of the small provincial villages where he lived whilst studying the Greek culture, “The tension between national and political identity forms a dominant theme [...]; if authoritarian discourse is characterized by such totalizing equivalences as nation and state, or religion and church (cf. Goldschlagel 1982: 13-16), then by the same token the Glendiot response is a constant, irreverent deconstruction of that discourse” (Herzfeld, 1985: 23). And as he also suggested in another of his studies (cf. Herzfeld, 1986), women in Greece can be seen as an equivalent of, or as having the role occupied by the ‘Romeic model’ in interpreting Greek society as whole; that is, as the mode of thought that takes woman to be subversive, submissive but also seductive, irradiating, however, a certain delicate and graceful cunning. In all instances, the negotiation and constantly reinstated slippage of any solid identity-building process – among the various levels of correspondence of the ‘Greek’, the ‘Cretan/Rethemniot’ and the ‘Mediterranean’ identities – has been led astray and overshadowed. It is for this reason that, in subsequent chapters, I shall focus not only on Deleuze’s (1994) lines of flight, but also on the mathematical infinity that Badiou’s (2005) analysis lavishly offers.

For now, however, a brief historical account of the Old Town is offered, which focuses chiefly on the Venetian period, though it does not comprise a detailed historical analysis opening up instead the history of the town to a deterritorialized '*point of view*' ('deterritorializations' and 'points' do not go together and this is why the italics) in order to help us understand how Rethemnos' identity was historically construed. To explore and explain the extent to which the number of interventions and improvements of the properties of the Old Town is a useful illustration of the general ability of the residents to afford, appreciate, and appropriate the multifaceted and much-contested restoration program, is one of the tasks of the present thesis. Though house-tenancy and occupation are not necessarily markers of class-belonging, they can be still taken to constitute a trace of socio-cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984) which explicates the grounds on which the suspicion of the residents with respect to the monumentalization process resides and the way in which the city's identity has been radically transformed by recourse to the restoration project. The improvements, alterations and restorations of the properties stand, in other words, for an equivalent, not only of class position/cleavage, but above all, of the general ability of the residents in economic, social and cultural terms to accept, participate and support whole-heartedly the coveted and seductive game of tourism, and consumption.

The monumentalization of the Old Town has turned the historic centre of the town into a vast playground at the disposal of the seduced. Whilst I am not taking, on the one hand, the Old Town's rich residents as necessarily the seduced and, on the other hand, the poor residents as the repressed, the spatial formation of this split, that is, the difference between the houses that have been restored and eventually turned into hotels, tourist-shops, bars and restaurants and the properties that have not been fully restored and refurbished, points in the direction of the euphemistic postmodern divide between the 'repressed' and the 'seduced'. Such a socio-spatial division is neither a totally localizable break in space that divides, categorizes and distributes differences, constituting a transcendental exegetical scheme of foundational origin, nor a programmatic manifesto of a novel approach to Mediterranean studies. Yet as we shall see in Chapter 7, it resonates with the conceptualization of the systemic nature of consumption, the sociogenesis of consumerism, the heteronomy of the producers, and the reversibility of symbolic exchange. Despite the fact, therefore, that the repressed/seduced division, as a theoretical category, neither homologically represents

nor hermetically coincides with matches the socio-spatial polarization generated and sustained by the restoration project, it is still a useful theoretical-practice that allows a fruitful experimentation with urban problems on the face of a rapidly changing reality that transforms the city in an unprecedented manner.

Much of Mediterraneanist rhetoric conceives of space and place naturally and matter-of-factly, that is in a manner which accentuates the power and ability of place to unprecedented heights conceiving of it as an authentic expression of local difference. Such a strategy, however, is enclosed within the anachronism and structural nostalgia of the metaphysics of presence, the impoverished ontologies of space and the idealized periodization and historization of the Venetian past. Herzfeld's (1991) study of Rethemnos is hugely implicated and coincidental with such metaphysical conceptions that imputed to Mediterraneanist thinking the need to conceiving of place as immune and innately pure – something however that calls for rigorous reconsideration. It is time to start reading the Old Town neither as point, nor as a mark of Mediterranean difference and uniqueness, nor as limit but above all, as a doubly-folded event that oscillates between the repressed/seduced division and the ethnography of the event. Rethemnos is neither a clash between social and monumental history, nor a parasitic or spontaneous fix that absorbs or irradiates some kind of intact Mediterranean authenticity or innocence, for the difference space makes does not involve the uniqueness and precariousness of a place which is violently taken over by an exterritorial agent. Nor is difference an extreme limit through which place is internalized by some kind of poetic ability, which in turn defends in public the excellence and performance of a deeply rooted cultural embeddedness executed in some kind of rhetorical, verbal or stylistic manner. The poetic Rethemnos is unbecoming and ill-mannered, as we shall see in Chapter 4, simply because it insists on a good and authentic side of place, which gets violently distorted or exploited by mass tourism.

The task of deconstruction by contrast, is to loosen and break out of such an impoverished ontology and fetishism of space, place and difference in accord with the spatial art of origami and the systemic nature, hyperteleia and suppletion of the consumer society (Clarke and Doel, 1994). These issues are further taken up in subsequent chapters, yet for the time let me unpack what the 'Old Town problem'

stands for and why the town's incomplete and contested identity should not be taken as a deviation or an exception of a solidly produced and historically durable identity, but as a way of being or a way of making sense of the identification process, which in the wake of consumerism is embroiled in a turmoil that cast its long shadow and leaves a heavy imprint on the town's identity. The exposition below is unavoidably descriptive and rather empirical, but is useful in that it lays the groundwork for Chapter 2, which tries to integrate methodologically, so to speak, the Old Town problem with the radical reconceptualization advanced by the 'ethnography of the event'.

1.2 The Problem

Rethemnos is a small coastal town in Crete, which has recently faced the prospect of considerable growth in terms of population and economic development. Rethemnos, in particular is not an industrial town but it is largely based on tourism, a statement that holds true for most islands of Greece. Yet the Old Town part of Rethemnos, a beautiful Venetian spatial configuration which as Herzfeld (1991: 34) admits is one of the best-preserved Venetian monuments outside Italy, has not been always dependent on tourism. It is only after the restoration projection was put forward that tourism became of major importance and its potentials was fully exploited and acknowledged. And although many of the Venetian buildings are in need of restoration and reconstruction, a process which has already started some 40 years ago, the town still preserves many of its geographical and architectural characteristics from the 17th century (Fig. 1).



Το Ρέθυμνο σε εγχώριο σχέδιο του 17ου αιώνα. Στο εγχώριο σχέδιο η πόλη φαίνεται να είναι πολύ διαφορετική από την σημερινή, με πολλά κτίρια να έχουν καταστραφεί (FEDERICO, 30 χρόνια μετά τον πόλεμο 1982).

Σήμερα ο παλιός φάρακας της Αγοράς της πόλης, όπως τον έχουν βρει οι κάτοικοι, με τους κτίσις που έχουν καταστραφεί (FEDERICO, 30 χρόνια μετά τον πόλεμο 1982).

Figure 1: Venetian Rethemnos on canvass (Dimakopoulos, 1977: ι)

The Venetian town constitutes an important part of the geohistory of Rethemnos, which besides the Old Town includes a recently formed and continually developing New Town that keeps expanding from Perivolia, Panormo, Skaleta and Misiria in the East all the way to Mastaba, Kallithea, and Panorama in the West. All these areas of Rethemnos constitute distinct yet interrelated places with their own particular history and geography, but the Old Town is still dominant amidst such a social cartography of people, histories and places, and has played a key role in the recent economic development and restructuring of Rethemnos. And although tourism became the chief economic activity over the last 40 years, the restoration of the Old Town was already from the very beginning a hotly contested issue among the residents. The original Old Town Houses' Owners Association (OTHOA), formed in the 1970s, has characteristically opposed and fought against the restoration project and the fact that the Venetian properties should be reconstructed under the law of the 'scheduled monument'. The revival of the residents' Association (AROOT) however, under a new leader, and in a totally and radically new direction in the 1990s, seeking this time increasing state intervention and protection, is not only a remarkable change in the manner in which the identity of the town is currently seen and negotiated but marks a displacement in society and space that necessitates a reconceptualization of the Mediterranean town and a retheorization of the Old Town problem.

To demonstrate and explain how and why the residents changed their attitude in terms of the restoration project from ardent opponents of the restoration project of which they thought to be an inexplicable ordeal, to constant supporters of the need to preserve the monumental and historical significance of the town, is an issue that deserves closer scrutiny. The question I want to address is whether this change is somehow related to the recent development of the consumer society and the changing experience and identity formation of the Mediterranean subject; and whether it is still plausible to appeal or assign to such transformations the notions of hospitality, friendship, poetic purity, spontaneity and creativity that are dominant in Mediterraneanist imaginations or the time has come to elaborate on certain differential concepts that will most likely stem from conceptions of difference without

name, identity or negation. Building on such a differential theory of the subject which is singular and territorialized but at the same time multiple and deterritorialized, undecidable and uninsurable, moral but infinite if not universal too, will allow to think the Old Town problem through an understanding of the cultural logic of late capitalism (Jameson, 1984), the consumer society (Baudrillard, 1996), and the division between the seduced and the repressed (Bauman, 1987). Such a theory is also vital, in accomplishing a more perceptive appreciation of the ceaseless deformation and reformation of the Old Town and the far-reaching consequences and implications the restoration project has for the undecidable experience and multiplicity of the Rethemniot subject. What I am going to argue in the following chapters thus is that Rethemnos is indicative of such strategies of writing difference regarding our understandings of space and identity that emanate by virtue of the discourses of poststructuralism.

The ability to restore a Venetian property can be taken to reflect the social position of the residents within a social context that is highly determined by the relations and structures of consumption which are, by and large, consonant with a cultural hierarchy surrendered to the irresistibly seductive forces and contradictions of the market. For consumption, as we will see in Chapter 7, is about a mode of domination and a social hierarchy that presides over contemporary societies, far beyond any logic that insists on taking it as a mere cloth or a superficial accessory of capitalism that manipulates and produces a variety of 'false' needs (cf. Marcuse, 1964). The monumentalization of the town, that is, the fact that the Greek state demanded the restoration and preservation of all Venetian properties according to specific guiding rules and designing standards, while resulting on the one hand, in the beautiful restoration of many of these buildings, on the other hand, has produced a deformed and degenerated urban landscape of properties occupied by tenants who were unable, unwilling or simply unaware of the need to restore their houses. The number, use and geographical distribution of the restorations completed throughout a period of almost 40 years constitute a useful, even if schematic and improvised feature, of the emerging contested consumer geography of a city, which is currently succumbed to the predominance of aesthetic spacing. The revival of AROOT in the 1990s founded this time on the grounds of a radically different conception of the state signals, neither a temporal break (monumental versus social history) nor a strict spatial polarization


between the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos, but mostly the becoming-possible and medium through which the repressed and the seduced are opposed in the town. Conceptualizing the Old Town as a consequence of the postmodern divide between the repressed and the seduced tends to reconsider, therefore, not only the bureaucratic and archaeological restrictions of monumental history, but forges a common conceptual thread that runs from the event of Rethemnos to the highly shifting socio-economic context of capitalism. As time and again the monumentalization of the town produced an uneven urban landscape of minimum practical use for its inhabitants, a fuller understanding of the processes and the manner in which space and identity unfold and are mutually determined, becomes more urgent than ever. Of these processes, it is mostly the social spaces of the Old Town which constantly depend on and are hugely affected by tourism, consumption and the promotion of the place's history in the tourist market, that make the restoration project a profound and visible sign of the changing experience of space, place and the subject at the dawn of the consumer society.

I discuss below Rethemnos' history¹, and its current spatial organization in a way which is simplified to a considerable extent. Such an exposition neither provides a complete historical account nor analyzes some major historical events in much detail as it is restricted instead to some key historical episodes that largely refer to the Venetian period. Yet despite its partial and incomplete character, comprising only a caricature of the image of the city from the beginning of the Venetian domination to the town's surrender to the Ottomans, such a periodization is still useful in that it helps to make sense of the present situation and spatial structure of modern Rethemnos and in that it sheds light on some of the reasons behind the inchoate and yet much contested nature of the monumentalization of the town.

Rethemnos, from the Greek *reithron* + *idor* (flat stone + water), is the third largest town of Crete, located at the northwestern part of the island, between the other two

¹ This brief historical introduction is based on Dimakopoulos, I., E. (2001) *Rethemnos Houses: A Contribution to the Study of the Renaissance Architecture of Crete in 16th- 17th*. Athens: TAP, 1st ed. 1977 (in Greek); Troulis, M. (1998) *Rethemnos, History, Contemporary Life*. Athens: Mitos (in Greek); Ksanthoudidi, St. (1939) *The Venetian Domination in Crete and the Struggles of Cretans against the Venetians*. Athens (in Greek); Prevelakis, P. (1980) *Chronicle of a Polity*. Athens: Estia, 1st ed. 1938 (in Greek); Moutsopoulos, N. and G. D. Zervas (1973) *The Old Town of Rethemnos*. Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (in Greek).

major towns of Crete, Herakleion and Chania. Rethemnos' climate, like the rest of Crete, is hot and dry, and a considerable shortage of water supply was already evident in the town especially throughout the Venetian period. *Rittimna* has existed since the Mycenaean period, without necessarily constituting an important settlement at the time whilst as legend has it, the island of Crete was originally inhabited by a few families of Byzantine origin – though whether Venetian Rethemnos was constructed on what was the site of ancient Rittimna is still a matter of dispute. The town, however, irradiates even until the present days, a considerable degree of continuity in terms of its spatial structure, streets and building blocks (Fig. 2). In 1206, Rethemnos was taken over by Enrico Pescatore's navy, a Genovese leader who was at the time fighting against Venice, although the Venetians finally won the battle against Pescatore's navy, managing to occupy Rethemnos. The period of the Venetian dominance was marked by a series of conflicts and struggles between the residents and the Venetians to be extended across the whole of Crete. An on-going period of tensions and resistance against the invaders began and although many revolts ended in bloodshed, and were fiercely and violently paused, the antagonistic spirit of the Rethemniots remained inexhaustible. Some of the most characteristic and notorious, in terms of their scale and the sorrow, calamity and cruelty they caused, were the revolt of the family of Agiostefaniton in 1211, followed in 1217, by the revolt of the families of Skordilidon and Melissinon and in 1261, by the revolt of the family of Chortatzidon (Ksanthoudidi, 1939). Conflicts occurred, however, not only between the Venetians and the Cretans but also between the Venetians of Crete and the people of Venice, one of the most famous of which took place in 1363, sadly to be ended, nevertheless with the revolt of St. Titos, an endo-Venetian clash between colony and metropolis (Dimakopoulos, 1977).



Κατά την περίοδο της Βενετικής κυριαρχίας, η πόλη του Ρεθύμνου αναπτύχθηκε ως σημαντικό εμπορικό κέντρο, με την πόλη να αποτελεί το βασικό λιμάνι της Κρήτης. Η πόλη του Ρεθύμνου αναπτύχθηκε ως σημαντικό εμπορικό κέντρο, με την πόλη να αποτελεί το βασικό λιμάνι της Κρήτης.



Figure 2: Contemporary street plan of Rethemnos (Dimakopoulos, 1977: 326)

From 1367 onward Rethemniots and Venetians entered into a period of almost three hundred years of peaceful coexistence, although the underlying tensions never really stopped. Interestingly, some areas of Crete scarcely, if ever, saw any Venetian presence, with Sfakia to the south of Chania being one such remarkable exception refusing to surrender to any of Crete's conquerors. Conflicts and struggles emerged also between the peasantry and the Venetian-Rethemniot higher social ranks. In the 1571 uprising, which was the first Ottoman attempt to take over the town, the peasants instead of protecting the town from Oulouts Ali's attack, robbed the abandoned houses of the aristocrats. It is worth mentioning, however, that the original conflicts between the Venetians and the Rethemniots had nothing to do with the cruel Ottoman invasion of 1645, which followed Oulouts Ali's conquest during which many Rethemniots were killed and the town was completely destroyed. After the Ottoman invasion of 1645, the higher ranks of the Venetocretans gradually lost their strength and power, while a new middle class emerged owing its existence to the rapid development of commerce and a significant increase in population. Fewer and fewer conflicts were also reported between the Venetian Catholic and the Cretan

Orthodox populations, not only because the visible foe was now the Ottomans but, above all, because the Cretans of Venetian background were eventually outnumbered by the Cretan Orthodox population. By 1453, nonetheless, when the Ottomans invaded Istanbul (Constantinople's 'fall', in the Greek nationalist discourse) the Greek orthodox element was already dominant in Rethemnos.

The need, accordingly, to protect the town was urgent and thus it comes as no surprise that on the Vigla Hill of Rethemnos, the foundation stone of a castle was laid, into which all residents had to move. In 1588, the impressive Fortezza was finally built making the authorities expressly proud, despite the fact that most of the inhabitants unexpectedly refused to abandon their properties and move in the castle, with the exception of two or three families. In desperation, the Venetian authorities of Rethemnos kept this a secret from the metropolis of Venice, but the fact remained that the Fortezza castle was a great disappointment, though remarkable in terms of its architecture and design, representing, above all, a significant failure in persuading people to relocate to a place that would considerably restrict and control their lives, even if it was about offering a safer predicament.

Geographically speaking, the Old Town's buildings and overall designing tone have all kept the original geographical structure, which owes much to the unexpected, and more often than not unappreciated by many historians, respect the Ottomans showed to the Venetian architecture. The three well-known commercial streets of the town, the street of Arkadiou, the street of Ethnikis Antistaseos and the street of Melissinou have long been important and famous, leading to the town centre known as *Castel Vecchio*. During the 15th century, when most urban formations of Crete were undergoing expansive development, Castel Vecchio expanded toward the southeastern part of the coast overcoming its initial boundaries. In the eastern part of the town, where the remains of the *Kara Mousa Pasa* mosque lie, an elementary defensive position stood, known by the name of *St. Varvara* or "Gate of Sand" (*Porta tis Ammou*) (Dimakopoulos, 2001: 70), constituting the eastern entrance of the town – to be carelessly destroyed, however, during the short Russian domination of 1900, soon after the Ottomans abandoned Rethemnos. A similar construction known as *St. Veneranda* that was destroyed earlier in the 17th century, used to stand at the south of the town. Today it is only the Guoro Door (Fig. 4 and 5) that survives, named after the

Rector (Rettore) Giacomo Guoro who designed and built the gate, and unlike the two previous entrances, it still appears solid and stable, located in the beginning of the Street of Ethnikis Antistaseos (Dimakopoulos, 2001). Overall, the roads and streets of the Old Town constitute a fairly complex urban morphology with irregularly sized streets cutting acanionically across each other (Fig. 3), something which holds particularly true for the Eastern part of the town.



Tò Ρέθυμνον, ὡς ἦν 1625. Plana τοῦ Ζορζι Κορνιέρ (Il Regno di Candia). Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana.

Figure 3: Venetian Map of Rethymnos Town (Dimakopoulos, 1977: 326)

By contrast, the western part of the town irradiates a rationally organized space of regular squares. Apart from the three important streets above, a number of other constructions deserve to be mentioned. The building of Lozza, located in the area of Castel Vecchio, was the place where the noble Venetians gathered, and was constructed in the 16th century. It proudly stands now at the corner of the streets of Ethnikis Antistaseos and Palaiologou, housing the 28th Inspectorate of Byzantine and Postbyzantine Antiquities. At about the same time as Loggia was built a Venetian sun-clock-tower was also built, only to be destroyed immediately after the Second World War. Most of the Venetian neighborhoods are currently known, and historians believe that they are in a position to locate their exact position in the town. The Castel neighborhood, we are told, is located close to the Castel Vecchio, whilst the *Agias Sofias* neighborhood is adjacent to the area where the Sohora mosque lies. In addition,

the *Agiou Lazarou* neighborhood is the place where the Greek Orthodox Church (*Mikri Panagia*) stands, whereas the area called *Mantraki* is believed to be located near the old Venetian Porto. Finally, the area known as *Ouzoul Sokak* (*Makri Steno*) is today the area around the Street of Nikiforu Foka.



Figure 4: The Guoro Door top left (Dimakopoulos, 1977: 333)

Figure 5: The Guoro Door as it currently stands on the right (picture taken by the author)

In 1967 Rethemnos' Old Town was declared a 'scheduled monument' and in order to be protected a complicated set of laws was produced, such as the *Ministerial Decision* ΦΕΚ [606B/3.10.67] and the more recent corrective ΦΕΚ [700B/30.8.91]. These laws concerned almost the entire Old Town, from Fortezza, to the Street Dimakopoulou, to the Street Ethnarhou Makariou, and to the Street Venizelou. A variety of other regulations and bills have been also promoted. *Presidential Decree* 1.12.75 specified the conditions and limitations of construction [ΦΕΚ 36Δ/31.1.1976], whilst *Presidential Decree* 19.10.78 designated Rethemnos a 'traditional settlement' [ΦΕΚ 594Δ/13.11.78]. *Presidential Decree* 10.11.78 added further prohibitions and 'conditions of construction' [ΦΕΚ 634Δ/1.12.78], whilst *Presidential Decree* 25.10.84 concerned the 'Modification of the Old Town zone plan and free spaces, yards and streets' [ΦΕΚ 30Δ/14.2.85]. Two more subsidiary laws, K.N. 5351/32 about the 'Buildings built before 1830' and N. 1469/50 concerned with the 'Buildings

built after 1830', were also introduced in order to complete the canonistic set of bills under the jurisdiction of which the Venetian and Ottoman monuments should be reconstructed. In terms of its population, the Old Town in 1973 numbered 5,133 residents, comprising 1,329 families and 423 people living on their own. 1,034 properties were owned at the time by Old Town residents, whilst 647 were rented properties. Most of the residents were of low economic and educational background (Moutsopoulos and Zervas, 1973: 117–120). In 1991, the Old Town numbered 7,150 residents, whilst in 1998 the area reportedly numbered 2,100 houses. At present, Rethemnos, the newly constructed parts included, numbers almost 35,000 people. In 1998 (Table 1) 863 properties were rented or privately owned, 127 were reported empty, 342 were made for general commerce, 63 were jewelry shops, 96 tourist shops, 42 shops of pure commerce, 18 small business, 10 stores, 94 empty shops, 59 offices, 13 tourist offices, 39 hotels and rooms to let, 18 bars, 88 taverns, 2 cinemas, 10 public services, 2 banks, 12 cultural centers (Zivas, 1998: 18).

Table 1: Uses of properties in the Old Town in 1998 (based on Zivas, 1998)	
Rented or owned properties	863
Empty properties	127
General commerce (mini markets and stores)	342
Jewelry shops	63
Tourist shops/mini markets	96
Pure commerce (clothing)	42
Small business	18
Stores/super markets	10
Offices	59
Tourist offices	13
Hotels	39
Bars	18
Taverns/restaurants	88
Cinemas	2
Public services	10
Banks	2
Cultural centers	12

Interestingly, however, almost thirty years ago Rethemnos did not look the way it looks now. As Herzfeld (1991: 41) would have put it, "Until about 1965 Rethemnos was a self-contained, small town that barely overran the enclosure of its Venetians walls". Yet, the Old Town problem is not strictly about the boundaries of physical/social space. The booming tourism industry has significantly problematized the manner in which locals think and perceive of themselves and their place's identity. What is more, tourism and consumption have considerably altered and transformed, the identification processes and discourses that were, more often than not, associating the Cretan identity with a proud individual that resists and fights bureaucracy, the state and foreign capital. And as Herzfeld (1991: 86) had already noted with respect to the influence and impact tourism would have on what might be considered to be a 'Mediterranean' way of responding to foreigners, strangers or outsiders, indeed some "local observers object to the commercialization of social relations – "tradition" – that has moved, in short time, from hospitable spontaneity to "servility" (*dhouloprepeia*). What is worse from their point of view, this servility is based on commercial calculation". Being servile, therefore, according to Herzfeld's account seems increasingly and inevitably problematic in a small coastal town that has faced the prospects and fruits of consumption and tourist development, especially, in moral terms as the Rethemniot individual appears now inferior or subversive to the foreign capital and its power, and in a way the town is about to lose the traditional hospitality on which social relations were previously based. It is questionable, however, whether such a conception of Rethemnos which is mostly based on the glosses of lack, absence or loss, could serve as a realistic alternative in coming to terms with the changing aspects and facets of space and identity in a place where consumption and tourism play pivotal roles in the formation of the collective imaginary and the social memory of its inhabitants.

Such theorizations, however, that insist on portraying the town in accord with some unitary conception of identity that has been sadly or irretrievably lost because of the tourist consumption, should not be cause for lamentation, nostalgia or crisis, but should instead be given over to and replaced by a careful examination of the excessive conditions that are responsible for the changing experience of space, place and the subject in the wake of a full-blown consumer society. One should, therefore, let the

poetic ontologies of loss, presence and scarcity go, making space, for schizoanalysis, deconstruction, consumption, origami and the ethnography of the event.

I will have the chance to delve into these huge issues in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to note for now, that one of the concerns of the present thesis is to undo the above poetic and nostalgic conceptualization of a place and its alleged loss of an identity-building process based on proud individuals, and honourific subjects, that appears gradually to be left on the hands of a regrettably ruthless servile Cretan subject who is after profits and thereby beyond any authentic expression of Mediterranean hospitality and tradition. Such a theorization will have to be totally reconsidered and reconstructed, and it is one of the tasks of the next chapters to present a fuller account of difference that will be truly differential rather than representative or poetic.

It is true, however, that since the town was declared a monument “a largely new economic resource has become apparent: houses” (Herzfeld, 1991: 116). Thus the restoration project, the Venetian buildings and the need to preserve them have all played a key role in transmogrifying the landscape of the town and in altering the manner in which space, place and the subject are dis-articulated and unfolded in Rethemnos. My own concern with space and the subject, however, is not meant to propose that the Rethemniot is not servile and that the spatial organization of the town has not been subject to considerable alterations and transformations or that tourism is simply an economic and fairly unchallenged activity that benefits all residents irrespective of their class position/standing. What I propose is not about denying the change, becoming and deformation of the traditional urban landscape and the subject formation of Rethemnos, but about thinking of ways in order to map and explore what matters to subjects amid such a highly dynamic and changing socio-spatial environment and how to make sense of these recent transformations, perceiving Rethemnos’ identity through excess rather than lack, absence rather than presence, becoming rather than being, space rather than time, deterritorialization rather than territorialization and geography rather than history or anthropology. That truths exist we know from Badiou (2005)’s marvelous analysis of being. It remains to be seen, however, which are the truths that matter to subjects in terms of the allegations over servility, the restoration project and the manner in which the dialectics of change between the restoration project and the subject’s identity are transformed on the face

of the Old Town problem and by way of the ceaseless negotiation of the town's identities.

Having outlined some of the basic historical and geographical characteristics of the Old Town, I am now in a position to start deconstructing Mediterraneanism by opening up Mediterraneanist identities (the shame-and-honour model, the poetic model, the notion of the friends of the heart and the poetics of womanhood) to the far-reaching implications and effects of differential repetitions (Deleuze), the counterfeit (Derrida), and becoming-woman (Deleuze and Guattari). Before that however, I offer some glimpses into the underlining methodological peregrinations of what I have come to call 'ethnography of the event', discussing the manner in which this intuition, especially in the way taken up by Badiou's forceful and persuasive theorization (2005), can be useful in further mapping the Rethemniot subject.

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY - ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE EVENT

2.1 Introduction

The recent restructuring and tremendous rebuilding of the properties of the Old Town, not only intensifies some original differences, and conflicts but creates new divisions in and of space. The intense restructuring of the town, the restoration of the Venetian properties and the increasing number of tourists that visit the town coincides with the irresistible forces of consumerism, which have all turned the use of social space and the Venetian buildings into a marketable sign of the meticulous reorganization of the town's identity.

The ethnography of the event is one of the possible ways to study the experience of the subject in the face of such a turmoil. Yet it is neither simply a method of some interpretive ethnography contained in the form of a mystic local knowledge that begs for extra careful unveiling (Geertz, 1983), nor just a technique. Its philosophy, therefore, needs further unpacking. I should state at the outset that the ethnography of the event begins in the middle of things, re-releasing effects of speed and slowness, re-inscribing and re-citing repetitions of the difference in the same itself, rather than describing or symbolizing 'exotic' or 'distant' cultures. And thus, it goes without saying, it moves beyond traditional or conventional ways of mapping the modern subject, like interviews, questionnaires and the various participant observations. The event, above all, is a difference-producing repetition that draws lines of flight allowing the subject to make motionless trips in space, precisely because an event is not a symptom of presence, but that which affirms the responsible other which is open to solicitation, iterability and conjuration. Hereinafter, I am not interested in the poetic subject of Rethemnos, but in the event which may occur somewhere, elsewhere, otherwise and which the subject faithfully follows in such a manner that states its fidelity to it; for "Events *arrive*" amid the "possibility of non-arrival" (Clarke and Doel, 1994: 507). Something may happen exactly when everything, stutters, vanishes and dissimulates. Cast of the die, as Mallarme has it, for "Every thought emits a cast of dice" (Badiou, 2005: 197). Theorizing the event, therefore, is important in order to come to terms with the Cretan subject if one wants to explore and understand not only in some relativist sense how the current identification processes work, but most importantly the truth that matters to subjects when a generic multiple emerges, which

is open to the radical alterity and infinite variation of something wholly other – which is not solely associated with the notions of honour, hospitality, poetics and so on. What the ethnography of the event maps, in short, is the trace that leaves behind the a-signifying and a-subjective individual which forces the undecidable out of the indiscernible rather than the meaning, symbolism or honourific poeticity of an individual that executes obediently or even skillfully some rhetorical or practical tasks. For Badiou however, in order an individual to deserve the name of the subject, a truth procedure should break and swerve away from the state of a fully-deployed historical situation.

The structure of the present chapter is four-fold. First, I draw attention to the problems of the so-called hermeneutical tradition offering a brief criticism and proposing another way of doing ethnography beyond the poetic ontologies, focusing mainly on Marcus' and Fischer's *Anthropology as Cultural Critique* (1986), which I take to constitute one of the major influences in hermeneutical ethnography, not only because it is explicitly associated with what is often called 'postmodern ethnography', but crucially as way of showing that not all accounts of difference are as 'legitimate' as it is often assumed and that any true difference that deserves its name as such should be above all, differential. Second, I take up on the event in order to sketch out how a subject amidst conditions of undecidability, manages to withhold, postpone and delay any poetic presence and honorific identification, enacting a certain ethics of the event and a non-representational ethnography, which is not easily grasped by traditional ways of doing ethnography. I proceed, accordingly, following Badiou's (2003, 2005) conception of the subject's militancy, multiplicity and un-anticipation in an attempt to arrive at a difference that can be truly respected as such, beyond the hermeneutical ethnography that simply maps differences, without paying attention to the truth that matters to the undecidable event that is still to come and to which the subject expresses its fidelity – otherwise the subject is not possible or does not deserve such a name, being simply a poetic individual.

In addition, the present chapter explains and demonstrates the manner in which the data of the properties that were collected in the Old Town, despite its ostensibly empirical and improvised character, holds for a 'telling' and more nuanced way in getting to grips with the division between the repressed and the seduced, materializing

in a certain operational sense the way in which the transformation of Rethemnos' built environment resonates with postmodern sociology without claiming any sort of generalized validity or application. Finally, I offer some glimpses into the ethics of the event, which succinctly summarizes my own concern and experience of the events I encountered and engaged in while doing fieldwork in Rethemnos.

2.2 Traditional Ethnography

This is not going to be a detailed critique of social anthropology or ethnography. My scope is more modest focusing on those aspects of traditional/hermeneutical thought that in my view fail to consider the undecidability and ambivalence of the event and the generic multiplicity to which the Rethemniot subject is currently submitted. Clifford Geertz (1983: 58) has defined the task of interpretive anthropology as the analysis of "the symbolic forms – words, images, institutions, behaviours – in terms of which, in each place, people actually represented themselves to themselves and to one another". Yet in their *Anthropology as Cultural Critique* (1986), Marcus and Fischer dismiss Said's (1978) *Orientalism*, on the grounds of posing no "alternative form for the adequate representation of other voices or points of view across cultural boundaries, nor does he instill any hope that this might be possible" (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 2). What matters to interpretive anthropology, we are told, is to examine the way in which meanings, symbols and languages are negotiated, focusing on the "renewed recognition, central to the human sciences, that social life must fundamentally be conceived as the negotiations of meanings" (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 26).

However, it is exactly on the unevenness of such a negotiation of meanings that Said drew, in order to distill from a powerful western discourse the manner in which the Orient has been construed, on the back of a variety of imagined geographies that successfully merge with various travel writings and 'true' representations in order to produce and further consolidate a certain image of the Orient. According to Marcus and Fischer, nevertheless, one of the tasks of interpretive anthropology is to address questions of conceptions of personhood, "which for simplicity of discussion we will divide [...] into three groups" (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 48). First, there is the model of *psychodynamic ethnographies*, which includes works such as Levy's *Tahitians: Mind and Experience in the Society Islands* (1973) arguing over "a division

between public surfaces and private behaviour” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 50); Kracke’s *Force and Persuasion Leadership in an Amazonian Society* (1978), a work which provides “an important experimental initiative by demonstrating how psychoanalysis might be pursued in cross-cultural settings” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 53); and there is Obeyesekere’s *Medusa’s Hair: An Essay on Personal Symbols and Religious Experience* (1981), which shows “how in the effort to explain inchoate distress and emotions to themselves and to relieve traumatic pressures, individuals appropriate available cultural models and, under patterned social stresses, create each individually, significant new patterns” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 53). The psychodynamic model of ethnography, in general, reveals “a behaviourally and conceptually significant level of reality reflecting, contrasting with, or obscured by public cultural forms” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 54). Second, there is the model of *realist ethnographies*, which examines in a rather functionalist manner the difference between public patterns of behaviour and various cultural forms, with two texts playing key roles in this doctrine, Evan Prichard’s *The Nuer* (1940) and Turner’s *Schism and Continuity in African Society* (1957). To explicate further and draw on the nature of this functionalism, Marcus and Fischer (1986: 57) employ five frames/devices: *life history*, as the “effort to explore the multiple points of view that go into the construction of any life history [...] as they are formed in the conversations and interviews of fieldwork” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 58); *life cycle*, as the “typical phases and events that each individual passes through” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 59); *ritual*, by which they mean “the appropriate vehicle for understanding sentiment, emotion, and the endowing of meaning upon experience” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 61); *aesthetic genres*, the study of a “strikingly different aesthetics than our own” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 63); and last but not least the *dramatic incident*, which is about the explanation of “a dramatic incident – a murder in the community in which [one] work[s] – as an ethnographic display tactic” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 64). In sum, the realist model “raise[s] epistemological questions about representing differences across cultural boundaries [that] are in fact transitional to a more sophisticated appreciation for and ability to explore alternative aesthetics, epistemologies, and sensibilities that survive strongly and subtly in a homogenizing world” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 67). Finally, there are the *modernist texts* that “highlight[s] the eliciting discourse between ethnographer and subjects or [...] involve the reader in the work of analysis” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 67).

Without getting into the ins and outs of interpretative ethnography, it is still possible, on the back of the brief account offered above, to argue that hermeneutical anthropology is susceptible to criticism on a number of grounds. I want to stress here only three points that are relevant in discussing and further unfolding the event and its rupture and suture to being with regard to a certain foundational situation, which seems to escape the above interpretive problematization. First, the psychodynamic model is, by and large, based on a superficial distinction between personal behaviours and wider cultural forms. What needs further unpacking, however, is not only to explain the interrelated and interwoven practices between subject and society, and presentation and representation in a rather 'psychological' manner which takes place through various cultural settings, but mostly to theorize and map what matters to individuals, that is, what makes a real difference in their lives and what kind of interchanges and interrelationships take place, though always in the form of a constant battle and negotiation, between subject and society. It is psychoanalysis, however, as opened up by Freud, developed through Lacan's linguistic turn and, subsequently, taken further up by the schizoanalytic accounts of Deleuze and Guattari's *Body without Organs*, and becoming-woman that may offer an alternative account taking seriously the 'inner structure' of the subject, along the lines (and beyond as we shall see with respect to Deleuze) of the 'repressive hypothesis' and the discontents caused by the devastating effects and rationalism of modern civilization. Moreover, psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis constitute a useful entry point in theorizing the event, by way of which a truth occurs, as Badiou explains, on the back of which a subject may be possible. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, does not suggest simply that the subject is impotent, as many of the anthropological estimations are afraid of, but provides a rather 'structural' way in reviewing and discovering many of the psychological and subterranean grounds on which not only the behaviour, which is taken as symptom of the erotic and death drives/instincts, but the unconscious, with its catalytic influence, of the individual, lies.

The second point I want to make is that the model of realist ethnography fails to challenge the metaphysics of presence, the poetic ontologies, the 'miserly thought' of scarcity (Doel, 2009) and the authority of the ethnographer. Interviews and questionnaires are based on a pre-conceived perception of what is expected in the field and more often than not, sooner or later, the anthropologist insists that what

takes place in the isolated community is an alternative rationality that interestingly may correspond with parts, sentiments or functions of structures that are already present in the west (economy, state, exchange etc.). I suggest in the modest and most prudent of manners that even classical texts are not immune from such a 'rationalist anachronism', as Cornelius Castoriadis (1984) put it with respect to Marxism. Malinowski (1978), for example, argued that the *Kula Ring* is an alternative economic system possessing an intrinsic rationality and Durkheim's (1965) *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* on the totemic classification, suggested that the totem is the basis for all religious phenomena, whilst Mauss' (1954) *The Gift* proposed that gift exchanges constitute a system of exchanges and obligations more just than the crude economism of capitalism. Even Levi-Strauss' (1973) *Tristes Tropiques* relied, as was shown by Derrida (1976), on a romantic preconception of a society misleadingly taken as primitive (without writing), which ignores the poisonous classification of the west.

The last point I want to make is that modernist texts that depend on a dialogue between the ethnographer and the object of study, seeking to reach a consensus between western rationality and the nobleness of an 'exotic' or primitive origin, remain narrow and unbecoming (as opposed to the becoming-imperceptible of Deleuze) in that they simply conceive of the object of study as inherently pure, domesticated and innocent, a dubious strategy however, that constitutes a mirror of the manner in which the original imperialist model of knowledge was constructed. Any 'native's point of view' or 'common sense' experience (Geertz, 1983), however, is questionable because it always involves not only a certain application of forms of thoughts of western origin over a social reality that refuses in vain to adapt or adjust to a highly changing or modernizing context, but also a continuous repetition of differences that erode any original, so to speak, appeal or claim for a 'common sense' understanding from the very beginning. For it is not possible to apply anything at all, for the simple reason that a supplement is always already applied or supplemented in all differential manners (Derrida, 1976, 1981) before any origin or source have come to take hold of any pure 'common sense'.

My task above was not to offer a detailed critique of anthropology but rather to hint at the omissions of such a theory hoping that such a point of view will help to take the

necessary leap toward a truly differential procedure with which a differential subject will be from now on associated, dwelling this time on generic multiplicities and undecidable and unanticipated events. The ethnography of the event is such a form of thought that can supplement the poetics and politics of postmodern ethnography with the singularity and spatiality of the event. An event is neither revolutionary, nor poetic, nor domestic, nor heroic but simply an expression of the militancy of truth (Badiou, 2003, 2005), on the side of which a subject may be found to reside, refusing to be named, categorized, pinned down and classified, and yet remaining open to the generic multiple and indiscernible undecidability of a wholly other. Even if the event ostensibly appears to be in accord with what Clifford (1986: 24) termed “cultural *poesis* – and politics – the constant reconstitution of selves and others through specific exclusions, conventions and discursive practices”, difference is not only about *poesis* but also about what exists between what is poetic and what is not poetic, or what makes the antithesis between *poesis* and non-*poesis* possible. The event, moreover, may also seem to be in line with some allegoric conceptions of ethnography that take it as a story that “has the propensity to generate another story in the mind of its reader (hearer), to repeat and replace some prior story” (Clifford, 1986: 100). But again, such ‘repetitions’ make sense and have meaning only when they are differential, becoming, spectral, incorporeal and light, in the way, as we shall in Chapter 4, suggested by Bergson (1970) and Deleuze (1994).

Without having to dip into Deleuze’s philosophy, suffice it to discuss at this juncture seven points – or *dispositifs* as Lyotard (1993: 26) would have it – that highlight my take on the choreoethnography of the event without, however, seeking to pigeonhole or pin down its ‘merits’, ‘qualities’ or ‘characteristics’. *First*, the ethnography of the event takes flight from the contested notion of representation, challenging the established forms of hegemony between the one who represents and the one who is represented. *Second*, the ethnography of the event refuses to privilege theory over praxis – yet it does not underestimate praxis or historical experience. *Third*, it refuses to privilege the subject over the object. *Fourth*, it seeks to reconcile theory and praxis bringing together, on the one hand, the irreducible dynamics of place, and on the other hand, the universal in-consistency of truth, without erasing or dialectically transcending or even worse, wounding their disjuncture. *Fifth*, the ethnography of the event remains faithful to truth and the subject, even if such fidelity marks a certain

rupture with respect to a fully deployed historical situation. *Sixth*, it is in essence fragmentary but not exactly like “Life in the field [which] is itself fragmentary, not at all organized around familiar ethnological categories such as kinship, economy, and religion” (Tyler, 1986: 131); rather it holds that there is nothing but fragments of fragments, or folds of folds, or by the same token transitions upon transitions and so on. And *seventh*, it remains deeply incomplete, that is, it is a never-ending process, a work in progress, which refuses to settle down and rest. In sum, the event is bound to an interventional fidelity that breaks with any form of Statist representation and remains open to the undecidable other on his/her way back. It is worth recalling, with Badiou (2003: 14) – although a fuller account is offered in Chapter 9 – how a universal singularity works with respect to law and truth:

“If there has been an event, and if truth consists in declaring it and then in being faithful to this declaration, two consequences ensue. First, since truth is evental, or of the order of what occurs, it is singular. It is neither structural, nor axiomatic, nor legal. No available generality can account for it, nor structure the subject who claims to follow in its wake. Consequently, there cannot be a law of truth. Second, truth being inscribed on the basis of a declaration that is in essence subjective, no preconstituted subset can support it; nothing communitarian or historically established can lend its substance to the process of truth”.

The ethnography of the event, in other words, is swept up by a truth procedure that maps the vicissitudes of a subject beyond identity, embeddedness, jurisdiction and Law; and beyond the forced stabilization of minoritarian identities and most importantly, beyond the homogenization promoted by the market. It seeks, moreover, to transcend the dialectical resolution of difference, which is based on the opposition between differentiation and homogenization, that is the “permanent creation of subjective and territorial identities in order for its principle of movement to homogenize its space of action, identities moreover that never demand anything but the right to be exposed in the same way as others to the uniform prerogatives of the market” (Badiou, 2003: 10–11).

Likewise, the subject of Rethemnos is neither about the embeddedness of identity nor about the homogenizing expansion of the market of tourism and the restoration project, but would involve a truth procedure that swerves away from any established order of things. Such a multiple singularity will eventually take flight from the shame-

and-honour model and the poetic model, remaining at the end of day non-reciprocal, non-recognizable and non-economic. For such an event is beyond the negativity of shame, honour, poetics, domestication and spontaneous flexibility or any other unitary identity whatsoever, especially insofar as one knows after Badiou that a multiplicity affirms and kindles the ineffaceable threshold of an irreducible difference, despite the fact that “there is no hero of the event” (Badiou, 2005: 207); and to that extent a generic multiple is not necessarily a hero, but an intervention which refuses to be ontotheologically restricted within the confines of the undisclosed potentials of a poetic place.

Interpretive ethnography is not necessarily Statist. It is, nonetheless, indifferent, unbecoming, in-appropriate and contradictory. Clifford (1986: 7), for example, has argued that “ethnographic truths are [...] inherently *partial* – committed and incomplete” and that to claim otherwise stems from what is called “the constitution of the ethnographer’s authority” (Crapanzano, 1986: 53). Likewise, Fabian (1983) and Rosaldo (1986: 83) pointed out how anthropology’s inherent anachronism adds to this partiality through the deployment of an allochronic discourse that refuses the so-called primitives the possibility of a synchronic presence in line with the ethnographer’s ‘time-zone’. And Tyler (1986: 109) suggested that ethnographic “accounts are clearly no longer *the story*, but a story among other stories”. But however closely such accounts seem to lie with respect to postmodernism and poststructuralism, a more rigorous theory of difference is still required, which neither represents nor signifies nor simply symbolizes – as these theories do – but chimes with a difference always in continuous variation, splayed out according to innumerable differential calculi; a difference, in short, that will no longer be division, contradiction, antithesis and *arnesis* (negation), (and thus an annulled difference) but will form a process, which sets in motion flows upon flows, differences upon differences and changes upon changes.

2.3 The Ethnography of the Event

Hence difference must be made. I propose that that the Rethemniot generic multiple is indiscernibly ambivalent and undecidably unnameable and thus the subject is possible only when taken up by movements of speed and slowness. It is not about representing or expressing an individual, therefore, or an identity, but about ex-appropriating

him/her, writing him/her “otherwise, elsewhere”, on hollow ground (Doel, 1993: 383); and it is also about mapping a truth that occurs once an event is decided or named after an intervention. The ethnography of the event is not about interpretation or representation either – it does not interpret, for example, the words and discourses of the Rethemniots through a certain method of poetics, identifying a “good man” with “being good at being a man” in the way Herzfeld (1985: 11) does it. While the ostensible linguistic/poetic turn of anthropology acknowledges the importance of language, it remains a dualistic, dialectical, antithetical, contradictory and nihilistic form of thought, opposing one’s actions with a certain poetics and rhetoric that sets out to explain why a word or a phrase is more important than the action itself. The ethnography of the event, by contrast, moves beyond such binary oppositions, not because it thinks of words being less interesting, exciting or significant than deeds, structures or actions, but rather because words and actions are nothing but degrees of variation, intensities, movements of speed and slowness, in short flashpoints, which either affect you or do not (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). The poetic model seems to oppose an infrastructure with a superstructure that is, the economic or social reality with a linguistic and cultural discourse subjecting difference to a kind of immaterial separation, contradiction and negation. Yet the event is the only model an ethnographer has once the antithetical schemata of the dialectic which negates, appropriates, erases and disqualifies difference, distinguishing between infrastructure and superstructure, language and matter, are ultimately but unregrettably, swept away. An event, thus, is both poetic and antipoetic. It does not oppose the poetic but rather constitutes an antithesis to the antithesis between poetic and antipoetic. “It thereby deconstructs any one-effect” (Badiou, 2005: 30), between linguistic and non-linguistic, material and immaterial, representation and reality, virtual/real and the actual. Badiou’s conception of the event, accordingly, provides an exemplary basis for superseding such poetic and anthropological controversies, in that the event, as we shall see briefly directly below and analytically in Chapter 9, is able to make sense of the Rethemniot subject by drawing, chiefly, on relationships of belonging and inclusion – rather than on signs, identities and representations.

I now want to pick up on three of the mathematical formulas of Badiou’s (2005) *Being and Event* in order to make space for such a generic multiple Rethemniot subject. Given that being is multiple and that a theory of being is fully grasped by set

theory which is the theory of pure multiple and given that *mathematics is ontology*, (one of Badiou's fundamental propositions as we shall in Chapter 9), I want to draw some attention to set theory, at least the manner in which such a formula is taken up by Badiou and the manner in which it is embodied in the present thesis. The models I drew upon involve the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the matheme of the indiscernible. I used such a mathematical language in order to think of the affirmative and responsible Rethemniot subject as work in progress beyond agonistic poetics and servility, which is mainly the way through which the subject was seen or identified with by Mediterraneanist writings. For my part I will be arguing that the Rethemniot individual is a trace left behind by a truth procedure which allows the subject to remain deeply and, extraordinarily, open to a wholly indiscernible and undecidable other beyond poeticity. Such a theorization serves a three-fold scope. First, it seeks to undo and unsettle the honour of the Mediterranean subject in order to allow the Two of affirmation and responsibility (the Two of the evental ultra-one) to hold sway by transcending the interpretive/poetic anthropology and the Mediterraneanist accounts of identification by way of the axiom of foundation – such a theorization is fully explored as was already mentioned in Chapter 9. Second, it challenges the conception of the Rethemniot subject as a docile or servile subjectivity depending on foreign capital or its negation (a rebellious and undisciplined poetic individual) in the place of which it situates the indecision of the 'non-servile servility', which stems and is heavily inspired from what was termed on a different occasion an 'interruption-without-interruption' (Doel, 1993). And third, it opens up the Mediterranean subject to an ambivalent and indiscernible other that is yet to come, that is a difference without unity or identity. In sum, the two axioms above and the matheme of the indiscernible lay the ontological groundwork for an ethnography of the event, unpacking the Rethemniot chaotomic multiplicity on the basis of which an affirmative, responsible non-servile and wholly ambivalent Other will be called forth to hold sway.

I do not offer a sustained account of Badiou's subtractive ontology here, not least because it is Chapter 9 which deals seriously with such a theory. The present chapter, however, offers some glimpses into set theory and serves as an introduction to some of Badiou's more complicated parts of mathematical analysis that follow in an attempt

to elucidate the way in which these formulas are reconciled or read on the back of philosophies of differences.

Badiou suggests that the one is not and that being is a multiple of multiples; that being exists in any presentation, and constitutes a presentation of presentation; and that the language of being-qua-being is mathematics whilst the new in being happens under the name of the event. Although ontology is mathematics and ontology is what exists, being's prohibition of the event does not mean that mathematics cannot, at least implicitly, think of the event. Though one should abandon any hope of explicitly defining what a multiplicity is, the event leaves a trace that can be fully mapped or explored by Cantor's set theory, Godel's constructible sets and Cohen's continuum hypothesis. The axiomatization of set theory, which is a means to count, or to make sense of the ontological situation of being – the *void* – can further unpack the interimplications between being and event. The axioms deployed below are set in, in order to provide for an understanding of what a multiplicity *is*, without having to name or pinpoint an event. Thus “Axiomatization is required such that the multiple, left to the implicitness of its counting rule, be delivered *without concept*, that is *without implying the being of the one*” (Badiou, 2005: 43). The Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) axiomatization, which is one of the possible ways of axiomatization, contains no ‘one’ but only relations of belonging \in , and thus the elements (sets/multiplicities) of these belongings are multiple(s). In ZF axiomatization everything is a set, a multiple, to the extent that “every multiple is composed of multiples” (Badiou, 2005: 57). There are nine axioms of ZF theory that set out to *present* the multiple-without-one. I focus below on the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the matheme of the indiscernible in order to *ontologically* (to think the being of the event is absurd and this explains the italics) un-ground and de-consist an event, bearing always in mind that a subject takes place on the side of a truth procedure, which in turn is supported by an event. As the thesis progresses, it will be made clear why these specific axioms were selected. Suffice it to note for now that these formulas, as Badiou himself admits, constitute the cornerstone of his entire ontology because of their *metaontological* status, that is, they do not simply think being but make space as well for historicity, that is, the evental site within which an event may occur, that is, that which-is-not-being-qua-being, which swerves away from being.

For Badiou (2005: 173) being-qua-being, that is ontology, includes the thought of “the multiple, general form of presentation; the void, proper name of being; the excess, or state of the situation, representative reduplication of the structure (or count-as-one) of presentation; nature, stable and homogenous form of standing-there of the multiple; and infinity, which decides the expansion of the natural multiple beyond the Greek limit”. However important the above analyses are, and although the whole of Badiou’s work intends to rethink being and event at once – and thus any chance to methodologically separate them seems rather unjustified – I concentrate below on the event rather on being insofar as it is the event which “is-not-being-supernumerary” (Badiou, 2005: 178). I am not suggesting that being is not important especially in the way Badiou theorizes it – the fact that being and event are thought in his analysis in one single stroke makes it even harder to isolate one from another. Yet what I suggest is that in order to think of the subject in Rethemnos, it is the event on which one must draw, especially because from the standpoint of the situation the event is undecidable, that is, “the multiple which both represents its entire site, and by means of the pure signifier of itself immanent to its own multiple, manages to present the presentation itself, that is, the one of the infinite that it is” (Badiou, 2005: 180). The events of Rethemnos, therefore, the multiplicities of affirmation and responsibility beyond honour-and-shame (the axiom of foundation), the multiplicities beyond servility (the axiom of choice) and the ambivalent and undecidable multiplicities beyond poetics (the matheme of the indiscernible), set out to enact a disruptive occurrence, which has nothing to do with the identities of honour, shame, poetic, servility or the friendly subjectivations – these last issues are also explained in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. I will be arguing in general that the Rethemniot generic multiplicity is faithfully connected to the undecidable and unnameable other, which should be named (founded), after being chosen (choice), by a subject deciding upon its indiscernibility (the indiscernible), from the standpoint of the undecidable.

2.4 The Axiom of Foundation

The axiom of *foundation* gives a considerable pause to the infinite regression of being and prohibits the being of the event by halting extraordinary sets from belonging to ‘themselves’. Ontology and thus mathematics do not allow the existence (the count as one) of multiples that belong to themselves. Foundation, in other words states that being which is void should be founded always on the basis of some other. Yet the

event is not only constituted by elements of its site but of the signification itself that it is. If being thus which is void could be evental it should be founded on some otherness and should be based on the other of void. But the other of the void cannot be but void itself and thus the otherness demanded by the axiom foundation would be eroded. Foundation, in short, prohibits being's event because the event should belong to itself, and yet to found means to count on some other, while the void, on the other hand, has no other. In the light of this, foundation states that “within an existing one-multiple, there always exists a multiple presented by it such that this multiple is on the edge of the void relative to the initial multiple” (Badiou, 2005: 185). Analytically, the axiom of foundation insists that “given any existing multiple whatsoever (thus a multiple counted as one in accordance with the Ideas of the multiple and the existence of the name of the void), there always belongs to it – if, of course, it is not the name of the void itself in which case nothing would belong to it – a multiple on the edge of the void within the presentation that it is. In other words: every non-void multiple contains some Other”: $(\forall \alpha) [(\alpha \neq \emptyset) \rightarrow (\exists \beta)[(\beta \in \alpha) \wedge (\beta \cap \alpha = \emptyset)]]$ (Badiou, 2005: 186).

Chapter 9 takes up on the above mathematical language in a manner which resonates with the Two of the ultra-one event, and the subject of affirmation and responsibility. Suffice it to say for now that the axiom of foundation is “a non-void set [which] is founded inasmuch as a multiple always belong to it which is Other than it” (Badiou, 2005: 186). And thus for every sentiment, episode, event or discourse that implies honour (the being of Mediterraneanism) there should be an affirmative subject which while being part of the discourse of shame-and-honour, stands between itself and the void engaging in a behaviour that varies from affirmation to responsibility. In so doing, it “affirms through the mediation of the Other, that even though presentation can be infinite it is always marked by finitude *when it comes to its origin*” (Badiou, 2005: 187). Such an axiom guarantees, in other words, that every multiple contains and necessitates its other and thus beyond or underneath the usual characteristics of the cartography of the Mediterranean being (shame, honour, poetics) there should be always an affirmative and responsible Other en route from Mediterraneanism to the iterability, solicitation and undecidability of the uninsurable Rethemniot multiple. In Badiou's words “The axiom of foundation de-limits being by the prohibition of the

event” (Badiou, 2005: 190). Situated beneath the strictures of shame-and-honour, the axiom of foundation insists that there is still an original foundational affirmative and responsible other, which even if it remains unnameable – an event cannot be named by means of or on the grounds of the language of the situation – may still have a chance of happening. And whilst it is true that “Ontology has nothing to say about the event” (Badiou, 2005: 90), it can still map “the traces it leaves behind” (Badiou, 2005: 91). What names an event, however, is not a subject, but a process which is termed intervention. “I term ‘intervention’ any procedure by which a multiple is recognized as an event” (Badiou, 2005: 202). Intervention “is what presents an event for the occurrence of another. It is an evental between-two” (Badiou, 2005: 209). The axiom of foundation thus while it prevents being’s event, opens up at the same time the non-being of the event to the continuous variation and manifold affirmative responsibility of that which breaks with the solidity, fixity and constancy of Mediterraneanist identities: an intervention.

2.5 The Axiom of Choice

The interventional form of the event can be recognized in the *axiom of choice*. The multiple of choice *consists*, which comes down to saying that it exists. Yet intervention does not name a rule of choice but affirms the existence of choice. The axiom of choice, “in its final form posits that given a multiple of multiples, there *exists* a multiple composed of a ‘representative’ of each non-void multiple whose presentation is assured by the first multiple. In other words one can ‘choose’ an element from each of the multiples which make up a multiple, and one can ‘gather together’ these chosen elements: the multiple obtained in such a manner is consistent, which is to say it exists” (Badiou, 2005: 224). The events drawn upon in association with the mathematical language of the axiom of choice affirm that in Rethemnos, the residents who are often accused of abandoning the Cretan values and morals – as a result of the recent tourist development and due to the fact that they increasingly depend on tourism, as Herzfeld’s account of servility insinuates – are not, simply, alienated or reckless servants submitted to the exploitative forces and spillover effects of foreign capital. There is, in short, no clear-cut division between a period of servility and a period of pride or Cretan poetic ideals. And although people insist that many of the Rethemniots have lost pride and dignity seeking only to make money, my

suggestion is that such a distinction between a period of poetic pride and a period of disgraceful servility, simply does not exist. Pride and poeticity are always already interrupted by servility but without actually being interrupted in a linear, chronological or hierarchical sense. Both periods extend and overflow into each other deforming an uninterrupted non-identity, and marking a period of interruption-without-interruption or as I prefer to call it, a period of non-servile servility. Asking the residents (which is pretty much what Herzfeld ethnographies imply) which their preferred period is, the one before the corruption and massification of tourism or the period marked by an unprecedented touristication of the Old Town's geohistory, is highly controversial and unproductive. As Badiou puts it in terms of such infinite sets which do not establish a rule of choice, "there is something *un-delegatable*" (Badiou, 2005: 225) about them. The axiom of choice thus affirms the existence of a choice-multiple, which does not have to choose between the servile period and the non-servile period. The existence of the choice-multiple affirms the non-inscription of a rule of choice, the unnameable of a delegate and the non-existence of a law of presentation en route from the non-servility period to that of servility admitting, purely and simply, that "there are some interventions" (Badiou, 2005: 230).

2.6 The Matheme of the Indiscernible

Such an intervention, however, should be properly thought. It is the matheme of the *indiscernible* that manages to think of the non-place of the above non-choice, which is also applicable to what the resident, as was briefly sketched out in the introduction, might have said in relationship to the 'There is nothing to see'. The matheme of the indiscernible states that "the set of terms of the situation which are positively connected to the event is in no manner already classified within the encyclopaedia of the situation" (Badiou, 2005: 336). The indiscernible of truth is not about truth but about the being of truth (Badiou, 2005: 355), for truth is always "that which makes a hole in a knowledge" (Badiou, 2005: 327). As it should be clear by now "one cannot speak of a multiple which is indiscernible 'in-itself'" (Badiou, 2005: 356). The general idea, therefore, as Badiou suggests, following Cohen's mathematical formula, is to add the indiscernible to such a set of conditions within which it will not be able to be discerned. Let us briefly see – although a fuller account is offered once again in Chapter 9 – how Badiou constructs his model.

In the quasi-complete situation one constructs names for all multiples and for the indiscernible as well, without, however, knowing which the indiscernible *is*. A general set of conditions for the indiscernible is “a multiple π of the fundamental situation S which is destined to possibly belong to the indiscernible (the function of material) and whatever the case may be, to transmit some ‘information’ about this indiscernible (which will be a part of the situation S)” (Badiou, 2005: 362). Such a set of conditions will be dominated by the principle of information and the principle of compatibility. Without getting into formal logic for now and without going into the ins and outs of Cohen’s strategy, a set of conditions would be also dominated by the materiality of the indiscernible, the existence of more precise conditions than the ones a situation knows, the coherency required to describe the indiscernible and the fact that there are real choices in describing the indiscernible (Badiou, 2005: 365). Accordingly, a correct set of conditions will aim (but not name) at the one multiple or at a part (δ) of a set \odot of conditions in deciding whether δ belongs to the situation. If a correct part δ is discerned by a property λ , every element of δ (every $\pi \in \delta$) would be dominated by a condition π_2 such that $\sim \lambda (\pi_2)$. The crucial thing here is to define *domination*, which is “a set of conditions such that any condition outside the domination is dominated by at least one condition inside the domination” (Badiou, 2005: 369). Hence, the capital definition of the indiscernible “*a correct set φ will be generic for S if, for any domination D which belongs to S we have $D \cap \varphi \neq \emptyset$* ” (Badiou, 2005: 370).

The above mathematical forms will be further unpacked with respect to the adestination and infinite potentials of the multiplicities of the Rethemniot subject in subsequent chapters. Though such ontological language may appear hard to follow in terms of the pragmatics and analytics of the experience of Rethemnos, as the thesis progresses these experiments will be brushed against the grain of the generic truth of the poetic subject once, however, I am done with the reversal and reinscription of the Mediterraneanist identifications and spatialities. It should be stated once again that events have nothing to do with interpretations, symbolisms and representations but occur in a time that is yet to come. Events *will have been* in the Archaeological Service where I was searching the archive and the files regarding the data of the restoration of the Venetian buildings; events *will have been* in the office of the head

of the Old Town's Residents Association, where I was looking for old and recent publications regarding the Old Town. Non-representational ethnography allows, in other words, a fuller appreciation of the rupture which the event, suture to being, generates, that is the new, the contingent and the multiple that happens in being, that is, "an infinite multiplicity [...] deprived of any limit to its multiple-deployment" (Badiou, 2005: 33). It is in there that a true subject may have a chance of happening. The event, therefore, which, as we shall see is what the subject militantly and faithfully follows in order to deserve its name as such, is a means to an end, that is, it can help us to think of a subject which is infinitely open, swerving away from the authority of the ethnographer, the bias of the structured interview, the typicality and harshness of questionnaires, the metaphysics of presence, the face-to-face uninterrupted 'ideal/consensual speech' communication, and the dialectical appropriation of difference as separation, constancy, unity, and opposition.

To recap, the event opens up the Rethemniot multiplicity first, to the ultra-one of Two of affirmation and responsibility (the axiom of foundation); second, to the non-servile subject of a period of interruption without interruption (the axiom of choice); and, third, to the undecidable subject beyond domestication and poetics (the matheme of the indiscernible). These images, however, are not three different identities or subjects of the Cretan lifeworld that effectively resist the systemic colonization promoted by the ensuing processes of tourism. The ethnography of the event is in search of *a* truth, which vibrates, stutters, stammers and trembles before the subject sitting always on the side of a generic extension, which is faithfully connected to the post-evental occurrences of an intervention. I am not interested, in other words, in discovering the real Rethemniot identity. Rather I am ready to fall for those aspects of a polymorphously perverse and absolute contingency of events associated with a truth which only when followed by a subjectivation process will allow the name of the subject to be assigned to an individual. As time and again the subject cannot be represented explicitly, immediately or directly, it should be finally left "to the implicitness of its counting rule, be delivered, *without concept*, that is *without implying the being-of-the-one*" (Badiou, 2005: 43).

I now want to explore how the contested restoration project of the Old Town resonates with a theory of the consumer society and the effective power of

consumerism – although it is Chapter 7 that unfolds in a more elaborate way the systemic nature of consumption. What I am about to offer is rather a ‘technical’ explanation of the operationalization of the division between the repressed and the seduced of Rethemnos; an attempt arguably that constitutes a prudent as much an improvised and idiosyncratic way of theorizing the current socio-spatial polarization of the town, but one which I think captures incisively the irresistible dynamics and vibrations of place. Given though that I have not adequately explained any of these terms so far regarding the consumer society, though a short account is offered below in terms of the theory developed by Baudrillard and Bauman, the current presentation is certainly limited; as the thesis progresses, however, the data of the restoration project will make more sense once brushed against the systemic nature of the consumer society (Baudrillard, 1996), the division between the repressed and the seduced (Bauman, 1987) and the fetishism of utility (Baudrillard, 1981). Taking up on the restoration data of the Archaeology Department is, simply, a way to operationalize how theory is brought to bear upon a pragmatic, floating, errant and eventful reality. The data of the restored houses constitute, in other words, an illustration, and a telling though certainly heuristic metaphor of the forces, contradictions and struggles that take place when a full-blown consumer is fully deployed taking over every corner of social life by means of the restoration project. What I will be suggesting is that as the Venetian buildings are gradually turned into commodities, as a consequence of the expansion, intensification and scale of the tourist market of Rethemnos, the Old Town problem may be taken to mark a transition in society and space which may be termed postmodern.

2.7 The Consumer Society and the Restoration Project

Although a fuller analysis is taken up in Chapter 7, it is crucial to start discussing here what is meant by a systemic theory of the consumer society, how this theory is used in the context of Rethemnos, how to make sense of the Old Town problem in the wake of the systemic nature of consumption, and whether such a theory can pave the way for a more apposite dissection of the processes and transitions to which the Mediterranean town of Rethemnos is currently subject.

Consumption is often taken as a practice that satisfies individual needs. A more sensitive approach, however, will make clear that such an argument is far from satisfactory. The social logic of consumption is altogether different insofar as consumption is an institution, a whole social system, which has nothing to do with the mere satisfaction of individual needs. As the so-called 'structural Marxist' school put it, most convincingly in Althusser's wording, "A full part of consumption is devoted not to the satisfaction of the needs of individuals, but to allowing either simple or extended reproduction of the conditions of production" (Althusser, 1970: 165). The narrow understanding of consumption as a process involving the personal fulfilment of needs fails to take into account that consumption is a mode of domination like production. Little wonder, then, that Baudrillard should state that "the act of consumption is never simply a purchase [but] it is also expenditure [...]; that is to say it is wealth manifested and a manifest destruction of wealth" (Baudrillard, 1981: 112). Every attempt, therefore, to associate consumption with the anthropological obsession of needs and their teleological satisfaction is an oversimplified and naive suggestion for needs are neither about an individual satisfaction, nor do they have anything to do with a superficial distinction between affluent and scarce societies. Needs are, first and foremost, culturally produced and intend to classify and differentiate social groups according to a social logic, based on consumerist preferences, tastes, differences and social-class criteria (Bourdieu, 1984). Baudrillard's and Bauman's theorizations unfold in a very constructive way the manner in which such a systemic nature of consumption takes hold and the manner in which the reconstruction of an understanding of consumption can help us to rethink and reconsider how capitalism works with respect to space. As Canetti put it – in a somewhat different context – "One of the consequences of this increase in production is that more and more people are wanted. The more goods we produce, the more consumers we need. The point of business is the winning of as many customers as possible; and ideally everyone. In this respect it resembles if only superficially those universal religions which lay claim to every single soul" (Canetti, 1962: 465–466). The consumer society, therefore, socialises the masses as consumers in exactly the same way industrial capitalism is about socialising the masses as producers. This is why "A consumer is never isolated any more than a speaker" (Baudrillard, 1981: 75). And as Baudrillard (1993) has suggested, it is not needs that are the fruits of production but the system of needs, which is the product of the system of production. Utility, needs and use-values thus

are susceptible to and obey the same social logic as exchange-values obey. “In fact the liberty to consume is of the same order as the freedom offered by the labour market. The capitalist system was erected on this liberty – on the formal emancipation of the labour force (and not the concrete autonomy of work, which it abolishes)” (Baudrillard, 1981: 82). Hence, there is nothing real or natural about needs. “To sum up: man is not simply there first equipped with his needs [...] for man never really does come face to face with his own needs” (Baudrillard, 1981: 86).

The above brief account gives an idea of what is meant by a *systemic* theory of the consumer society and what it means to conceive of needs as a system of cultural production, that is, a system as commensurable and quantifiable as the system of exchange values is. The Old Town is fully enmeshed in such processes that have led to a remarkable transformation of its built environment as a result of the cultural consummation of almost everything in town, especially its built environment. The restructuring of the spatial configuration of the Old Town, therefore, makes it absolutely necessary to integrate the geography of Rethemnos with a theory of the consumer society in the wake of the political economy of the sign (Baudrillard, 1981); especially since consumption produces an uneven geographical landscape, dividing the town roughly in two parts, which nevertheless extend, expand and flow over each other. The logic of consumption, however, not only exploits an already existing social geography, but sets in motion a spatial configuration, which did not, originally, exist. The Venetian past although an immanent part of the town from the very beginning, is now given over to the intensification, overaccumulation, and simulation of the consumer society, which is not about arguing that the Venetian history is not and should not be an integral part of Rethemnos’ identity and its cultural heritage. What I am suggesting however, is that the Venetian history was only *a* part of the history of the town, which has been intensively and hugely commercialized, commodified, and ultimately turned into the *only* history that matters in town over the last the thirty or forty years.

As a consequence of the monumentalization² of the town, many shops, bars and restaurants have now opened and many Venetian properties selling consumer goods have been beautifully restored. Yet properties housing families and tenants in the western part of the Old Town are left unconverted, a process, as previously mentioned, that began from the time the town was declared a monument in 1967, and according to which any type of restoration, however small or insignificant, had first to be officially approved by the strict criteria and bureaucratic documentation prescribed by the Archaeological Service. The Archaeology Service's documentation and the restoration data offer such a useful basis, therefore, on the grounds of which one can unpack the way in which a fully-fledged consumer society occupies, exploits and re-appropriates the social spaces and built environment of the Old Town, with respect to the restorations and alterations that have been carried out on the buildings. The changes the built environment has been subject to over the last thirty years is indicative of the extent to which the monumentalization of the town altered and significantly transformed the geography of the town, by glimpsing, for example, into the number of the converted houses, the type and uses of the properties that are now dominant, and the extent to which these changes and transitions go hand in hand with a fully-fledged consumer society and its geographical variation. The operationalization of the division between the repressed and the seduced by taking account of the Venetian buildings restorations, however, is not meant as a method that seeks to establish in some kind of positivist manner whether the proposed theory is useful or applicable. As was already mentioned, Rethemnos holds as an illustrative case-study or a symptom that may help us to think of the way in which space, place and the subject are negotiated at the dawn of consumerism, opening up new ways in order to think about how theory works when is brought to bear upon an errant social reality that is irreducibly dynamic. The restoration project is useful, moreover, in that it allows us to go beyond the poetic, spontaneous or informal conceptualizations of the Mediterranean city. Given therefore, that my intention is to furnish and equip the theoretical suggestions with the pragmatics and analytics of a place, the data collected in the Archaeological Service are only meant to help us re-considering and re-constructing our understanding of the implications and far-reaching consequences a full-blown consumer society has for the geography of the Old Town.

² In Foucauldian terms that process may be also termed a 'documentarization' of the town – a useful observation which I owe to Mat Hannah's patient reading of my thesis.

In the archive of the Archaeological Service one can find files containing information on the restorations that were approved, applications for restorations that failed to get permission, files containing information on illegal interventions and restorations and files that had no evidence whatsoever about any restoration. Since I wanted to look at the morphological changes and restorations of the properties that were officially approved by the Archaeology Service, I had to produce a statistically representative sample of the houses that appeared in the files – with a 10% sample of the properties being satisfactory. The sample numbered 180 properties out of a total population of 1800 buildings – though the buildings I ended up with were 175. There are currently 2200 properties in the Old Town, but I did not count 400 properties that were not included in the files, either because no documentation was available or because they concerned buildings or properties that have never been restored. A very practical and improvised way to deal with the ‘representativeness’ of the sample under the circumstances – many files were missing, others were incomplete or lost – was to give a number from 1 to 1800 to each of the files (each file should contain all documents and applications made for and referring to one particular house) and write down the address, architectural characteristics and recent restorations of each property and then using excel, to produce a second column mixing the original 1800 numbers. A third column produced in the same manner, and which included the 180 numbers that were originally selected, had then to be matched with the first column of the 1800 properties. We will see in Chapter 9 by way of Badiou’s subtractive ontology how the Archaeology Service can be taken to constitute an Encyclopaedia, in the way meant by Badiou, of a fully deployed and unfettered historical situation within which an eventual site may occur and which in turn can set free and unleash the undecidable multiplicity beyond the territorial and narrow identification processes to which the subject was submitted once Mediterraneanism was in charge.

I set out to map how the houses were used (for example as shops, restaurants, private tenancies etc.) and whether these uses had changed in the last 30-40 years, that is, from the time the town was declared a monument. Moreover, in more concrete terms, I explore the changing geography of these uses in the Old Town in an attempt to conceptualize whether the changing attitude of the residents toward the state and the restoration project was pertinent to the newly founded Houses’ Owners Association

(AROOT) in 1994. The original Houses' Owners Association (OTHOA) of the late 1970s was strongly posited against any type of state intervention, yet the reinstitution of AROOT in 1994, marked not only the creation of a new society but the reorientation and changing attitude of the resident toward the state and the restoration project. To explore the extent to which the changing attitude of the Houses' Owners Association toward the restoration project is associated with and tantamount to the current commodification of the built environment is one of the tasks of the present thesis. Mapping in other words how the intense socio-spatial unevenness of the predominance of aesthetic spacing and the division between the repressed and the seduced in the Old Town resonates with the morphology, uses and restorations of the Venetian properties is an attempt to integrate the formal discourses of consumerism with the problems and uses of social space on more pragmatistical and empirical grounds. I did not, however, intend to impose a theory of some western origin, on the social reality of Rethemnos, but sought to explore instead and map how a theory of consumerism can be brought to bear upon the everyday understandings and discourses of the Rethemniots by figuring out the changing Venetian environment, acknowledging at the same time that such a mapping is not possible, unless a fuller appreciation of the event is to emerge, which makes ethics and most importantly the subject, possible. It is to this task that I now turn summarizing not only the above discussion, but mostly offering an account and experience of the ethics of the event.

2.8 The Ethics of the Event

The ethnography of the event is the methodological peregrination that establishes the non-being of a truly universal singularity in an attempt to take flight from traditional ethnography, which never really breaks with the authority of the ethnographer, the metaphysics of presence and the detemporalization of social space (Fabian, 1982). The event, as was shown above, makes a hole in knowledge and yet truth, as Badiou (2003) argues, drawing on the Pauline antiphilosophy, is simply defiant of context, even if the subject, which Badiou calls a 'universal singularity without identity', may follow faithfully the truth procedure after the intervention of an event. Truth, in other words, is a process which is set in motion and not an empirically documented reality under the jurisdiction of Law – poetics, the Greek state, officialdom etc. The event, by the same token, is affirmative before being negative, contradictory or oppositional. Moreover, the event does not pick on some key-informants, insofar as it remains open

to that which happens, to the inconsistent multiplicity, which is yet to come; a wholly other which is totally indiscernible and undecidable and which neither forces nor appropriates a subject or a place. The ethnography of the event, moreover, is not obsessed with the objectivity, repeatability and generality of the findings of the research. This is because first, truth in Badiou's philosophy is a process and not simply an objective or a fact; second, because what is termed 'universal' does not necessarily mean or coincide with what is implied by 'objective'; third, because repeatability, as we will see, stands for and implies a difference-producing repetition, a difference in the Idea, a difference without concept, which is difference in-itself rather than the Same, the Analogous, or the Representational (Deleuze, 1994); and fourth, because to generalize means to explain how and why a particular event may be found useful in making sense of a similar process in another context, whilst as I have already suggested, an event is simply what happens, pure multiplicity which escapes the jurisdiction of Law, language, prediction and prognostication. This does not, necessarily, mean that meanings, symbols and practices, in the way purported by Marcus' and Fisher's ethnography, are a-contextual or immaterial. Rather, it means that meanings and practices are deconstructed with respect to manifold spacings, differences in continuous variation, differential repetitions, becomings, supplements, prosthetic traces and non-present differences that form a horizon of relations of speed and slowness, immanence and consistency, defamilialization and defamiliarization, beyond Mediterraneanist and territorial understandings of space. The ethnography of the event, in other words, is not defiant of historical sensitivity; it is not a system closed upon itself either, but an open and aleatory process composed of inconsistent and non-unified multiplicities that yearn for and are fascinated with what *takes place* – what Doel (1999) suggested in his 'diabolical art of spatial science', in relationship to *space taking place*. Finally, the ethnography of the event is subtractive, to the extent that it speaks of beings and subjects without reference to their attributes, qualities, presences, losses, lacks, substances or identities – for strictly speaking, no reference to 'ones' is allowed in the evental constellation. As Badiou (2003: 49) aptly sums it up, "the event has not come to prove something; it is pure beginning [...]. There is no proof of the event; nor is the event a proof". Rather it presents "itself as pure givenness" (Badiou, 2003: 63), a non- dialectical *charis* – in Greek both joy and unlimited offer – that is affirmative rather than negative, reciprocal or obligatory. It is time, however, to turn to the deconstruction of Mediterraneanist identities starting to

chart how the symptoms of shame, honour, and poetics have failed to theorize the irreducibility of the event.

PART TWO: DECONSTRUCTING

MEDITERRANEANISM I: MAPPING THE SUBJECT

CHAPTER THREE: MEDITERRANEANIST IDENTITIES

3.1 Introduction

Deconstructing Mediterraneanist identifications (shame, honour, poetics, friends of the heart, womanhood), is not, necessarily, about destroying them. To start groping around the model of shame-and-honour, dominant in Mediterranean studies in the 1960s and 1970s and which asserted that it is the values of shame and honour with which women and men identify and associate themselves in the Mediterranean region, is what I propose now, unhinging what holds such a form of thought together. I argue, despite the latter being a mode of thought largely abandoned in recent years, that it is still useful to see how poststructuralist theory splays it out and stretches it beyond meaning and being, along the lines of active becoming, affirming otherness and infinite alterity. Subsequently, I take up on the model of poetics (Herzfeld, 1985), a mode of thought which is heavily enmeshed and closely tied to the dialectic, which I suggest fails to provide convincing excuses for 'the sin of Mediterraneanism' (Herzfeld, 2004), in order accordingly, to deconstruct Papataxiarchis' (1991) assertions of the 'friends of the heart', and 'coffee-shop commensality' as a means to transcend the strictures and limitations of gift exchange. Finally, I set in motion Dubisch's (1995) 'poetics of womanhood', a mode of thought that conceives of women, exclusively, on the side of the negative and the reactive ontologies of presence – as in religious rituals – in an attempt to reconceptualize and restructure how gender is understood once it is given over to the Body without Organs and becoming-woman by recourse to Deleuzoguattarian philosophy. While such distinctive moments constitute a premature attempt to deconstruct the sedentary identifications of Mediterraneanism, it is Chapter 4 that unfolds and pushes to its logical conclusion the full implications of the above movement, reinscribing difference on the plane of differential repetition (Deleuze), the counterfeit (Derrida), and becoming-woman (Deleuze and Guattari).

3.2 The Shame-and-Honour Model

As Du Boulay (1974: 4) put it in her anthropological account *A Portrait of a Greek Mountain Village*, a small village in Evoia, Greece, where she conducted fieldwork in late 1960s, “I have been looking for a village without regular transport and thus without too constant communication with the more urban oriented world”. What I want to do here is challenge such a unitary conception of place, mostly with reference to honour, that haunts the early ethnographic depictions of the 1960s and 1970s as indicative of the obsession with the innocence and transparency of place and the metaphysics of presence that take honour not as a “commodity which may be gained or lost easily in the seesaw of social competition, but something which men and women are born, which they lose only in an extreme situation, and which, once lost, tends to be lost for ever” (Du Boulay, 1974: 107). My argument will be that honour is already *differential* before it is subject to such an eternal, undisputed and steady system of evaluation which is allegedly not easily violated by the play of differences and that not everyone is born into the same system of honour nor is honour the same for everyone nor is the same honour at stake in all different expressions and aspects of social life. Honour is a commodity like everything else that classifies and signifies, that is, a totally commensurable and quantifiable trace which chimes with the acceptance that there are some people being clearly more honourable than others. For John Peristiany (1965: 11), the theorist of Mediterranean studies whose influential collection of essays *Honour and Shame, the Values of Mediterranean Societies*, has long ago laid the groundwork for the unitary fashion under the lens of which Mediterranean societies have come to be viewed, “Honour and shame are the constant preoccupation of individuals in small scale, exclusive societies where face to face personal, as opposed to anonymous, relations are of paramount importance”, while Pitt-Rivers (1965: 22), in the same collection of essays, throws his backing behind a similar reasoning by pointing out that “Honour, therefore, provides a nexus between the ideals of a society and their reproduction in the individual through his aspiration to personify them”.

Yet what does it mean to say that one is born into honour or that honour is a social attribute, if not that there is a quotation market of signs and differences that differ and defer various sizes, portions and levels of honour? Honour, in other words, can be, perfectly, comparable and quantified just like any other marketable good, which is

entirely enmeshed in power relations. The British anthropologist John Campbell, who was one of the first anthropologists to undertake fieldwork research and carry out a detailed ethnographic study of the Sarakatsani nomadic population of northern Greece, promoted the view that “the basis of social reputation for a family is the recognition that it has honour (*temi*), a word which is also used in Greek language to describe the monetary price, or value of an object or service”. But as he, interestingly, went on to suggest “*Temi* expresses the notion of worth whether this is an economic value in market or social worth evaluated in a complex of competing groups and individuals” (Campbell, 1965: 143–144). It is tempting, therefore, to note that since honour is an equivalent of *temi*, then honour is not the other of *temi* but no other than *temi*; and that it works in a similar way any other sign works in a market of signification and differentiation. Honour, it could be argued, is pure and simple commensurability and exchangeability itself.

There are more to come with respect to how honour works in terms of the often disregarded and usually unappreciated differentiation that sweeps differences. As Pitt-Rivers (1965: 32) logically pointed out, “On the one hand, honour demands keeping in faith and to break one’s word or to lie is the most dishonorable conduct, yet in fact a man is permitted to lie and to deceive without forfeiting his honour”. This is a remarkable statement, though, if attention is paid, in that it affirms that honour exists in various stakes and exchanges, and in various shapes and degrees of difference and that it holds independently from and irrespective of what one does. For honour, truly, fails to be solidly and permanently defined slipping always from any hegemonic discourse that wants to block it, given that by managing to be honourable while ‘permitted to lie’ simply affirms that there are honours that not only are more honourable than others but that, occasionally, may go beyond a narrow understanding of what is tacitly expected from a ‘honourable attitude’, in that, for example, even a lie, occasionally and on condition, can be taken as a mark or a sign of honour.

The anthropologist Michael Herzfeld (1987: 75) has rightly argued that “the old ‘label’ of honour might be usefully displaced by descriptively simpler and less ambiguous glosses such as ‘hospitality’ in order to allow more precisely calibrated comparisons”. However, hospitality is no less indifferent or ill-judged than honour, even if, theoretically, it goes beyond the Mediterraneanist gloss of honour. For, what

does comparison mean? Is it about comparing differences across various geographical areas? Even if hospitality seems a more sensitive concept on the back of which the Mediterranean distinctiveness can be fully or more productively assigned to or examined, comparison still inclines toward processes of inclusion and exclusion (for in order to compare there has to be some 'solid', or 'stable' yardstick on the basis of which one can account for any difference) that cling on various aspects of Mediterraneanist assumptions without avoiding the trap of the unitary conception of the Mediterranean; rather the opposite is the case since by 'comparing' things, entities and traits of a behaviour or a culture novel forms of consolidating Mediterraneanism are permitted that can hardly ooze away or wipe out unification. One (a theorist who wants to study the Mediterranean) should, therefore, go beyond a conceptual, external and representational understanding of difference taking up instead on a difference without identity, which will affirm the return not of the same (honour), but of the differential repetition, manifold spacing, chance and becoming-other of a wholly other honour that in a certain Nietzschean sense returns; but in a way which is eternal ('eternal return').

The position I am converging on thus is not that honour should be abandoned as a means through which one should come to terms with Mediterranean societies, but that in Mediterraneanist writings, the concept of honour shores up or presupposes a hidden rationality that is not yet disclosed and a unitary fashion that remains to be discovered. Such a strategy of writing prioritizes the 'weak', the 'irrational' and the 'object' of study, without taking into account the fact that the so-called object of study is already intoxicated, contaminated and altered by differential doctrines; and without reckoning with the fact that difference has been already an organizing principle of the Mediterranean societies before honour is called forth. On another Mediterraneanist occasion, *patronage* (an indirect informal electoral-network based on mutual favours between citizens and politicians) was often presented as a political form that substitutes for the absence of a well-organized capitalist state, something which in a certain evolutionist sense implied that patronage should be seen as an inchoate and yet incomplete, in the process of becoming, form or infant stage of a fully operational state. Kenny (1963: 158), for example, saw patronage "acting as a control, a check, a balance and indeed an insurance against the misuse of official institutionalised power", whilst Campbell (1964: 260) argued that "Patronage is the means through

which the local community is linked to the wider national society". Such a rhetoric however, still depends on a dubious philosophical theorizing that enhances and accentuates the irrational and the marginal, lying on ontologies and geographies of presence (the state is present in the form of *patronage*), loss (the western type of state is missing) and lack (*patronage* is a dysfunctional state but soon to be fully operational).

Interestingly, however, such controversies cannot be easily resolved or confronted. For one thing because it is hard to tell whether honour is an individual category or a social/collective value, and yet for another, as Bourdieu (1965: 211) for his part pointed out adding a further twist to the above confusion, because honour is "the basis of the moral code of an individual who sees himself always through the eyes of others, who has need of other for his existence, because the image he has of himself is indistinguishable form that presented to him by other people". But again, what does it mean to conceive of honour through the 'eyes of the others'? One could argue that all men have honour to the extent that all people are seen 'through the eyes of the others', and yet it can be, easily, counterclaimed that honour is easily violated in the long course of the contested and a(nta)gonistic daily affairs of the community because of or through exactly the same 'lens of the others', insofar as by living in a small community one's actions are always subject to close and careful scrutiny as a result of the transparency of social spaces and the greater level of interdependence among the members of the community. Thus in Campbell's (1964: 297) account of the Sarakatsani nomads, honour is caught up within, on the one hand the "ideal equality of honourable men" and on the other hand, the "inequalities, which differentiate families in terms of numbers and wealth and certain other criteria". Campbell, accordingly, thinks honour through an alleged capacity to reconcile and bring together two separate systems of classification, the one ideal/religious and it goes without saying more 'just', the other material/secular, and by implication, unfair, uneven and highly discriminating, both of which in many respects and at first glance seem to be hugely ineffective, antagonistic and incompatible. What Campbell suggests, however, is that to the extent that the ideals and criteria of the Greek Christian Orthodox religion (the dominant religion in Greece claiming its own right/*ortho* glory-belief/*doxa*) are defiant of the wrongs and injustices of life, while by contrast, the struggles and battles among the Sarakatsani seem to neglect the ethics and ideals of

Christianity, honour is able to bring together and reconcile such ostensibly incompatible and diametrically opposed social systems of value and classification. As Campbell put it, “there remains an opposition between Christian ideals and the values of prestige. Fortunately or otherwise, the Sarakatsani, do not see this; partly because the two value systems either appear to be complementary as in family or kindred, or in other areas of social life they are relatively segregated in their incidence; and partly because the individual thinking in egocentric terms cannot see that his own honour, prestige, pride and self-regard threaten another” (Campbell, 1964: 356).

Yet this is a metaphysical distinction between an ideal and a material honour, that is, an ontoteleological expression of the metaphysics of presence, the geographies of absence and the ontologies of loss and lack that are part and parcel of the discourse of Mediterraneanism; for there seems to be little evidence to suggest that there is a clear-cut and undisputable line of distinction between the two classification systems. Not only because the Sarakatsani believe in some kind of theological justice in terms of honour, but because they fail, precisely, to see the apparent contradiction between an ideal and a material expression of honour, that is, because – according to Campbell – “*Fortunately or otherwise, the Sarakatsani, do not see this*” (emphasis mine). Long live the blindness of the primitives! Honour, therefore, is a potential, or a means through which to make sense of Mediterranean societies, but only inasmuch as and on condition that the Sarakatsani fail to consider how wrongly put honour is when taken up by their ‘impoverished’ discourses. As Davis (1977: 96) notes, with respect to Campbell’s idealization of honour, “It is difficult to escape the conclusion that honour is, in spite of Campbell’s assertions to the contrary, intimately related to wealth” (Davis, 1977: 96). The inevitable contradiction to be found in such conceptions that want to separate and seclude once and for all an ideal from a material honour, is better summarized by Pitt-Rivers’ (1965: 25, emphasis mine) brief comment below, who seems to realize or suspect that the controversy should be part of the widely and often unquestionably accepted unitary ground which the Mediterranean studies have hitherto taken for granted, “*No stereotype of the Mediterranean Countryman emerges, but some of the ways in which the rural communities of the Mediterranean differ are explained not only in terms of the different cultures to which they belong, but in terms of the mode of their integration into the nation of which they are part*”.

The gloss of honour, therefore, and not the practice of it, that is, the fact that honour should according to Mediterraneanist a key paragon determining by and large, the Mediterranean way of life, depends on dualistic interpretations, contradictions and oppositions. On the face of such reasoning, however, a difference should become a certain kind of knowledge and thus it should miss, accordingly, the potential of being subject to continual and contingent transformations and permutations (which is after all what should matter to any *real* difference). Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers (1992: 6), not long ago, have insisted on the fact that “Our aim in treating the Mediterranean as a whole was epistemological only and we never attempted to define it geographically”. Yet the alleged wholeness, unity or totality of the Mediterranean should be questioned and challenged, not only in terms of an empirical or geographical documentation that will prove that honour, for example, is irrelevant to the Mediterranean, but crucially as a result of a critical examination of the theories put forward to interpret the Mediterranean reality. I am not saying, in other words, that honour does not exist in the Mediterranean, but what I suggest is that the Mediterranean identity is unaccomplished, perpetually negotiated and deterritorialized rather than an imprint or a sign of a territorial understanding of difference that should be necessarily assigned to or explained through the gloss of an all-encompassing honour. Fazio (2004), for example, is not only sceptical about the “paradigm of the Mediterranean honour” but, contra Peristiany’s (1976: 2) assertion, that every family “is always of the nuclear bilateral type”, Fazio points out that “families in the so-called Mediterranean area were not linked by any strict homogeneity of structure” (Fazio, 2004: 267). And even if Davis (1977: 11) argues that “there is some sense in which the Mediterranean is a useful category”, as he soon goes on to suggest, “honour, is not primarily to do with sexual intercourse [...] but with the performance of sexual roles: to be good of your kind” (Davis, 1977: 76).

Honour, if such there is, however is not simply performative – in the sense that it is not a social role or a ‘clothing’ played by an actor, who when finished would put it away, in order to be readily redeployed when occasion or duty calls. It is both an ideological/spiritual trait and a social/material condition of difference, that is, a mark of an untraceable non-originary difference, a certain form of ‘dematerialization’ as Lyotard (1993: 44) put it, which is not assignable to any Mediterranean idiosyncrasy. Honour is neither a matter of quality nor a matter of quantity in the manner in which

Campbell's ethnography strives to establish, nor is it a sign of an existent signified in the Mediterranean, but involves instead variations in and of difference, and differential repetitions, which as we will see with respect to Deleuze's philosophy, refers to a *difference-producing repetition*. For as Deleuze put it "This is why the variations do not come from without, do not express a secondary compromise between a repressing instance and a represented instance and must not be understood on the basis of the still negative forms of oppositions, reversal or overturning" (Deleuze, 1994: 17). If honour is to be taken seriously, therefore, difference should not be manifested in a straightforward manner or mediated by identity, representation, resemblance or analogy, but should be acknowledged "In its essence, [as] difference [which] is the object of affirmation or affirmation itself" (Deleuze, 1994: 52). For honour may be repeated in the various small communities across the Mediterranean, but repetition, all these second-comings of difference, are not about the same honour, but concern a differential honour, which comes prior to any reflection of honour, as "*Repetition is a condition of action before it is a concept of reflection*" (Deleuze, 1994: 90). And thus the whole issue is not about the return of the same honour, but, on the contrary, "it affirms everything of the multiple, everything of the different, everything of chance *except* what subordinates them to the One, to the Same, to necessity, everything *except* the One, the Same and the Necessary" (Deleuze, 1994: 115). That honour is difference, comes down to saying, therefore, that it is always eternal and intrinsic (in-itself), for "everything is a multiplicity in so far as it incarnates an Idea" (Deleuze, 1994: 182).

Herzfeld's (1985, 1987) and Papataxiarchis' (1991) accounts do not move effectively beyond the above deficiencies and controversies of the shame-and-honour model; and thus there is still a need to set in motion the metaphysical, ontotheological and teleological nature of the poetic model, which fails to overcome the metaphysics of presence, the geographies of absence and the ontologies of lack and loss of the shame-and-honour that were made possible and were formed on the back of the unitary conception of the Mediterranean. Let us focus, therefore, on the poetic turn which had a massive influence in the way in which Mediterraneanist studies were shaped in the 1980s, as was explained by the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld and his ethnographies carried out especially with reference to the island of Crete, Southern Greece.

3.3 The Poetic Model

The model of poetics launched in the Mediterranean imaginary in the early 1980s, set out to analyze the behaviours and attitudes of Mediterranean people, and to explore in particular how “a man’s performance successfully announces his personal excellence” (Herzfeld, 1985: 11). Poetics intended to move beyond the distinction between the observer (anthropologist) and the observed (Mediterranean societies), a dualism often taken for granted in the classical anthropological texts of the 1950s and 1960s, reconciling theory (social anthropology) with a certain practical way of doing ethnography in the Mediterranean, drawing, for example, on particular fieldwork experiences, like that of Glendi – a pseudonym for the village where Herzfeld conducted his first major fieldwork in Crete (Herzfeld, 1985). I do not seek to deny the usefulness of his entire work here, nor do I intend to document its methodological flaws – not that that would be an easy task. I want to criticize, however, but only in an attempt to construct my argument by way of *a* deconstruction of Mediterraneanist identities, which I shall further pursue in subsequent chapters, the grounds on which the epistemological and ontological presuppositions of the poetic model rest, destabilizing and loosening this holding formation that in my view is closely associated with the discourse of Mediterraneanism, especially the rationalist epistemology, unitary perception, dualistic nature, metaphysics of presence-ontology, and dialectical resolution of difference.

In his *Poetics of Manhood* (1985), Herzfeld defines poetics as the thought that “does not furnish a means of prediction. On the contrary, it is a conceptual and rhetorical tool for defending one’s actions [...] subject to negotiation and manipulation for individual purposes” (Herzfeld, 1985: 84). What matters to Herzfeld, accordingly, is the informal language and discourses of the people that live in the Mediterranean region, rather than the more strict, officially derived discourses that obfuscate and confuse a socially constructed and meaningful understanding of one’s place. Official history is further deconstructed in Herzfeld’s *A Place in History* (1991) through and because of the daily uses and reuses of the words and meanings of the residents that reconstruct the official understandings of their place’s identity, in a manner in which according to Herzfeld, is defiant of the formal language endowed by the Statist ideology of the Greek nation-state. For as Herzfeld sums it up with respect to his ethnographic experience in mountain Crete, Glendi is “a world that seems to have less

and less to do with the official acceptance face of the national culture” (Herzfeld, 1985: 122).

Official interpretations and unofficial uses of history, however, are not as homogeneous as Herzfeld seems to assert. Everyday discourses can leak in all possible directions, and not solely or unilaterally against official interpretations of history, which are always internal or external to an already existent understanding of history, to the extent of course, that the internal is the internal of the external (of the internal and so on) or the external is the external of the internal (of the external and so on). Once however official history is opposed with a socially constructed understanding of a place’s identity, and once this becomes the ‘call of the day’, the infinite substitution, supplementarity and prostheses of the suspended marks that come between the two instances are considerably threatened. This is why the social imaginary of a place that remains intact and untouchable, promoted by the poetic model should not, necessarily, oppose the officially and historically incarnated and informed conceptions of history with a lay, popular or traditional rhetoric. It is hard to tell the difference between the bureaucrat and the local/resident, for example, once identity is seen as an unaccomplished and unfinished project that does not await accommodation (in the sense that an individual can be at different times a bureaucrat *and* a resident *and...and...infinite*) but strives to and leans toward a relentless play of unassimilated differences. Du Boulay’s earlier desire to find a place beyond any possible urban influence is, I argued, very telling of anthropology’s inability to make sense of such intermingled, interwoven and interimplicated identities beyond any desire for stabilization and permanence. Herzfeld’s account, however, is not that different from such a spatial purity, in that they both presuppose and accept the authenticity of place, which is in danger of getting violently taken over by a foreign/external ‘evil’ or an additive supplement.

One becomes more suspicious when Herzfeld (1985: 171) points out the “initiation into manhood [...] must be convincingly exhibited”, which is an assertion that still fathoms Campbell’s attempt to draw a demarcation line between immaterial and material forms of honour. In Campbell’s account, recall, it is the immaterial aspect of honour that counts, even if the Sarakatsani seem to ignore or to be negligent of how oppositional and idealized such a conception of honour remains, when brushed

against the prestige and wealth of material life. A similar idealism, however, is not absent from Herzfeld's theorization of manhood either, for what else could be, meant, by the 'convincing exhibition of manhood' other than the fact that 'we all know that you are a man now but, nevertheless, you should act or speak or perform like man', something that further implies, that one does not have to 'be' in a very 'practical' or 'material', so to speak, sense a man, if such there is, but that he should convincingly/ideally 'show' or 'prove' it?

The above unchallenged idealism is also evident in the manner in which animal theft is theorized by Herzfeld, which, as he suggests, nowadays has become an act of financial profit, whereas in the past it used to be an equivalent of "personal revenge or the creation of new ties of *sindeknia* [kin relations]" (Herzfeld, (1985: 267). According to that, the commodification of animal theft, ought to be considered as a consequence of the massive scale of raids, which thwarts the traditional way of exposing and negotiating perceptions and meanings of manliness, gagging in that way what used to be an explicitly or utterly verbal, expressive or poetic exposition or ability to sustain social bonds. Little wonder then, that for Herzfeld "as far as most Glendiots are concerned, [it] lack[s] the poeticity that gives *simasia* [meaning] to male action" (Herzfeld, 1985: 268–269). The modern/commodified raid is a threat to the original, transparent, meaningful and innocent animal theft on the grounds of the scale of the theft and thus by implication some people are entitled to the corollary of *simasia*, whilst others are not. But isn't that an exotic picture of the original theft? Is the seizing of animals only a matter of numbers? How to make sense of or distil from the distinction between the poetic raid and its modern counterpart in the light of the above, if not by conceiving of the original theft as an innocent, sensible and defensible action of poetic meaning, while the recent transformed and corrupted form of mass raid, as a perverse metamorphosis that lacks any poetic essence? And isn't that, as Derrida (1976) put it with respect to Levi-Straus' anthropology, an exoticism, which on the grounds of the superficial 'writing/non-writing' distinction, thinks of itself as progressive liberalism?

In his *Anthropology Through the Looking Glass*, (1987) Herzfeld has further advanced his poetic model by arguing that "Everyday usage breaks the uniformity of official definition; *istories* and *dhiafores*, quarrels and differences – the contentions

matter of actual events – challenge the verified history of a politically, religiously and culturally homogeneous nation state” (Herzfeld, 1987: 141). This is not, necessarily, wrong, yet it is one thing to conceive of local culture as a totality composed of various everyday practices and quite another to move exclusively from one concept (nation-state) to another (everyday life/poetics). And despite the fact that Herzfeld (1987: 185) acknowledges “that no anthropological formulation has much value if it is taken out of its historical context”, the Scylla of naïve relativism and the Charybdis of the fixity, illusory stability and constancy of a place’s history are not swept away, unless a differential, non-representational theory of difference is to emerge. Prior to dipping, however, into this theorization, let me keep unfolding and unhinging the joints of the poetic model in an attempt to specify and draw attention to the ontological bonds and ties that stubbornly enough ties and hold this formation steadily together.

Segmentation is another of Herzfeld’s terms, an allegedly plural, affirmative and variable image of thought linking the various aspects of social life with the more specific attributes and behaviours of the individual. Segmentation does not sit easily, however, with Herzfeld’s (1982) earlier work on the ‘disemic nature’ of Greece – from *dio simia*, two signs – which rests on the binaries, strictures and contradictions “between official discourse and social knowledge” (Herzfeld, 1987: 152). If the segmentary model is plural, affirmative and active, the model of disemia remains dualistic, dialectic, transcendental, constant, and irrevocably negative. How can disemia and its strict and Statist philosophy and designations of choice (the one or the other), hierarchy (the one over the other), and contradiction (the one versus the other), fit and be ascribed to the many, heterological, polymorphous, multiple, infinite, manifold, differential and innumerable lines of flight of Glendi’s deterritorialized identities? Moreover, the need to “pursue this exercise in doing to ourselves as we have done to others” (Herzfeld, 1987: 96), which prompts anthropologists to do with theory/anthropology what they normally undertake during their ethnographic fieldwork – most likely, finding out and categorizing the whereabouts of people the ethnographer is not familiar with – is nihilistic and ascetic, seeking only to blame, accuse and punish. It is a slave’s poetics, which is deeply reactive, inferior, unproductive, submissive, negative and guilty. Little wonder, then, that theories of difference and otherness do not seem to be to Herzfeld’s taste, but are mistakenly taken (Herzfeld, 1987: 113) as the product of a “fashionable [...] era [that] attack[s]

any binary code as evidence of the imposition of a foreign system on indigenous values". Yet, this is clearly an oversimplification and misunderstanding of poststructuralism. Theories of difference do not simply attack binary codes, but instead encapsulate and affirm difference, as repetition in continuous variation, that is, a non-present, non-originary and graphematic difference, beyond the One (honour), the Other (shame), the Same (poetics) and the Many (friends of the heart).

Even if "a pragmatic concern with display and concealment is a key to the front and back door of Greek culture" (Herzfeld, 1991: 40), such a seemingly correct statement cannot hide the fact that the poetic model is still based on the domesticity of display and concealment, which says more about the relationship of anthropology to the Mediterranean rather than it says about the Mediterranean region itself. And even if it is generally correct to assert that "monumental history has its place in Rethemnos, but Rethemnos has, and is, a place in many histories" (Herzfeld, 1991: 259), one should not forget either that any binary code works perfectly well, however one conceives of the history or identity of a place as long as these terms are taken up solely on the back of the transcendental assumptions and dialectic theorizations of poetics.

Arguing however that such a domestic "alternative rationality [that] recasts the relationship between themselves and the state in ways that are quite alien to official thinking" (Herzfeld, 1991: 159) is ill-mannered and unbecoming, as I am striving to venture thus far, that is, a binary code that does not escape the metaphysics of shame-and-honour, is not about denying the creativity and reflexivity of social actors in re-assembling the social (Latour, 2005), but rather about opposing the negation/contradiction itself, the oppositional and contradictory logic of shame-and-honour, and the antithesis between poetics and official discourses. Failing to come to terms with the irreducible and manifold spacing of such a difference is a symptom of a certain epoch of knowledge, that of Mediterraneanism, that describes rather than invents, discloses rather than produces and unites rather divides the Mediterranean. For truly, there is nothing real, contradictory, dialectical or representational about the Mediterranean, inasmuch as there is no reality, only reality effects, as "Reality 'cannot be used to explain why a statement becomes a fact, since it is only after it has become a fact that the effect of reality is obtained'" (Latour and Woolgar, 1986: 180, cited in Doel, 1999: 123). In the light of the above, the Mediterranean difference is

never present but remains open to the spectrality and ex-appropriation of writing (Derrida, 1994) rather than to any capital appropriation of poetics. I will return to such a hauntological conception of difference with respect to the transitional state of the Mediterranean city in Chapter 4. Suffice it to note for the moment that by ex-appropriation, I mean the “radical contradiction of all ‘capital’ of all property or appropriation, as well as the concepts that depend on it, beginning with that of free subjectivity, thus of emancipation as ordered by these concepts” (Derrida, 1994: 90). Such is the textual and graphematic resonance of the Mediterranean, which will be further pursued with respect to Deleuze’s differential repetitions, Derrida’s counterfeit money and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s becoming-woman in due course. It will be then possible to ground mathematically the unanticipated multiple subjectivity that sits at the edge of an evental site (of Rethemnos) by way of Badiou’s subtractive ontology, which will pick from where Deleuze’s deterritorialization and Derrida’s deconstruction left off. Let us turn, for the moment, to the friends of the heart, and the unwieldy purity of another assimilating effort of Mediterraneanism: commensality.

3.4 The Friends of the Heart

Papataxiarchis’ (1991) study of alcohol consumption in the small Greek coffee shops of Lesbos, an ordered and hierarchical reality most likely to be located in a visible and recognizable part of the village, set out to break with the restricted economic scarcity and obligations of gift exchange. This analysis points to a different kind of sociation called ‘friends of the heart’, which is based on the purity and honesty of commensality in an attempt to move beyond the obligations of gift exchanges. According to Papataxiarchis (1992: 209), the consumption of alcohol in small coffee shops is not so much about the quantity (though how much one drinks is always an issue) or the type of the alcohol consumed, but rather about the manner, recall the poetic excellence noted above, in which a drink is offered and consumed. The manner in which one buys a drink in the coffee shop, so Papataxiarchis suggests, points in the direction of a possible ‘friendly company’ (*parea*) whose members’ excellence will no longer have to be prescribed, limited or bordered by the obligations of the Mausean theory, but due to certain “coffee shop practices”, like the consumption of alcohol, will be given the chance of a “cultural construction of manliness” (Papataxiarchis, 1992: 212), through the pursuing of a truly pure *parea* (friendly

company) (Papataxiarchis, 1992: 216) that in turn will purge the power relations surrounding the village's social life. The one who buys a drink, we are told, prefers to pay it not in front of the other members of the *parea*, but discreetly and almost secretly (Papataxiarchis, 1992: 219).

Yet the mannerism, style and aesthetics of such a poetic consumption of alcohol, do not really transcend the boundaries, obligations and power relationships of the androcracy and hierarchy of the coffee shop. The right to offer a drink is constituted by and constitutive of the social hierarchy of the village and thus commensality does not seem to lie outside the usual restrictions of gift exchanges. The impossible non-economic gift, beyond reciprocity and obligation that Papataxiarchis is in search of, is not about alcohol which fails to generate novel forms and politics of friendship. I propose without further ado that it has to do rather with Derrida's (1992) theorization of the 'counterfeit' which as we shall shortly see can be useful in a two-fold sense; first, in that it paves the way for and corresponds with processes that flee from territorial ways of mapping and understanding identity and the rational, thinking, and parochial subject; and second, in that it engages in a sociation that, crucially, goes beyond reciprocity, economy and exchange deconstructing the strictures of solidity, fixity and constancy of the coffee shop *parea*, readily remaining at the same time, a-signifying, non-reciprocal, non-economic and a-subjective. Such a depersonalized and deindividuated multiplicity that corresponds with 'counterfeit transactions' will come to supplant the unexpected generosity of the coffee-shop by dwelling exclusively on the plane of consistency rather than on the repressive, productive and poetic plane of the friends of the heart. What the counterfeit allows, in other words, is to move beyond the strict boundaries and hierarchies of a coffee shop consumption, in an attempt to conceive of a generic and multiple 'gift', which will be indiscernible, undecidable and unnameable, a multiple, in short, which will not have to further promote or consolidate the gingerly power relations that are about to thrive in the coffee shop.

The counterfeit, as will be shortly shown, is a far more rich and fruitful theoretical-practice that can map the floating experience of space and subject, beyond the Mediterraneanist imaginary of the widely shared conception by anthropologists of a highly idealized conception of provisional coffee shops. For the gift, says Derrida, if

there is any, should remain unspoken, non-reciprocal, unacknowledged and should hold beyond exchange. It is only such a sliding, and splaying out of difference, that is, the gap and distancing between what one should do in order to be altruistic while offering a drink and the choice to ignore or deny such an offer that breaks and interrupts the economic cycle. For there is always delay, deferral and postponement at stake while offering drinks, that is, a challenge that one may accept or totally leave behind. Offering a drink is still very much part of the obligation to give or to receive a gift, whether one calls it 'friends of the heart' or 'pure gift'. The counterfeit, by contrast, tears the economy apart by launching a non-economic, non-symmetrical and non-calculable exchange as the one who gives a gift, experiences the differential calculus of a spatial and temporal distance, that is, an intervallic space, which is neither about altruism nor about friendship. That the counterfeit goes beyond the pointillist anthropology of the coffee shop and can successfully withhold, suspend or postpone a gift and the concomitant hierarchies and power relations and their repercussions that stem from such a domestic space, is what I will be arguing in Chapter 4. Papataxiarchis' notion of the 'purity of the gift', fails to escape the Mausean obligations and restrictions of purity and unification, for, rather than being pure, a gift is fundamentally aporetic and an aporia cannot be resolved. Whilst Papataxiarchis is right in looking for a different conception of the gift beyond the Mausean economic regulations, the asymmetrical gift is not about alcohol but about the reversibility of symbolic exchange, that is, an untraceable and non-present difference that opens a distance between the obligation to receive a gift and the negation of this obligation that is not easily or metaphysically spanned. Such is also the resonance and undecidability that affirms the spatiality, delay and distancing of the event, which contra Papataxiarchis' conception of the value of the gift, acknowledges and eagerly accepts that the a genuinely lasting gift has a value, which is perhaps irremovable (e.g. not exchanged, returned or appreciated *as such*). While a fuller account of the counterfeit is offered in Chapter 4, it is time to turn to Dubisch's poetics of womanhood, which still irresponsibly bathes in the grid of the negativism, reaction, bad conscience and guilt of the dialectical denigrations of the poetic model.

3.5 The Poetics of Womanhood

The problem besetting Dubisch's (1995) poetics of womanhood bounces off a possible writing of women's histories and rites of passage in the Greek island of

Tinos, where women may appear to have a prominent role in the usually male domesticated public spaces, through their participation in religious rituals and rituals of mourning. As Dubisch argues, women's presence in such public spaces allows them to reveal their ability, performances and practices in negotiating meanings and identities and in displaying and showing excellence in an effort to accomplishing specific tasks in places, for example, that are not particularly marked by male dominance. Like Herzfeld's poetics of manhood, however, what matters to Dubisch is the rhetorical and poetic performances according to which a woman can perform and adequately expose her eagerness of being good "at being a woman" (Dubisch, 1995: 206). As Dubisch points out, "through gestures, tone of voice, phrasing and appeal to bystanders as an 'audience', an individual 'frames' certain statements and acts" (Dubisch, 1995: 205) and thus maternity lies at the heart of such performances on the face of which women are enabled to demonstrate and manifest convincing ways of excellence. Exposing maternity allows for various and interesting performances to flourish in public, as a pregnant woman, for example, will exaggerate the way she walks in order to expose in a more dramatic manner her condition. Granted, however, that women quite often in Mediterranean studies have been taken to be symptoms of or synonymous with an unrestrained sexual behaviour, motherhood offers an extremely rich potential, so Dubisch insists, on the grounds of which, women's alleged sinful nature can be effectively exorcised, reversed or redeemed. Reimbursing the heretofore unsatisfied and dangerously exhibited sexuality of women through the ideal of motherhood, in short, can be taken "as the means by which women redeem their inherently sinful nature" (Dubisch, 1995: 208); also, the ability to maintain a household, to cook or to participate in religious and rituals of mourning, can be among other things, a prominent field in and through which women can constantly and further justify their poetic excellence. Such an excellence however, is best measured on the back of performances of pain and suffering which give women the chance to compete, struggle and fight for a 'competitive suffering' (Dubisch, 1995: 215), to be found, for example, in the various ways through which women participate in the religious rituals of Tinos (the Greek Orthodox annual celebration of Madonna, *Panagia*, on the 15th of August), in an attempt to enhance and empower their presence in public spaces (Dubisch, 1995: 212–213).

Yet one cannot but observe that mourning is a highly negative and reactive performance, which should be given over to a more radical and perceptive theory of gender beyond poetics, being simply too narrow, negative, reactive and ascetic a concept. It is Deleuze's becoming-woman that can effectively make space for such a poignantly unsettling theoretical apparatus, which deconstructs the impoverished oedipal sketches of a domestic and reactive representation of women, moving beyond fixity and domestication by affirming that gender "is a case of a 'transition', of a 'change', a becoming, but it is a becoming that endures, a change that is substance itself" (Deleuze, 1991: 37). The reactionary poetics of womanhood when being subject to the liberating effects of becoming-woman are cracked open and worked over by the imperceptibility, undecidability and indiscernibility of a difference without identity, or unity, as the subject, in the light of the above, is neither poetic nor friendly, but "*a manifold, a multiplicity, a rhizome*" (Doel, 2000: 123). For every subject is a multiplicity, especially since, "In contrast to the alternative of the either/or exclusions, there is the either ... or ... or of the combinations and permutations where the differences amount to the same without ceasing to be differences" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 70). When all's said and done, however, becoming-woman knows nothing of the presence of women in public and private spaces and suffering, for "the present *is not*; rather it is pure becoming always outside itself" (Deleuze, 1991: 55).

What is required to take things further is an explication and explanation of the manner in which the affirmative and differential conceptions of difference deconstruct and inhabit what the above hotly contested and disputed ideologies and modes of thought failed to loosen and set in motion, mainly a truly respected difference in accord to what matters to the Mediterranean region and which will no longer have to be seen through the lens of any unitary fashion whatsoever. Such a task is further taken up in the next chapter, by picking up on a difference as differential repetition in an attempt to move beyond shame-and-honour; the counterfeit, as means to go beyond the poetics of the friends of the heart; and becoming-woman, as a means to avoid the trap of the poetics of womanhood; meanwhile an account of Lacan's symbolic register is also offered, introducing the bulk of schizoanalysis and becoming-woman. Having, accordingly, deconstructed in one but four-folded stroke these Mediterraneanist identities, I will be then, hopefully, in a position to undertake a similar deconstruction with respect to the manner in which Mediterraneanist spatialities articulate.

CHAPTER FOUR: DECONSTRUCTING MEDITERRANEANIST IDENTITIES

4.1 Introduction

I have argued so far that Mediterraneanism, specifically the tropes of shame, poetics, friends of the heart, and poetics of womanhood are powerful imaginations swinging a pendulum composed of a bizarre conception of a unitary fashion of the Mediterranean and an unrestrained poetic ability of subjects, which is nonetheless susceptible to criticism on a number of grounds. I stressed the need to move beyond such representations that fall for the One, the Same and the Many in order to ex-appropriate and in-consist difference without unity or identity. I insisted that difference is differential, manifold, kaleidoscopic and fragmented beyond any spontaneous or striated theorization. Having laboured a reversal of Mediterraneanism, I now want to turn to the reinscription and affirmation of difference, by drawing on a) a differential repetitive difference by way of Deleuze's (1994) theory, which substitutes for shame-and-honour; b) the counterfeit of Derrida's (1992) non-reciprocal and impossible gift which substitutes for the friends of the heart, and c) last but not least, the theoretical-practice of becoming-woman of Deleuze and Guattari (1988) that takes over from where the poetics of suffering failed to establish a certain differential picture of gender – though an immature familiarization with Lacan's (1977) theory is also experimented prior to dipping into schizoanalysis and the Body without Organs. Accordingly, and having opened the space for an infinite, indiscernible and undecidable deindividuation, I will be in a position to pick up on the Mediterranean spatiality (Chapter 5) and its deconstruction (Chapter 6) on the grounds of the spatial art of origami and the systemic nature of the consumer society (Chapter 7), in order, consequently, in Part 4 to pave the way for an eventual Rethemnos, which is doubly un-folded, once through the reconsideration and revision of the Old Town problem (Chapter 8) and once again through the contested identification of the choreoethnography of the event and the subtractive ontology of Badiou (Chapter 9).

4.2 Differential Repetitions – Beyond Shame-and-Honour

Difference, I have already argued, is manifold and multiple. And thus Deleuze proposition to think of difference independently of the various forms of representation that often catch hold of it by means of analogy or representation (Deleuze, 1994: 24).

Difference is neither conceptual, nor representational but instead singular at the levels of Ideas and repetitive, and thus whether in Campbell's ideological perception of honour or in Du Boulay's account of a place or even in Herzfeld's notions of concealment and display, it still remains contradictory and representational, dominated by lack, loss and scarcity. Difference though, in a certain Nietzschean sense, should not be mediated, but, instead, should be the object of affirmation and excess, even when it returns, "for eternal return affirmed in all its power, allows no installation of a foundation – ground" (Deleuze, 1994: 67). As a consequence it escapes the anthropological trap of unity, identity and fixity being simply and purely composed of other differences that are not already contradictions. For "It is not difference which presupposes opposition but opposition which presupposes difference" (Deleuze, 1994: 51), to the extent that difference is "light, aerial and affirmative" (Deleuze, 1994: 54), denying the "primacy of original over copy, of model over image" (Deleuze, 1994: 66).

To argue that certain behaviours, patterns and structures 'found' or attributed to Mediterranean societies as portrayed by anthropologists are not real or true or that Mediterranean societies do not have anything in common or have nothing to do with honour, is mistaken. A differential repetition however does not renounce honour, neither refers to objects placed under the same concept, nor is it about the generality or similarity of objects classified according to a concept. Rather a differential repetition changes something in the mind which contemplates it, to the extent that difference in-Itself is "already repetition" (Deleuze, 1994: 124), especially from the moment that honour is not the same for all people, nor is everyone entitled to the same aspects, degrees, variations and differentiations of honour. Taking honour as a representative of Mediterranean societies "fails to capture the affirmed world of difference" (Deleuze, 1994: 55), which is neither the one of honour, nor the same of shame but instead what "*lies between repetitions*" (Deleuze, 1994: 76). A repetition of honour, therefore, is neither about the same honour repeated or constantly reinstated across the Mediterranean world, nor about s(h)ame even in a small community; it is not about what returns, but instead "a force of affirmation, [which] affirms everything of the multiple, everything of the different, everything of chance *except* what subordinates them to the One, to the Same, to necessity, everything *except* the One,

the Same and the Necessary” (Deleuze, 1994: 115). For “*Repetition is a condition of action before it is a concept of reflection*” (Deleuze, 1994: 90).

When honour is seen as a multiplicity that refers to other differences that differentiate rather than identify a place with a certain identity, attitude or behaviour of honour, Deleuze’s differential calculus of Ideas becomes all the more pertinent, to the extent that it involves “Ideas [that] are differentials of thought [...] a differential calculus corresponding to each Idea, an alphabet of what it means to think” (Deleuze, 1994: 181). For, truly, “everything bathes in its difference” (Deleuze, 1994: 243), in the same way, the true difference of honour like the throw of a dice returns not in the same or in an identical manner (the same honour on and on and on again), but in a way which affirms chance, infinity, chaos and osmosis. Can one, at least, assume that honour is of Mediterranean origin? Yes, insofar as one accepts that any origin is an origin of another origin and so on in a certain *grammatological* way Derrida (1976). Honour thus is an original difference in the Mediterranean, but only to the extent that it concerns a honour of honour (of honour...infinite), which in turn refers to and is associated with variations of ‘intensity’ and ‘scrambles’ or ‘dispositifs’ (Lyotard, 1993) that differentiate honour and do not presuppose a honourific identity confidently defined in solid terms and guided by a local poetics that tacitly subjects and expects from it to reach an undisputable and absolute perfection.

Honour, from a similar perspective, it can be argued, works in the same manner a fold operates. For “A fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern” (Deleuze, 1993: 6). This is why when honour is conceived as representation, it blocks and ultimately erodes the unfolding of differences and the hope of any deconstructive account of writing difference in a manner which will not dash or stave off otherness. Yet “The problem is not how to finish a fold, but how to continue it, to have it go through the ceiling, how to bring it to infinity” (Deleuze, 1993: 34). A differential repetition is not about honour, therefore, but about an event which “is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples, such as an audible wave, a luminous wave, or even an increasingly smaller part of space over the course of an increasingly shorter duration” (Deleuze, 1993: 77). In the light of the above, all differences, even that of honour should be taken as a process that *takes place* amid a zone of indiscernibility and a zone of undecidability, passing between material perceptions

and idealistic conceptualizations of honour. A differential repetition of the Mediterranean would then have to start “from *action*, that is, to say from our faculty of effecting changes in things, a faculty attested by consciousness and towards which all the powers of the organized body are seen to converge” (Bergson, 1970: 67). Such a rhizomic thought defies and dislodges the dogmatic Mediterraneanist intuition through which, the imprints of shame, honour and poetics unleash only a sterile way in coming to terms with difference.

For truly there is nothing hidden or masked in the Mediterranean. “The masks do not hide anything except other masks” (Deleuze, 1994: 17). The conclusion to be drawn from the above examples thus is simply that differences exist before representing an object or a concept. They are affirmative of the multiple, the repetitive, the simulacrum, the unlimited and the dynamic. “Difference” in short “is in-itself already Repetition” (Deleuze, 1994: 129). Honour presupposes difference against the background of a dogmatic thought of truth, recognition, error, problem and interpretation, which keeps considering itself as good, common, recognizable, representational, and propositional (Deleuze, 1994: 167). Ideas are aerial, differential, multiple and infinite, insofar as they incarnate an Idea and thus the true opposition is not between Ideas – e.g. material honour versus ideal honour – but between an Idea and a representation (Deleuze, 1994: 191) – e.g. a differential perception of honour and a Mediterraneanist perception of honour – in exactly the same way that the “virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual” (Deleuze, 1994: 208; Deleuze, 1986) .

Having laboured a philosophy of difference, which is not about the One, the Many, the Analogous, and the Representational, I will keep reinscribing Mediterraneanism on the plane of affirmative differentiation and becoming, but at this juncture, I prefer to pick up on Derrida’s (1992) counterfeit in order to think of a non-reciprocal and unlimited exchange which will be open from the off to a de-personalized and de-individuated subjectivity, taken hostage this time, not by the purity of alcohol commensality and the friends of the heart, but by an unanticipated offer that withdraws before any permanent and final decision and the hierarchy, oneness and structure of the coffee shop.

4.3 The Counterfeit – Beyond the Friends of the Heart

Deconstructing the friends of the heart allows paving the way for a non-economic and asymmetrical economy that tears apart the homogeneity, stability and domestication of personal bonds, kin obligations and family structures that are playing a key role in the formation of the Mediterraneanist imaginary. Derrida's (1992) analysis of the counterfeit and the non-reciprocal, irreducible and aleatory nature of a non-spoken gift, opens up the multiplicity of the Mediterranean subject to the molecular Body without Organs and becoming-woman, intensifying and accelerating the processes of deindividuation and depersonalization by cancelling out the strictures of gift exchange. To that extent, the personification, signification and subjectification prompted by the gift, that has only come to reproduce power relations and hierarchies, is finally set in motion, through a form of thought that affirms the impossibility and unbecoming misery of the friends of the heart. The non-reciprocal counterfeit is meant, in short, to theorize a multiplicity which is neither reciprocal (as in Mauss), nor honorific (as in the shame-and-honour model), nor rational (as in the poetic model), but that which causes surprise by way of infinite offer and incalculable openness.

A gift which is not present or given, a gift which is not recognized as such, is the radically different meaning Derrida's work reserves or conveys for the gift. The gift, if there is such, is something one cannot make a present of, however willing one is to give "that rest of the rest of which [one] cannot make a present" (Derrida, 1992: 4). For there is a certain in-compatibility between gift exchange and economy, as "One cannot treat the gift, this goes without saying, without treating this relation to economy, even to money economy. But is not the gift, if there is any, also that which interrupts economy?" (Derrida, 1992: 7). Thus while the gift, on the one hand, presupposes a certain exchange within specific temporal limits, on the other hand, when this happens its truly uneconomic character is irreversibly annulled and irretrievably eroded. Little wonder then, that "It is perhaps in this sense that the gift is the impossible" (Derrida, 1992: 7), to the extent that the one who receives a gift needs to return another gift, preferably not the present he received, but in that return the gift never truly interrupts economic exchange, whether it is altruistic, friendly or pure. Yet should not the gift be treated in such a way as if it did not have to be returned within

the temporal limits of an obligatory exchange? It feels, as though the answer should be yes. Indeed, "In any case, time, the 'present' of the gift, is no longer thinkable as a now, that is, as a present bound up in the temporal synthesis" (Derrida, 1992: 9), insofar as, in order to be a gift, "there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift or debt" (Derrida, 1992: 12). For "If the present is present to him as *present*, this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. Why? Because it gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent" (Derrida, 1992: 13). Hence, as soon as the gift is revealed as presence, there is no gift; on the other hand, once the gift is not spoken, given or exchanged, there is no gift either. "If there is no gift, there is no gift, but if there is a gift held or beheld as gift by the other, once again there is no gift; in any case the gift does not exist and does not present itself. If it presents itself, it no longer presents itself" (Derrida, 1992: 15). The gift, therefore, must keep its asymmetrical and ambivalent character, staying out of time and exchange, for "From the moment the gift would appear as a gift, as such, as what it is, in its phenomenon, its sense and its essence, it would be engaged in a symbolic, sacrificial or economic structure that would annul the gift in the ritual circle of the gift" (Derrida, 1992: 23).

Against the horizon of such an ambivalent undercurrent, the unbecoming essence of the friends of the heart, I am convinced is rendered imperceptibly apparent. Like Mauss who, "does not worry enough about this incompatibility between gift and exchange or about the fact that an exchanged gift is only a tit for tat, that is, an annulment of the gift" (Derrida, 1992: 37), Papataxiarchis, I gather, does not seem to be aware of the economic and deeply hierarchical nature of commensality. Note moreover, that even "The title of 'Counterfeit money' is, may be, counterfeit money. Counterfeit money is never, *as such*, counterfeit money. As soon as it is what it is, recognized *as such*, it ceases to act as and to be worth counterfeit money. It only is by being able to be, *perhaps*, what it is" (Derrida, 1992: 87). In other words, "in order for there to be counterfeit money, the counterfeit money must not give itself *with certainty* to be counterfeit money" (Derrida, 1992: 95). The counterfeit is at once thus "double annulment, double circle and double annulus of the annulment" (Derrida, 1992: 115). Such a withheld, postponed, suspended and unacknowledged offer is about a form of thought opened up by that which "must not be *bound*, in its purity, nor even *binding*, obligatory or obliging" (Derrida, 1992: 137).

By contrast, alcohol commensality still reflects the social hierarchy of the village as everyone, for example, knows the social position of the person who offers a drink in a *parea* and because of that, strictly speaking, it cannot “give [only] in the measure of the incalculable: therefore only a hypothesis of counterfeit money would make the gift possible” (Derrida, 1992: 157). The dissymmetry, infinity and disproportional and irreplaceable character of the counterfeit destabilized on the move, differentiate and dissociate both the offer and the counter-offer. The aporia of the gift, even of alcohol, should be “a love *without reserve*” (Derrida, 1995: 106), insofar as “one must give without knowing, without knowledge or recognition, without *thanks* [*remerciement*]: without anything, or at least without any object” (Derrida, 1995: 112). In the coffee-shop, however, the one who buys a drink for a member of a *parea* is entitled to do so, as a consequence of his/her social position and thus alcohol fails to ‘problematize’ in a way Foucault (1980) would have it, the unity, meaning, identity, truth and presence of any possible offer that wants to settle and stabilize a relationship or a debt, even if it stems from or as a consequence of a friendly obligation.

The friends of the heart are part and parcel of Mediterraneanism, for even if they do not refer exclusively to honour such an entity nonetheless, remains bound to the concealed rationality of dialectics, poeticity, and reason. Once it is appreciated, however, that “*The thing itself is a sign*” (Derrida, 1976: 49), the coffee shop *parea* deconstructs, inasmuch as a *parea* exists within a “community immediately present to itself, without difference, a community of speech where all members are within earshot” (Derrida, 1976: 136). When all is said and done in terms of the metaphysics of presence, however, there is still an intervallic space that *takes place* between the one who offers and the one who receives, which does not privilege the one over the other. The ‘interval’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) between the two guarantees their togetherness but only as double bind and irreducible split, which does not wound their disjointure. The difference between an offer and a counter-offer is preserved and erased at once, to the extent that “in a single gesture, but doubled” the counterfeit “read[s] and write[s]” (Derrida, 1981: 64). Hence the *undecidable* counterfeit, like writing or the pharmakon “can never be simply beneficial” (Derrida, 1981: 99) or simply friendly, for “The essence of *pharmakon* lies in the way in which, having no stable essence, no ‘proper’ characteristics, it is not, in any sense (metaphysical, physical, chemical, alchemical) of the word, *a substance*. The *pharmakon* has no ideal

identity: it is aneidetic, firstly because it is not monoeidetic" (Derrida, 1981: 119–129). The counterfeit affirms the impossibility of the gift, by moving beyond hierarchy and reciprocity, friendship and purity, and by giving without actually giving or by receiving without actually receiving. It affirms an impossible exchange and a non-presentable and non-economic relationship that resonates with the depersonalization and deindividuation processes that haunt contemporary identifications on the face of a full-blown consumer society. The counterfeit takes flight from the obligatory character of gift, presence, being and economy, setting the *parea* in motion and swerving away from shame, honour, poetics and the restricted economy of coffee shop consumption and to that extent allows the emergence of a subject beyond the coffee shop restrictions, sliding and inclining toward suspension, becoming and frustration by avoiding a solid and constant poetic identity. Such an unacknowledged "*multiplicity without unity*" (Doel and Clarke, 1999: 437), forms an exemplary basis and a suitable context in order to study the various conflictual and contradictory aspects of an identity building process, beyond, the poetics of womanhood and mourning, which is a mode of thought deeply enmeshed in the negative, reactive and ascetic denigrations of poetics. It also allows to move beyond, shame, honour and the personalization of the friends of the heart that are now given over to the deindividuation of a machinic, chaosmotic, and multiple transformation, of which the most salient feature takes the subject as "flux, flow, becoming" (Doel, 1995: 232).

I have argued so far that an affirmative, responsible and indiscernible subject dwelling on chance, allegory, difference and contingency necessitates a fuller consideration and systemic conceptualization of the need to let the dwindling riddles of shame-and-honour, poetics and the friends of the heart go, abandoning the anthropology of the coffee-shop and the unitary identification politics of Mediterraneanist imaginations in favour of differential repetitions oozing with differends, and the counterfeit. There is still a need to take up, however, on becoming-woman, in a manner which will not only suspend and crack open the poetic identities of suffering, but will admit to a totally differential and infinite other to come to pass. Arguably though, it is psychoanalysis that may offer initially some useful insights in order to map the vicissitudes of the subject on the face of philosophy of becoming, especially in terms of the reformulations advanced by Lacan's work. It is to this task that I now turn,



before setting in motion the molecular art of schizoanalysis by way of which the Deleuzian stuttering and interminable intervention of becoming will, consequently, take hold of the poetics of womanhood.

4.4 Lacan and the Subject

To undo the domestication model of women en route from Mediterraneanism to the depersonalized and deindividuated counterfeit, requires not only to unpack the subject formation beyond a happy poetic or honourific conceptualization that rhetorically defends manliness or womanhood, but to establish, above all, the manner in which Deleuze's and Guattari's molecular subjectivity submits the domestication model to the schizoanalytic theorizations of an incalculable choreographic becoming-woman. Lacan's work is a useful entry point in making sense of the schizoanalytic discourses in that it helps to render apparent and getting a better handle on the poetic limits.

By drawing on Saussure's distinction between language and speech, Lacan conceives of the subject as always spoken and under the law of the signifier. To that extent "the unconscious is structured in the most radical way like a language" (Lacan, 1977: 234) and thus "is that part of the concrete discourse in so far as it is transindividual, that is, not at the disposal of the subject in reestablishing the continuity of his conscious discourse" (Lacan, 1977: 49). The 'I' thus is something that needs to be satisfactorily explained rather than being taken for granted. The dominance of the signifier and the concomitant yet irreparable constitutive lack of the subject is a later stage of the development of the subject, as prior to it, the subject is identified in the mirror-stage in which it recognizes itself as a *gestalt* even if the recognition and understanding that the image one sees in the mirror is always displaced, through the presence of the other and, thus, is always about *misrecognition*. Such an identification process refers to "the transformation that takes place in the subject when he³ assumes an image [...] *imago*" (Lacan, 1977: 2). The mirror stage, in other words, marks "a fantasized identification with others" (Grosz, 1990: 32), insofar as the image in the mirror is "an accurate [...] as well delusory (since the image prefigures a unity and a mastery that the child still lacks)" (Grosz, 1990: 39). Thus the subject "recognizes itself at the moment it loses

³ This 'he' does not imply a gender-specific designation. It is a translation of the French, where the subject [*le subject*] is a masculine term.

itself in/as the other. This other is the foundation and support of its identity as well as what destabilizes or annihilates it” (Grosz, 1990: 41).

Whilst the mirror stage concerns the imaginary identification of the Ego, it is in the symbolic register, through the accession of the subject in inter-subjective and inter-linguistic relations, that the constitutive lack of the subject becomes pressingly apparent. In the symbolic register, “the Other is, therefore, the locus in which is constituted the I who speaks to him who hears, that which is said by the one being already the reply, the other deciding to hear it whether the one has or has not spoken” (Lacan, 1977: 141). It is through the mediation of language that the subject is produced as an individual, as language comes to fill a gap, which is constitutive of the subject but only at the cost of submitting it to lack. For “The subject is the effect of discourse, no longer its cause” (Grosz, 1990: 98). And as Lacan (1977: 86) pointed out, ‘I’ may be capable of identifying “myself in language but only by losing myself in it, like an object”. Language functions negatively, in other words, and the differences implied by it have nothing to do with identity.

This is something however, that does fit into the mould of the poetic model and its idealized and consensual communication model. While Herzfeld (1991) rightly argues that the values of shame and honour constitute ‘shifts’ that determine local differences rather than values in-themselves, and should be seen in close relationship to the various aspects of the Greek society – what he terms *display* and *concealment* (Herzfeld, 1991: 40) – the poetics of manhood still take the marketization and commodification of social relations as a corrupted, fake, untrue and non-poetic event of intense self-reflection that owes its existence as much to the unrestrained tourist development as to the monumentalization legislation imposed by the Greek state. For Lacan, however, the subject is structurally separated from truth, the world or the real, insofar as there is always a difference between the ‘I’ of the signifier and the signified. The one who talks does not, necessarily, coincide with the ‘I’ of the signifying chain as language is always negatively defined, for both Saussure and Lacan see everywhere differences. “Language says: ‘You go here, and when you see this, you will turn off there’. In other words it refers itself to the discourse of the Other” (Lacan, 1977: 85) inasmuch as “the function of language is not to inform but to evoke” (Lacan, 1977: 86). Doubtless it is “Man who speaks, then but it is because

the symbol has made him man” (Lacan, 1977: 65). The poetic model fails to grasp such a displacement that *takes place* between the signifier and the signified; and the confusion that lurks behind such a theorization, should be by now obvious not only in terms of the ambivalent positionality of honour (is it a marker of wealth or an idea?), but also with respect to the unlimited creativity tacitly assumed by the social engineering of the poetic model. To put it in a nutshell, the ‘I lie’ of the famous Cretan ‘liar paradox’ does not mean that I am telling the truth either, for there is someone who lies and there is the ‘I’ that ‘lies’ but let us say – in a language that Lacan would not probably approve or recognize as his own – that it is one thing to lie and quite another to say that ‘I lie’. Language turns the subject into an incomplete, unfulfilled and lacking social being which has nothing to do with poetic aspirations. As Lacan (1977: 165) rhetorically asks “Is the place I occupy as the subject of a signifier concentric or excentric in relation to the place I occupy as subject of the signified?”; and do I know “whether I am the same as that of which I speak?”

The subject, accordingly, is always placed under erasure; a barred subject that fails to result in unity, homogeneity, domesticity, stability, and identity; and although lack generates desire, the subject remains split and disencumbered, owing its existence to language, by being at once a means and a limit to this lack. If the subject is possible, therefore, it is only because it talks but, in turn, it talks only as a result of lack. Accordingly, “the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing and this death constitutes in the subject the eternalization of his desire” (Lacan, 1977: 104). The symbolic in the way conceived by Lacan, therefore, is beyond the speaking capacities of the subject, and thus the desire that comes along in another well known statement of Lacan, is always the “desire of the Other” (Lacan, 1977: 58). Psychoanalytic conceptions do not sit easily with the positive identifications nourished by shame, honour and poetics, whether in Campbell’s idealistic conception of honour, built on the basis of ethnographic data collected in a small nomadic-community, a place where everyone knows everyone, or with reference to Papataxiarchis’ notion of the friends of the heart, however interesting as an ethnographic account, which is strictly situated within the androcratic and domestic boundaries of provincial coffee-shops, mixing up the salutes of alcohol with the allegedly fulfillment and purity a *parea* offers.

Lacan's account, above all, can help us to stress the need for a careful examination of the limits to poetics, as a consequence of the subject's accession in inter-subjective and inter-linguistic relations that are always subject to or fathomed with lack. There are, of course, limits to Lacan's own theorization and I want to mention here only two points. The first one is that even in its symbolic constitution the subject is derivative of and coextensive to familial and Oedipal obligations, constancies, lacks, losses, traumata, fixities and oppressions (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983); and thus as Deleuze (1993: 54) put it, "There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing or substance. We reserve the name *haecceity* for it". One needs, therefore, to go with the flow of such a depersonalized and deindividuated line of flight, which complicates, potentializes and undoes the familial and familiar triangles. The second point I want to make, and which chimes with and extends over the first, is that Deleuze's schizoanalysis is neither about lack, nor about poesis, nor about resistance, but about a mode of thought based on excess rather than lack, loss or absence, which penetrates and tears apart the repressive unconscious and the theorizations that want the subject to be always incomplete and lacking. For the subject in schizoanalysis, "has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome" (Deleuze, 1993: 56). And even if desire in the theory of Lacan is insatiable, the desire of Deleuze is machinic and a machine is always connected to other machines; in Deleuze's words "Desire never needs interpreting, it is it which experiments" (Deleuze, 1993: 136). A machinic unconscious resembles, therefore, a factory rather than a symbol or an oedipal complex of sexual or poetic repression or expression. Machines are neither imaginary nor repressive nor negative but instead, "real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines with all the necessary couplings and connections" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 1).

Hence schizoanalysis is defiant of the rational, thinking and conscious subject, opening up the poetic identification to haecceities, singularities and multiplicities that work strictly by way of consistency and immanence. Schizoanalysis does not think of the subject as impotent or dupe, however, but is simply skeptical when it comes to its poetic, rhetorical and spontaneous irradiations in the place of which it wants to make space for a truly differential becoming, and the effective processes of solicitation,

destabilization, iteration and continuous variation. “This is why the question of schizoanalysis or pragmatics, micropolitics itself, never consists in interpreting, but merely asking what are your lines, individual or group and what are the dangers on each” (Deleuze, 1993: 253). Yet the creativity of schizoanalysis should not be confused with the creativity of the poetic model, which is irrevocably enmeshed and indissolubly bound up with a game of binary polarities and oedipal forces. Let us see, therefore, how schizoanalysis that knows only of haecceities, individuations, rhizomes, flows and machines, deconstructs the poetics of womanhood.

4.5 Becoming-Woman – Beyond the Poetics of Womanhood

Schizoanalysis, becoming-woman and the Body without Organs set the domestication structure and poetics of womanhood in motion helping us to move beyond the corrosive Mediterraneanist conceptions of inside and outside, within and without, inclusion and exclusion, and public and private (Dubisch, 1986, 1995; Herzfeld, 1986). While women in the Mediterranean face considerable restrictions, anthropological and ethnographic studies have rightly suggested that even in small and remote villages, women enjoy particular and undisclosed forms of freedom (Dubisch, 1986; Loizos and Papataxiarchis, 1991); and that it would be far more effective, we are told, to examine “in what ways power [is] exercised. Examining power in terms of the private/public distinction allows us a clearer view of the nature and dimensions of women’s power” (Dubisch, 1986: 19). Friedl (1986: 51) for example, distilling from a variety of tasks and practices with which women are more often than not concerned, argued that women “have informal power over household economic decisions and over the economic and marital future of their sons and daughters”; and Dimen (1986: 59) pointed out that “the domestic scene is the locus of a process that reproduces the social relations and contradictions of state and economy”, whilst Pavlides and Hesser (1986: 92–93) insisted that “The decrease in value and significance of one of women’s major productive activities has coincided with the increasing importance of men’s role as wage earners”.

Such conceptualizations are useful in that they exemplify and chart how gender is constructed and transformed across various geographical locations, yet, the metaphysics of presence, the strict and impoverished boundaries of small community,

the familiarity of domestic space and the poetic ontologies of place still play a key role in the construction of womanhood. I feel, therefore, that a differential theory of gender, beyond such conceptions that take the division between public and private for granted, is still required in order to overcome the domestication, stability and negativity of the performances of women. Dubisch's (1995) notion of womanhood, as was shown in Chapter 3, is a negative image of thought conceiving of women solely in terms of their presence in rituals of suffering, pain and mourning. By contrast, Deleuze's and Guattari's lines of flight unsettle such a conceptual caricature of womanhood letting the Body without Organs (BwO) hold sway by drawing more than one line of flight, which permit gender in the light of the above, to be seen as a process that lies always already outside the integrative and assimilating fixities of the division between public and private, manhood and womanhood, poetics and silence. These "irreducible dynamisms drawing lines of flight and implying other forms of expression than those of myth" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 237), break decisively with Mediterraneanist imaginations, to the extent that they dwell on another plane, "the plane of consistency [which] is defined only by a longitude and a latitude" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 260).

Of that plane, a crucial theoretical practice that has come to play a pivotal role is becoming-woman which belongs neither to history nor to any ethnographic or poetic enquiry, but is strictly positioned against the illusory stability of symbolism, domestication, submission, subversion and the gendered poetics of silence and irony (Herzfeld, 1986, 1991). Becoming-woman is also of interest to me for another reason. "Becomings belong to geography, they are orientations, directions, entries and exits" (Deleuze, 1987: 2). And thus contra Herzfeld's (1985, 1987) social uses of history, on the basis of which a man wills – his reputation, manhood etc. – a becoming "wants [...] to affirm its difference or to deny what differs" (Deleuze, 1983: 78). Going against the stream of thought of Dubisch's poetics of suffering, thus, a constellation of points grounded in silence, irony, and pain, means simply to recall with Deleuze that points abuse and suppress becomings and this is why the aphorism: "I do not like points" (Deleuze, 1995: 161). Becomings, moreover, are not negative like the self-pitying poetics of womanhood but are instead expressive, affirmative and a-signifying, compliant with a multiplicity, which do not belong to the plane of constancy but on the plane of consistency, which "knows only relations of movement

and rest, of speed and slowness, between unformed or relatively unformed elements, molecules or particles borne away by fluxes. It knows nothing of subjects, but rather what are called haecceities” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: 92). And thus becomings are not about the history of mourning or suffering, but are composed of a thrust of nomadic and schizoid fragments, for “nomads have no history; they only have a geography” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 73), of which, eventually, (the) *cosmos* is made; for such is “the world [when] made up of divergent series (chaosmos)” (Deleuze, 1993: 137); and in which even women are urged to become-woman in exactly the same manner becoming-animal is not about imitating an animal, but about making “your organism enter into a composition with *something else* in such a way that the particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed will be canine as a function of the relation of movement and rest, or of molecular proximity into which they enter” (Deleuze, 1993: 123).

Being neither negative, nor reactive, becomings fold, un-fold and refold, “not what occurs but what is inside what occurs” (Deleuze, 1990: 149). For “I am forever unfolding between two folds and if to perceive means to unfold then I am, forever, perceiving within the folds” (Deleuze, 1993: 93). The subversive and silent poetics fail to get to grips with such a reasoning incisively captured by Deleuze’s theorization of the fold, which “is always folded within a fold [since] unfolding is [...] not the contrary of folding but follows the fold, up to the following fold” (Deleuze, 1993: 6). Yet en route from honour to shame, from concealment to display, from inclusion to exclusion and from gift exchanges to commensality and the friends of the heart, folds are neglected, repressed and erased due to an image of thought fraught with negative, molar and representative features that have nothing to do with the pluralist and manifold becomings. This is why Deleuze and Guattari insist that “it’s too easy to be antifascist on the molar level and not even see the fascist inside you” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 215). Now clearly, the poetic model is not, necessarily, fascist or totalitarian. Yet by being caught up within the negativity of mourning, suffering and pilgrimage, and by ignoring at the same time the potential of becoming-woman, and the potential to affirm the plural joy of multiplicity, “the thought of pure becoming” (Deleuze, 1983: 47) is regrettably lost. For “to affirm is [...] to release, to set free what lives” (Deleuze, 1983: 185) despite the fact that “as someone becomes, what he is becoming changes as much as he does himself” (Deleuze, 1987: 2).

In short, there is no extraterrestrial point in the Mediterranean from where to observe the silent suffering of women, in exactly the same way there is neither shame, nor honour, nor domesticity, nor any sort of hierarchy between surface and depth that suffices to affirm the superiority of poetics. What *takes place* is nothing but plateaus connected to other plateaus and hence domesticity is associated with men, the public and agoraphobic spaces with woman, shame with men and honour with women.

Becomings are also set in line with rhizomes and haecceities, which have a consistency all of their own. “A rhizome does not begin and does not end, but is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 57) and “a haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 263). Hereinafter, only becomings, rhizomes, haecceities, flows and fluxes. This is what schizoanalysis is about. “Flows” that “no longer belong to one nor the other but constitute the asymmetrical becoming of the two, a molecular sexuality that is no longer that of a man or a woman” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 82). And thus becoming-woman is neither untrue nor immaterial, for “what is real [is] the becoming itself, the block of becoming not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 238). Becomings intensify the fragility, ephemerality and precariousness of identity taking flight from the oedipal triangulations of a poetic thought. As the public performances of womanhood, poetics, suffering, mourning and pilgrimage, are negative and ascetic incarnations of women’s roles in the Mediterranean, becoming-imperceptible and becoming-woman constitute infinite multiplicities beyond domestication.

As was pithily summed up by Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 251) “From the viewpoint of micropolitics a society is defined by its lines of flight, which are molecular. There is always something that flows [...] that escapes the binary organizations”. As a consequence, becoming-woman neither negates, nor contradicts nor opposes rationality, state, and manliness insofar as to oppose a poetics of manhood (Herzfeld, 1985) with a similar poetics of womanhood (Dubisch, 1995) is ill-mannered and unbecoming. Oppositions are part of the dialectic, engineering and appropriating difference according to the standards of Identity, Analogy, Opposition, the One and the Same (Deleuze, 1994). And this is why “Our claim is not only that difference in

itself is not 'already' contradiction, but that it cannot be reduced or traced back to contradiction, since the latter is not more but less profound than difference" (Deleuze, 1994: 51). For difference, "must, therefore, refer to other differences, which never identify it but rather differentiate it" (Deleuze, 1994: 56).

It should be clear by now that the model of suffering advanced by Dubisch misses the effective difference of becoming to the extent that it "becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude" (Deleuze, 1994: 138). Yet "the equal or identical always moves toward the absence of difference, so that everything may be reduced to a common denominator" (Deleuze, 1994: 65). This is why one needs "to break this unholy bond which subordinates difference to the negative" (Deleuze, 1994: 269) inasmuch as one is no longer "faced with identity of contraries, which should still be inseparable as such from a movement of the negative and of exclusion [but] with a positive distance of different elements: no longer to identify two contraries with the same but to affirm their distance as that which relates are to the other insofar as they are 'different'" (Deleuze, 1990: 172-173).

It is only when "one has become imperceptible and clandestine in motionless voyage" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 199) that the poetics of womanhood (women's appearance in religious rituals), and the domestication of women (the public and private spaces) are, ultimately, swept away. Resistance thus if this is at stake in terms of the poetics of womanhood, should not involve, necessarily, a structural reorganization (of the mode of production) but should be concerned, above all, with the mixing and blurring of all possible depths and surfaces. For "everything that happens and everything that is said happens or is said at the surface. The surface is no less explorable and unknown than depth and height, which are nonsense" (Deleuze, 1990: 132). No small wonder thus that I argue that the poetics of womanhood is symmetrically contradictory to the creative manhood of the Cretan discourses of manliness (Herzfeld, 1985), granted that a difference-producing (wo)manhood does not need to oppose a masculine speculum of poeticity simply because a direct and symmetrical negation of manhood will not do; because it is indifferent and unbecoming and fails to be swept up by a femininity that works affirmatively, making spacing for a non-identity without manhood, unity and stability. Such is the resonance

of becoming-woman without manhood, phallogocentrism, public and private spatializations and androcentric ideals, once gender is no longer part of any sort of poetics but expands, multiplies and leads astray in uncertain, insecure, ambiguous and unstable ways. Becoming-woman dissimulates, defamiliarizes and defamilializes the conformity to the same (the domestication of women) or to the other of the same (the poetics of womanhood versus poetics of manhood); or to put it in nutshell, becoming-woman “is the key to all the other becomings” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 277).

Mediterraneanist identifications, I have argued so far, correspond with impoverished ontologies and conceptions of space – small communities, remote islands, nomadic shepherds etc. In terms of their epistemology, Mediterraneanist identities are reductive, striated, digestive, dialectical and one-dimensional conceptualizations taking sides with shame, honour, poetics and womanhood. By contrast, I have suggested that differential repetitions, the counterfeit and becoming-woman, move beyond such an image of thought. I will be arguing now that the above reformulations can sit easily with relational conceptions of space, offering at the same time and opening up new ways in order to theorize urbanism and the spatial configuration of the Mediterranean city on the back of the spatial art of origami, that is, the geophilosophy taken up by Deleuze and Guattari. To explore, therefore, the link between differential conceptions of identity and differential conceptions of space is the task of the next two chapters.

Having bravely initiated a deconstruction of Mediterraneanist identities (shame, honour, poetics, friendship, and womanhood) on the grounds of the incalculable differential repetitions of the counterfeit, and becoming-woman, I am now ready to turn to a similar unpacking and deconstruction of Mediterraneanist spatialities (parasitism, capitalism without capitalists and spontaneity), in an attempt to draw on origami, and the co-ordination of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spaces (Bauman, 1993), lending consistency and teasing out the consequences of such a theorization with respect to the events of spacing that are yet to come. I will be, then, in a position in Chapter 7, to open up parasitism to the effective power of consumption (Baudrillard, 1996) and the division between the repressed and the seduced (Bauman, 1987), in order, consequently, in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 to be led to Rethemnos and the experiences opened up by the ethnography of the event (the

affirmative/responsible subject, and the indiscernible and totally infinite and undecidable other beyond servility). But for now let me turn to the way in which space is conceived by Mediterraneanist accounts and the tropes of 'parasitism', 'capitalism without capitalists' and 'spontaneity' that have been arguably dominant in theorizing the spatial imagination of Greece.

PART THREE: DECONSTRUCTING

MEDITERRANEANISM II: CONSUMPTION AND

SPACE

CHAPTER FIVE: MEDITERRANEANIST SPATIALITIES

5.1 Introduction

I have set Mediterraneanist identities in motion because they fail to consider and take into account difference in-itself, and for failing to fully appreciate how a non-reciprocal exchange works beyond the tripartite gift obligation (to offer, accept and return) a gift. It remains to be seen, however, how a theory of space resonates with the movements of writing difference otherwise, and how identity and space are ceaselessly intermingled and woven practices in an attempt to think of the transformations, metamorphoses and events that will have taken place in Rethemnos. In Chapter 6, I will be in a position, to open up the event of spacing to the spatial art of origami in a manner worthy of such multiple forms of subjectivity; a theorization which is useful in letting us think of spacing as a ceaseless process of differentiation that marks in the Old Town an irreducibly split and a disjunctive joint beyond the holding formation and conflictual interpretations of history. Once the Old Town is subject to the reading of the kind I propose, it will become clear why a reconsideration of the experience of the Old Town problem is needed with respect to the virulent and deconstructive strategies of writing difference first, through the spatialization of the internal contradictions and conflicts of the consumer society (namely the division between the repressed and the seduced and the emancipation of capital from labour), and second, through the choreoethnography of the event (the subject as affirmation and responsibility, beyond servility sliding toward ambivalent undecidability).

Before broaching the question of origami though, that is, the art of spatial science that comes on the back of the Deleuzoguattarian drifts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 1988; Doel, 1996, 1999), I briefly discuss below Harvey's politico-economic theory and how its ontological requirements subsume consumption and difference under a strict anthropomorphic contour. This is not going to be an exhaustive reading of Harvey's entire work, but will be proved useful to the extent that political economic discourses constitute an important part of and play a key role in the formation of the discourse of Mediterraneanism. Subsequently, I explain, and demonstrate what is essentially problematic with the spontaneous imaginary advanced by Leontidou's (1990) *Mediterranean City in Transition*, regarding the way in which she conceives of space;

and I also offer a critique of the Marxist school of thought that haunts Greece by way of the major contributions of Tsoucalas' (1977) 'parasitic' theorization and Vergopoulos' (1975) 'capitalism without capitalists'.

I am not concerned, however, with the historical dissection of the spontaneous model and the empirico-pragmatic documentation of the making of the working-class of Greece. Moreover, the readings I picked are neither representative nor have anything to do, at least in a straightforward manner, with the Old Town of Rethemnos. It is my conviction however, that a considerable revision of the grounds of the epistemological presuppositions on which the works of Leontidou, Tsoucalas and Vergopoulos lie, may offer an opportunity in order to discuss how wrongly theorized and ill-informed consumption gets, once taken up on the back of the politico-economic stock and whether it is possible or not to move from such a restricted economy and miserly thinking to a form of thought that takes hold by way of excess and prodigality rather than scarcity, loss or lack (Doel, 2009). It will be then possible in Chapter 7 to abandon and discharge the negativity of consumption in favour of conceptualizations that conceive of it as a mode of domination rather than an epiphenomenal cultural accessory of neoconservative origin. I will be arguing, accordingly, that parasitism when brushed again the Mobius bands of consumption, paves the way for a *systemic* appreciation of the consumer society, opening up utility and use-value to the commensurability, spectrality and fetishism of exchange values.

Mediterraneanist writings conceive of space either as an inactive container of social relations or as an objective reality that exists irrespective of the material practices that make its appropriation possible. That identity in Mediterraneanist discourses is absolutist, authentic and unbecoming, was shown in Chapters 3 and 4, with reference to shame, honour, poetics and womanhood and by recourse to differential repetitions, the counterfeit and becoming-woman. What is required to take things further is to uproot, and unsettle not only a self-defining identity but also the spontaneous spatial organization, in an attempt to retheorize the urban configuration of Rethemnos, which is currently subject to a tremendous socio-spatial restructuring triggered by the development of a fully-fledged consumer society. Prior to dipping into Rethemnos' doubly folded spatiality however, what needs further unpacking is not only a deconstruction of the Mediterranean city in transition, but also a fuller appreciation of

the discourse of political economy on the basis of which the Mediterranean city was taken to be firmly associated with spontaneity. I shall turn, first, to a discussion of Harvey's (1973, 1982, and 1990) work on the spatialization of capital, not only in order to criticize political economy, but most importantly in order to unfold the relationships, implications and co-dependencies between spontaneity, capitalism without capitalists and parasitism as a means, above all, to draw a fuller picture of the epistemological grounds on which Mediterraneanist spatialities rest.

Offering a critique of Harvey, however, is not intended to provide a complete critique of Marxism; nor is it about carving out a totally novel work on Marxist geography. The intention here is not to construe a new agenda that will re-work and re-invigorate some major meanings and concepts of Marxism either – that have been bluntly, though regrettably, misunderstood or misinterpreted. In fact, there are many writers besides Harvey (such as Smith, 1984; Peet, 1977; Castells, 1977; Sayer, 1989; and Massey, 1991, to mention but a few) who have led the way in opening up novel, diverse, exhilarating and exciting inquiries with regard to the 'classic' or 'orthodox' Marxist image of thought. Yet it is an essential part of the present discussion of Harvey that capitalism should be conceived, above all, as a discourse that needs to be considerably reconstructed if it is going to convey or retain something of the radical 'openness' of a certain spirit of Marxism. From a feminist politico-economic perspective, for example, and seeking to remain faithful to such a dissemination of Marxian discourse, Gibson-Graham (1996) have produced a well-stated case by recourse to the ambivalence and contingency of certain Marxist concepts. Before delving into Harvey's reworking of political economy by way of its spatial implications, however, one should at least acknowledge that not all Marxist ramifications and repercussions of politico-economic discourses are susceptible to a strict totalitarian or one-dimensional reading.

Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 94-96), for instance, have convincingly inclined toward one of the most nuanced approaches to Marxism from a Gramscian perspective, reworking some basic analytic categories of Marxism. Though their work still revolves around a certain Althusserian conception of social formation, a totally novel understanding of the concept of *overdetermination* that heavily shaped the structuralist Marxist agenda, which appeared in France in late 1960s, has blossomed

on the back of their analyses, which has come to mean, amongst other things, that “the social constitutes itself as a symbolic order. The symbolic – i.e., overdetermined – character of social relations therefore implies that they lack an ultimate literality which would reduce them to necessary moments of an immanent law” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 97-98). This is probably why “abstractions like ‘production’, [...] only have meaning in terms of concrete system of social relations” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 99). The fact, therefore, that economy should be *in the last instance* what determines any society whatsoever – a vague interpretation of the Althusserian school of thought – does not appear compatible with the openness and ‘hiatuses’ with which Laclau and Mouffe – and Balibar (1970) to a certain extent – want to associate the entity of *overdetermination*.

Jason Read (2003, 2004) for his part – an American scholar specializing in continental philosophy, although convincingly exposing and exhibiting how different and yet productive Deleuze’s and Guattari’s writings can be – ends up by advancing a certain ‘abridgement’ between political economy, psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis. I do not mean to get into any serious discussion of the problems of such a position here. I would insist, however, given that I have already pointed out how schizoanalysis and the Body without Organs are taken up by the present undercurrent, that in order to make something of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s schizophrenic machines, one should rather follow, fall for and invent certain unexplored lines of flight, instead of, strictly speaking, applying their theory to some ready made theoretical questions. Not that Read is doing that. Yet, the point is about using, drawing and inventing lines of flight by way of innumerable and differential repetitions, rather than about representing, proving or testing them against the backdrop of or with reference to the legacy of Marx, Freud or Lacan. This is why a statement such as the one that follows (Read, 2003: 31), makes little sense in the context of my approach to these matters:

“At the center of Deleuze and Guattari’s neologisms and conceptual inventiveness is an attempt to produce a reading of Marx that is not only adequate to the production of desire necessary to so-called consumer society, but to the various “neo-conservatisms” that seize hold of desire. Beyond these possible uses, Deleuze and Guattari present us with a new possibility of thinking history after Marx [...] not a history of necessity, or even a historicism of completed epochs, but a contingent and differential history of the lines of force, and desire making and unmaking us in the present. It is these lines of force and their relations that are the precondition for a future different from the present”.

The point is not about illustrating the continuities between Marxian concepts and Deleuzoguattarian discourses. As I have already stressed, the intention of the present section is to lay the groundwork for a rigorous reconsideration of Harvey's dissection of capitalism and urbanism in an attempt to theorize the spectres that still haunt Mediterraneanist geography, and thus any systematic conceptualization of class and class structure lies beyond the scope of the present theoretical articulation. Yet it seems as though some basic lines of argument with reference to social class, class struggle and social formation should be drawn, even if they scarcely refer or are not directly related to Harvey's analysis of the spatialization of capital.

Thus, for example, Stuart Hall's keen suggestion to explore, from a cultural or rather a humanistic perspective, which should not maim the maturity of a certain symptomatic reading of Marx proposed by Althusser, how "Marx's ideas on classes and class struggle differ, at different periods of his work; and of how they advance" (Hall, 1977: 19). The articulation of the political and the economic seems, according to Hall's eager assertion, to be more complex than a simple reductionist conception implies or wishes to establish; that is, specifically, the fact that every instance and moment of the socio-political *milieu* should be ultimately determined by the 'economic' and that the 'economic' and the 'political' are somehow deterministically responsible to one another. Yet such an "articulation is accomplished only through a series of displacements and disarticulations" (Hall, 1997: 47), in a similar tone that Laclau and Mouffe have already picked up on the breaks and internal differentiation, with respect to the concept of overdetermination; and it is by way of an analogous line of flight that Hunt (1977: 85) criticized Poulantzas for producing "an essentially economistic treatment of social classes", especially in terms of the distinction between productive and non-productive labour, which Poulantzas unproblematically, or so Hunt assumes, associates with the production of surplus-value; basically, by depriving the so-called 'white collar'-labour of any 'productive role'. We will shortly have the chance to gather how such a distinction prompted another Greek scholar, Tsoucalas (1977), to dub the Greek social formation 'parasitic'.

For Nicos Poulantzas, however – the prominent Greek political scientist, who lived in Paris from early 1960s until his death in 1979, and whose name has been chiefly associated with Althusser's thought and Castells' (1977) early work, even if the latter,

in his later 'grassroots' restatement (1984) has clearly distanced himself from Althusser, "Salaried non-productive workers have a specific class membership [but] it is nevertheless important that we understand that this is never an automatic or inevitable process" (Poulantzas, 1977: 116).

In the cases briefly mentioned here, I have refrained from going into the ins and outs of the so-called 'Althusserian formalistic' school of thought and its problems. All I have intended to propose is that, while I am critical of Harvey on certain points of his theorization that lie at the nexus of the spatialization of capital and Marxism, political economy is not a unified conceptual body of inquiry or a methodological tool beyond dispute. Thus we return to Laclau and Mouffe's convincing exposition of the contingency of the concept of overdetermination, or what they prefer to call, that "*field of identities which never manage to be fully fixed, [...] the field of overdetermination*" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 111). In other words, what I contend is that Marxism cannot be taken as a unified or fully deployed discursive repertoire, a closed unit of analysis that unobtrusively represents a highly ossified reality or is superimposed on the 'real world' out there; and that the reason I have chosen to select Harvey's hugely influential work has primarily to do with the fact that certain aspects of his theorization of capitalism and space may help us to understand what made the discourse of Mediterraneanist geography not only possible, but, crucially, a hegemonic discursive practice that wittingly sought to tell the 'truth' of the Mediterranean.

Before picking up on Harvey, however, I will follow some of the lines of criticism drawn out by one of his most cogent critics, namely Doreen Massey, whom, from a feminist political-economy perspective, conceives of Harvey's work as being guilty of a certain reductionism, sexism and economism. I would rather not focus, however, on her thorough depiction of the *Spatial Divisions of Labour* (1984), and the whole rhetoric and problematic of industrial geography, the labour process and the various structural determinations that, in late 1970s, dominated the research agenda of the British geographical thought, but will lay out, instead, a criticism by way of her appreciation and evaluation of Edward Soja's (1989) *Postmodern Geographies* and David Harvey's (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity* or what she calls 'flexible sexism' (Massey, 1991).

One of the points Massey strongly opposes regarding Soja's work is that it is construed in a linear manner, which "omits, not just other themes, but other voices" (Massey, 1991: 36). For example, patriarchy is simply mentioned in passing by Soja but does not receive consideration in its own right; that is, as an axis of power with considerable material implications and consequences. Likewise, Harvey's *The Condition of Postmodernity*, according to Massey, has clearly downplayed the point of the social and authoritative construction of masculinity, which, in his many discussions of postmodernity, tends not to be subjected to any sort of serious questioning; indeed, the "male is not even recognized to be gendered. He is the universal" (Massey, 1991: 43). And thus "By not taking account of the feminist literature, a whole line of argument central to the relationship between modernity, space and social relations has been closed off" (Massey, 1991: 46).

I am not suggesting here that Harvey's work should be entirely retheorized in relationship to what Massey's pointed attack insinuates regarding his work's omissions and flaws. Yet, I still think that certain points of Harvey's laborious theorization could be reviewed by reference to a broader and more general embrace of culture and the political economy of the sign (cf. Baudrillard, 1981; Bauman, 1974). The above programmatic comments, nevertheless, amount to useful entry points that can allow us a glimpse into a more mature perspective in terms of the criticism I shall shortly engage in by recourse to Harvey's theory and the role it has played in inspiring, grounding and further solidifying, even if inadvertently, the discourse of Mediterraneanist geography. It will be then possible, in Chapter 6 to deconstruct Mediterraneanist spatialities first, by way of the hauntology of use-value (Derrida, 1994); second, by recourse to origami, that is, the folding, unfolding and refolding of social space (Deleuze, 1994; Doel, 1999); and third, by considering the co-ordination of moral, aesthetic and cognitive spacings (Bauman, 1993), in order finally, in Chapter 7 to pave the way for a more consistent analysis of the consumer society suffused this time with the excessive thoughts of Baudrillard and Bauman.

5.2 The Political Economy of Space

Politico-economic discourses take space not only as a means to accommodate and absorb a crisis-prone capitalist development but "as likely to contribute to the problem as resolve it" (Harvey, 1982: 429). The geographical re-structuring of the Old Town

may be taken as an example that reflects such processes that divide, segregate and polarize society in order to reproduce and perpetuate various forms of spatial unevenness. Space reflects, in short, and constitutes an expression of the dominant social relations that prevail in our consumer society, but is also what occasionally deforms and transforms social relationships. It is to that extent that the implications and consequences of the interrelationships and mutual dependencies between space, place and the subject are vital for an understanding of the imaginative geographies of the Mediterranean city. Harvey's (1982, 1985, and 1990) dissection of the urbanization of capital is arguably one of the most profound and consistent theorizations of the uneven spatialization of capitalism. Yet when it comes to space a fuller consideration and theorization of the consumer society and the political economy of the sign (Baudrillard, 1981) is also required, especially to the extent that consumption has recently become an important feature that organizes and stratifies contemporary societies (Bauman, 1982, 1987). The urbanization process demands, therefore, a further unpacking of consumption in a way which will reveal the infinite merging of the uneven, contradictory and antagonistic spatialities of capitalism with the inherent contradictions of a full-blown consumer society. The task of the present chapter, consequently, is to show that politico-economic theories of space fail to disclose the extent to which the uneven geography of late capitalism is indissolubly enmeshed with and depends on a full-blown consumer society. If tourism and consumption are intimately associated with the meticulous restoration of the Venetian properties of the town of Rethemnos however, it is only by means of a formidable appreciation and fuller consideration of consumption that the Old Town problem should make any sense. It is, therefore, incredibly necessary to undo the restricted economism that lies at the heart of productivist discourses in order to understand the mutually invaginated structurations of the consumer society and the Mediterranean city.

As it is well-established by now the survival of capitalism depends on its spatial surroundings in order to overcome, produce and achieve new forms of capitalist accumulation. But given that as Harvey (1982: 379) notes, "*devaluation, arising for whatsoever reason, is always particular to a place, is always location specific*", one of the key terms in his reformulation of Marxist political economy is the concept of social justice, which actually permits planners and theorists alike to think "about

urban problems and how by virtue of such thinking [they] can better position [them] selves with respect to solutions” (Harvey, 1992: 888). Positionality, the social place from where one discusses, decides or makes up his mind on which form or meaning social justice should take is “fundamental to all debates about how to create infrastructures and urban environments for living and working in the twenty-first century” (Harvey, 1992: 888). But such a discussion of social justice cannot be tackled on the basis of some cultural logic of diversification, which as Harvey suggests, (Harvey, 1992: 389) with respect to Tompkins Square Park’s colourful mixing of people and images in New York, “On a good day” will allow “to celebrate the scene within the park as a superb example of urban tolerance for difference, an exemplar of what Iris Marion Young calls ‘openness to unassimilated otherness’”. For as he immediately goes on to suggest “there is an immediate question mark over that suggestion: in what ways, for example, can homelessness be understood as spontaneous self-diversification, and does this mean that we should respond to that problem with designer-style cardboard boxes to make for more jolly and sightly shelters for the homeless?” (Harvey, 1992: 390).

Yet deconstruction and philosophies of difference, which is what Harvey above seems to imply and hint at, is not about making ‘more jolly the shelters for homeless’. Moreover, what positionality suits such an ironic caricature of difference? As Harvey (1992: 391) explains “we cannot understand events within and around the park or strategize as to its future uses without contextualizing it against a background of the political-economic transformations now occurring in urban life”. Historico-geographical materialism, accordingly, offers practical ways of dealing with poverty putting forward some key issues in solving urban problems like, efficiency, economic growth, aesthetic and historical heritage, social and moral order, environmental issues, distributive justice and communitarian bonds, and is not merely ‘celebrating difference’. What is required to take things further, Harvey (1992: 392) notes, is to “provide the basis for consensus” in what seems however to be not only what political-economic theories provide, as a strategic plan in order to ‘solve urban problems’ but, above all, what is required as a presupposition on which the politico-economic stock should draw and on the back of which it should be justified. What is more as, Harvey (1992: 393) points out, there has to be also some higher-order argument, “the phrase that was most frequently used to describe it was *social*

rationality". Political-economic discourses, therefore, necessitate an understanding and acceptance that some arguments are more valid than others through which and as soon as this is understood consensus should be reached regarding planning. But isn't such conception a vicious circularity based on the *hysteron proteron* confusion? Is consensus required in order to decide whether a decision is rational (*let's all agree, this is rational*) or is rationality going to decide whether consensus will be reached on a certain issue (*this is rational let's all agree*)?

By wrangling over the issue of difference, Harvey's theorization does not clarify the point, and moreover, his conception of social justice and its alleged universal application does not shed light on the issue either. The dispute on whether social justice necessitates a universal appeal or universalism comes, inevitably, prior to it in order social justice to be possible is never resolved, to the extent that universalism can hardly affirm how 'just' a policy is, in terms of the solutions it offers, the people it targets and the problems it solves. What universalism does is simply to turn social justice into a sign within a market of policies and politics that go hand in hand with the two other key modern concepts, that of consensus and rationality. A universal acceptance of the value of social justice is not, necessarily about a universal justice though, for it is obvious that such a term would be absurd. What it would mean, after all, a 'universal justice'? Would it mean justice for all or justice for each one according to his/her logic and needs? And who is going to decide over what is logical or useful and for whom?

Building on this discussion will help us to understand why a better treatment of Rethemnos needs Baudrillard rather than Marx, Deleuze rather than Herzfeld, Derrida rather than Peristiany, and Badiou rather than Dubisch. In Harvey's *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1990), postmodernity is closely associated with cultural forms that correspond with certain politico-economic practices that in turn mark a new round of time-space compression. And although Harvey (1990: 9) relates postmodernism to "heterogeneity and difference as liberative forces in the redefinition of cultural discourses", what he soon goes on to argue is that these elements are as much about postmodernism as about modernism, and that what postmodernists oppose today is only a certain aspect of modernism, that is, the fact "that there was only one possible mode of representation", which in any case "began to break down" (Harvey, 1990:

28) long before the claim on the postmodern condition was couched in terms of an 'incredulity toward metanarratives' (Lyotard, 1984). Postmodernists thus maybe right in judging, criticizing, and condemning the unified conception and representation of the world but they are wrong in casting modernity as the mode of representation that nourished and reproduced a unified and totalitarian image of the world. Postmodernists should be accused thus not because of their insistence on ephemerality and fragmentation, but, so Harvey insists, in that they wrongly and rather simplistically ascribe and assign the denial of differentiation, pluralism and heterogeneity to the discourse often called modernity. This is not necessarily wrong, yet it is one thing to argue that modernism is not what many theorists think and understand, and quite another to suggest, as Harvey (1990: 33) does, that the universality of modernism generated a kind of reactionary modernism of the kind advocated by Heidegger's destruction of traditional ontology, "a counter-myth of rootedness in place and environmentally-bound traditions as the only secure foundation for political and social action in a manifestly troubled world" (Harvey, 1990: 35). For even if it is true that many postmodernists seem to have misunderstood modernism, that, however, they ought to be read as being in close alliance to the reactionary politics promoted by fascist ideologies, is highly, of course, questionable, not to say disappointing.

Where postmodernists and Harvey appear quite close, though, is when postmodernism is taken to signify two interrelated things, "a departure (if such there is) in ways of thinking about what could or should be done about that social condition, or else [...] a shift in the way in which capitalism is working these days" (Harvey, 1990: 112). And yet the consequences of such a suggestion are never pushed to a logical conclusion – that is, the fact that one should engage in novel forms of theorization in getting to grips with the newly transformed social situation. Even when Harvey and postmodernism appear quite close, for example, in statements such as "if the only thing certain about modernity is uncertainty, then we should, surely, pay considerable attention to the social forces that produce such a condition" (Harvey, 1990: 118), the potential to reconcile historico-geographical materialism with ideas of difference appear, to say the least, inappropriate, given that Harvey, consistently, denounces postmodernism as a nihilistic and neoliberal camouflage that promotes what he calls

the “aestheticization of politics” (Harvey, 1990: 210), pursuing in that way the dissection of some kind of likeness between postmodernity and Nazism.

The dialectical machinations advanced by Harvey above nourish the constants, integrities and points of a theory of place that fails to consider the folds, joints, multiplicities and haecceities of a difference without unity or identity. Difference under the jurisdiction of historico-materialist determinations is never fully unpacked and appreciated and thus a more perceptive and rigorous understanding of spacing and origami (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; Doel, 1999), is still required. When such an effective processing of spacing is put into service, difference then resonates with the major task of geography, that is, the obsession it should have with multiplicity and the fascination it ought to have for the thought of non-being, in order for the universal consensus Harvey insinuates, to be finally given over to an undecidable, indiscernible and non-originary other.

The dialectical understanding of the spatialization of capital ought to be viewed, therefore, with skepticism, especially because the dialectic subsumes “within itself everything else that is happening in the social situation in which it is produced and consumed” (Harvey, 1973: 156). But when the flows, folds and undecidable events of spacing, are seen through the lens of the historico-materialist dialectic, their effective differential character is regrettably petrified, solidified and lost. Poststructuralism, by contrast, does not oppose points, stases and positions but opposes the oppositions, contradictions and disputes between flows and points, fluxes and stases, and so on. It takes place in the middle of events that are posited contra events and fluxes amid other fluxes that in turn cut and flatten out the great ephemeral skin of the spontaneous body of the Mediterranean city in a way which is not yet-fully-grasped. The dialectics of place and historical materialism of Harvey oscillate between, on the one hand, an attempt to privilege solidity, stability and constancy and, on the other hand, an attempt to affirm fluidity, positionality and relationality, forgetting however, that solidity and fluidity, are both “effects of folding” (Doel, 1999: 17), rather than ready-made theoretical-practices and pre-given philosophical suppositions.

And thus to the extent that Marx’s political economy focuses on “contradiction within and between structures and consequent transformation of the totality” (Harvey, 1973:

294), one should depart from both Marx's and Harvey's politico-economic theorizations, inasmuch as the differential events of spacing neither come as points, nor as relations nor as structures but, on the contrary, slide and slip through points, relations, structures and folds. For events undo and set in motion all possible contradictions focusing on metamorphoses, transformations and deformations. Harvey's theory (1973), however important or useful cannot offer a fuller appreciation of difference qua difference and of consumption, beyond the teleology and rationalist theorization of political economy, remaining faithful to Marx's original depiction of production:

"Production [...] distribution, exchange and consumption are [...] links of a single whole, different aspects of one unit. Production is the decisive phase [...] That exchange and consumption cannot be decisive elements is obvious, and the same applies to distribution in the sense of the distribution of products. Distribution of the factors of production on the other hand, is itself a phase of production. A distinct mode of production thus determines the specific mode of consumption, distribution, exchange and the specific relations of these different phases to one another. Production in its narrow sense, however, is in its turn also determined by the other aspects. For example, if the market, or the sphere of exchange, expands, then the volume of production grows and tends to become more differentiated. Production also changes in consequence of changes in distribution, e.g., concentration of capital, different distribution of the population in town and countryside, and the like. Production, is finally, determined by the demands of consumption. There is an interaction between the various aspects. Such interaction takes place in any organic entity" (Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, 204–5, cited in Harvey, 1973: 296).

There are three interrelated points I want to stress here. First, consumption is a far more rich, complex and *systemic* practice with a logic all of its own than the above account allows. Second, while the concept of totality can be seen in relation to the elements that constitute the whole, there is nothing organic about it, in some kind of biological or naturalist sense. And third, and most importantly, prioritizing one stream over another – production over exchange or consumption – is totally outside the logic and philosophy of difference, which refuses the ability of any holding formation to stabilize relations, crystallize constancies, block differences and prioritize one mode of thought over another. Let me quote another paragraph from Harvey (1996), which in my view explains the suspicion of political economy over theories of difference – which is exactly why I am suspicious of materialism's own philosophy (be it either historical or dialectical).

“While it is formally true that everything can be reduced to flows [...] we are in daily practice surrounded by things, institutions, discourses, and even states of mind of such relative permanence and power that it would be foolish not to acknowledge those evident qualities. There is, I believe, little point in asserting some sort of ‘dissolution of all fixity and permanence’ in the famous ‘last instance’ if, as far as we human beings are concerned, that last instance is nowhere in sight. The ‘solid rock’ of historical-geographical materialism [...]” (Harvey, 1996: 17).

What Harvey argues above is that despite all liquidity there has to be – “there is little point in asserting some sort of dissolution of all fixity” – some kind of stability and permanence most likely to be found in and most importantly to be explained by the “solid rock of historical materialism”. Such a politico-economic ‘reading’ however is not unrelated to the previous dissection and link between universalism, rationality, and consensus and yet when space is seen through the lens of this materialist solidity, it can hardly get to grips and let itself go with the movements of difference and the effective power of spacing that unhinge the stability and constancy of the evental Rethemnos. Politico-economic approaches because of their obsession with stability, permanence and integrity fail to see the richness and spatiality of the events of becoming that will have taken place in Rethemnos when space and identity are subject to the ceaseless folding, unfolding and refolding of origami and the consumer society.

It is a similar failure to appreciate the ceaseless deformation of space that is evident in the notion of the spontaneous Mediterranean city advanced by Leontidou (1989). It is to this task that I now turn.

5.3 The Political Economy of the Mediterranean

Leontidou (1989) set out to map certain aspects of the idiomorphous, spontaneous, and flexible spatial organization of Athens, in accord to the battles of the working-class to occupy urban space. For my part, I will argue below that first, spontaneity is unbecoming in that it ignores the multiplicity, variety, transformation and becoming-other of space, which is always already a transformer and deformer of social relations and thus it should not be necessarily associated with a particular class; and second, that spontaneity ignores the fetishism of use-values and the systemic role of consumption, which is something that characterizes most discourses that stem from or

incline toward a politico-economic orientation. I do not, simply, denounce spontaneity, therefore, for being untrue or imprecise on empirical grounds but rather I propose that spontaneity in-appropriates and un-becomes spatial difference because it rests on an empiricist, rationalist and productivist perception of geography and space. A differential reading of spontaneity, therefore, is required in order to intervene in the middle of things offering a more nuanced understanding of how consumption and space are interminably invaginated structures, a point that I have already started stressing with respect to Harvey's spatialization of capital and the ill-mannered attempts into which the politico-economic stock delves in order to take up on consumption on the face of a form of thought that knows only of scarcity and lack. Opening up consumption to a differential and deconstructive reading, accordingly, may pave the way for unblocking and dissociating parasitism from the original negativity with which it has been heretofore enclosed and associated, especially in Tsoucalas' (1977) work, undoing at the same time the allegations over a dysmorphic capitalism without capitalists (Vergopoulos, 1975).

Parasitism, I will argue, is neither unproductive nor a marker or a sign of a peripheral space-economy but a theoretical-practice that affirms consumption, seduction, the fetishism of use-values and the systemic nature of needs. Parasitism, consumerism and spontaneity are not features, therefore, of a deformed capitalist model, and do not, necessarily, amount to a passage or a transition from the one to the other, from precapitalist to capitalist, from flexibility to spontaneity, from modernity to postmodernity and so on. On the contrary, by dwelling on the Mobius bands of consumption, something which is further taken up in Chapter 7, the manifold, non-localizable, irreducible, unsettling and discontinuous parasitism is turned into a phantom without flesh that takes place when it does not take place, being a fusion not of the 'either/or' principle but of the 'neither/nor' affirmation: *Υμήν* (hymen) (Derrida, 1981: 213). Consumption, in other words, splays out spontaneity, by insisting that parasitism is not an aberration or a deviation of production, but a theoretical-practice, which is neither the equivalent of an epistemological break nor a kind of oppositional reading – I do not propose that the Greek social formation is postmodern, postindustrial etc. – but, instead that, which affirms the current mode of differentiation having neither beginning nor end but only an undecidable value, which is neither historical nor official (like the disputes over Rethemnos' history). Such a

writing of a difference flies from the pointillism, reactive and negative implications of Mediterraneanism and once theorized beyond the negativity and productivism of politico-economic discourses, starts charting, even if prematurely, the conditions intrinsically pertinent to a full-blown consumer society. Such a disseminative writing leaves the Mediterranean difference open from the off, in perpetual suspense and regret, allowing seduction and symbolic exchange, and deconstruction and schizoanalysis to lend consistency to the innumerable events and choreoethnographies of Rethemnos. Suffice it to note for now that these duplicitous strategies of writing exhaust rather than exterminate, invent rather than discover and return rather than commence meaning and difference.

At this juncture I unfold the polyvalent meaning of parasitism in order to withhold any final decision between a parasitic economy and a consumerist parasitism until Chapter 7, where I reinscribe parasitism as it runs aground on the plane of consumerism, seduction, the fetishism of utility and the systemic nature of use-value.

5.3.1 Parasitism

For Tsoucalas the overgrowth and hypertrophy of the Greek state is a characteristic of the Greek social formation (Tsoucalas, 1987: 24), which among all other countries of OECD has the greatest percentage of students registered in law schools and schools of social sciences. Because of the underdeveloped industrial sector of the country, we are told, students prefer to study law and social sciences, professions, in short, that are not directly related to the job market of the productive sector.

Yet such an empirical depiction of parasitism, based also on a variety of similar data regarding the scale and size of the Greek public sector, presents certain problems. On the one the hand, in that it seems to condemn the capitalist model of Greece because of its poor performances in terms of industrial production, an argument caught up in a *rationalist* trap (the ‘progressive’ imaginary of capitalism), whilst on the other hand, in that by being critical of capitalism and exploitation, it remains at the same time faithful to an *ideological* trap, (the class-based imaginary revolution of capitalism). Such a doubly-faced limitation is not a mere dysfunction of a theory wrongly transferred to or imposed on the Greek social reality as a strict hermeneutical tool, but

is chiefly based on the theoretical priority and ontological predominance production possesses in politico-economic discourses. Even if the Greek capitalists failed to invest and develop any productive activity within the territory of their own country (Tsoucalas, 1977: 19), the failure to accomplish or achieve a standard level of capitalist production, should not be, necessarily, associated with a parasitic social formation. As time and again the Greek economy of the late 19th century relies heavily on conspicuous activities marking in a profound manner the postwar economic landscape of Greece, the point is not about associating the huge public sector with some oriental or underdeveloped traits to be located in countries that have never been 'capitalist', but about proposing a convincing and more consistent theory of 'parasitism' that will not have to be directly or diametrically opposed to the glosses of absence, loss, lack and misery that fundamentally shape the grip of political economy.

Yet Tsoucalas insists, on the one hand, that there exists a 'state-class' (the people working in the public sector or the people struggling to get a job in the public sector?) that may form the kernel of a possible future revolutionary strategy, while on the other hand, he seems to purport the fact that the same class consists a means through which capitalist unevenness is further perpetuated – e.g. the fact that 'public servants' do not form a class with a real revolutionary potential/orientation. This is not necessarily wrong but to suggest that the Greek capitalists should be blamed for failing to invest and further promote an indigenous capitalist production, should sound at least an oxymoron, especially when you call yourself a Marxist! Granted, for example, that the capitalist apparatus is inherently tied to processes of economic and geographical unevenness, how is it possible to criticize the Greek social formation for being a dysmorphic, dysfunctional capitalist model and not a fully-developed exploitation system? That the Greek space-economy constitutes an unfinished project imperfectly connected to the accumulation processes of capital, does not have to be linked, necessarily, to the unprecedented expansion of the Greek service sector as a result of a failed model of capitalism. For Tsoucalas however, the urban configuration of Athens is a non-industrial urban formation; something that marks in a profound manner the alternative way in which urbanism and the intersecting mobilities of capital and labour take up on the geography of the Mediterranean city. But is that because capitalism in Greece is different or is it because there is a certain sense in

which capitalism and accumulation processes are differential all the way down, allowing always value to slide over a baseless ground, which is not as solid as is often assumed by the language of historical materialism? Tsoucalas, for example, notes with respect to Athens, that while, on the one hand, a rapid urbanization takes place and the city population thrives and boosts during the whole 19th century, on the other hand, there exists a socio-economic structure dominated by an impressively non-productive urban population (Tsoucalas, 1977: 163); and thus the level of urban concentration is significantly higher than one would normally expect in terms of the level of industrialization (Tsoucalas, 1977: 197). Greece in short, is primarily, characterized by a socio-economic structure with intense service-sector characteristics, dominated by a petty-bourgeoisie state-class and non-productive activities, within which a particularly high number of public-sector employees dominates (Tsoucalas, 1977: 209).

Yet this is not the only possible interpretation of parasitism, which should not be the negative, reactive, residual and non-productive activity Tsoucalas wants us to believe. Parasitism can be instead a way of being, a form of life, which opens up the Mediterranean first, to the seduction of consumption, the fetishism of use-value and the reversibility of symbolic exchange (Baudrillard, 1981, 1996) and second, to the division between the repressed and the seduced (Bauman, 1987). When parasitism inclines toward a theorization that swerves away from the ardent negativity of productive discourses, that is, when it is no longer perceived through the non-productive, negative and oppositional lens that take consumption to be the immediate opposite of production, there is no reason to keep directly relating or accusing parasitism of not exploiting the Greek proletariat class (Tsoucalas, 1977: 518). For truly, this does not seem much of a problem to me! To put it bluntly, if a radically differential theory of consumption is not fully deployed parasitism will, necessarily, be embroiled and caught up within the contradictions of political-economic approaches that block a further appreciation of the active and systemic role consumption plays in forming and deforming the capitalist landscape and the urbanization process of the Mediterranean city. My suggestion thus is that space, place and the subject amid the current socio-spatial trajectories of late capitalism can be drawn upon in far a more productive way, once parasitism is freed from conceptions that conceive of it as the monstrous face of capitalism's

underachievement. Parasitism can lay bare, in other words, some of the most intrinsic and structural dimensions of consumption, once however it is no longer taken as a failed or deformed model of capitalism. As Tsoucalas suggests in his more recent works, after all, the definition of the political in firm opposition to the economic is problematic, incomplete and conceptually uncrystallized (Tsoucalas, 1986: 74), and thus the conceived representations that define and draw an absolute distinction between economy and politics, private and public, and society and state require radical reconsideration and reconstruction (Tsoucalas, 1986: 79).

It is thus “possible to imagine capitalism with more complicated, internalized contradictory and *less oppressive* mechanisms that tame the working-class” and with “less totalitarian forms of subjecting labour to capital” (Tsoucalas, 1986: 184). Less totalitarian, nevertheless, does not mean the absence of any classification or social stratification, for the consumer society, as will shall see, is equally uneven and divided. It means, however, that parasitism need no longer be interpreted solely as a consequence of the ineffective and unproductive huge Greek state (Tsoucalas, 1986: 95), for even if there are less totalitarian forms at work that subject labour to capital, domination is not over. A possible leap therefore, from a parasitic state to a social formation based on seduction and consumerism may start, imperceptibly, becoming possible once it is appreciated that consumption should not be confused with negativity, underproduction and parasitism. As Tsoucalas himself admits the Greek public sector should not be submitted to the same criteria and evaluations to which the one-dimensional, commensurable and goal-oriented market is usually submitted (Tsoucalas, 1986: 106), once it is accepted that the public sector has a social dynamic and a logic all of its own not merely posited in direct opposition to the function of the market. The huge scale of the public sector in Greece, in short, is neither less capitalist nor more parasitic for the same reason. Having said that, parasitism moves now, imperceptibly, beyond the imaginary of a negative, reactive, nihilist and contradictory aspiration as capitalism does not appear to be unthinkable without a proletariat (Tsoucalas, 1986: 159). Such a radical reconstruction of the understanding of parasitism and capitalism when pushed to its logical consequences, can be taken to be, extremely, close to what Bauman’s and Baudrillard’s analyses on consumption propose, which is, a crucial step en route from a negative parasitism to conceiving of parasitism as a structural characteristic of a society based on the systemic organization

of needs, the fetishism of utility and the system of objects. Parasitism therefore, neither concerns underproduction nor involves underdevelopment or despotism, but necessitates a radical inversion of the meaning of value, which cannot be documented empirically, but only through a theoretically oriented and conceptually elaborated intervention that takes seriously the systemic organization of needs, the division between the repressed and the seduced and the fetishism of utility, following Baudrillard's and Bauman's insightful interventions. And whilst this is not probably what Tsoucalas originally had in mind, it may offer a radical alternative re-assembling and re-connecting parasitism to the prodigious, conspicuous, celebratory and orgiastic differential play of consumption.

In sum, a negative conception of parasitism is unbecoming and rationalist and this is why it is important to start seeing parasitism through a form of thinking that goes hand in hand with the Mobius bands of sign-value, the fetishism of utility and symbolic exchange. Explicating how parasitism can be affirmative – beyond the productive nihilism – and systemic – beyond the anthropomorphism of consumption – can further permit us to understand the displacement and trajectory the Old Town is currently subject to. Let us turn, however, for now to Vergopoulos' (1975) notion of the dysmorphic 'capitalism without capitalists', a mode of thought which needs to be also set in motion – although it differs significantly with respect to parasitism in one important aspect, that is, in that the deformed agriculture of Vergopoulos is parasitic not *in spite of capitalism*, which was the case according to Tsoucalas, but precisely *because of being capitalist*.

5.3.2 Capitalism without Capitalists

That Greek agriculture should be dubbed a 'capitalism without capitalists' is a modernist conceptualization of the Greek agricultural system, coined by Vergopoulos in the early 1970s (Vergopoulos, 1975: 18), according to which, the main characteristic of Greek agriculture is its family-based organization, something however profoundly ideological, not in the sense of not being pragmatologically true, but rather as a means through which the truly uneven character of capitalism is disguised or concealed. As Vergopoulos noticed the contemporary 'agricultural crisis' is not a crisis of its familial organization but rather a crisis of the whole social system of which agriculture constitutes only the Achilles heel (Vergopoulos, 1975: 22). This

is why under conditions and circumstances of peripheral capitalism the reproduction of the system depends not only on the progress and growth of the relations and forces of production, but chiefly on processes of creative destruction that necessitate, apart from growth, the dismantling and disintegration of certain sectors and geographical areas. That both Tsoucalas and Vergopoulos have to take as their starting point an alleged dysmorphism, deviation or exception – be it either underproduction, the huge public sector, conspicuous consumption or a poorly developed agriculture – of the Greek social formation is not necessarily a problem. But that in particular, Vergopoulos has to suggest that the Greek agriculture is underdeveloped not as consequence of the small scale family-based business but as a result of the operation of the whole capitalist system (Vergopoulos, 1975: 136) is not flawless. The land, we are told, is not so much in the hands of a small minority of economically viable farmers, but is shared and owned by many farmers, whose properties, in order to be profitable demand intensive cultivation and constant care. Yet capitalism treats the farmer as a source of profit without throwing him off of his land or out of his property (Vergopoulos, 1975: 149) and thus only in terms of its articulation and esoteric, so to speak, structure, can agriculture be considered underdeveloped, fragmented or oriental. The small family-based land system, consequently, is vital in reproducing and further sustaining the whole social system (Vergopoulos, 1975: 172), and *modus operandi* of Greek capitalism. Despite the plethora of agricultural properties thus the family-based agriculture of Greece is less a remnant of a communal/oriental organization, than it is an outcome that survives alongside the domination and operation of a fully-fledged industrial capitalism. The major contradiction, so Vergopoulos asserts, is not between a family-organized agriculture and a capitalist one that exploits the poor small landowners, but exists fundamentally between two distinct yet interdependent productive sectors, agricultural production and the capitalist industrial sector (Vergopoulos, 1975: 205). It is such a paradox that Vergopoulos (1975: 214) terms a ‘capitalism without capitalists’.

I do not intend to offer here an exhaustive criticism of Vergopoulos’ work, which is beyond the scope of the present thesis. A couple of points, however, deserve closer attention and scrutiny with respect to the inherent ambivalence that haunts politico-economic analyses. First, in Vergopoulos’ analysis, agriculture is supposed to be capitalist due to an empirical documentation of the profits, productivity and

technological means used to cultivate the land. Vergopoulos understands capitalism as a mode of social reproduction under the jurisdiction of which some sectors of the economy remain underdeveloped in order for others to expand and grow. The crisis-prone uneven capitalist development, in other words, can only survive through expansion in order to resolve its internal and deeply embedded contradictions, but this expansion can only lead to the formation of novel controversies and crises that, in turn, lead to specific forms of devaluation – of capital, labour power and geographical areas. Vergopoulos, in other words, theorizes agriculture's *hysteresis* not in spite of capitalism – which is how Tsoucalas conceives of parasitism – but precisely because of being capitalist. The implications, I think, are quite vast. Vergopoulos' documentation of a crisis-prone agriculture depends not only on the understanding that the underdevelopment of its esoteric structure is an inherent necessity, but that it is heavily coincidental with the achievements and development of other sectors – like industry – and thus takes the capitalist unevenness for granted, not by saying that Greece is non-capitalist, but by insisting that whether developed or not, the Greek agriculture is based on or is a consequence of a capitalist form of organization.

Second, for Vergopoulos (1975: 207) the small farmers had somehow to be kept occupied insofar as their labour was not of immediate use. They are seen, therefore, as a reserve army of labour who had to stay on hold waiting for their turn. But do the small farmers constitute or form a class? In many respects their economic position and ideological orientation does not sit easily with the 'ideology' of the working class (farmers own small parts of land and their labour is, strictly speaking, going to benefit, prior to anything else, themselves and their lot). Moreover, it is mostly the farmers who wanted their children to study finding a way out of and escaping from the poorly organized and roughly lived small and rural communities of the Greek countryside – interestingly for Tsoucalas it is this same thing that generated, sustained and further promoted parasitism. But while in Tsoucalas' theorization, the trend for a massively and widely accepted need for education that swept the Greek imaginary of the 19th and 20th centuries, is synonymous with a 'parasitic' social formation and marks intensely the existence of a non-capitalist formation, for Vergopoulos works the other way round, that is, as an indicator or a sign of a fully operational capitalist society. The students descending from small towns and villages on their way to study in Athens throughout the whole 19th and 20th centuries, wanted above all to transcend

and overcome the strict class barriers of their predicament, which by contrast, is for Tsoucalas what turned Greece into a parasitic formation.

The contradiction between these two theorizations is inevitable and yet the tension does not seem to be easily solved. Both ways of perceiving of capitalism are stubbornly enough assigned to a revolutionary expectation or a rhetoric, which claims that equity and justice will be sooner or later fulfilled. This is doubly problematic though, not only because such a revolutionary hope conceives of the owners of the small properties as a revolutionary class, but first and foremost, because at the same time it secretly implies and irradiates a counter-revolutionary suspicion over the roles of education (Tsoucalas) and land fragmentation (Vergopoulos), as factors or paragons that may occasionally reproduce the status quo of current power relations.

It is in a similar way – a theorization that fails to see its own limitations in terms of this doubly-folded structuration of the discourse of political economy – that Leontidou's (1989) text is construed and her notion of spontaneity articulates. It is to this task that I now turn.

5.3.3 Spontaneous Spatiality

As Leontidou (1989) suggests regarding Athens, the interaction between the working class and the city is thinkable only from the time the Greek proletariat is fully crystallized – a point of reference might be the year 1909 (Mavrogordatos, 1983). Her conviction is that urbanism has been theorized in a manner which ignores the specific history of place (Leontidou, 1989: 13) and that theory appears deprived of any empirical evidence that can help us making sense of how to come to terms with urban problems. Such a conception, however, is still about a certain theoretical level of abstraction for it is hard to see how reality can independently and unobtrusively offer substantive models of interpretation, provided that even if it is true that reality 'speaks', 'exposes' or 'reflects', this can only happen on behalf of and through a constellation of practices and signifiers within which a certain subject grows.

Leontidou's intention is to build a theoretical model in order to analyze the experience of the urbanization process of the Mediterranean city in a way which will be sensitive to history, practice, and social action. Yet her effort remains deeply problematic and

limited from the very beginning. By insisting on the importance of rendering apparent the class-origin of housing segregation in Athens, she never really breaks with linear and evolutionary notions and models of development. The fact that the geography of Athens is seen through the lens of a model that draws on the American experience – the Chicago School of urban ecology and Burgess' model of concentric zoning – is a narrow, oppositional and contradictory attempt to come to terms with the Mediterranean geography. Overall her argument is that the working classes of Athens, managed 'spontaneously' to take over the urban space of the city in a manner which is the exact opposite of the way in which the American city was structured and formed. It is hard not to see, however, that there is a certain sliding by recourse to the way in which the above 'spontaneous' occupation is accomplished. Is spontaneity, for example, capitalist or peripheral? And if it is capitalist, is it capitalist in the way 'we' ('we' the westerners? 'we' the intellectuals? 'we' the geographers?) know of capitalism? Be that as it may, while Leontidou (1989: 127), on the one hand constantly renounces parasitism, arguing that capitalism has been fully developed in Greece by the 19th century, something that Tsoucalas saw as a non-capitalist form of life and Vergopoulos as an inevitable stage of a world capitalist development, on the other hand, she suggests that the spontaneous appropriation of urban space – the illegal houses built by the working-class at the suburbs of Athens – is a defensive strategy of the proletariat resisting the devastated and highly uneven mechanisms nourished at the dawn of the capitalist market.

The weaknesses of such a position will be gradually become apparent, and yet in a way they do not necessarily concern or coincide with her inadequate treatment of theory. They ought to be seen, instead, as closely related to the immanently ambivalent character of political-economic discourses, and in accord to the fact that the ensuing tension between capitalism and spontaneity is never resolved. Spontaneity is susceptible to a two-fold stuttering, first, in that it takes the relentless effort of the working classes to buy or build illegal properties as revolutionary, and second, in that it asserts, at the same time, that 'illegality' – the illegal occupation of urban space – is, surreptitiously, promoted or allowed by the dominant classes, in order to further exploit the proletariat – by selling houses for example, to the labourers. The spontaneous language is, interestingly though inevitably, inherently immersed with the antithetical and contradictory fissures, textures and fractals that extend, overflow

and penetrate politico-economic discourses, however insistently these heterogeneities were sought to be hidden or disguised. Even if for Leontidou (1989: 243) the workers took control of areas on the outskirts of Athens, which were peripheral but close to their works, cheap but owned by them, excluded from the plan of the city but soon to be 'legalized', such a spontaneous and illegal allocation fails to result in any kind of unity. I do not mean to oppose spontaneity here on some empirical or pragmatological grounds, but I only seek to disclose what it wants to hide, that is the fact, that it is profoundly posited in contradictory and antithetical terms, presenting the Mediterranean city in terms of a paradoxical yet transitional rationality. For even if the houses of the working class are located in the suburbs, such a model is but a superficial inversion of the American capitalist experience that can hardly deliver a radical change in the way one understands, contemplates or thinks and experiences urban problems under conditions of a full-blown consumer society. Paradoxically, spontaneity's failure to block the ceaseless differentiation and disadjustment of space, that is, to block the motionless trips and voyages of and in space, constitutes its ostensible but characteristic success. It is a success in that it renders apparent how hard it can get to avoid the "harsh law of spacing" (Derrida, 1976: 200), that is the fact that space is both what forms and deforms social relations and, moreover, what affirms heterogeneity; and thus on the one hand, spontaneity admits that there is an external and conspicuously invested foreign capital, which is responsible for the parasitic geo-economy of Athens, whilst, on the other hand, it seems to propose that the working-class 'spontaneously' invades and takes over the peripheral urban space, resisting and fighting capitalism. It is a success, finally, because in the light of the above sliding, the joyful liberation and affirmative spatial differentiation that hesitates at every step becomes more persistent, pressing and tentative, as spontaneity fails to present and accomplish – and this is what makes it a success – what initially set out to do, that is, to explain the antithesis between a privileged form (foreign capital), and a subordinate or inferior element (the domestic informal sector/spontaneous allocation). The incalculable choreographies and events that are yet to come in subsequent chapters, therefore, are meant to reinscribe not only parasitism but also spontaneity, on the plane of fetishist consumption, and the experience of place which is not already formed, stabilized, pinned down and calculated in any whatsoever poetic or spontaneous manner. Spontaneity should be allowed thus to go with the flow, events, continuous variation and differential repetitions that avoid the negativity and

contradiction of the productivist milieu, and are most likely to be swept up by the counterfeit, becoming-woman, and the spectrality, hauntology and fetishism of utility, that is the innumerable spirits of Marx, and the 'no more one/more than one spectres' that haunt political economy (Derrida, 1994).

To recap, in the preceding pages, I have denounced a dwindling parasitism for dwelling on negative, ill-manner and unbecoming theorizations luring space and geography into an indifferent Mediterraneanist state. Consequently, I have attempted to open up space to the becoming, fetishistic, and systemic nature of the consumer society which has taken pains to deliver a rigorous reconstruction of the meaning of parasitism. That attempt however was not meant to imply a new orthodoxy, but merely to reorganize what has already been said and done affirming the irreducible snags and events that are yet to come with respect to consumption, place and the subject in Rethemnos. Parasitism is not simply mistreated, in the above writings, but oscillates between two ex-positions, the underdeveloped agriculture (part of the capitalist system), and the spontaneous allocation (a revolutionary occupation of urban space of the semi-periphery). Suffice it to say that I did not mean to oppose parasitism, spontaneity and the non-capitalist capitalism, but sought instead to bring them to bear upon the twisted and twirling events of consumption, that is events which as we shall see, traverse and transmogrify the historical clash between official and social interpretations of the Old Town, engaging in novel forms of theoretical terrorism.

A fuller deconstruction of the above Mediterraneanist spatialities, therefore, on the grounds of a hauntological use-value (Derrida, 1994), (the) origami (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Doel, 1999) and the moral, aesthetic and cognitive spacings (Bauman, 1993) will be now taken up.

CHAPTER SIX: DECONSTRUCTING MEDITERRANEANIST SPATIALITIES

6.1. Introduction

I have already deconstructed the oft-tarnished Mediterraneanist ideals in Chapters 3 and 4 – the models of shame, honour and poetics – allowing for a difference-producing repetition, the counterfeit and becoming-woman to glare and I have also started imperceptibly to point in the direction of a similar deconstruction of Mediterraneanist spatialities. The disturbing and disintegrating geography taken up by such a theory breaks with the pointillism of politico-economic conceptions – the ‘time-space compression’ of Harvey, the poetic Old Town of Herzfeld and Leontidou’s spontaneous model. What I will be arguing now is that such a deconstruction is not complete unless Rethemnos is unfolded in association with the notion of origami, that is, the geophilosophy launched by Deleuze and Guattari, which makes it possible to subtract the recent trajectory of the Old Town from the Oneness of Mediterraneanism (the One of history: poetic resistance; the One of anthropology: the values of shame-and-honour; and the One of geography: authenticity of place).

An origamic conception of space admits that there is no Old Town without New Town, no social time, without monumental time. In short: “No one without two. No first without second” (Doel, 2001: 557). To affirm the difference the Old Town makes means simply to affirm that “Place and placeness are no longer opposed, as the humanistic geographers believed. Hereinafter, a place is both NowHere and NoWhere” (Doel, 2000: 124). The Old Town is neither a point nor a limit, but both a spatial fix and an irreducible split that allows difference to take hold: “Letting space take place. That’s all” (Doel, 2000: 132). To say that space *takes place* means simply that place is a process which once set in motion unsettles the points of spontaneity, parasitism, and informal history, going against the flow of a holding formation, and preventing the One from deciding, naming, categorizing or separating the Old Town from the New Town. The (s)playing out of place, in other words, affirms not only that the two parts of the town are inseparable but that relations exist only to the extent that they engage in a perpetual movement of constant negotiation. Such is the resonance of (the) origami that sets the Old Town in motion, in a way which allows to extend its old part into the new parts and the new parts into the old part of the town. On the back

of such a suspended invagination, therefore, between the various parts of the town ‘nothing is constant but everything is a transformer’ (Doel, 1999).

I have already demonstrated how politico-economic theories fail to be swept up by such an origamic understanding of space, especially with respect to Harvey’s three-fold scheme of rationality, consensus and universalism. I have also taken up on parasitism, capitalism without capitalists and spontaneity in an attempt to demonstrate how their epistemological and ontological presuppositions are part and parcel of the politico-economic ontologies of Mediterraneanism. I now want to brush the Mediterranean city against the grain of a *fantasmatic* (from the Greek *fainesthai* – both what appears and what is lost, a ghost/phantom) conception of value that deconstructs once the ‘more than one/no more one’ spectres of Marx, are put forward by Derrida (1994). Subsequently, I shall go with the flow of an origamic understanding of space, based on the geophilosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (1994) before finally, picking up on the processive character of spacing by way of Bauman’s (1993) theory regarding the cognitive, moral and aesthetic spacings. The latter will, finally, lay the groundwork for a fuller understanding of consumption, which is analytically exhibited and taken up in Chapter 7.

6.2 Hauntology-Spectrology – Beyond Spontaneity

The spontaneous Mediterranean in transition, I have argued, is an unbecoming spatial practice that bathes in rationalism, revolutionary hopes and productivism. I have asserted in Chapter 3 that the Mobius bands of utility, the fetishism of use-value and symbolic exchange submit the Mediterranean space to a consistent restructuring with reference to the consumer society that is neither unproductive, nor negative, nor parasitic, nor spontaneous. It is time thus to start picking up on one of these bands, specifically the spectrality of use-value, in order to specify how such a theory can effectively set free and unleash a non-parasitic appreciation of urban space which has hitherto been blocked and discharged by the naturalization, and territorialization of the spontaneous denigration. A Mobius band is a mode of thought that turns the outside into the inside and the inside into the outside, and thus “It is infinite and contrary to the representative cube, intensities run in it without meeting a terminus, without ever crashing into the wall” (Lyotard, 1993: 4). I have already followed such

a band in the last subsection of Chapter 3, where I began to discuss the permutations and implications between parasitism, spontaneity and capitalism without capitalists. I now want to pursue the above unfolding in a more consistent and intense manner in order to map the effects of the *more than one/no more one* spectres of Marx (Derrida, 1994), once space is subtracted (withdrawn from any presently speaking spontaneous movement) from the Oneness of spontaneity.

A spectre, according to Derrida, can be unfolded in the following manner. “First of all mourning [for] One has to know. *One has to know it. One has to have knowledge [...]* Next, one cannot speak of generations of skulls or spirits [...] except on the condition of language [...] Finally [...] the thing *works* whether it transforms or it transforms it self, poses or decomposes it self: the spirit, ‘the spirit of the spirit’ is *work*” (Derrida, 1994: 9). Thus a spectre on the basis of the above three-fold reasoning might be taken to refer to political economy, even Marx’s, on condition that “what has been uttered ‘since Marx’ can only promise or remind one to maintain together, in a speech that defers, deferring not what it affirms but deferring just *so as to affirm*, to affirm *justly*, so as to have the power (a power without power) to affirm the coming of the event, its future-to-come itself” (Derrida, 1994: 17). A spectre, and political economy by implication, should have a future, but only by means of a promise that is yet to come and which at present is ‘out of joint’. This is why “there is tragedy, there is essence of the tragic only on the condition of this originary, more precisely of this pre-originary and properly spectral anteriority of the crime – the crime of the other, a misdeed whose event and reality can never be *present themselves* in flesh and blood but can only allow themselves to be presumed, reconstructed, fantasized” (Derrida, 1994: 21).

Always already trapped in the contradictory depiction of a theorization that works by way of a double bind (either/or...both/and), a spectre, accordingly, is ‘out of joint’, in exactly the same way in which spontaneity, as was shown in the previous chapter, follows the logic of a double bind, once when the illegal working-class housing is taken as a spatial form that constitutes a revolutionary tactic of the proletariat (against the commodification of urban space) and once again when it is taken as a capitalist way of exploiting and dividing the city (and thus a means to perpetuate the existent power relations). Spontaneity haunts the urban space of Athens by being ‘out of joint’, therefore, not because it is illegal but precisely because of being haunted by a

spectre which points in the direction and ghostly presence of a double bind – being both an antidote to the fierce commercialization of urban land and what further exploits labour, housing and social space.

Put differently, on the one hand, illegality and spontaneity undo and dis-articulate the law by way of a future that is yet to come (the state promising that the illegal constructions of the workers will be soon legalized); on the other hand, spontaneity is what makes possible a further exploitation of urban space and thus it is not as revolutionary as often assumed (breaking the building legislation does not really change anything in the way capitalism works in Athens). The question, accordingly, is how just (*dike* in Greek) is such a spatial organization or by the same token, how peculiarly Mediterranean(ist) spontaneity is? Is the statement ‘the time is out of joint’, relevant at all to this justice of and in space? Heidegger interprets *dike* as “joining, adjoining, adjustment, articulation of accord or harmony” (Derrida, 1994: 23), while *adikia* “to the contrary [...] is at once what is disjointed, undone, twisted and out of line, in the wrong of the unjust, or even in the error of stupidity” (Derrida, 1994: 23). The *dike* of illegality, therefore, is what restores and compensates for the *adikia* of the capitalist production of space and thus “the disjointure in the very presence of the present, this sort of non-con-temporaneity of present time with itself (this radical untimeliness or this anachrony on the basis of which we are trying here to think the *ghost*) is, according to Heidegger ‘said and unsaid’” (Derrida, 1994: 25). Spontaneity is obliged to reckon with this ‘said and unsaid’ of a *dike* which is always already beyond law and calculation “over and above the market, above market, bargaining, thanking, commerce, and commodity” (Derrida, 1994: 26). But it should also reckon with what is concealed in Leontidou’s spontaneity, but is still implicitly present there, that is, the fact that spontaneity does not really break with the way in which the system works. For spontaneity is spectral, not in the sense of being unreal or untrue but exactly because of being composed of fractals and fragments that haunt the assumption of a self-defining revolution (the illegal occupation of a space as a means to resist the capitalist production of space) which at the same time tacitly nourishes the suspicion of being (the illegal housing) a capitalist trick. The illegal and spontaneous occupation of space – if it has any meaning at all as a distinct Mediterranean characteristic – should cope, therefore, with such a ghostly play of a

justice which is open from the off to innumerable choreoethnographies and calculations.

Without taking into account and without reckoning with this spectre, the spontaneous spatial practice is already caught up in the trap of reactionary politics. Seen through the lens of a double bind, by contrast, spontaneity avoids such a negativity once it is acknowledged that there is no way to appeal or count for anything spontaneous unless it is both a possible strategy of emancipation, and what restricts or prohibits its imminently revolutionary apprehension. It is in the light of this impossibility that Derrida (1994: 31) speaks of differance as the condition of thought that cannot be dissociated from alterity, singularity and the irreducibility of spacing, involving as such “a matter of linking an *affirmation* (in particular a political one), *if there is any*, to the experience of the impossible, which can only be a radical experience of the *perhaps*” (Derrida, 1994: 35). If spontaneity meant to be in any true or radical sense revolutionary, therefore, it should retain something of such an impossible double bind that does not hold onto a reserve but constitutes both an illegal spatial practice and what inadvertently supports capitalism. Being spectral, therefore, means, that “there are reasons to doubt this reassuring order of presents, and especially, the border between the present, the actual or present reality of the present, and everything that can be opposed to it: absence, non-presence, non-effectivity, inactuality, virtuality or even the simulacrum in general, and so forth” (Derrida, 1994: 39).

Spontaneity, parasitism and the capitalism without capitalists are productivist and rationalist discourses that deconstruct, once the Mobius bands of such a ‘doubting over the reassuring presents’ are taken seriously. For any genuine or spontaneous Mediterranean, should be taken in accord to the event of a spectre, which is “the impossible itself, and that this *condition of possibility* of the event is also its *condition of impossibility*” (Derrida, 1994: 65). Spontaneity is neither a politico-economic revolutionary spatial planning, nor an ineffective or convenient logic of informal/illegal housing. Rather it is a spirit which opens up a future that is yet to come, an intuition or “promise and decision, which is to say, responsibility” (Derrida, 1994: 75), compliant with the unbearable ambivalence of a type of spatial planning that should never be fixed or solid.

The spontaneous spatial organization has to be illegal, in other words, as a means to compensate for the injustice – the capitalization and commercialization of urban space – but at the cost of being always suspected of being implicitly or surreptitiously promoted by capitalism as a means through which a further commodification of urban space in the name of a Mediterranean rationality, will be achieved. Without reckoning with this spectre, spontaneity will be always a pseudorevolutionary local anarchism that does not really take hold of or grasp the dynamic of a Mediterranean space which is full of possibilities, rich potentials and fraught with corners, creases, cavities, and multiplications, that is, a surface without holes, for “There are no holes, only invaginations of surfaces” (Lyotard, 1993: 21). Such intensities that are neither good (revolutionary), nor bad (oppressive), constitute decompressions that dissimulate, and differentiate delivering a difference within identity, a chance event and a passion within reason (Lyotard, 1993: 52). Housing thus even in its spontaneous form is less a necessity, which in Athens has to be illegal in order to overcome the commodification of urban land, than it is a fold of libidinal economy invested and taken up by desire.

As spontaneity is now imperceptibly given over to the double bind and affirmative postponement of a spectre, it is worthwhile recalling with Derrida how Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism is associated with use-value, which “haunts the thing, its specter is at work in use-value” (Derrida, 1994: 151). Utility, on the face of this, is already a form, a fetish, and a value, even in the case of housing, before it is an idea of a superstructural origin. The necessary spontaneous allocation, for example, was already spectral from the very beginning before a house becomes a commodity – e.g. to be the owner of a house in the Greek imaginary was and still is one of the most powerful ideas and most praised achievement one can accomplish. The commodity-form thus under which housing is now recognized in the shape of the illegal occupation of urban space sets in motion an already ghostly use-value and does not take over from a transparent use-value that allegedly satisfies certain residential needs. The commodity, according to Derrida’s reading of Marx is a strange creature which is neither alive nor dead but that which has a chance of a certain autonomy: “Facing up to the others, before the others, its fellows, here then is the apparition of a strange creature: at the same time Life, Thing, Beast, Object, Commodity, Automaton – in a word, specter” (Derrida, 1994: 152). Being spectral thus means to remain faithful to the commodity fetishism of Marx’s political economy (Derrida, 1994: 156),

and to the always already fetishized social relations that preside over capitalist conditions. What commodities would say if they could speak as Marx has famously suggested – though he never pushed such a conception to its logical conclusion – is that “our use-value may interest men, but it does not belong to us as objects. What does belong to us as objects, however, is our value [...] We relate to each other [...] merely as exchange values” (Derrida, 1994: 157).

One is tempted to ask, therefore, when exactly the commodity – in our case housing – was not already capitalized and commodified, that is, when it was not already a ghostly, spectral and spiritual ‘kind of being’ that recites differences? How is it possible for any use-value to avoid spectrality? For if the neutrality of housing in Athens “is not guaranteed, then one would have to say that the phantasmagoria began before the said exchange-value, at the threshold of the value of value in general, or that the commodity-form began before the commodity-form, itself before itself” (Derrida, 1994: 160). The spontaneous model of Leontidou is a useful spatial model once its undisclosed potential is submitted to the spectre of a value which slides over a *dike* which is yet to come. Such is the resonance of an undecidable event that takes place in the urban history of Athens, in which spontaneity is always already contaminated and intoxicated by a spectre that is excessive, superfluous and given over to the undecidability and ephemerality of an event. If spontaneity is to be differential thus it should remain faithful to an event ‘out of joint’; which is beyond the presence of the illegal and informal housing spatial structure that is now taken hostage by a promise that neither adjudicates nor calculates nor prognosticates a method or a practice of spatial resistance. A more sophisticated approach regarding space, therefore, is required in order to go beyond such a Mediterraneanist conception of spontaneity. This is why I have to turn now to origami.

6.3 The Spatial Art of Folding: (the) origami

“Geography spaces” writes Doel (1999: 103) in an attempt to suggest that space is always already caught up within the solicitation, reinscription and reiteration of movements of slowness and speed interrupting, defamiliarizing and defamilializing the world – or forming, deforming and reforming the world rather than simply representing it. The major concern of geography thus is to differentiate, intensify, remark, and experiment rather than to integrate, represent, interpret or signify. Embarking on such intuition is about arguing now that space is relational, unstable and decompressed, rather than a clash between social history and monumental time.

Deleuze’s notion of the fold fits the above assumption to unsettling, and deconstructing any politico-economic spatial fix, which is fraught with poetical social histories and the integrity, pointillism and unbecoming constancies, permanencies and solidities of an oppositional resistance. Rethemnos when seen as a fold captures incisively the Old Town’s transformation and trajectory, through a theorization that insists on the decompression, deconstruction and destabilization of space that ceaselessly marks the shifting attitude of the residents toward the Greek state and the restoration project. For being a fold, above all, means also that the Old Town is pointless, which comes down to saying, not that it is without meaning, but that it is not made or composed of points, for “Space, place and dwelling [...] comprise *pointless points*” (Doel, 1996: 423). The split between the houses that have been restored and the properties left to careless decay thus is not reproduced but suspended, insofar as to reproduce “implies the permanence of a fixed point of view that is external to what is reproduced: watching the flow from the back” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 36). For a fold takes up on space in a way that unfolds and refolds, in a similar way a shop or an area in the Old Town is turned into or resembles a fold, when it opens on the basis of the number of tourists that come and go, in order to be unfolded (during the winter) waiting to be refolded again (in the summer). In an attempt to remain faithful to the meaning and experience of folding, therefore, Deleuze takes sides not with reproduction but with the notion of *following* inasmuch as “following is something different from the ideal of reproduction. Not better, just different” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 36). Following subtracts Rethemnos from a fully deployed situation that is, from the One of history (contradiction), the One of anthropology (poetics) and the One of geography (authenticity), reducing from the *n*th

power ($n-1$) and lending consistency to spacing and becoming. For truly, becomings do away “with all integral, molar and majoritarian categories [...] Becoming is therefore a radicalization of relations, of the spacing of relations, and of relationship space, wherein the conjunctive ‘and’ takes all” (Doel, 1996: 426, 427). This is why one has to deconstruct the Old Town problem “by force of restraint at the level of dimensions already available by making $n-1$ ” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 10), that is by, working against the dialectic of an embedded placeness – the contradictory polarity between official and social conceptions of history. The Old Town problem should be set in motion *following* the n dimensions of its neighborhoods, small streets, and abandoned buildings that are connected to each other via irreducible double b(l)inds, dis-joints and conjunctive ‘ands’, comprising not only hierarchies but above all rhizomes, plateaus and folds. It is such a spatial configuration exemplified by the fold and the rhizome that make Rethemnos’ call more urgent than ever: “use me” (Lyotard, 1993: 64). As Deleuze and Guattari put it in association with the rhizome:

“[it]connects any point with any other point, and none of its features necessarily refers to features of the same kind. It puts into play very different regimes of signs and even states of non-signs. The rhizome does not allow itself to be reduced to the One, or the Many. It is not the One that becomes two or that might become three, four or five etc. [...] It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle, through which it pushes and overflows. It constitutes linear multiplicities in n dimensions without subject or object, which can be laid on a plane of consistency and from which the One is always subtracted ($n-1$)” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 47–48).

A rhizome is what comes between the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos, for the “rhizome does not begin and does not end but is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, *intermezzo*” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 57), potentializing and actualizing more than one line of flight as “Difference does not separate, detach, divide, split, shed, fragment or cast-off” (Doel, 1993: 379), but marks the ceaseless spacing that keeps under continuous suspense, threat and regret any kind of separation between the folds of the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos. Folds are not simply divided but perpetually folded around other folds growing, expanding and leaking in all possible directions, like an irreducible difference-producing repetition that opposes not a substance or a trait but the opposition between substances and traits – e.g. social history versus monumental history. A fold, moreover, is not immobile or static, but should be seen in terms of flows “that no longer belong to the one, nor the other but

constitute the asymmetrical becoming of the two” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1983: 82). Mediterraneanism – shame, honour, poetic, friends of the heart, parasitism, capitalism without capitalists, spontaneity, and official history – succumb to a social logic that “goes from one opposite to the other only by means of imprecision” (Deleuze, 1991: 44). The fold and the rhizome, by contrast, de-limit, re-cite and re-inscribe the Old Town problem and its practices – honour to women, shame to men, poetics to silence and parasitism to consumerism – without pinning down, naming or pigeonholing difference.

Such a movement of writing difference based on the effective origami, which is further composed of events, rhizomes and folds can be usefully explicated with reference to the undisclosed potentials of the conjunctive AND, for a simple demarcation line cannot separate the Old Town from the rest of Rethemnos. It is only a suspended and withheld split that can take up on the inbetweeness of the Old Town, which comes as a disjunctive conjunction reassuring that “whenever there is an ‘and’ there is never a clean-cut separating distinct and immutable term” (Doel, 1996: 422). It is hard to tell, therefore, which part of the Old Town is outside and which is inside. The difference the Old Town makes is not hierarchical but resembles a trace, a supplement and a graphe of incalculably blurred, blended and intermingled folds, which is precisely about what the conjunctive ‘and’ stands for, that is, “this new-found emphasis on the affective power of joint-action” (Doel, 2000: 118). Thus one must understand that each part of Rethemnos is always in the middle of the other in the same way that “the world is always in the middle of things” (Doel, 1996: 424); something which has been already stressed by both Bergson (1970) and Deleuze’s (1986) cinematic philosophy; and that the folds, rhizomes, heterogeneities and discontinuities that fascinate poststructuralist geography are all composed of similar conjunctions. To quote from Deleuze (1983) once again:

“The AND, as something which has its place between the elements or between the sets. AND, AND, AND – stammering. And even if there are two parts in town, there is an AND between the two, which is neither the one nor the other, nor the one which becomes the other, but that which constitutes a multiplicity. For the conjunctive *and* does not form “a dialectical opposition, but opposition to the dialectic itself: differential affirmation against dialectical negation, against all nihilism and against this particular form of it” (Deleuze, 1983: 17).

In order to write, therefore, the difference space makes in a radically different manner to what has been already proposed by Mediterraneanist writings, (the) origami is of paramount importance. Such a molecularly differential writing of space is always suspicious of historical, materialist, anthropological and other molar types of resistance, which are associated with small groups, pure identities, gift exchanges and authentic remote places. Conceiving of the Old Town as an expression of official and social appropriations of history in a manner which rests strictly on the power of small groups is neither creative nor affirmative nor for the same reason productive. Small groups as Deleuze should warn, after all, are full:

“[...] of micro-fascisms that exist in a social field without necessarily being centralized in a particular State apparatus. We have left the shores of rigid segmentation and entered a realm that is no less organized where each one plumbs his own black hole, thereby becoming dangerous, confident about his own situation, his role, his mission. This is even more disturbing than the certitudes of the first live: Stalins of little groups, neighborhood, dispensers of justice, the micro-fascisms of gangs etc. [...] We have been interpreted as saying that for us the schizophrenic is the true revolutionary. We believe rather that schizophrenia is the collapse of a molecular process into a black hole. Marginal groups have always been the object of fear and sometimes of horror. They are not so clandestine” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1983: 98).

I am not suggesting that the poetic model is fascist. But the fact that it overestimates the power of molar groups, thinking “too much in terms of history, whether personal or universal” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: 2), while having nothing to say of the effective power of spacing, and the indiscernible events that interrupt and break with the interminability of the Old Town, is a highly limited conception that fails to stave off the effective origami. It is worth recalling once again with Deleuze that “Becomings belong to geography they are orientations, directions, entries and exits” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: 2), rather than being assigned to historical or anthropological grounds. The effective origami unfolds space and complicates official and monumental times and thus no small wonder that what the resident meant to say when Herzfeld and his wife were taking pictures of the Venetian monuments is that ‘There is nothing to see’. For as Deleuze and Guattari point out with respect to such a material clinging on the face of ethnography, there is “nothing to understand, nothing to interpret” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 4), except from the fractal and spectral effects of speed and slowness, and the events that *will have been* – untimely. Origami

irradiates, therefore, through its folds, rhizomes and plateaus, a fascination for an infinite multiplicity – the simplest question in the origamic universe being always, *does this multiplicity work for you?* If not, then take another fold, or unfold an already existent one, but in a manner which is simply worthy. Folding, refolding and unfolding. Such is the resonance of origami and the differential repetitions that crack, cut open and seep through the evental, unknown and undecidable Rethemnos.

This is not to suggest that the split between the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos is unreal in a metaphorical sense. The issue is not about a metaphor but about a totally and absolutely real and material transition, but what is crucial, however, is that such a reality or transition is “irreducibly *split*: a double ‘agent’ – but no less a schizophrenic for that” (Doel, 2001: 147). The social rhetoric of everyday history its ethnographic value notwithstanding, remains imprisoned and trapped within the striated space of state philosophy, despite the fact that it constantly denounces such a state ideology. It still conceives however of social identities, by way of contradiction and negativity, reaction and lack, misery and insufficiency, seeking to pan out and block everything that takes flight from the constants and fixtures of place. A philosophy of difference, by contrast, seeks only to make space for a “thought that would *affirm* life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life” (Deleuze, 1983: 101), for to “*affirm is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what lives*” (Deleuze, 1983: 185).

Hence the task of geography: not to represent, interpret or make sense of the Old Town problem, but simply and purely “all those articular intervals that open up the forced stabilization and self-identity of what appear to be points” (Doel, 2000: 120). This is why opposing the state-bureaucratic explanations of monumental history and the Greek officialdom with some local mythologies, social rhetoric, the Cretan manhood and history, is still ill-mannered and unbecoming; and pointillistic (Doel, 1999). For the Old Town is neither a self-sustained geographical area in physical or geographical terms nor a constant analytic category – place, locality, milieu etc. Instead it is “nothing but bands of intensity, potentials, thresholds and gradients” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 19). Meanwhile, everywhere, space is a transformer and deformer of social relations, signs and identities.

If Rethemnos is worthy of the decompressed events of dissemination, deconstruction, schizoanalysis and the ethnography of the event, therefore, this is because the motionless trips and Mobius bands of difference, affirm the relations that come between the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos, suspending, postponing and withdrawing from any permanent contradiction between the Old Town and Rethemnos; and affirming the in-betweenness, stuttering, interminable and trembling fractality of space. For such is the effective power of origami when composed of folds, rhizomes and plateaus, which are always already interrupted, in a manner in which affirms dis-junction, heterogeneity and postponement; and hence an “*interruption without interruption*” (Doel, 1992: 163), insofar as difference “is always an undecidable and irreducible double [...] suspend[ing] itself between these two possibilities” (Doel, 1992: 166). Betweenness though “does not designate a localizable relation ‘going’ from one thing to the other and back again but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps the one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 25). Once this double bind is set in motion, the Old Town is no longer about opposition, contradiction or negation but about everything that stutters, stammers and trembles; in a nutshell: *Rethemnos*, recall, *is not what you think*.

Mediterraneanists would counterclaim that the careful collection and recording of empirical data is a far more pragmatic and realistic way than origami, in order to disclose the potentials and hidden possibilities of a place like Rethemnos. Yet one should know from Deleuze and Guattari that “there is no ethnological interpretation for the simple reason that there is no ethnographic material: there are only uses and functionings” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 180). Humanistic approaches to space and place, for their part, would insist on the need to “uncover the nature of the social world through an understanding of how people act in and give meaning to their own lives” (Eyles, 1989: 2). And as a place-based perspective approach would have it, the crucial question is to study “how [...] the human being [is] related to the earth and cosmos” (Tuan, 1997: 88). Even a recent turn in human geography dubbed ‘thirdspace’ (Soja, 1996) may occasionally feel uncomfortable with the traces left behind by origami and the geophilosophy put forward by Deleuze – though at other times it appears to be sympathetic to the notion of the postmodern (cf. Soja, 1989).

Yet things are far more complicated than these accounts allow and perhaps go a bit too far in the direction of an eventual adestation than people assume or are ready to accept.

To recap, origami is an expressive, stretched, distanciated, deconstructed and affirmative movement in and of space, dwelling on “neither a this-side of nor a beyond: it is the boundary line between the two-*Incest*, that slandered shallow stream – always already or not yet crossed” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 161). The spatial binds and double joints of the origamic universe destabilize on the move the embeddedness of the Old Town, which is jointly disjunctive, yet this is a “disjunction that remains disjunctive and that still affirms the disjoined terms, that affirms them throughout their entire distance, *without restricting one by the other or excluding the other from the one*” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 76). What matters to the origamic universe is simply the “*masses or flows*, with their mutations, quanta of deterritorialization, connections and accelerations” that outwit the “*classes or segments* with their binary organization, resonance, conjunction or accumulation and line of overcoding favouring one line over the others” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 221). And thus it is only by way of the interval and the in-between that the Old Town counts or makes sense, for “the interval takes all, the interval is substance” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 478). When all is said and done, therefore, every difference brushed against an origamic conception of space serves a single purpose, to “Mark [a] distance. What is mine is first of all my distance; I posses only distances” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 319), as it gets imperceptibly apparent that nothing is historical, anthropological or philosophical about the Old Town; though, admittedly it can always be a certain sense of philosophy or history at stake or at work as long as of course, “philosophy is geophilosophy in precisely the same way that history is a geohistory” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 95).

I have so far covered considerable ground opening up difference to the movements of deconstruction in order to unsettle certain nihilistic representations that negate otherness – the stifling images of thought presented by poetics, friends of the heart, shame, honour, and the spontaneous parasitic spatial practice. I have, moreover, argued that Mediterraneanism should be altogether abandoned because it dwells on the molar plain of constancy, remaining ethnocentric, metaphysical, unbecoming,

striated and digestive. On the back of the driftwork of such a deconstructive supplement, I have set out to loosen the purity of the friends of the heart, letting them go with the flow of the counterfeit, which is a non-reciprocal and non-economic social form beyond the economic and obligatory character of gift exchanges. In addition, I have picked parasitism and the Mobius bands of the consumer society (though more bands are still to come in Chapter 7) in order to start making sense of the implications and consequences a full-blown consumer society has for space, place and the subject, transcending the modernist, rationalist and productivist discourses and narratives of a spontaneous capitalism without capitalists, which take consumption as a deformed/failed companion of capitalism. A differential conception of gender has been also pursued in Chapter 4, grounded in the baselessness of a theoretical-practice that knows only of schizonomadic machines, becoming-woman and differential repetitive choreoethnographic differences that move beyond shame, honour, domestication and poetics. Given that certain forms of subject formation correspond with and reflect certain socialities and spatialities, I have been led, consequently, to explore the manner in which the above differential conceptions of identity resonate with differential conceptions of space. At this juncture, I have found exemplary the task of unfolding space as relational, fractal, fragmented, polymorphous, perverse, affirmative and disjunctive, in order to deconstruct the Mediterraneanist accounts of a certain absolute, inactive and objective space on the grounds of origami. I have also proposed, directly above, that the folding, unfolding and refolding of social space is far a more fruitful way to grapple with the thorny issues of space, place, and the subject formation of Rethemnos, rather than any poetic model of history. The full implications of such a suggestion in terms of the Old Town problem will start making sense in due course. Meanwhile, prior to dipping into this unraveling – and the way in which the geophilosophy of Deleuze and Guattari resonates with the Old Town problem – what is still missing is an adequate interpretation of how space and consumerism are indelibly linked structurations.

Baudrillard's, and Bauman's theories – on different occasions – have all been on various occasions, radically misread and misconceived by geographers. Thrift (2000: 109), for example, commented on the relationship between consumption and postmodernity in the following manner. "In the most apocalyptic of postmodern pronouncements, the chief reason for existence has become consumption; signs of the

commodity have become more important than the commodity itself and people have begun to lose their identity in the melee of consumption (Baudrillard, 1998a; Bauman, 1993 [sic. – 1996a]; Clarke, 1997 [a]). And Miller *et al* (1998: 8) have characterized Bauman's theory 'a hysterical' interpretation of consumption. Even Harvey (1990: 352), in his otherwise sober depiction of what he calls a 'new round of time-space compression' conceives of Deleuze's and Guattari's (1983) exquisite coupling of capitalism and schizophrenia as an extreme, if not superficial, account of capitalism. This is, however, a serious misinterpretation of both postmodernity and consumerism. Suffice it to say for now that Baudrillard's analysis does not simply promulgate that 'the sign is more important than the commodity', nor is Bauman's work 'hysterical' – but will have the chance to work on these issues in Chapter 7. What needs further unpacking, therefore, is not only a more substantive theorization of the consumer society in order to undo these inadequate interpretations and caricatures of postmodernism and consumerism but also an attempt, to move beyond the negative and reactionary parasitism, and the spontaneous modernist accounts of space. Coming to terms with the *systemic* nature of consumption necessitates an understanding of Baudrillard's and Bauman's accounts of consumerism (Chapter 7), which in turn will help to shed light on the manner in which the Old Town problem (the way in which the restoration project is perceived by the residents and the conflicts and battles surrounding it) is currently transformed (Chapter 8). There is still a need, however, to explore the manner in which space is used in order to promote a fully-fledged consumer society and the manner in which consumerism organizes and is related to space and the geography of the postmodern city. It is Bauman's (1993) theorizations of the association and coordination between cognitive, aesthetic and moral spaces that acutely offer such a scrupulous depiction of the necessary link between geography and consumption that paves the way for a fuller consideration of consumption. It is to his theory that I now turn.

6.4 Cognitive, Aesthetic and Moral Spaces

Bauman's (1993: 145), theorization of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spacings may provide a useful entry point for a theorization that is of considerable importance in order to map the recent twists and turns of the Old Town problem.

The primordial and deeply embedded ability of human nature, Bauman suggests, to perceive and make sense of the world, is “so simple and ‘matter-of-fact’ that we hardly ever give it a thought” (Bauman, 1993: 146). It is “the knowledge we all have without knowing that we ‘have’ it” (Bauman, 1993: 147). But while such an understanding is in a certain sense pre-given or so to speak intuitive, knowledge by contrast “picks up from the point of breach, disruption, *mis*-understanding” (Bauman, 1993: 148). And thus the further away one moves from the intimacy pole of social proximity where understanding is unquestioned and unchallenged, the less one knows of the people who inhabit the social spaces marked by anonymity. “The more ‘strange’ the stranger is (the less knowledge I have of her), the less am I confident in my decision to assign her to a type” (Bauman, 1993: 149). That kind of physical proximity which was characteristic of traditional societies was based on the mutual trust and familiarity among those who lived close, and the persons one knew about and was most familiar with, though not always a friend. Familiarity, above all, concerned the satisfactory amount of knowledge one possessed, in order to get to grips with and make sense of others. And thus “What truly distinguished the neighbour from the rest was not therefore sympathy felt toward him, but the fact he had always been potentially within sight, always leaning towards the intimacy pole, always a prospective partner of intercourse and biography-sharing” (Bauman, 1993: 151). At some point, however, en route from traditional forms of life to modern ones, when the strangers appeared “inside the confines of the life-world” (Bauman, 1993: 152) such an understanding and classification which was based more on a pre-reflexive state of knowledge than a reasonably calculated and carefully estimated account of the risks that waited round the corner, turned out to be opaque, insufficient, and inadequate, for “The most striking and off-putting trait of strangers is that they are *neither* neighbours *nor* aliens” (Bauman, 1993: 153). In many ways, therefore, the radical transformation of the social poles of familiarity and anonymity due to the appearance of the stranger have made the heretofore traditional social spacing obsolete and misleading (Bauman, 1993: 159). And thus as time and again, strangers “are indispensable in the modern business of life” (Bauman, 1993: 159), being the “products of the same social spacing which aims at assimilating and domesticating the life-world” (Bauman, 1993: 160), relying on traditional forms of classification was no longer sufficient.

Strangers would be constantly on the move, however, and would hardly stay in a place, refusing to settle down, causing anxiety, insecurity and curiosity. Curiosity was above all, one of the fundamental characteristics surrounding the mythic figure of the stranger. Not only in the sense of strangers being curious, observing and watching carefully over people and places as they were going or passing from one city to another, but also in the sense of the 'city-people' being curious about and interested in the lots and whereabouts of strangers. For the spaces strangers came to occupy, or tended for a short time to be occupying, were neither the well-documented and charted areas where cognitive spacing was dominant, nor were the intimate, secure and safe spaces of small communities. Such spaces, above all, were the visible aesthetic spaces of the open markets and the public spaces of the cities which intensify "precisely our feeling of being lost, of not knowing how to act and what to expect, and the resulting unwillingness of engagement" (Bauman, 1993: 149). Money economy was one of the most formidable and prominent ways in order to deal with and engage in this perpetual art of 'mismatching', the basic function of which in city life, marked by the appearance of an increasingly silent but saliently indifferently and neutral so to speak – when it came to its whereabouts, intentions and thoughts – urban crowd, has come profoundly to saturate modern times (Bauman, 1993: 153).

What Bauman (1993: 164) calls *proteophobia*, literally the fear of Proteas – a feature of Greek mythology that could take many forms and shapes – is produced exactly by the overexposure and increasing number of strangers that imperceptibly have started to occupy the aesthetic spaces of modern cities. What cognitive spacing thus would accomplish, above all, was to categorize and classify the city according to the totalitarian and all-encompassing ideology of reason, and order within which and because of which the anxiety caused by strangers by simply being there, by being visible, or simply at sight, should be remedied. "Proteophobia refers therefore to the dislike of situations in which one feels lost, confused, disempowered" (Bauman, 1993: 164). Cognitive space orders, rules and classifies thus social space assuring that nothing out there will ever again generate fear, anxiety and aporia, or so it would hope, and claiming that such sediments generated by the stranger's appearance should be kept at a safe distance. The modern city, accordingly, was a result of a spacing that wanted to garden and protect its members from the strangers, the outsiders, and the unclassifiable and the concomitant aesthetic spacing, something which resonates with

what Bauman (1993: 168) terms *proteophilia* – literally the love of Proteas – which basically refers to “the uneven distribution of interest, curiosity, capacity to arouse amusement and enjoyment” (Bauman, 1993: 168). For as Bauman put it “The joy of strolling in the city (in a well-policed city, a city with the job of social spacing properly done) is the joy of playing. ‘Wandering without aim, stopping once in a while to look around’ (this is how the activity of the *flaneur* – the character made into the epitome of the modern urbanite by Baudelaire and his most famous interpreter, Walter Benjamin – is described) is, one may say, the ultimate play” (Bauman, 1993: 169).

On the face of the above, it is aesthetic spacing that has become a central and key strategy in charting and organizing the city in line with the contours drawn to our attention by the play and incessant movement of strangers. For, today “We are all players. The urban *flaneur* is the *travelling player*” (Bauman, 1993: 172).

The above theorization can be useful in unfolding the Old Town problem. The fact, for example, as we shall see, that the town of Rethemnos should be organized and designed in order its Venetian past to be visible and recognizable, is a profound case of such a cognitive spacing. Like every ruling or hegemonic spacing however, the charting of the town in line with its Venetian past was not without disputes and struggles, especially from the side of those who had felt in the most painful and cruel manner the repressive dominion of the monumentalization project that prevented all possible restorations of the properties unless authorization was acclaimed by the Archaeology Service.

One of the possible ways to theorize such a resistance might be poetic history. It is not the only way though. Another, more daring, so to speak, way of proceeding, can materialize also by turning to moral spacing, which is crucially in conflict with the cognitive spacing of the restoration project, and which partly explains the original enmity of the residents toward the project of restoration. For, “The objects of cognitive spacing are the others we live *with*. [While] The objects of moral spacing are the others we live *for*” (Bauman, 1993: 165). The original rejection of the restoration project, therefore, was not necessarily a sign of a reactionary and locally based perception of politics, but an expression of the difficulty to reconcile the

presence of the stranger with the infinite and asymmetrical responsibility of moral spacing, which is “the sole resource of founding the moral space” (Bauman, 1993: 166). For “moral spacing is negligent of reasons, refers to no communicable knowledge and is unable to mount an argued self-defense, let alone convince those in doubt to accept its results” (Bauman, 1993: 166). The restoration project organized social space according to a conceptualization of history that saw in the Old Town the glory of Venetian past, ignoring simultaneously the current problems and concerns of the residents. The initial cognitive spacing of the restoration project, however, turned the public spaces of Rethemnos into a commodified scenery of Venetian glimpses into the world stage, as the monuments were not only a mark of official interpretations and ideologies of history but contributed, even if by default, to the concomitant but unprecedented tourist development and consummation that affected the geography of the whole town. It is such a mutual and subdued dependency and interwoven implications between aesthetic and cognitive spacings that turned the precariousness and fragility of a place into a site of idealized resistance – as in Herzfeld’s social history. Thus the marketization of the geohistory of the Old Town is not only subversive of the traditional values of hospitality of the Rethemniots, as many Mediterraneanist accounts assume, but, above all, clashes with the non-calculable, unanticipated, asymmetrical and non-reciprocal processes of moral spacing.

Again this can be tremendously useful in coming to terms with Rethemnos where today it is only the tourists and the visitors who can effectively pursue the amusement and play of the aesthetization of the Old Town, calling something of the original figure of the stranger. The monumentalization of the Old Town channeled into and followed by the need to preserve the Venetian properties, not only reduced significantly the ability of the residents to intervene and fix their houses, but sustained, fundamentally, a parallel and incessant charting of the town in line with the pleasures, fruits and requirements of consumption. The cognitive spacing of a state-based history however, is not simply negligent of the needs, wills and desires of the residents but is, readily, associated with the mode of domination which substitutes, seduction for repression, needs and public relations for class-interests and use-values for economic exchange-values (Bauman, 1987). Consumption/tourism processes and the restoration project, therefore, are highly consonant and indelibly congruent structurations that do not sit easily with moral spacing. It is, accordingly, such a

conflict between these two interrelated processes of social spacing that ceaselessly deform and transform the attitudes of the residents toward the restoration project. It is, moreover, in the light of this coupling and coordination of aesthetic and cognitive spacings that a better understanding of consumption is possible in an attempt to unpack how the recent transformation of the Old Town resonates with a theory of the consumer society and the ethnography of the event. If hospitality, therefore, the subliminal Mediterranean ideal put forward by Mediterraneanist writings as the cornerstone on and the background of which Mediterranean societies should rest and be usefully dissected and explained, has any meaning at all it should be linked to the above disputes and battles generated by the coordination of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spacings.

That Herzfeld (2001: xi) therefore, should keep perceiving of theories and philosophies of difference as “a self-satisfied nihilism”, should by now appear highly unjustified. Even if “we should also recognize that most bureaucrats are neither the heartless lackeys nor the choiceless victims of some generic teleology – the state, postmodern hegemony, colonialism” (Herzfeld, 1991: 13), to imply that the subject in postmodern theorizations appears as ‘passive’ or ‘dupe’ makes for a limited understanding of poststructuralism. Philosophies of difference, after all, seek only to affirm the multiplicity, singularity, haecceity and differential mode of *a* subjectivation, beyond honour, poetics and shame.

One last point deserves attention with respect to consumption and the coupling of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spaces. Herzfeld (1991: 86) argues that the traditional trait of hospitality is “object to the commercialization of social relations – ‘tradition’ – that has moved, in short time, from hospitable spontaneity to ‘servility’” (Herzfeld, 1991: 86). The necessity of “Accepting tenants (*nikarides*) turns hospitality into business. In the old days, most of the tenants were village boys, whose actions were at least fairly predictable and whose families understood the rules of reciprocity. Today few tenants offer any such reassurance” (Herzfeld, 1991: 116). But isn’t that an idealization that goes hand in hand with the metaphysics of presence? Doesn’t this nostalgia nourish the impoverished ontologies of space that I have already sought to deconstruct and set in motion in accord to differential repetitions, the counterfeit, becoming-woman and the spectrality of utility? And is that a genuine reconstruction

of the city's identity and its cartographies of place or is it still part and parcel of a theorization that takes place as being always in danger of losing its supposed authentic essence?

A more considered approach, therefore, is required with respect to the commodification and recent geo-restructuring of Rethemnos under conditions advanced by late capitalism that will not merely mourn, or be cause for lamentation for an alleged loss of some traditional and heretofore unobtrusive and pure values. Unlike the processes Herzfeld describes, *proteophilia* and the aestheticization of the Old Town will make it possible to think the Old Town problem not only in terms of production, parasitism, spontaneity, loss, lack and absence (if one after all said and done by now is still keen to move along such lines of thought) but also with reference to notions of excess, prodigality, conspicuous consumption, affluence and expansion. The aesthetization of the geography of the Old Town was possible in Rethemnos once, however, cognitive spacing had fully charted the town according to the imperatives and prerogatives of the official and bureaucratic restoration. The amusement offered by the aesthetic spaces of Rethemnos is not, therefore, part of a strategy that overcomes the cognitive boundaries, but is chiefly about a process which coincides with the obligation to learn, make sense of and respect the Venetian history. What is miraculous about the Old Town, however, is that such a social/cognitive spacing managed both to structure, stabilize and predict social space according to the standards and requirements of the official history of the Greek state and at the same time to preserve "the fuzziness and movable partitions, the shocking value of novelty, of the surprising and the unexpected, expectations that always move faster and stay ahead of fulfillment" (Bauman, 1993: 179). That the cognitive and aesthetic spacings overlap in the Old Town, therefore, makes it absolutely necessary to integrate the geography of Rethemnos with a mature understanding of the *systemic* nature of consumption, the fetishism of utility and the abstractedness and commensurability of use-value. It is to this task that I finally turn, in an attempt to break with the unbecoming and pointillistic perspectives of spontaneity, parasitism and the sterile accounts of history, putting forward some new perspectives, first, in reconsidering the urban affairs of Rethemnos and second, in unpacking the various peregrinations of the subject formation by recourse to events and trajectories that will have taken place beyond a narrow poetic historical periodization.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CONSUMER SOCIETY

7.1 Introduction

Mediterraneanist identifications, I have argued so far, conceive of the Mediterranean region in accord with the values of shame, honour and poetics, insisting on the struggles and poetic ability of men and women as they are at pains to reconstruct and adequately exhibit and accomplish their identities. They are however, susceptible to criticism, because of their ontological disallowance of space and their dialectical conception of difference as separation, contradiction and negation. I have set out to undo the friends of the heart, the poetics of womanhood, spontaneity and the purity of the gift, taking up on a difference-producing repetition, the counterfeit, the schizoid machines of becoming-woman, and the 'more than one/no more one' spectres of political economy. I have also sought to open up the event of space to cognitive, aesthetic and moral spacings, and the splaying out of place and origami that fold, unfold and refold geographical imaginations. I am now in a position to explain the extent to which a theory of the consumer society resonates with the deconstruction of the discourses of Mediterraneanism and the geography of the Mediterranean city.

Spontaneity, parasitism and capitalism without capitalists, when submitted to the one-sided curved surface of a Mobius strip, as was shown in Chapter 5, offer a rich potential in mobilizing the driftwork of the spectrality of use-value, the division between the repressed and the seduced and the fetishism of utility. A more perceptive theory of late capitalism, is therefore required, which will not only differentiate and affirm the continuous variation and geography in things and people drawing new lines of flight beyond the known negative spontaneous semi-periphery, but will also disclose how an affirmative parasitism comes to terms with urbanism and the changing experience of space, place and the subject in the Mediterranean city, which is currently undergoing a posturban transition.

Such a theorization will also help to come to terms with the events drawn upon in Rethemnos, which as we will see in Chapter 9, call forth a subjectivation process through which an individual deserves the name of subject, once he/she is subtracted from being (the theory of pure multiple) when truth is at stake. A theory of the subject, however, is not complete, unless a more perceptive analysis of the material

processes within which it grows and expands is carefully laboured. To unpack what is meant by a *systemic theory* of a full-blown consumer society is thus the subject of the present chapter. As Clarke (2003: 3) has noted, with respect to consumption, it “*has remade the city in its own image*”. It is not for nothing, therefore, that a more sustained understanding of consumption is required, in making sense of Rethemnos, especially insofar as consumerism and tourism are social practices that are indissolubly associated with the manner in which space is organized under the jurisdiction and effective monumentalization of the Old Town. Politico-economic discourses, as has already been shown, with reference to Harvey’s theory and in terms of Leontidou’s notion of spontaneity conceptualize space as a means to accommodate and absorb mainly production, the labour process and the crisis-prone capitalist system that divides, segregates and classifies society. Space, however, reflects and constitutes also an expression of the dominant social relations that prevail in our consumer society. To that extent, the implications and consequences of the interrelationships and mutual dependencies between space, place and the subject are vital in order to make sense of the way in which consumption arranges the spatial structuration of Rethemnos. Though Harvey’s (1982, 1985, and 1990) depiction of the urbanization of capital offers a generous understanding of the uneven geographical development of capitalism, the current state of capitalism necessitates a fuller consideration and systemic theorization of the consumer society and the political economy of the sign (Baudrillard, 1981). And thus as the urbanization process of contemporary societies begs for a more thoughtful unpacking of consumption, Bauman’s and Baudrillard’s theorizations can be useful in conceiving of the often contradictory and antagonistic spatialities that are ultimately associated with consumption. In drawing out the implications of such a theorization I have only sought to draw on those ideas that will accomplish a fuller appreciation of the Old Town problem reconciling the formal discourses of consumerism with the more pragmatic and empirical concerns of the residents of the Old Town.

Consumption is often taken as an individual practice that satisfies human needs. This is, however, a highly mistaken and simplistic idea that misses the richness and complexity of consumption. One of the principal tasks of the present chapter is to unpack the collective nature of consumption, beyond the narrow understandings that characterize it as an individual capacity that fulfills given needs. A theory of the

consumer society is neither about a neoconservative trait nor a capitalist trick that goes hand in hand with the dominance of neoliberalism (Habermas, 1985; Harvey, 2005). Such conceptions fail to disclose the extent to which space, consumerism and capitalism are indissolubly connected, imbricated and interwoven practices beyond the anthropologism nourished by politico-economic discourses. Building on this discussion, moreover, is vital not only as an attempt to clarify the limitations of the type of theory advanced by Harvey and Leontidou, but also in demonstrating the changes, transformations and transitions to which Rethemnos is currently subject. If tourism and consumption are intimately associated, it is only by means of such a serious appreciation and fuller consideration of the systemic nature of consumption with respect to what Clarke (2003: 13) notices –“In a fully-fledged consumer society, consumption performs a role that keeps the entire social system ticking over” – that a more cogent explication of Rethemnos is to be accomplished. Given that Baudrillard’s and Bauman’s theories have been radically misread and misconceived, however, not only by geographers but by other social scientists, there is much to say and do in terms of delivering a more sustained view and nuanced understanding of how consumption works. It is, therefore, necessary to start conceiving of and explaining consumption by carefully undoing the restricted economism, negativity, and rationalism that lie at the heart of productivist discourses.

It is true however that consumption is still the heir to capitalism, even if the cultural logic of late capitalism is different to the logic of industrial capitalism, in that the latter has remade the city of modernity according to the internal relations of production, while the former works basically in accord with the power relations of a seduction-based consumer society. This is to be sure, not the only way to deal with urbanism but I hold that it is one of the possible ways to stimulate new ideas in order to make sense of Rethemnos, unfolding the spatial structuration of the Old Town in a manner analogous to the way in which Harvey has taken pains to unfold the relations of production, explicating the transformation and immensely wide implications of production and industrialism for the modern city –‘filling Harvey’s shoes’ should be, of course, a superficial ambition but points in the direction the present thesis ponders.

7.2 The Consumer Society: Setting the Agenda

The profitable marketization of the geohistory of the Old Town is an inevitable turn in the history of Rethemnos at the dawn of a fully-fledged consumer society. And thus the Old Town problem is not only about the manner in which the residents perceive of the restoration project but, fundamentally, about the changing experience of space, place and the subject in the Mediterranean city whose major not to say paramount characteristic can be taken to be in recent years a genuine restructuring with respect to tourism. But if today the residents seek increasing state intervention in order to preserve the Venetian architectural character and identity of the town, which according to their view is bluntly ignored and extirpated due to an intense round of tourist development, in the past they fought tooth and nail against the grip of the rigidity and formality of the restoration procedures. The restoration project has produced however a spatial configuration, which left many parts of the town hidden and silent, whilst allowing other parts to be beautifully and vividly remade. The overexposure of the geohistory of the Old Town, which served as the backcloth of the restoration of the Venetian properties divided the city on grounds that sit easily with and can be explained by the theoretical-apparatuses that come on the back of the driftwork of seduction, consumption, deconstruction, schizoanalysis and the choreoethnography of the event. The monumentalization of the Old Town, I suggest, may bring into sharper focus, not only the twists and turns of a theory of a full-blown consumer society, but can also reveal and deliver a more empirical so to speak, understanding of the transition in which Rethemnos is currently subject to from a modern society of coercion to a consumer society based on seduction. A careful reconstruction of the material conditions and historical presuppositions that made consumption the dominant mode of reproduction, beyond spontaneity, reactive parasitism and the regulations of time-space compression, is therefore, crucial not only in making sense of Rethemnos but primarily as means through which to appreciate consumption's totally collective nature.

To begin with, consumerism is an institution which, like production, is virtually unlimited (Baudrillard, 1998), to the extent that every single taste or consumer choice affirms the superiority of one class over another insofar as goods, tastes and lifestyle-choices differentiate and discriminate, solidifying and transgressing social boundaries using various forms of cultural, educational and social capital (Bourdieu, 1984). As

Bourdieu once remarked, however, consumption does not have to be conspicuous in order to be symbolic, and yet even if consumption is symbolic, it is not necessarily hedonistic as has been suggested by Campbell (1987). It is above all, an institution and not an individual act. If it is symbolic though, in the sense implied by Bourdieu, it means that even in its slightest, smallest and insignificant manifestation consumption involves competition, emulation and struggle that stem from and intend to show, perform and enhance the status and position of the person who disposes or consumes a certain commodity – a line of thought most conspicuously defended by Veblen (1994). For as Baudrillard has pointed out “the act of consumption is never simply a purchase [but] it is also expenditure [...]; that is to say it is wealth manifested and a manifest destruction of wealth” (Baudrillard, 1981: 112). This is crucial, if one wants to understand the systemic and totally collective nature of consumption, and how the objects possessed, disposed or consumed do not come to correspond with an atomic and individualistic conception of needs but purport, above all, and obey the strategic logic of an entirely and altogether differential system. Needs, by the same token, are culturally defined, pertaining to a whole universe of objects that classify and differentiate social groups according to their own social logic (Baudrillard, 1981, 1996). And thus the objects that come to fulfil or satisfy these needs do not correspond with a metaphysical functionality, but work instead at a systemic level (Baudrillard, 1993). In the light of the above consumption “is not [about] the quantity of money that takes on value, as in the economic logic of equivalence, but rather money spent, sacrificed, eaten up according to a logic of difference and challenge” (Baudrillard, 1981: 113). In the same way that gift exchange (Mauss, 1970) is beyond the exchange of objects as mere economic values, consumption is beyond the non-commensurability, naturalness and ideality of use-values. Consumption, in other words, follows “neither use value nor (economic) exchange value” (Baudrillard, 1981: 64) but “the logic of sumptuary values” (Baudrillard, 1981: 115).

In the preceding chapters, I have subjected parasitism to the spectrality and hauntology of use-value, and the coordination of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spaces. I now want to bring parasitism to bear upon Baudrillard’s and Bauman’s theories, the gist of which was slightly touched in the paragraph directly above, in an attempt to unfold the division between the repressed and the seduced, symbolic exchange and the mode of domination of consumerism, taking flight from and

breaking with the negative, spontaneous and productivist embraces of Mediterraneanism. Letting parasitism go with the flow and driftwork of a systemic theorization of consumption serves a three-fold purpose. First, I lay out the sociogenesis of consumption, in order to show that consumerism can be grounded in accord to Bauman's (1982, 1983) depiction of the transition and transformation of regimes of power; the latter being also an attempt to demonstrate and explain the meaning of the postmodern divide between the repressed and the seduced; second, on the face of the above reasoning I pick up on consumption as a mode of domination that takes off from where the mode of industrialism left off (Baudrillard, 1975, 1981); and third, I also offer a brief account of *symbolic exchange*, which according to Baudrillard (1993) may pave the way for elaborating a possible resistance against the totalitarianism or a way out of the *structural law of value* (Baudrillard, 1981). All three aspects have been raised or implied to some extent, in the preceding pages in an unsystematic and sporadic manner, but will now take a more cogent and appropriate form, opening up another route into the attempt to reconstruct our understanding of consumerism.

7.3 The Sociogenesis of Consumption

Bauman's (1993) account of the coupling of social and physical spaces, as was shown in Chapter 6, permits a useful unfolding of the manner in which space is socially produced and constituted. I have already taken up on the theorization of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spacings and have also explicated the meaning of the splaying out of place and origami that surge through the Old Town, once geography is taken as a deformer and transformer of identities and spaces. A fuller version of Bauman's theory is now offered in association with his apt dissection of the sociogenesis of postmodernity and consumption.

All societies, Bauman suggests, drawing on Foucault, are based on the deployment of a certain type of power that keeps them integrated, bound and sustained. The mode of reproduction of traditional societies was heavily reliant on a system of mutual trust, and thus what further allowed the sustainability of the system was the demand that the physical distance between people correspond with their personal bonds and social relationships. That type of power, the sovereign type of power, as Foucault had

already proposed, organized traditional societies in a manner that intervened from the outside by subtracting, for example, a part of the communal surplus, without, however, either arranging the way the surplus was produced or the means, methods and the time used for its production. The coupling of social and physical spacing in traditional societies, therefore, did not require vigorous surveillance over the time, means and process of production but was somehow 'naturally' imposed, though not accidentally, and was accomplished due to the 'transparency' of social spaces.

En route from traditional societies to modern societies, however, another form of power emerged, which was considerably different to the type of power briefly discussed above, and which was necessary in order to further seal and reassure the reproduction and sustainability of the social system. Of this modern regime of power, the factory system was a key and most recognizable feature, in which the modern subject was born and which the new power meant to incarcerate and confine as a consequence of the attempt to supervise all those people who were left unattended by the bankruptcy of the traditional regime of power, that is, of the 'I watch you, you watch me' principle (Bauman, 1982). Industrialism, in other words, in which the factory system had taken its most oppressive and all-embracing form, demanded that the 'masterless men' who had been somehow left unattended (for various demographic and economic reasons), had to work in order to be visible, useful and disciplined in order to maintain the coordination and coupling of social and physical spaces in a status as readable as it was in its traditional version. It is within such a transitional state of regimes of power, from traditional modes of reproduction to modern tropes of discipline and coercion that Bauman situates and with which he associates the sociogenesis of industrial capitalism and class. Such a theorization is particularly interesting and useful for Rethemnos given that it stresses the need to appreciate how historically consumerism has involved as a sort of civilizing process (Elias, 1994).

Due to the unprecedented demographic expansion of the 1750s, a variety of social groups that were more often than not considered to be 'dangerous', 'idle' and 'parasitic' have come to surge through the public spaces of many European towns. Those people were vagabonds, beggars, drifters, poor and unemployed, whom by having nothing better to do or nowhere else to go, were drifting and strolling from city

to city, and from town to town, causing anxiety, and insecurity. The self-enclosed ranks of the small communities and the sovereign type of power that was dominant in places where these dangerous forms of life kept unrestrainedly arriving, were found, by and large, inadequate and unprepared to 'keep an eye on' and control or tame these people. Traditional forms of life, in other words, were not well equipped in order to confront the unknown, unclassifiable and unassignable strangers and were unable and insufficiently organized in order to control these 'dangerous classes'. That social system, therefore, which time and again was becoming less and less relevant or useful in coming to terms with the needs of a highly expanding social body that was not to be easily educated, trained or ruled through the methods usually employed by a form of power that was to certain extent external to the social body and was presenting itself only through its various representatives when the collection of the social surplus was deemed necessary, had to be replaced or enriched by new techniques and methods of supervision and social control.

What was required thus in order to go and cope with the flow of the strangers, the drifters and the beggars who were threatening social order by simply being there, by being visible, or by just being at sight, was another form of social power. It was needed, in short, another social system that would have to watch over, keep an eye on, and distill from the wills, desires, actions, even the thoughts of these people, those ideas, thoughts and deeds that would most suitably fit the scope of the needs of the emerging modern society. Hence the factory was invented as the most appropriate and most formidable social form that would rule over, train, educate and socialize the masses that have appeared and so gradually the great confinement began, of which the most eloquent analyst remains until now, Michel Foucault.

What was still a matter of dispute however, and would be probably causing trouble in the future, was the fact that given that the factory system was about to produce not only moral order but products and goods to be traded and sold in the market, the craftsmen and the skilled labour that in traditional societies were those who were feeding the market, would found themselves useless or redundant given that their job would be now taken by the hundreds of hands employed in and subjected to the factory labour. Craftsmen would still have to be, certainly, subjected to the same training the factory system had already submitted the poor, yet their opposition and

bargaining power, as it was expected, was by and large stronger than the resistance of the 'dangerous classes', given the formers' more prestigious and higher social position. And so the bargaining between the factory system and the skilled workers who had to be also part of a similar training as the poor had been, was about to begin. Out of this negotiation, whose repercussions and turmoil are visible even in present days, among other things, what was to emerge was social class, which was a response and reaction of those skilled labourers whose autonomy over the means of production was irretrievably lost in the poor houses, the work-houses, and the factories, as a means through which to forge a generalized resistance against the newly implemented disciplinary organization. Social class, therefore, was a result of this problematization of the regime of power, an outcome of the transformation of social power from a traditional regime of self-reproduction to an industrial regime of panoptic and coercive orientation. And it was, in all likelihood, because modern industrialism necessitated another kind of power, disciplinary power, that a fully deployed productive system was made possible. Production, in other words, was not the aim *per se*. As Bauman, aptly, put it "Class was born of social conflict" (Bauman, 1982: 38), for if the poor and the working-classes were easily forced to work within the strict barriers of factories, the craftsmen had to be generously compensated, in order to surrender the usual autonomy they had over the means of production. Money and market-interest were the most convincing means used in order to reassure that such a labour-aristocracy would give up the freedom it usually enjoyed in the autarkic and transparent traditional societies. And as Bauman (1982: 38) once again insightfully puts it, "In other words, the conflict, triggered by the attempt to extend over the skilled part of factory labour the disciplinary forces developed in dealing with the unskilled part (or the fear of such an extension), was displaced and shifted into the sphere of surplus distribution".

Such a theory intermingles and merges with – though there is no space here for adequately developing a mature theory of postmodernity – the recently (not that recent as a matter of fact given that some of the theories go back to the 1960s, like Bell's, Touraine's, Offe's,) debate on postindustrialism and the rest. What made industrial capitalism possible however, not to say desirable, was the incapacity of the standard categories of social spacing of traditional societies, to produce a meaningful classification of society, an incapacity however, which was firmly exacerbated by the

appearance of the stranger. For as Bauman explains “Strangers are neither a part of ‘us’ nor a part of ‘them’. Neither friend nor foe. For this reason they cause confusion and anxiety” (Bauman, 1990: 53). Moreover, the stranger “is a constant threat to the world’s order” (Bauman, 1991: 59) and this is why “industrial employment was seen as just one conventional way of dealing with a much wider problem of taming the ‘dangerous classes’” (Bauman, 1982: 68). It is within this tentative, contradictory, conflictual and unstable situation of regimes of power and their transformation that industrial capitalism was born and in which social class had come to emerge as a result of the disciplinary mechanisms of modernity. Put another way “Disciplinary power [...] was first and foremost about bodily control. It was the human body which for the first time in history was made, on such a massive scale, an object of drill and regimentation. Later consumerism was a product of failed resistance to such a drill and regimentation” (Bauman, 1983: 40).

It is a similar transformation of the regime of social power that takes place in contemporary societies that turned consumption into a mode of domination rather than a eudemonic state of capitalism. As the communal bond of reproduction that was dominant in traditional forms of life was given over to and gradually replaced by industrialism and discipline, it is in a similar way in which industrialism is now given over to and replaced by consumerism, which takes from where industrialism failed to further assure social integration and systemic reproduction. This is why “Consumerism is not about the emancipation of the body from control; it is about the joy of controlling the body of one’s own will, with the help of sophisticated products of technology which offer all the visibility of the formidable power of one’s controlling agency” (Bauman, 1983: 40). And thus the freedom the producers and the craftsmen had once over production was surrendered to the market in exchange for some heteronomous satisfaction they would allegedly get from the sphere of distribution. By implication accordingly, the power conflict was transformed from what was once a battle over autonomy to a struggle situated firmly on the terrain of heteronomy simulated and shaped by distribution and consumption. This is why “The channeling of the initial power conflict into the sphere of distribution was based on the promise of greater levels of wealth, security and living standards: everything, in fact, except the autonomy in the productive sphere relinquished in this momentous exchange” (Clarke, 2003: 141). Consumerism thus was born, as Bauman avers “as a

twice removed offshoot of the frustrated resistance against disciplinary power, which penetrated and finally conquered the field of productive activity” (Bauman, 1983: 40). There is no evidence, therefore, that an unprecedented affluence will sweep away the scarcity of the world, providing for individual happiness and the satisfaction of needs and desires heretofore uncompleted and unmet. Consumption is simply “the equivalent and the extension, in the twentieth century, of the great indoctrination of rural population into industrial labor, which occurred throughout the nineteenth century” (Baudrillard, 1988: 50).

Not everyone, of course, is credited access to the market. And while it is true, that in productive societies there were people formerly known to be excluded, who were usually the unemployed and the poor, it is also true that in the long course and overall, sociologically speaking, they were taken at the same time to constitute a reserve labour army. They had their chances, in other words, and would sooner or later, in one way or another, be part of the labour and production processes. In contemporary societies, however, and in terms of the manner in which the current regime of power is deployed, such a role seems to be increasingly irrelevant and on the way out. For it can hardly make any sense to have a reserve army of consumption today, simply because the people who are excluded from the market are not suitable and cannot fit or perform their roles as consumers, and thus are considered as having no access to or rights on the fruits of consumption. To put it in a nutshell, these people simply do not have a role. These are the people who may be taken to be the ‘repressed’, the people, in short, who will not be used and will not use the market; the people whose lives are linked to and depend on state benefits and who will be easily punished or criminalized once they will ask for or demand a bigger portion or a more generous part of the surplus of production and for whom the market has simply reserved only a highly moral characterization, as the ‘undeserving poor’ (Bauman, 1987, 1998). Their way of being and social existence, however, comes in sharp contrast with the people who have access to the market, travel around and use their credit cards, the people, who in other words, are fully-paid members of the consumer society; the people, in short, who may be considered to be the ‘seduced’. Both social categories are the sides of the same coin. They are both parts of our world, though they differ from each other in a very strategic manner, in that the repressed are virtually excluded from what has come to be the organizing principle of current societies, that is consumption, and are not

simply excluded from employment. Yet despite their differences both worlds co-exist, interact and depend on their mutual exclusion. It is conceivable to suggest, therefore, that “The division between the ‘seduced’ and the ‘repressed’ is vital to the new systemic arrangement. It is perhaps *the* postmodern divide” (Clarke, 2003: 113).

Economic conceptions of class fail to take into account the richness and complexity of such transformations and metamorphoses of the regime of social power that marked in a profound manner, the system of industrialism, which were set to replace the self-monitoring practices and social spacing of traditional communities. Disciplinary power, as was shown, was not necessarily, about production but it was instead associated with the taming of the classes who were set free when the communal regime of social reproduction broke down and collapsed. It was only after the confinement, the training and the ‘day by day’ ceaseless discipline, that production as a process became a profitable and useful solution. Production and the expansion of capitalist development, in other words, were a result of the rationalization and effectiveness of the factory training initially imposed on the masterless men who somehow had managed to avoid the social spacing of communal life. Modernity, a constellation of discourses and practices at the heart of the capitalist mode of domination, is closely related to this transformation of the regime of power, which sought to overcome the ontological insecurity and ineradicated ambivalence of the traditional world by way of the legislative accounts of reason, truth, progress, meaning, and order. The attempt, however, to rid the world of the inherent and esoteric contingency was not as successful as was intended, insofar as “reason can carve out a niche for itself [...] only in opposition to its subordinated other” (Clarke, 1997: 220).

I propose that it is in such a manner that one should start seeing consumption, that is, as an excessive, prodigious and sufficient regime of power that takes from where industrialism left off, rather than a negative mirror stage as opposed to production. But as capitalism, at a certain point of its growth and expansion needed a more inclusive, all-embracing form of social reproduction, to the extent that the abstract measures and laws based solely on coercion and the work-ethic of the factory system were no longer effective or adequate, consumption had to take over and socialize the masses as consumers in the same way industrialism socialized people as producers.

What separates the two modes of reproduction, industrialism from consumerism, thus, is that consumer capitalism “distinguishes itself by the substitution of seduction for repression, public relations for policy, advertising for authority, needs-creation for norm imposition” (Bauman, 1987: 167–168). Even if social class, therefore, was once a means to interpret spatial unevenness and social inequality, it has become imperceptibly, “subject to a metastatic proliferation – which sees the progressive disappearance of the possibility of any *authentic* meaning for class or class struggle” (Clarke, 1997: 231).

And this is why consumption is neither parasitic, nor individual, nor spontaneous, but a pre-eminent mode of domination, which came to replace industrialism emanating by virtue of mechanisms that were purposefully set in as a means to impose control over the social body. Little wonder then, that the contemporary “search for freedom is re-interpreted as the effort to satisfy consumer needs through appropriation of marketable goods” (Bauman, 1983: 38). Put another way, if it was the struggle for autonomy that triggered the transitions from a traditional mode of communal reproduction to the state of modern industrialism and subsequently, to postmodern consumerism, rather than some individual or class-based strategy against exploitation and alienation, then consumption has nothing to do with the satisfaction of individual needs but is instead a structural characteristic of the capitalist system that fulfills in an incredibly effective way its compensatory role and thus it is immanently linked to and constitutive of the uneven geography of the postmodern city.

Such is the new brave world consumption promises to deliver. It involves new divisions, categorizations, classifications and hierarchies, and is a result of an unabating process that charts and harnesses anew, rules and criteria of domination, exploitation and hierarchy, albeit not in the usual disciplinary and bureaucratic manner. One has to turn to Baudrillard, however, to find a fuller and more penetrating account of consumption as an institution and a mode of domination.

7.4 Consumption: A Mode of Domination

That consumption operates beyond the satisfaction of individual needs is clear. It is Baudrillard, however, who has underlined in the most emphatic way the need to unfold and unpack the systemic nature of consumption, moving beyond political economy, even its Marxist incarnation, which constitutes one code out of the many that interpret the world according to their own standards and in terms of their own logic. Political economy, Baudrillard argues, speaks of productive forces, productivity, development, growth, equality and economic exchange, when it is itself a product of the same commodity-fetishism it set out to demystify. This vicious circularity, Baudrillard notes, makes critical and Marxist theory more fetishistic than the fetishism it promises to unmask. It is not a critical metalanguage, therefore, that can adequately interpret the world, for by “Failing to conceive of a mode of social wealth other than that founded on labour and production, Marxism no longer furnishes in the long run a real alternative to capitalism” (Baudrillard, 1975: 29). This is because consumption is, fundamentally, an ambience or a *system* of objects. For “Strictly speaking the humans of the age of affluence are surrounded not so much by other human beings as they were in all previous ages, but by objects” (Baudrillard, 1998: 25). By implication then, objects neither correspond with a given need nor simply signify and stand for the prestige and status of their master. In the terms Baudrillard employs, “Today objects are with us before they are earned [...] *their consumption precedes their production*” (Baudrillard, 1996: 159, italics in original). The object in the Baudrillardian oeuvre thus is a rational form spoken by a certain technological language (Baudrillard, 1996: 5). As objects constitute a *system*, which is no longer practically consumed or empirically experienced but instead, works as a language, what they “embody is no longer the secret of a unique relationship, but rather, differences, and moves in a game” (Baudrillard, 1996: 21). Objects, in short, should be understood in terms of a discourse that obeys a social logic “of a combination of signs, [which] is irreversible and limitless” (Baudrillard, 1996: 41).

Such a theorization is particularly useful in that it allows an appreciation of the significance of consumption as a collective practice that classifies human beings rather than satisfies individual needs. As Baudrillard (1996: 47, italics in original) points out thus “*this systematic connotation at the level of objects is what I am calling ATMOSPHERE*”. Objects, therefore, are subject to a code, which transgresses any

singular or ideological function that takes needs as singular or natural. On the other hand, having the right to choose, if this is at stake in terms of consumption, does not make the system less oppressive. Rather the opposite is the case. "Choosing one car over another may perhaps personalize your choice, but the most important thing about the fact of choosing is that it assigns you a place in the overall economic order" (Baudrillard, 1996: 141). And thus "Consumption may indeed be deemed a defining mode of our industrial civilization" (Baudrillard, 1996: 199), but as long as it is conceived of as "*an activity consisting of the systematic manipulation of signs*" (Baudrillard, 1996: 200, italics in original). Such is the radically different meaning Baudrillard's theory conveys for consumption, which breaks with the mirror of production and the rationality, progress, and teleology of labour with which the discourses of political economy usually associate objects and needs. No small wonder then that as Baudrillard (1996: 204) should argue "THERE ARE NO LIMITS TO CONSUMPTION".

Like Bauman, who theorized consumption in accord with the transformation of regimes of power, beyond any anthropomorphism or prosopopoeia, Baudrillard argues that "The industrial system, having socialized the masses as labour power, had much further to go to complete its own project and socialize them (that is control them) as consumption power" (Baudrillard, 1998: 82). To that extent "consumer man never comes face to face with his own needs any more than with the specific product of his labour; nor is he ever confronted with his own image: *he is immanent in the signs he arranges*" (Baudrillard, 1998: 192, italics in original). This is why consumption is a mode of domination, one that marks a transition from industrial capitalism and repressive modes of reproduction to a mode of domination largely stemming from mechanisms of seduction. Political economy for its part assigns to value and thus to labour a two-fold meaning, the quantitative and abstract meaning of exchange-value and "the moment of use-value: concrete, differentiated and incommensurable" (Baudrillard, 1975: 26). Yet this distinction is in line with bourgeois thought and the obsession with production, finality, progress and rationality and thus no small wonder why Marx ultimately failed to break with the system of thought which renders "unchallengeable the evidence of production as the determinant instance" (Baudrillard, 1975: 33). Labour, as the irreversible telos of man's own existence, is never seriously questioned by Marx, who fails to understand

that society is not only about production and labour – whether in it is concrete or abstract form – but also about the prodigality, squandering and purposeless destruction of wealth. Terms, for example, such as ‘dialectics’ and ‘history’ may be suitable to explain industrial society in its recent capitalist form, but have nothing to do with the *modus operandi* of so-called primitive societies. Even if political economy gives priority to economy, rationality, science, production and labour it does so only on condition that the critique launched against capitalism does not go beyond the mirror of production, progress, growth and so on. So-called primitive societies, however, are subversive of and have no meaning or understanding of what in productivist discourses is often associated with the entity of value.

At the heart of so-called primitive societies, a different mode of exchange is dominant, that is, “the condition of symbolic exchange and circulation [and] not the socio-cultural realm that limits ‘potential’ production; instead, exchange itself is based on non-production, eventual destruction, and a process of continuous *unlimited* reciprocity between *persons*, and inversely on a strict *limitation* of exchanged goods” (Baudrillard, 1975: 79–80). So-called primitive societies, therefore, are structured on the social logic of symbolic exchange, debt, reciprocity, and destruction that “sets up a relation of exchange in which the respective positions cannot be autonomized:

- neither the producer and his product;
- nor the producer and the user;
- nor the producer and his ‘concrete’ essence, his labour power;
- nor the user and his ‘concrete’ essence, his needs;
- nor the product and its ‘concrete’ finality, its utility” (Baudrillard, 1975: 102–103).

Such a limitless and ambivalent symbolic exchange, as we shall shortly explain, still haunts consumer societies and as Baudrillard (1981: 31) has suggested drawing on Veblen’s notion of conspicuous consumption, “just as the slave is not fed in order that he eat, but in order that he work, so one does not dress a woman luxuriously in order that she be beautiful, but in order that her luxury testify to the legitimacy or the social privilege of her master”. Objects, therefore, will never exhaust themselves in the function they are often taken to serve through lens of a functionalist discourse, but will always designate the social rank of their master, “social pretension, and resignation of social mobility and inertia, of acculturation and enculturation of

stratification and of social classification” (Baudrillard, 1981: 38). It is in the light of the above that symbolic exchange may be taken to haunt consumer societies, but to haunt alone, not to rule or govern; as a consequence therefore, there is no “vital anthropological minimum that would be the dimension of ‘primary needs’ – an irreducible zone where the individual chooses himself, since he knows what he wants: to eat, to drink, to sleep, to make love, to find shelter, etc” (Baudrillard, 1981: 80). This is why consumption should be understood “*not only structurally as a system of exchange and of signs, but strategically as a mechanism of power*” (Baudrillard, 1981: 85, italics in original).

Hence there are no limits to consumption. As Baudrillard (1998: 74) insightfully sums it up “The truth is not that ‘needs are the fruits of consumption’ but that *the system of needs is the product of the system of production*” (italics in original). For “Even the most ‘rational needs’ (education, culture, health, transport, leisure), [when] cut off from their real collective significance, are taken up, in the same way as the incidental needs deriving from growth, into the systematic future perspectives of that growth” (Baudrillard, 1998: 65). Needs, therefore, are neither true nor false, as a naturalist or anthropological intuition assumes. Rather “The truth of consumption is that it is not a function of enjoyment, but a *function of production*, and hence, like all material production, not an individual function, but *an immediately and totally collective one*” (Baudrillard, 1998: 78, italics in original). In Baudrillard’s words once again, (1998: 81, italics in original), “It is difficult to grasp the extent to which the current training in systematic, organized consumption is *the equivalent and extension, in the twentieth century, of the great nineteenth-century-long process of the training of rural populations for industrial work*”.

I have attempted so far to think of consumption as a mode of domination, in order to pave the way towards an appreciation of the trembling and changing geography of Rethemnos and its recent restructuring, and in order to allow and further accelerate at the same time the dismantling of the productivist Mediterraneanist spatialities of parasitism, capitalism without capitalists and spontaneity. What needs further addressing, however, is the question about whether there is a way out of the infinite, labyrinthine type of power that subjugates human nature to the irreversible alienation

advanced by consumerism. For Baudrillard the only alternative to consumption is *symbolic exchange*.

7.5 Symbolic Exchange

If symbolic exchange is destined to haunt a place such as Rethemnos, it is felt that a thesis that draws on Baudrillard's and Bauman's elaborations should have something to say about the theoretical-practice of symbolic exchange. I will briefly refer to symbolic exchange, therefore, but only as a means to conclude the theory presented above. Symbolic exchange is an ambivalent social practice based on the principles of reversibility, the counter-gift and the counter-offer, remaining crucially beyond the law, value, and unconscious desires. As Baudrillard states, "the real rupture is not between 'abstract' labour and 'concrete' labour but between symbolic exchange and work (production, economics)" (Baudrillard, 1975: 45). So-called primitive societies know nothing of economic exchange but only of "symbolic disorder [that] can bring about an interruption in the code" (Baudrillard, 1993: 4). This is why Baudrillard should insist on "the inadequacy of the concepts of labour, production, productive force and relations of production in accounting for, let us say, pre-industrial organization" (Baudrillard, 1975: 101). For "Historical materialism [...] is incapable of thinking the process of ideology, of culture, of language, of the symbolic in general" (Baudrillard, 1975: 109).

In contemporary societies, production, labour, and money have lost all finality constituting signs, phantoms and simulations without any referent and devoid of any meaning. It is no longer effective, therefore, to fight the system by way of the plane of the real, that is, by "direct, dialectical revolution of the economic or political infrastructure" (Baudrillard, 1993: 36). The only superior challenge to capitalism would have to be "reversal, the incessant reversibility of the counter-gift and, conversely, the seizing of power by the unilateral exercise of the gift" (Baudrillard, 1993: 36). Putting everything in symbolic terms, in other words, is what destroys the system, which in turn has to respond with a bigger challenge, which is exactly what labour fails to do, that is, to get to grips with such a powerful reversibility that will effectively abolish power relations. For labour constitutes a "slow death. This is generally understood in the sense of physical exhaustion. But it must be understood in another sense. Labour is not opposed, like a sort death, to the 'fulfillment of life',

which is the idealist view; labour is opposed as a *slow death* to a violent death. That is the symbolic reality” (Baudrillard, 1993: 39).

While in economic exchange-value the object finds meaning in relation to other objects “according to a hierarchical code of significations” (Baudrillard, 1981: 64), in symbolic exchange the object has “neither use value nor (economic) exchange value” (Baudrillard, 1981: 64). Symbolic exchange thus “defines itself precisely as something distinct from and beyond value and code” (Baudrillard, 1981: 125). The symbolic however “is the destruction of the value code (exchange and use) not the destruction of objects in themselves” (Baudrillard, 1981: 134). And thus needless to say, it breaks with the equivalence and code of the gift and signification insofar as its basic function is not to offer but to return. For “if no counter-gift or reciprocal exchange is possible we remain imprisoned in the structure of power and abstraction” (Baudrillard, 1981: 211). What destroys power relations is one single form: “reversibility, cyclical reversal and annulment put an end to the linearity of time, language, economic exchange, accumulation and power” (Baudrillard, 1993: 2). The social forms and practices that pertain to symbolic exchange, however, cannot be totally and fully present in a metaphysical conception of being as presence. It is always a kind of “displacement”, a “detour by way of the signifier” (Baudrillard, 1993: 140) that *takes place*. As the symbolic annuls every single duality and dual code of signification, “*It is the u-topia that puts an end to the topologies of the soul and the body, man and nature, the real and the non-real, birth and death*. In the symbolic operation, the two terms lose their reality” (Baudrillard, 1993: 133, italics in original).

I have argued so far that theorizing consumerism is vital in deconstructing Mediterraneanism and in setting in motion the socio-economic structure of a spontaneous Mediterranean city that rests unproblematically on the plane of parasitism and on the striated space of certain well-entrenched digestive, stable and solid strictures and discourses that pertain to and are littered with identifications of honour, shame, poeticity and commensality. I have stressed the need, moreover, to move beyond the negative and oppositional readings of parasitism in order to start charting the conditions pertinent to a full-blown consumer society. In Chapter 3, I have taken up first, on a differential and repetitive understanding of difference in

order to transcend the model of shame-and-honour and, subsequently, I have picked up on the counterfeit in order to open up the personalization and economic character and obligation of gift-exchanges to haecceities, de-individuations and becomings, something which, consequently, led me to the poetics of womanhood currently swept up by becoming-woman. Last but not least, I have put at the service of the abovementioned deconstruction of Mediterraneanist identifications, a similar deconstruction of Mediterraneanist spatializations, taking up on the 'more than one/no more one' spectres of Marx, the systemic and spectral utility/fetishism of use values, the origamic differential spacing and the coordination of cognitive, moral and aesthetic spacings, in an attempt to loosen and destabilize spontaneity, parasitism, capitalism without capitalists, and the historical contradictions of social and monumental time.

Finally, I explored, directly above, the extent to which the Mobius bands of consumption, that is, the division between the repressed and the seduced, the sociogenesis of consumerism and the fact that consumption is a mode of domination rather than an anthropomorphic trait, are useful in order to lay the groundwork for a more apposite understanding and dissection of the Old Town problem. What is required to take things further is to pull the above threads together bringing them to bear upon the choreoethnographies, events and rhythm analyses of Rethemnos and the processes and mechanisms that lie at the heart of the contested restoration project. It is to a fuller appreciation, trying to put some flesh on the bones of the above theories, that I now turn, first, by opening up the Old Town problem to the systemic nature of consumption and, second, by taking up on the Rethemniot identification process, on the back of the subtractive ontology and choreoethnographies of some undecidable events that will have been.

**PART FOUR: DECONSTRUCTING
MEDITERRANEANISM III: RETHEMNOS AND THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE EVENT**

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE RESTORATION PROJECT

8.1 Introduction

Bringing the previous peregrinations to bear upon the choreoethnography of an eventual Rethemnos, and equipping them with Badiou's mathematical ontology and his subtractive depiction of the non-place of the event is the task of this last part of the thesis. I will put at the service of such a form of thought three devices from the specialized mathematical language of Badiou, namely, the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the matheme of the indiscernible as a means to unfold the generic multiple Rethemniot subject by way of *forcing*, a process according to Badiou, through which a subject is faithfully connected to an ungrounded truth that comes after the intervention of an event. Prior to that however, there is still a need to take into account the restoration project of the Old Town, offering a pragmatic illustration of the dynamics, manifold spacing, continuous variability and far-reaching implications consumption has for the town. This is not going to be a fully detailed historical analysis of a place's changing identity but rather the delineation of some key moments of the town's recent history with respect to how its geography is transformed and how such changes and metamorphoses resonate with the theories and philosophies of difference developed in previous chapters. This is not, moreover, the only possible way to reconstruct the history and geography of the Mediterranean town of Rethemnos, but is still a useful approach in that it brings consumption to bear upon some of the problems that currently haunt the socio-spatial imaginary of the Mediterranean city.

As previously mentioned, the Archaeology Service has occasionally accused the residents of ignoring the architecture and history of the Old Town due to the careless improvements, alterations and destructions they delivered on many of the properties. From 1967 onward when the Old Town was declared a scheduled monument, the inhabitants who wanted to repair a house should consult with the Archaeology Service, as a result of the ambition of the Greek state to garden and protect the Old Town along the lines of a history that would mostly had to be derived and stem, in a linear kind of way, from the glorious Venetian past. It was then that the residents founded an association in order to oppose the monumentalization of the Old Town (OTHOA), in a movement that would come to unite all ranks and social groups of the

town, rich and poor alike, agreeing on the fact that the state should not be credited with a role when it comes to the formation of the modern identity of the town and especially to its built environment and houses. Yet some of the rich residents had already seen in the monumentalization project a prospect which in the long run would bring money and profits inasmuch as the restored residences could be easily converted into luxurious hotels that would attract tourists. Three observations must be made at the outset. First, the majority of the properties in the 1960s needed immediate and decisive restoration and inevitably the residents had somehow to repair them. Second, the residents were proud of the town's history and identity, even without having the adequate educational capital and knowledge to appreciate and fully recognize the architectural and monumental greatness. And third, the proposed restoration project demanded more money than what any regular restoration would require and thus to deny the restoration imperatives and procedures was not only a consequence of the residents' inability to appreciate the culture heritage and importance of the Venetian history, but also a practical issue of economic affordability. Accordingly, the original enmity toward the restoration project was neither irrational nor simply an effect of poetics, ignorance, indifference or an opposition to the state's ambition to interfere in the Rethemniot life-world, but above all, a reflective reaction and attitude toward a way of 'going on' with the urban affairs of the town that was now highly influenced and determined by the official language of the state, which had little to say or do about the needs of the residents. The changes, transformations, transitions, and spatial arrangements that took place as a consequence of the restoration project, the way these changes were conceived by the residents, and the manner in which the relationships between the residents and the state changed in accord with the varying experience of space, place and the subject on the face of the consumer society, comprises what is generally called these days, the 'Old Town problem'.

The newly founded Houses' Owners Association (AROOT) instituted in the 1990s under a new leadership and with a totally different approach to the town's urban affairs, marked not only the changing attitude of the residents toward monumentalization – culminated in the struggles and fights between the residents and the state all those years – but most importantly, signaled the way in which a displacement in society and space would take place which is immanently linked and tantamount to the transition from an oppressive mode of state reproduction to a

seductive mode of market domination. The marvelous reconstruction of the Venetian properties and the increasing number of tourists that periodically visit, enjoy and appropriate the town have all significantly transmogrified the landscape of Rethemnos in a manner which, as Henri Lefebvre pithily observed, turned the city into “an object of cultural consumption for tourists” (1996: 148). Fernand Braudel for his part, had already suggested, several years ago, that the Mediterranean region should be taken “as a unit, with its creative space, the amazing freedom of its sea-roots [...] with its many regions, so different yet so alike, its cities born of movements” (Braudel, cited in Sartre, 1976: 169). Yet the monumentalization of the Old Town and its effects cannot be seen or recognized always in the colourful picture drawn out above by Braudel, as the restoration of the Venetian properties coincided with the opening of many new shops, bars and restaurants which while not, necessarily, a prerequisite or an indicator of unevenness, produced a landscape extremely divided and polarized as a consequence of the market-based and seductive-oriented organization that opened the economy of the town to the global market of tourism. Making sense of such a socio-spatial expansion and openness regarding the conflictual, incomplete and unfinished project of the town’s identification, by way of the data of the restored houses, that is, by way of the use, geographical location and type of transformation of the buildings, seems to me to offer a useful insight in explaining the changing experience of space, place and the subject in Rethemnos beyond the territorial and place-based perspective of a ‘monumental’ theorization.

8.2 The Consumer Society and the Old Town

The restoration program forced everyone in the Old Town wanting to built, redecorate or refurnish a house to follow carefully designed and consciously accepted laws of construction, as the owners of the properties had, initially, to have their proposed restorations approved by the Archaeology Service and the Ministry of Town Planning, though interestingly, the two offices often clashed with the latter usually permitting what the former prohibited. Since the permission of the Ministry of Culture was essential and the criteria strict, the problem seemed to lie exclusively, though disappointingly as well for the residents, with the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture. It is all "Archaeology's fault" (*"I archaeiologia ftaiei"*), the people often angrily remarked every now and then regarding houses whose restoration and refurbishment had irritatingly stopped because of the administered and comprehensive regulations of the Archaeology Service. In the 1960s and 1970s, the growing difficulty of restoring a property resulted in the formation of an association (OTHOA) whose aim was to back the right of the residents to carry out any necessary reconstruction in whichever way they wished, given that the residents felt at the time that the way in which a restoration should be materialized should not be the concern of the state and that it should be the owner who would arrange how, when and which parts of a house would have to be fixed, according to his/her logic and in line with his/her economic ability. It is true nevertheless that given that most of the residents were poor, the original restorations, those alterations in other words the residents had keenly adopted, had not been, properly speaking, compliant with or attuned to the overall Venetian designing style and tone of architecture the state wanted. In order to entice the residents the state vowed to contribute financially to the general restoration of the houses and thus many of the restorations of the 1970s and early 1980s had been partly funded by the state. Over a period of a decade or so, however, the OTHOA would no longer hold, as the rich and higher social ranks realized that by having their properties restored under the proposed scheme more profits were on the way, by renting their houses or by turning them into shops, taverns and restaurants. And thus as a consequence, while the town had begun, imperceptibly, becoming in the 1980s a considerably famous and well-known destination for tourists due to its Venetian architecture, OTHOA started running out of steam. Theoretically, in order to obtain permission to restore a property, a civil engineer had to produce the plans and designs of the proposed restoration, but practically, such a time-consuming process was

extremely costly and to that extent not all residents could afford or even understand the thoroughly modern ambition of a project that wanted to preserve a sheering memory of a past that was considered foreign or marginal to the town's current identity. As only a small number of residents managed, therefore, to restore their properties and benefit from the Old Town's monumentalization, the majority of the residents despite being constant supporters of the 'right to intervene' slogan, have sadly come to discover that even the smallest and insignificant improvement was far from affordable – not to mention works that had to do with the reconstruction of the entire property.

The transformation of a small coastal town into a tourist resort that bases its reputation and most importantly its economy on its historical heritage is not probably a unique case in the urban history of peripheral capitalism. It gets however, extremely, important and interesting when the need to preserve the monuments, an ambition sustained and promoted by the state overlaps with the tourist development and aesthetic promotion of the town. The latter's significance becomes even greater once it is appreciated that the building legislation that banned any improvised alterations from the standpoint of the residents, unless authorization was given by the Archaeology Service, had a direct and immediate impact on the geography and spatial arrangements that surged into and saturated the material constitution of the town. One of the most forcefully felt and vividly experienced trends that had to do primarily with the new geography under formation in the face of the monumentalization process, was the significant drop of restorations regarding residential uses and properties housing families and tenants. As Table 2 shows, while the residential uses were dominant in the Old Town from the very beginning (approximately 25% shops and 60% residences) of the restoration project, the restorations that took place over the course of the last 40 years, were more about some general reconstructions (usually applied to converted shops) than a full restoration (usually referring to residences). But while it is, moreover, worth noting that 32% of the properties irrespective of their use have not been repaired at all throughout the same period, whereas 2% of the properties have been repaired and turned into shops, as Table 3 shows, only a 7.4% of the restorations concerned residential uses; while another 7.5% were about various other consumer uses – once one adds the variables *permission* (to operate a new shop: 4.6%), *transform to shop* (2.3%) and *transform to rent rooms* (0.6%). And yet there is

still a 40% of a *general* type of restoration, mostly associated with shops and other commercial uses – compared to the 7.4 % of the residential *restorations* – that makes a strong a point in the direction in which the restoration headed, and which strongly corresponded with the ensuing tourist activity. The implications are quite significant. By adding up the variables *general* restorations, *permission* to new shop, *transform to shop* and *transform to rent rooms* – that all refer to commercial restorations – one ends up with a 47,6%, which is significantly greater than the number of the residential restorations (7,4%) even made in the area. It is such a trend that readily shows how the restoration project effected the built environment, which buildings were selected and promoted and which uses and geographical areas benefited from such a restructuring.

Table 3: Type of restoration

Table 2: How the properties are used

	Frequency	Percent
shop	45	25,7
residence	106	60,6
abandoned	4	2,3
preserved	1	,6
monument	1	,6
public building	4	2,3
Total	161	92,0
Missing 0	14	8,0
Total	175	100,0

	Frequency	Percent
General (shops) Restoration (residences)	70	40,0
illegal	13	7,4
permission	7	4,0
no change	8	4,6
expropriation	57	32,6
transform to shop	1	,6
transform to rent rooms	4	2,3
Total	1	,6
Total	161	92,0
Missing 0	14	8,0
Total	175	100,0

As I have already stated, the division between those who were able to restore their properties and those who were unable or unwilling to restore them, do not necessarily coincide with the division between the seduced and the repressed. What I have also argued however, is that the postmodern divide between the repressed and the seduced refers, above all, and is incumbent to a social territory which is currently split and divided due to the unfettered existence, on the one hand, of a group of people who appreciate, fully enjoy and are able to consume the history of the town, and on the other hand, a group of people who need to be kept at a sufficient and safe distance, as the increasing important role of the Old Town, within the broader socio-economic

environment of Rethemnos, is about to take gradually hold. Class, of course, is not irrelevant to Rethemnos' recent socio-geographical cartography, yet given that the Old Town accrues from and is inseparably implicated and indelibly linked to an increasingly uneven geography that is vividly expressed in the unevenness of the restoration project and the restoration of the houses, it is a fuller theorization of consumption that permits a radical reconstruction of our understanding of the Old Town problem. The uneven geographical development of the Old Town and the gap between the restored properties and those that were left unconverted, is intrinsically associated with and subtended by the ceaselessly exacerbated systemic nature of consumption. An increasing resemblance, therefore, exists between posturban forms of spatiality, as the one materialized and brought to the fore, however inadvertently, by the restoration project of Rethemnos, and the commodification and marketization of almost everything in culture and society, with which the postmodern culture is often associated.

Originally, as was already underlined, the majority of the residents were against any kind of state intervention of which they thought as an external evil that cynically ignored the endemic needs of the town. Yet, other voices, even in the 1970s when the anti-interventionist was dominant, opposed such an argumentation which tended to neglect the historical and aesthetic importance of the Old Town and which they thought, should be, somehow, preserved. For Herzfeld however, endorsing and echoing the opinion of many Rethemniots at the time, the inhabitants of the Old Town were right in complaining about the newly formed situation in which the state had the role of adjudicating on matters that should not be its business. As he approvingly cites one of the residents' comments on the housing issue:

"That his house essentially does not belong to him, and that the house he has belongs to the Archaeological Service. And, further, to that, the entire secret [i.e. issue] is that the Old Town is a monument and you all live off it. All right. Nobody has any doubt about that. We said, we have it as dowry (*procio*); but we could exploit this dowry in a suitable way" (Herzfeld, 1991: 205).

Yet as an anonymous columnist's comment, who passionately disagreed with the forceful opposition that coloured most of the disputes surrounding the restoration project, in a daily newspaper put it (KRITIKI EPITHEORISI, 21-6-1983, pg. 1):

“Nobody said that the old buildings should be left to collapse or that people should live in decaying houses. One should be free to rebuild one’s house with new material as long as the material is covered with the traditional setting buildings used to be built of. One should also be able to construct a floor between the ground floor and the first floor but covering only 50% of the size of the property and only in houses with height over 4,20m. It is also unacceptable that two agencies exist deciding on the building and reconstruction processes. What the Archaeology Service demands is not a mere “reconstruction” (*fiasidoma*). The Archaeology Service is not against “renewal” and “modernization” and indeed all towns have been above all “living organisms”. Those, however, who have the money to construct a “third floor” let them buy apartments in the New Town after they have finished with the restoration. If the “third floor” is the issue how come people did not build them before the protective legislation declared the Old Town a “monument”?”

The original Old Town House’s Owners Association (OTHOA) replied to this caustic commentary in the following way (KRITIKI EPITHEORISI, 21-6-1983, pg. 1).

“The Old Town and its residents have been condemned and their properties withheld for ever. There are only forty buildings out of 1800 that exist in the Old Town that deserve to be restored”.

Kostas Hliakis, the current president of AROOT, the new association founded in 1994 was already from the 1980s one of the few individuals who supported a more sensitive and soft approach about whether certain restoration proposals and standards should be taken under consideration in line with the oft-tarnished legislative restrictions imposed by the Archaeology Service, blaming, however, OTHOA’s leader as a ‘hard liner’ demanding to ‘tear everything down in the town and rebuild it from scratch’. In fact it was Andreas Andrianopoulos, a member of New Democracy, the right wing party who promised to reconsider and withdraw the designation of the Old Town as a scheduled monument. In 1979, the then minister of culture, Mr. Nianias, visited Rethemnos and heard many complaints from the locals as they were 280 residents who had already applied in order to restore their houses, but only 8 of them saw their applications reaching the next stage – at the time the restoration, as was mentioned, of the properties was partly funded by state grants. Most of the properties, however, appeared to be in bad condition, the houses were collapsing and the damp was, according to the reports and complaints of the residents, almost everywhere. Granted though that every single restoration required a tremendous amount of time and money, the residents felt significantly powerless to adjust to the highly demanding prerogatives and the confusing and perplexing bureaucratic documentation

that had to be followed in order for any restoration to be finally permitted. As some of the residents most dramatically, described their lives at the time (RETHEMNIOTIKA NEA, 1979, pg. 4), implying that things ‘should be moving faster’ and that ‘there was no time to waste’ with all this bureaucracy :

“Here, do you see my fridge? I only keep it in order to throw it away. It is useless from the damp of the walls during the winter. I use my hands to get rid of the cockroaches. I used to have mice as well but I have now blocked the holes”.

“The rooms on the ground floors have damp. The walls have damp as well. There is damp all over the entire house. I cannot do anything about it”.

“The Archaeology service left unfinished many of the proposed restorations. It looks good from outside but from inside has *a concrete construction* and the wind gets through so the house is always cold. My wife and I have become ill because of it, which was not previously the case. This is the ‘good’ done to us by the Archaeology service. Now it is like we live in a shelter”.

“The commitment we had to make to the Archaeology Service has condemned us and ,apart from that, we are not allowed to do anything unless we get a written permission from the ministry. Until that moment everything is in danger of collapsing”.

And as one anonymous commentator put it in a local newspaper (RETHEMNIOTIKA NEA, 1979: 7), epitomizing the suspicion of the residents regarding the ideology of the Greek state and the impossibility, if not absurdity of the restoration project, which wanted to impose over a highly errand reality the meaning and modern ambition of a history that had clearly nothing to do with how the residents felt or thought of the town at the time:

“There is no financial capability to preserve and restore the houses nor to keep its characteristic architectural physiognomy, nor its historical heritage. All the laws concerned with the Old Town are essentially against the residents”.

No one could ever possibly imagine, of course, how the town would look today, as the picture on the right shows.




Figure 6: Chania, top left and the Venetian port of Rethemnos bottom left (Dimakopoulos, 1977: 342).

Figure 7: On the right Rethemnos' port as it currently stands (picture taken by the author).

In all fairness, the restoration project was clearly a modernist ambition that sought to impose laws over a constantly and highly changing and erratic reality, putting everything in its place and cultivating the history of Rethemnos according to the jurisdiction of the Greek nationalist anthology, which saw in the Venetian built environment a firm basis on which the town's identity was finally to be built, as an exhibition, in short, that would expose, stage and communicate the town's greatness to the world – the 'world as exhibition' as Gregory (1994) once put it. The Old Town problem was subject thus and this is exactly what the restoration project amounts to, in all its conflictual, and contested forms and shapes, an ideology that sought to preserve and restore the Venetian properties; an attempt, however, that coincided with the unmitigated predominance of aesthetic spacing, and hence the remarkable inter-implication, and coordination of cognitive spacing (the restoration of the Venetian past) and aesthetic spacing (the rapid tourist development of the area) that marked in the most profound way the conflicts between the residents and the state. The commodification of the Venetian history of the town is neither, therefore, about a parasitic form of socio-spatial development, nor about spontaneity, but what tended to reinforce the residents' hostility toward the bureaucratic administration of Athens, insofar as the knowledge, practices and restoration imperatives nourished by the project were difficult to be reconciled and went beyond the scope and meaning of the

moral spaces of the Rethemniot lifeworld. The disputes, however, were mostly about simple things. A major concern, for example, of the anti-interventionist period was about the prolonged demand of the residents to construct a third floor ‘leaving something for their children’ and, the need to remove the Venetian doorways and the arched placements and to demolish, rebuild and reconstruct the entrances of the houses, replacing the original doors with modern constructions.

The ongoing struggle between the residents and the state in the 1970s and 1980s inevitably led many of the inhabitants to abandon their houses, especially in the Southwestern part of the town, as now it is the ambitious and hard-working immigrants, mainly of Albanian origin who buy or rent the relatively cheap old properties at the heart of the Old Town. A two-floored house, for example, with a bathroom and backyard in the street of Koronaïou, costs 160 Euros per month to rent. Given though that as Table 4 shows 38% of the Venetian properties of the Old Town are located within the historical centre, while 60% of them are situated elsewhere in the Old Town, the fact that many of the residents have abandoned their residences in the place of which commercial shops popped out, a significantly different landscape is now under formation and a rather different social geography grows in demographic and ethnic/racial terms. It is not only the immigrants, of course, that have found the Old Town attractive. Students from across Greece who study at the University of Crete, one faculty of which, social sciences and humanities, are based in Rethemnos, have also thought of the Old Town’s housing stock as a relatively affordable chance of accommodation. As Table 5 illustrates, the buildings that are now situated within the boundaries of the historical centre are hugely used as tourist shops, whilst 80% of the properties that house residential uses have been moved outside the historical centre and are now relocated elsewhere in Rethemnos.

Table 4: Location of Properties

	Frequency	Percent
Historical Centre	67	38,3
Rest of Old Town	108	61,7
Total	175	100,0

Table 5: Location and use of properties

		Geographical Area		Total
		Historical Centre	Rest of the Old Town	
Use	shop	28 62,2%	17 37,8%	45 100,0%
	residence	27 25,5%	79 74,5%	106 100,0%
	abandoned	4 100,0%	0 ,0%	4 100,0%
	preserved	1 100,0%	0 ,0%	1 100,0%
	monument	1 100,0%	0 ,0%	1 100,0%
	public building	2 50,0%	2 50,0%	4 100,0%
Total		63 39,1%	98 60,9%	161 100,0%

Be that as it may, even if is true, as one of the employees of the Archaeology Service told me once, that originally the historical centre of the Old Town has accommodated both residential and commercial activities, it is equally true, as things currently stand that the gap between a highly developing commercial historical centre and a silent, hidden and banal housing zone is far a more salient, intense and polarized divide than what initially stood. The historic centre, which includes the Gazi Housein Mosque and the areas around the Streets of Arabatzoglou, Messologiou and Nikiforu Foka – *Makri Steno* – are now commercially exploding and have nothing to do with the spatial structuration of the Southwestern Old Town, which contains mostly poor, abandoned and mould decayed houses within which mostly old people live, whose children have fled to Herakleion, Chania or even Athens. And as a young Rethemniot told me once I observed that her father's house in the Old Town seemed to be abandoned:

“You do not expect to make something of it. It is a complete waste of time. I do not think of going back in there because of the damp, the mice and the total lack of parking space.”

It was for that reason that the residents, who have witnessed their houses gradually losing their economic value, tended to conceive of the state as an external invader that restricted and weakened their ability to decide over their lives.

The year 1994 marks a radical change in the way the Greek state appeared to the eyes of the residents however; now it is the state that seems to be the most reliable and trustworthy feature that can guarantee and further protect all those who have been left out of the game of consumption and restoration. It is in such a way that the dialectic of change and preservation of the socio-spatial polarization between the historical centre and the residential zone of the Old Town resonates with the current division of the posturban city, that is, the fact that “the walls built once around the city now crisscross the city itself and in a multitude of directions” (Bauman, 1998: 48). Being unable to visit, walk through, or even enjoy today certain areas of the Old Town, the poor residents had invariably to turn to the administrative and authoritative predicament provided by the state, whose gardening aspirations they long ago denounced and rejected.

What brings together the fetishism of utility, the revival of AROOT and the changing attitude of the residents in terms of the way in which the restoration project is currently received, is neither a deeply embedded placeness that resists the historical interpretations of officialdom nor a behavioral characteristic of a characteristically untamed and ceaselessly passionate Mediterranean psyche. What consumerism and the restoration project signify, in a profound sense, is the responses, reactions and feelings of the residents as a consequence of the strategic “replacement – or better, *displacement* – of the repression-centred mode of social integration by new, seduction-centred mechanisms [which] comes about in direct proportion to the extent to which systemic reproduction is better achieved by letting social integration be guided by ‘needs’ rather than ensuring it be constrained by norms” (Clarke and Bradford, 1998: 875). To that extent the monumentalization of the Old Town is intrinsically tied and attuned to the consummation and aesthetization of the Venetian geohistory and co-ordination between aesthetic and cognitive spacings that inevitably leave a particularly heavy imprint on the town’s geography.

That the Venetian Old Town is heavily influenced by consumption nowadays, which has turned the use of buildings into commodified signs of a glorious past, does not mean, necessarily, that its histories, events, trajectories and narratives are elusive or immaterial. It rather connotes that the monumentalization process that has been proliferating all over the town in an unprecedented way in the last 40 years, faces now

a new round of intense and hostile receptions triggered off mostly because of the ardent consummation process of tourism. As most of the streets, shops and restaurants are named after some Venetian leader, whilst even a coffee-shop in the place where the Venetian sun-clock stood was named 'Clock' after the monument, the question is no longer about how to preserve, restore or even respect and communicate the historical meaning, symbolism and value of the Venetian properties, but rather, and this is not ironic at all, about whether there is anything in the Old Town that is not of Venetian origin. And while the Venetian past is virtually resurrected and constantly reinstated and resuscitated across the physical space and territory of the whole of Rethemnos, its history and identity are, imperceptibly, turned into a phantasmagoria and a vast playground of aesthetic values, simulated histories, overcoded signs and satellite images that scarcely refer to any real, authentic or historical truth. For, truly, it is hard to find in the Old Town anything that is not of monumental type or of Venetian origin. That the Venetian geohistory is almost everywhere is what makes the Rethemniot landscape a simulated Venetian history, which is more real than reality itself. And as Baudrillard (1988: 166) claims this "is no longer a question of either maps or territory", but about what happened to the geography of things once "there is no longer a scene, when everything becomes transparent" (Baudrillard, 1999: 67).

I am not proposing that the commodification and tourist expansion of Rethemnos signals the end of history or the end of the Old Town. For as Baudrillard has also pointed out being out of the visible or productive order does not, necessarily, mean the end of history. Rather such a strategy of aesthetic domination signals the *ec-static* transformation and metamorphosis of the Old Town which having turned its history into a commodity is now paying the price of disappearance, for when everything is Venetian nothing is Venetian any more. That the Old Town is about simulation that irradiates only signs and images of a glorious past is exactly what is meant by the figure of the hyperreal therefore, which is "The truer than true" (Baudrillard, 1990: 11). And this is why "Simulation threatens the difference between the 'true' and the 'false', the 'real' and the 'imaginary'" (Baudrillard, 1994: 3). Of such a fractal stage of consumerism, however, which postulated the whole of the Old Town as a Venetian monument, and forced the inhabitants to fight and oppose by all means monumentalization, the residents' lifeworld or the town's urban affairs, are no longer entirely under the residents' will and jurisdiction.

8.3 Old Conflicts, New Coalitions

That the Old Town appears to have little to do with the struggles, lives and concerns of its inhabitants can be also supported by the fact that the shops and restaurants, especially those around the old Venetian port, do not usually seem keen to serve the residents. They remain closed during the winter and the same holds for many hotels and bars located across the eastern part of the town, from Perivolia, to Missiria and Panormo; a rather indirect but still effective manner of sanctioning, segregating and purging all those whose profile or lifestyle choices does not appear to follow or fit the highly valorized, for his expenditure capacity, figure of the tourist. Such nice places are more often than not expensive – and this is why do not appear to be to the residents' taste, though this become evident only when seen retrospectively that is after the owners of the shops have already abandoned any hope of targeting local customers – having produced a certain ghettoization and purification of the area. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the reasons that should lie behind the inevitable institution of AROOT in 1994 have to do primarily with the suppression and limitation of the local population within specifically designated areas that are not entitled to be touristically 'exploited' 'overloaded' or 'oriented'. AROOT for his part, as its declaration-statement put it, meant to develop relationships of friendship between those who live in the Old Town, contribute to the educational and cultural level of the inhabitants, watch over the problems of the Old Town and communicate them to wider audiences, and the social actors and agencies involved in the town. As the members of AROOT suggested:

"The Old Town problem is a problem of all Rethemniots and not only of those who live strictly within the boundaries of the Old Town"⁴.

AROOT is open to all citizens who live permanently in the Old Town and are over 18 and to those who have tourist shops, small-business and various entrepreneurs in the area with the exception of bars, restaurants and disco-owners, who are among those, considered to be responsible for the recent experience of anxiety, convulsion, contortion and confusion that have never stopped to surround the entire monumentalization process of the Old Town. Things have now changed dramatically

⁴ The statement constitutes a small paragraph of the foundational declaration of AROOT, which I read in the Old Town's office having the permission of Maria Hliaki, a founding member of the association.

however not only in terms of the manner in which cognitive and aesthetic spacing proceed apace in Rethemnos, but also with respect to how the residents perceive of the restoration project and the state. In the anti-intervention period, even some local politicians, the mayor and would-be members of the parliament passionately would defend the widely shared anti-interventionist rhetoric of OTHOA, with Arkhondakis and Skouloudis, the rivals for the municipal office in the 1980s having already taken sides against it. As Herzfeld (1991: 120) put it in his account of Rethemnos “Dimitris Arkhondakis, chosen by the rightists to lead their slate, was a local man, a high school teacher and philologist much admired for his learning in the ‘town of letters’ [...]”. And as one of the residents expressing his preference for Arkhondakis observed:

“Skouloudis [...] hasn’t slept a single night in the Old Town to see what ‘Old Town’ means, to see in the morning when he gets up how the sheet is raw (*nopo*) from the damp [...]” (Herzfeld, 1991: 120).

In the 1990s nevertheless, the on-going tensions between the residents and the state was about to take an all together different turn, with the radical transformation of AROOT’s ideological orientation being a consequence of the current intense geo-restructuring of the historical centre, which coincided with a significant drop in the residential improvements as a result of the further marketization of the historical centre. While prior to 1994, 85% of the properties repaired concerned by and large, residential uses, after 1994 only 15% of the works completed involved improvements and renovations of residences. Inversely, only a 35% of the renovations completed prior to 1994 were related to shops, whereas after 1994 the shop improvements rose to 65% (Table 6).

Table 6: Type of property and year of intervention

Type	Year	
	until 1994	after 1994
shop	16 35.6 %	29 64.4 %
residence	90 84.9%	16 15.1%
abandoned	3 75.0%	1 25.0%
preserved	1 100.0%	0 ,0%
monument	1 100.0%	0 ,0%
public building	4 100.0%	0 ,0%
Total	115 71.4%	46 28.6%

The rapid and unprecedented commercialization of the Venetian properties, roughly, illustrated by the above numbers, is indicative of the far-reaching implications a full-blown consumer society has for space, place, and the subject as they are disseminated on the face of the effective spacing of restoration. The considerable co-ordination between cognitive and aesthetic spacings in the Old Town generated a tremendously ossifying spatial unevenness and as many conflicts and quarrels as the original impoverished geography – which the restoration project ambitiously administered – set out to resolve. And as it was rightly observed, “Few indeed are those who can afford the prohibitive cost of conforming to the requirements of the historic conservation office” (Herzfeld, 1991: 246). Thus the question is no longer about affording the restoration costs but has to do mostly with the failed promises and unfulfilled expectations, ambitions and challenges the restoration project had cultivated or surreptitiously induced, but was ultimately unable to deliver or meet. AROOT’s members, for example, insist on taking the local administration to court for neglecting foundational obligations and commitments the mayor had made just before the 2002 local elections, when he won another four years in the office. As AROOT sharply put it:

“Our association represents and protects residents and owners of the Old Town of Rethemnos. The Old Town constitutes a public good and is a source of profit for all citizens. The enjoyment of this good belongs to everyone and no one (citizen or the mayor) has the right to underestimate it. The streets of Arkadiou, Ethnikis Antistaseos and Palaiologou, which are the more commercial streets of the town, are not fixed and make the situation problematic. Because passengers are in danger; because the situation is bad for tourism; because the tourist period is just about to begin and there is an immediate need to repair the streets; because we receive daily complaints from residents of the Old Town whose interests we support; because it is unacceptable within such a short period for this damage to reappear; because the only person responsible for the situation is the mayor; because it is impossible to fix the damage while tourists are here – for all these reasons we are suing the mayor for his inappropriate attitude toward the problems of our town” (AROOT, 19-3-2004).

The growing inability of the local polity and its failure to protect the residents from the current unrestrained tourist development makes life difficult for all those who are unable to comply with the newly formed situation and the unabating consummation processes that followed the attempt to substitute an acutely designed housing condition for a more free and reflexive way of dealing with the properties’ renovations.

The inability of politicians to respond and satisfy the lower social ranks’ expectations offering a safer predicament and a way to get to grips with the emerging situation is not necessarily a sign of a general incapacity to halt or even partly remedy the highly uneven capitalist development and is not necessarily about the end of the political era. Yet a strong assertion can be made that at the dawn of consumerism, the inability of politics to perform its proselytizing and gardening role is a structural impotency and deficiency of the whole social system impeding the traditional way of political representation. And although Arkhondakis was usually conceived of as an Old Town child, born and raised in the area and thus the most suitable candidate for the job, today the residents hold him responsible for neglecting and compromising foundational promises he made at the beginning of his leadership some 40 years ago. This is neither a personal rejection of the mayor nor is it about a general suspicion of the effectiveness, honesty and meaning of politics, though politicians have been always considered as unreliable and characteristically untrustworthy persons in Greece. Such a political impasse is not about passivity or indifference either, or a *blasé* attitude on behalf of the residents who do not understand how politics and

economy are recently transformed. It marks instead a different kind of politics beyond the anomie of the modern anti-interventionist period whence the Archaeology Service took over and its strict prohibitions regarding the reconstruction of the Venetian properties were triggered off holding sway.

En route from the anti-interventionist and anomic apparatuses of the 1970s to the more intense interventionist call for state protection of the 1990s, the politics of the Old Town slide, imperceptibly, toward the intensification and massification of a generalized procrastination when it comes to decisions that obscure the function of the market, which can be taken as a symptom of the metamorphosis and transition from a *banal* modern clash between monumental and social history to a *fatal* contestation between the repressed and the seduced. Through the Venetian overhistorization of the town, with the many streets named after Venetian leaders, with festivals like the Fortezza-Renaissance festival taking place every summer, with the souvenirs, pictures and maps of the Old Town that promote a thoughtless and banal picture of the city, what is repeatedly affirmed time and again in Rethemnos is a Venetian overexposure, which merges and immeasurably coincides with the glorious past and western heritage, on which Rethemnos' history has supposedly, but not accidentally, come to converge. The call for increasing state intervention, therefore, marks a shift in the attitudes of the residents in response to this image of the town which has been gradually promoted and nourished by the state over the last 40 years and which is now spawned and further exacerbated by consumerism.

The political imaginary of the 1960s strongly believed that in the course of a painful but solid, and durable reform, the restoration project would deliver a better-deal not only for the identity and overall image of the town but also for its residents. As things currently stand, however, such an understanding is beyond imagination as the anomie of the first years of the restoration project has, however imperceptibly, turned into a call for immediate state intervention as a result of the monumentalization which presided over the town. The crisis of representation and overexposure of the Venetian geohistory went hand in hand with the residents' disappointment and suspicion of the mayor's policies, but it was only when the almost absolutely proximity of the Venetian representation was found to be inseparable from the history of the Old Town, to the extent that there is nothing around but monuments, that the fierce

opposition and anti-interventionist rhetoric broke down and collapsed. For even properties and buildings that have nothing to do with the Venetian past have been named or reconstructed in a fashion that remarkably, though in a certain banal manner, resembles now some famous Venetian architectural designs.

Be that as it may, on the back of the passage from OTHOA to AROOT and the far-reaching implications of such a trajectory in terms of the way in which the residents understand, experience and think of the restoration project, new conflicts emerge, not only between the residents and the state but also within the agencies actively involved in the urban affairs of the town. Let me further illustrate the point with another episode from the field.

In 2003, Kostas Hliakis became the new president of AROOT. He received 70% of the votes, while three years later in the local elections of 2006 he was elected deputy mayor in Rethemnos alongside the mayor Marinakis. Marinakis and Hliakis were both affiliated to PASOK, the socialist party that run the country from 1981 to 2004, with a small break in the period 1990–1993 when New Democracy, the neoconservative party, was in the government. Hliakis, nevertheless, in the wake of his electoral victory was asked to leave AROOT as its members insisted that the deputy mayor should not be at the same time president of AROOT. In November 2006 AROOT met in order to discuss the double role of Kostas Hliakis, with the then vice president of AROOT maintaining that Hliakis should give up one of his position. ‘If you quit, we would have 20 members in the council and not just one’ he told the summit, meaning that if Hliakis and the rest 19 members of AROOT did not hold any official position in the council, AROOT would be far more effective in promoting the interests of the Old Town. If Hliakis was to hold both offices, on the other hand, he would not be able to fight for AROOT’s interests, for it was firmly entrenched in the minds of AROOT’s members that the local council would never stop promoting a further round of commodification.

The clash, sketched above, is not only meant to show that there is gap between some bureaucrats of formal history (the city council) and a local understanding of history strictly oriented to territorial understandings of history (AROOT), but shows, above all, that similar disputes also exist within the supposedly homogeneous and unified

perception through which the restoration is usually conceived of by AROOT's members.

The revival of the Houses' Owners' Association exemplifies, precisely, how the original reactionary defense of the social history of Rethemnos against the restoration project is gradually given over to the fast-growing forces of the market that triggered in turn an unexpected defense of monumental history. While it is true that in the anti-interventionist period, the former OTHOA had the full support of the local administration, it now becomes apparent that it was only after AROOT emerged or at about the same time, that the residents started accusing the mayor for recklessly promoting tourism and for ignoring the needs and problems of the town. But even if AROOT requires now a more effective cognitive charting of the town, this time there is a crucial difference, in that the state is unable to protect those who virtually depend on its repressive mechanisms in order to support their lot. The general disaffection and discontent of the residents toward the state and the local polity and the heterogeneities, contradictions, disputes and struggles between the various agencies and social actors of Rethemnos, make clear, therefore, that a dualistic way of thinking and perceiving of the Old Town problem is ineffective and non-productive, especially since even within AROOT there are as many conflicts as there exist between the local council and AROOT. The local state sees the Old Town's prospect and future as inseparable from the aesthetic spacing, that is, the rapid and unstoppable commodification of the town, enhancing, in other words, even if it is through the negligence and absence of policies, the growth, proliferation and multiplication of the irresistible forces of the market, which is, financially, exploiting the social spaces of the historical centre by outnumbering the residential uses. AROOT by contrast, stresses now the need for a more intensive reinscription of monumentalization as the roles of the state and the market have considerably changed. Once, it was the state that adamantly advanced the monumentalization of the town; now it is the residents who further support and would fight for its further survival. If the Old Town problem is to be taken seriously, therefore, in terms of the way in which the residents experience and evaluate the actions and policies of local agencies and how they perform and operate within the urban context of the town, a careful reconstruction of certain understandings of identity and space should be founded and grounded in the successful coordination of cognitive and aesthetic spacings. That the residents

conceive of politics with skepticism is partly a result of this failure to break and disarticulate the immanent link and unholy bond between these two kinds of spacing that co-exist, inter-connect and depend on each other. The crucial difference being now, however, that what once constituted the rigidity, negation and fixity against which the original anti-interventionist period was turned and focused on, is now replaced by the overexposure of the Venetian history and the *hyperteleia* (beyond any possible telos or scope) of consumerism.

Table 7 shows how the restorations are geographically dispersed before and after 1994 when AROOT called forth the need to view and reevaluate restoration in a fundamentally and radically different manner, that is, from the time it was understood that the state having cynically, monumentalized the town will now eagerly stir it or let it go with the flow and stream of consumerism. But although the restorations in both the residential areas of the Old Town and the historical centre are significantly fewer, it is only within the residential zone that the restorations have most dramatically dropped by almost 50%, from 77% to 22%.

Table 7: Restorations before and after 1994

area	year	
	until 1994	after 1994
Historical Centre	45 67,2%	22 32,8%
Rest of the Old Town	84 77,8%	24 22,2%
Total	129 73,7%	46 26,3%

An essential part of this new aesthetical scenery of consumption that unexpectedly surge through the Old Town are the bars, discos, clubs and restaurants that appear in almost every corner of the town. They are only the epiphenomena of a continuously growing and ensuing consumer society which evolves and grows in an unprecedented manner, despite the fact that many of them operate in the historic centre illegally. Unsurprisingly, the local administrators have characteristically ignored the complaints of the residents, who after all, are less significant in their roles as consumers than the tourists. As a consequence, AROOT threatened to take to court many of the club-owners who did not have permission for their business, but still interestingly all

appeals made against the club-owners focused on the excessive and hyperbolic behaviour of tourists (in terms of alcohol consumption, noise etc.), rather than the illegal operation of clubs – even the local media, for example, often show images of drunken tourists in Hersonisos and Mallia asking the viewers to ‘imagine what they do in their countries’, disregarding the fact that the tourists are only the tip of the iceberg and that were not for the clubs, little would be left to attract tourists in the first place. Yet the poor residents do not have a chance of winning any of the verdicts of the cases, especially since the owners have the best legal advice and since the local council is not in conflict with the club-owners, who are occasionally forced to pay a fee in order to keep ‘business as usual’; and thus it is anticipated that it is in the interest of the administrators to maintain the illegal status of such places. No small wonder then, that being poor in the period when OTHOA was in charge is totally different to being poor in a place in which cognitive and aesthetic spacings overlap and merge. As Bauman has aptly put it “If ‘being poor’ once derived its meaning from the condition of being unemployed, today it draws its meaning primarily from the plight of a flawed consumer” (Bauman, 2005: 1). The flawed consumers and poor residents of Rethemnos have few options on offer, however, not only because, as was already shown, it is now almost unaffordable to repair a house and this is why most restorations in the residential zone have actually stopped since 1994, but mostly because in such a “wanting society” such people are simply “unneeded, unwanted, forsaken – where is their place? The briefest of answers is: out of sight” (Bauman, 2005: 116). And thus as these people are withdrawn “from the orders of the visible and the articulable” (Doel and Clarke, 1997: 15), and “have to be disciplined by the combined action of repression, policing, authority and normative regulation” (Bauman, 2005: 181), the restoration has not only turned the Old Town into an aesthetic play of values but engineered a punitive mechanism that watches over the poor.

The incapacity of the state to offer any substantive solution in terms of the Old Town problem, is not only about the residents’ attempt to fight bureaucracy in any poetic manner whatsoever, but, crucially, is a symptom of the transition from OTHOA to AROOT, from anti-interventionism to interventionism, from oppression to seduction, from the figure of the political to a state of affairs defiant of anomie, and eventually from modernity to postmodernity. The following incident may further illustrate the

point. Just four months before the 2006 local elections, the 60/2001 Regulation Act, which prohibited the opening of new bars in the Old Town, was surprisingly withdrawn in what marked another twist that would baffle and further infuriate an already anxious and dissatisfied population. The decision was made in favour of all those who owned bars in the area but also encouraged, the opening of more bars and clubs. Theoretically, the 60/2001 Act permitted the operation of cafeterias and coffees-shops, although, most of them were kept open until very late at night operating, in fact, as clubs. The act was withdrawn, however, when a majority of the council's members voted against it, something that was clearly 'un-constitutional' (*antisyntagmatiko*), given that a consensus of all members of the council was required in order for the act not to hold. Given that some members of the council strongly disagreed, the issue had to be discussed at a future meeting, yet until then, the act would not hold. As I have already suggested this is not about the bankruptcy of politics, the informality, precariousness and peculiarity of a place and the poetic reasoning and reassuring of a solid identity or even an informal, spontaneous reaction and opposition to the nationalist anthology systematically promoted by the Greek state – as the Mediterraneanist literature has harboured so far, with Herzfeld being among others, one of the most cogent representatives of such a line of thought. Rather it has to do with the prohibition and anomie of the anti-interventionist period, which is now imperceptibly swept up by, and turned into a Kafkaesque world of suspension, indecision and infinite procrastination in which the residents' call for increasing state intervention becomes the best way to rise to the challenge of aesthetization.


To slacken the hold of Mediterraneanism is the crucial undertaking I have been engaged in thus far. Bearing this in mind, I argued that the vicissitudes of AROOT's changing perception of the restoration project which embodied the territorial dreams of the Greek nation-state imposing on Rethemnos a strict version of Venetian history as the only tale that matters in town, materialize in a conflictual context within which the identity of the city is currently situated and negotiated. But if there is a lesson to learn from the controversies and innocuous relationships that arise out of the contested and purposefully designed building legislation, it should be about the increasingly important role consumerism has come to play in the city, whose far reaching and effective implications and consequences with respect to space and history, not only weakened the residents' suspicious of the restoration project, but

turned them into ardent supporters of the monumentalization project. Such is the general disaffection of a fully-fledged consumer society through which the residents conceive of their town's identity, and which, serves as a marker of the tentative and contestable reception of a state-derived history. That the residents should fall for the state does not mean, necessarily, that they think of it as less oppressive, but crucially, that the current aesthetic spacing is now breeding an aesthetic image of the city on the side of which there is no room left for them.

And thus AROOT appealed on 23-2-2005 to the Department of Hygiene of the Prefecture to shut down a tavern in the Street of Vernardou, which despite being called 'Old Town', and located directly opposite the Popular Art Museum of Rethemnos, insisted on using the backyard of the property for cooking until the early hours of the morning, polluting the atmosphere, and forcing the residents to keep their windows shut. The case was not solved and the owners, who appealed against the decision, will probably, have to pay a fee, but the tavern will still be operating.

In all the twists and turns of the above episodes, some critics have mistaken the residents' discontent in alliance with a poetic or heroic resistance which refuses to adjust to a highly changing and dynamically metamorphosed social territory (cf. Herzfeld, 1982, 1985, 1987). In all the above episodes, I see, however, the various consequences of a full-blown consumer once cognitive spacing was put into practice. The rhetoric of AROOT does not simply defend the monumental character of the town, but is an expression of the sociospatial segregation and separation intensified by the internal contradictions of the consumer society. The effective power of monumentalization, which was progressively followed by the manifested predominance of aesthetic spacing, the dissymmetry and dissimulation of the incontestable marketization process and the rapid and irreversible commodification of the Venetian properties, forced the poor residents to abandon any hope of restoring their houses. After failing to surrender to the aesthetic metamorphosis of the town, the residents wish now to preserve the Old Town's monuments, its cultural heritage and architecture, but chiefly as a survival or reminiscent of a collective memory that was unsuccessfully and a for short period put forward when the state was advancing restoration. It is at this juncture that the contradictions and inherent unevenness of the consumer society become apparent, as the massification and overexposure of tourism,

as AROOT insists, has destroyed not only the Venetian geohistory of the town but most importantly the lifeworld of the residents, forgetting however, that the present aesthetization has only come to complete or supplement what the original cognitive spacing and monumentalization launched some 40 years ago. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that AROOT has asked for the completion of one of the greatest Ottoman monuments in the Old Town, the Gazi Huseyin Mosque, which has been under reconstruction for the last ten years, but which in the years of OTHOA's dominion was adamantly considered to be a 'Turkish' remnant. Indeed, in the 1960s when "a representative of the military government visited Rethemnos [he] suggested that the unusually tall minaret of the celebrated mosque of the *gazi* (warrior of the faith) Huseyin Pasa should be torn down" (Herzfeld, 1991: 199).



1. Th. Dimakopoulos (1977) the rimondi water provider and the Lozza building. 2. Th. Dimakopoulos (1977) the Lozza building. 3. Th. Dimakopoulos (1977) the Lozza building.



Figure 8: The Lozza building top left and the Rimondi water provider (Dimakopoulos, 1977: 355).

Figure 9: The Lozza building (on the right) (picture taken by the author).



Figure 10: The Rimondi Krini as it currently stands (picture taken by the author).

The events drawn upon above frustrate and upset the established political agreement between the residents and the local polity and as was already seen the question is no longer about an effective or sensitive policy but should concern, above all, the general use of space of the Old Town. The residents' suspicion of the current political situation in the Old Town is, accordingly, an essential part of the displacement which marks a transition from the banal modernist aspiration and the official interpretations of a modern conception of history to the overexposure, overgrowth and proliferation of a commercialized Venetian present that saturates every corner of the geography of the town. What is masked in the above transition is not only some locally embedded spirit of resistance pertinent to the Mediterranean idiosyncratic way of dealing with contemporary challenges, but mostly reflects the division and exacerbated polarization in a society whose two major social poles' conflictual coexistence, that of the seduced and the repressed, continues to grow apace.

Little wonder then, that as was suggested in the introduction, what the residents have probably meant to say is that 'There is nothing to see'. Sadly the poor residents have been left now with the fatality, apathy, and radical passivity of a generalized and perplexing confusion in coming to terms with the contestable and negotiable character of the Venetian monumentalization. For the Rethemniots not only have been subject

to the cognitive spacing of the original monumentalization of the town, but are now vastly excluded from and feel the pressure of aesthetic spacing. It is to that extent that the division between the repressed and the seduced is central in making sense of the Old Town problem as the people, who complain, feel excluded, suffer and appear irrelevant to the current urban affairs, constitute the repressed. Inversely, the residents who are defiant of or manage to adjust and, perfectly, connect to the cognitive/aesthetic imperatives, understand, appreciate and enjoy the aesthetic spaces of the Old Town, taking, for example, pictures of the magnificent monuments, constitute the seduced. For the consumer society is, above all, a mode of domination “in a similar profound and fundamental sense in which the society of our predecessors [...] used to deserve the name of a ‘producer society’ in spite of the fact that people have produced since the beginning of the human species and will go on producing until the species demise” (Bauman, 2005: 24). In such a consumer society the current marked contrast thus is “between a residualized minority reliant on a dwindling public mode of provision [...] and a majority who are increasingly integrated by their common experience of private consumption (whatever their class position) (Clarke and Bradford, 1998: 871). The division between the repressed and the seduced however neither corresponds strictly with the cognitive/aesthetic spacings nor is it in any sense, an equivalent of the number of the houses restored. It is nevertheless a theoretical construction, which with the benefit of hindsight, can be seen as a way that begins to outline the conditions pertinent to the postmodern state of space. Both the cognitive and aesthetic spacings, invent, complicate and propose another way of seeing and another way of proceeding with urban problems and their structuration, putting consumption at the centre of the social concern and problematization when it comes to the social stratification of the Mediterranean city. While the repressed are excluded, prevented, punished or even disciplined on the basis of their illegal reconstructions and their poor understanding of the historical importance of the Old Town, the seduced, by contrast, are only too eager to go with the seductive consumer flows and streams that pioneered a significantly different way in order to stroll in the postmodern city. That the quarrels and struggles of the Rethemniots and the disputes over space have been associated not only with the cognitive spacing but with the aesthetic spaces, illustrates precisely the shifting balance between repression and seduction on the grounds of which contemporary posturban formations depend. The transition from OTHOA to AROOT thus is an equivalent of what takes place

“between modes of domination, not between kinds of society” (Clarke, 2003: 108). The division between the seduced and the repressed is one of the possible ways to make sense of and theorize the unevenness generated by the restoration project with respect to the buildings that were reconstructed and the properties that were abandoned or left unconverted. Even if the intention of the original restoration project was to allow the residents to take part in and become fully-paid members of the consumer society, the inherently uneven character of its implementation did not prevent the production of a newly formed landscape of characteristic unevenness between a highly tourist and consumption zone and those parts of the Old Town that failed to take advantage of the restoration potentials and prospects.

The monumentalization of the Old Town, accordingly, has produced as many problems as it allegedly set out to resolve. “Today” wrote Herzfeld (1991: 224), almost 20 years ago, “the situation is reversed in one important sense. Now it is the poor, who want to alter, demolish and rebuild”. Yet, I think a strategic shift of a different kind was already on its way well before the clash mentioned above. The poor residents were an inevitable and integral part of the OTHOA society from the very beginning but at that time, rich and poor alike, opposed the restoration project and it was only when it became clear that it would benefit mostly the higher social ranks, through a further aesthetization of space and through the reconstruction of the Venetian properties that OTHOA began gradually becoming suspicious of the restoration. Such an uneven socio-spatial trajectory of the urban affairs of the Old Town explains AROOT’s recent radical inversion in terms of how the restoration is now perceived, seeking and preaching for a more consistent cognitive spacing, as a consequence of the building activity and spatial reorganization of the last 40 years, which enhanced dogmatically the tourist and commercial uses and the restoration mostly of buildings that were later to be turned into shops, bars and clubs. What the shifting attitude of the Old Town’s residents toward the state illustrates is the noticeable transition and displacement in society from a cognitive/repressive mode of exclusion to an aesthetic/seductive mode of attraction associated with the current diversification and stratification of a society which falls under the jurisdiction advanced by consumer capitalism.

It was Herzfeld (1991: 191), once again who had observed that “The inhabitants complain that the Old Town no longer exists for them. It has been appropriated by forces they neither control nor particularly admire – government, foreign tourism, a few wealthy entrepreneurs from out of town”. But that was not simply because the poetic and social history of the Old Town had nothing to do with the Venetian homogenization prompted by the state, but rather because the spatial appropriation of the irreversible forces of the market had been neither desirable, nor easy to control nor to understand, due to their uneven, and in a very structural and strategic manner, unjust way of harnessing urbanism.

New lines of power (Olsson, 1991), therefore, are drawn in terms of the built environment, and between those who accept or can afford the effective cognitive/aesthetic spacing and those who simply fail to take into account and obey the rules and prescriptions of consumerism. It is true, nevertheless, that nowadays the residents have hardly a say in what is going on in the town and can scarcely intervene in the ongoing process of tourist consumption. The latter however was something totally ignored during the anti-interventionist period, when the different class-based interests and relations of the members of OTHOA were completely disregarded, being thought of as some tenuous and inevitable disputes of a community-bond that in essence meant to remain enduring and untouchable for the years to come, irrespective of the selective affinity and highly uneven effects of the cognitive/aesthetic spacing, which in the wake of the restoration project, distributed disproportionately losses and gains.

The frequently asked question these days, ‘Where is the Archaeology Service?’ (*Pou einai i Archaialogia;*) points, exactly in this radically new direction and shift in the inhabitants’ views and their conceptions of the restoration project. The odds are definitely against the residents who by demanding now increasing state intervention, fail dramatically to see that the state is no longer willing or able to offer any help whatsoever. Herzfeld (1991: 201) for his part had rightly foreseen that “now there is even talk of reviving OTHOA in a radically reversed form, under the leadership of a faction that repudiates the founders’ virulent enmity toward the historic conservation office and includes in its ranks at least one major former critic of the original OTHOA”. The problem is, however, that the conflict was not merely about a

contested interpretation of history between abstract agencies and moral individuals that fail to surrender or succumb to the nationalist ideology, even if it is now the poor who want to reconstruct, demolish and rebuild. The poor dwellers supported OTHOA's anti-interventionist policy from the very beginning, and did not simply want to prevent the reconstruction of the Venetian houses, but hoped mainly to oppose the specific cognitive spacing/aesthetic spacing, which was far beyond their scope, means and ability to understand. It was only when the cognitive spacing of the monumentalization processes coincided with the on-going and effectively ensuing aesthetic spacing that the poor residents had to turn invariably to state protection. Being the underdogs of a process that becomes increasingly irrelevant to their own social being, finding themselves eventually expelled and excluded from the game of tourism and consumption, the Old Town's poor residents, as cynical as this may sound, now demand repression.

8.4 One Town, Two Worlds

The changing attitude of the residents and their suspicion of bureaucratic agencies, as it should be clear by now, casts a long shadow on the restoration project when the latter is seen through the lens of an antagonistic or opinionated local history. I take it to reflect a broader shift and trajectory in society, which widens the gap between those who rely on the state's safety net and those who participate fully and wholeheartedly in a full-blown consumer society. The restoration project and tenancy condition of the Old Town enforced the poor residents to turn to state control when the market took over from where the oppressive-based mechanisms of official discourses and the cognitive, territorial and nationalized trap of the Greek state left off. The poor residents who opposed and fought restoration and were unable to restore their houses, however schematic and improvised this may sound, occupy in the aesthetic social space of the Old Town a territory (not only material/physical but also cognitive/mental with respect to how they perceive of the restoration) that calls for increasing state protection. The essential and strategic difference, therefore, between the two periods marked by the changing reception of the restoration project, can be considered fundamentally as a symptom of the dedifferentiation and blurring between state derived policies of charting the city and private/consumer means of classification and stratification. Whilst in the anti-interventionist period the poor residents still had a

role, the latter has been irretrievably lost once the market turned the residents into some redundant, useless and undeserving social beings. The state having monumentalized the Old Town through cognitive spacing, appears to be now willing to surrender the town to the seductive power and practices of aesthetic spacing, even if repression is always ready to deploy its totalitarian and oppressive mechanisms for all those who do not fit in the market-based enclaves, for it is only, “the seduced of society [who] need not fear the stick of repression, insofar as they willingly accept the carrot of seduction” (Clarke and Bradford, 1998: 876).

The opposition of the Old Town’s residents to the mayor’s policies is an example, as was shown, of the changing significance of the roles of the state and the market. The experience of space and place in the wake of consumerism can help us, therefore, to reconsider and reconstruct our understanding of the proselytizing modern conception of the Old Town as a scheduled monument and traditional settlement, starting now to conceive of it as a consequence of cognitive spacing which was surreptitiously given over to the market. The unforeseeable turnaround of AROOT in 1994 and the increasing demand for state intervention, which took its full force only once the town had been fully and irreversibly flared up in the tourist market as a remarkable example of Venetian architecture, has come to complete the original cognitive spacing that charted the town in terms of its historical and monumental significance. The glaring marketization of the Old Town’s geohistory allowed, moreover, only a privileged minority to benefit from the project and even if most of the commercial streets that are currently occupied by the beautifully restored and converted houses were commercial in the past as well, the newly formed situation sees in the transformation of almost everything in the town an unexpected and unprecedented intensity that has hardly anything to do with the old Venetian Rethemnos. Understanding such an intense socio-spatial polarization between the highly coveted commercial and tourist spaces and a largely decaying and degrading housing zone, in line with the devices and Mobius bands of consumerism is useful I think, in that it allows to make sense of the tension between the two collided worlds, that of the repressed and that of the seduced. For as Bauman, wittingly sums it up, these two worlds sit, “at opposite poles, which are increasingly out of touch with each other – much as the no-go areas of contemporary cities are carefully fenced off and bypassed by the traffic lines used

for the mobility of the well-off residents” (Bauman, 1997: 25, cited in Clarke and Bradford, 1998: 876).

To that extent, the unprecedented commodification of the Old Town should be seen not only as the result of the conflictual histories of a place currently swept up by the commercial and globalized flows of capital, and some altered identities of non-poetic meanings that are viciously threatened by the nation-state ideology, but must be related to the interconnected processes of aesthetic and cognitive spacings en route from a period of anomie and illegal restorations to one of a full-blown consumer society that falls under the jurisdiction of a Venetian aesthetic. That not all residents were able to benefit from the restoration project is not probably a surprise. But that the brave new world of consumerism should be extremely uneven, polarized and unjust is a matter that deserves closer and acute scrutiny. AROOT’s recent interventionist turn illustrates exactly such a displacement in society and space advanced by consumerism. Having witnessed the emancipation of capital from labour, and the fact that capitalism necessitates the socialization of the masses, chiefly, as consumers rather than producers, the ability to intervene freely and restore a house is vital in sketching out the unevenly formed and socially polarized posturban landscape of Rethemnos. The original restoration of the Venetian properties that was partly funded by the state constituted a safety net for the poor but only to the extent that they were willing to carry on the required restoration works prescribed and engineered by the fierce and compulsory proselytizing cognitive charting and gardening of the city that the state administered. The marked contrast, therefore, between those who finally managed to rebuild their properties and the rest of the residents, who found themselves unable to make something of the *museumization* of the Old Town, intensifies not only the dichotomy between users and residents of the town, with the balance shifting from the latter to the former, but, above all, explicates how the socially excluded poor residents can be easily characterized as the ‘undeserving poor’, which is a highly moral accusation against all those who allegedly fail to respect, appreciate and understand the historical importance of Rethemnos, destroying its architectural heritage with their uncaring constructions. The restoration program intended, indeed, to protect the monumental character of the town, and yet it only managed to block every single intervention from the side of the poor as the highly demanding rebuilding prerequisites required not only the Archaeology Service’s

permission but different and more expensive materials than those normally used in properties that were not considered to be of architectural significance.

As I bring this peregrination to an end, attention should be also drawn to the fact that en route from the sociogenesis of consumerism, the splaying out of place and the cognitive/aesthetic/moral spacings to the ethnography of the event, the episodes sketched out above are only meant to offer an empirical and practical, so to speak, way of dealing with the Mediterranean city, which is currently in the middle of a new type of transition associated with the meaning of the postmodern. What is still required to take things further after grappling above and groping around with the irresistible forces and pressures of the consumer society is to locate in the middle of such a turmoil of exquisite alienation whether or not there is a truly generic and undecidable subject which will be *forced* to emerge alongside the transpearing events that are yet to come and which pertain to a truth procedure beyond the sedentary poetic of honourable subjects. Such an ambition however necessitates turning to the choreoethnographies of the event, and the affirmative, responsible, non-servile servility and undecidable subject that outwits shame, honour, poetics, womanhood and coffee-shop commensality. I have already attempted in Chapters 3 and 4 to deconstruct and set in motion such a Mediterraneanist identification by taking up on differential repetitions, becoming-woman, and counterfeit transactions. It remains, therefore, to affirm the generic multiplicity of the Mediterranean identity, which by being faithfully connected to the differential calculus of some undecidable events, creates a hole in the restoration and monumentalization knowledge by way of what Badiou's subtractive ontology calls *subject*. It is to this task that I, finally, turn, in order to attempt to draw a fuller picture of the subject which despite being submitted to the effective spacing of the cognitive/aesthetic confines, may still have a chance of happening.

CHAPTER NINE: THE CONTESTED IDENTIFICATION

9.1 Introduction

The point, therefore, is not to explain Rethemnos but to follow its actors, events and undecidable features that might affect or not, the Old Town problem. My intention was not, in other words, to prove that Rethemnos had been a historical type of problem that desperately needed or required that kind of explanation but that Rethemnos is not what you think. I got interested in Rethemnos, however, out of a purely theoretical interest; that is, from having read Michael Herzfeld's (1991) influential book, *A Place in History*. As an undergraduate student in the Department of Geography at the University of the Aegean in Mytilini, I had, moreover, had the chance to attend some of the seminars of the department of Anthropology, of which a great part, in a rather celebratory and enthusiastic manner, had been entirely devoted to Herzfeld's theory, which at the time had been extremely well received by Greek scholars. It still felt, however, that many parts of such a theory required considerable revision and reconsideration. First, because even when reading such a systematic attempt as Herzfeld's, seeking to undo the unequal power relations between the one who represents and the one who is represented, one still had the feeling (or at least I did) that there is something missing in his dense ethnographic accounts, and that the Greek identity was still represented as something relying on notions of lack, loss, and misery and in need of constant 'compassion', 'protection' and 'care'. And second, because, after having read Said's (1978) ground-breaking *Orientalism*, a cultural as much as a deeply geographical work, I understood that geography and space were, to say the least, poorly represented in Herzfeld's various ethnographic experiments.

Yet, as Peckham (1999: 167) has queried with respect to such an antagonistic space of representation of travel writing, "Was Greece European, Oriental or Balkan?" This was a constant problem I had come across while I was undertaking fieldwork in Rethemnos, not only because, for my part, I wanted to decode or specifically explicate how the flows of such interpenetrating identities had been mutually co-dependent, but also because, among the Rethemniots, there seemed to be little agreement on issues of recognizing preeminent differences on the basis of the social context within which they have come to grow. Greece, therefore, it seemed to me, had come to play a fundamentally key role in determining and further unpacking how the relationship

between East and West articulates, shaping the residents' attitudes toward the Greek state; and Rethemnos, moreover, within the context of Greece could bring into particularly sharp focus similar issues. Such was my place within the context of Rethemnos.

As Sandra Harding put it, in a rather programmatic form, there should be a distinction between 'perspective' and 'standpoint', with the latter being something more of a task or a right one had to earn, achieve or accomplish (2004: 604), rather than a point of view that could be unproblematically assigned to a certain solid and crystal identity. It is in a similar manner that my own understanding of what is 'Greek', 'Cretan/Rethemniot' and 'Mediterranean' would finally come to materialize. And Said (1978) too in his various responses to all those who criticized his work for misconstruing, essentializing or even totalizing the 'Orient' – interestingly there have been some critics who have accused him of doing the exact opposite – replied that the 'Orient' and the 'Occident' are not meant as empirical categories that correspond to certain, palpable, real or physical borders/boundaries, but involve mostly 'abstractions', having considerable material implications nevertheless, that merge with the imaginative geographies of inventing, producing and learning the 'Orient'. It is in a similar vein that the permutations between the 'Greek', the 'Rethemniot' and the 'Mediterranean' are played out below.

For Kant, however, in his *Critique of Pure Reason* truth is defined as the alliance between knowledge and its object. For Badiou, on the other hand, truth is the work of a subject which is faithfully connected to an event in a manner which breaks with the established order of things and the knowledge of a fully deployed situation. Chapters 3 and 4 endeavoured to show that Mediterraneanist identifications of shame, honour, friends of the heart and poetics, rely on dialectical schemata, rational epistemologies and digestive philosophies without changing one iota in the mind that contemplates them. This is why I pursued a differential conception of repetition, the counterfeit and becoming-woman paving the way for a differential theory of the subject that deconstructs and sets in motion the romantic and nostalgic Mediterraneanist subjectivities. Such a discussion, however, is not complete unless a fuller theorization of what matters to subjects is further taken up, for simply by arguing that differences matter, does not avoid a simplistic relativism (different ideas mean different things to

different people), whereas differences should be true or should not be differences at all. On the face of such an intuition, Badiou's theorization is particularly useful in that it allows grasping what a subject amounts to and whether or not it deserves such a name without categorizing, discerning or associating it with unity, identity or substance.

In previous chapters I have also set out to map the subject in accord with the blocks of becoming, the haecceities and the singularities by way of Deleuze's and Guattari's schizophrenic machines, rather than by drawing on Mediterraneanist representations and meanings. Blocks of becomings however, are not merely discursive practices but constitute multifarious projections of one's ability to draw lines of flight of affirmative transfiguration, beyond the illusory stability of identity. The subject, as was shown, in schizoanalysis is affirmative and differential "implying other forms of expression than those of myth" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 237). Building on this discussion I now want to propose that the deconstructive and affirmative ex-appropriation of the almost absolute proximity of the event is useful in that it can help us to come to terms with a) the non-identity that holds beyond the notorious Mediterranean atomism/egoism – which is an integral part of the discourses and values of shame-and-honour – once an affirmative responsibility is taken seriously b) a subject which is, purely and simply, work in progress beyond the alleged 'servility' and dependency on tourism, and that the distinction between the innocent period (of non-servility) and a post-poetic period (of servility) amounts to an interruption-without-interruption; and c) that truth, which is what the Rethemniot subject follows, is ambivalent, indiscernible and undecidable once however difference is written on hollow ground, that is once "*we understand it otherwise*" (Lyotard, 1993: 51), without picking or clinging on the certainties, identifications and strictures of shame, honour and poetics.

I could still pursue the mapping of the subject in line with Deleuze's becoming, or Derrida's affirmative deconstruction. I prefer hereinafter to open up identity to Badiou's subtractive ontology. While deconstruction, schizoanalysis, and the BwO affirm difference, there is still a need to determine, but without naming, point, but without categorizing, and identify, but without establishing an identity, the difference that matters to subjects and what makes space for a truth procedure on the side of

which the subject may be found to rest. What matters is not some naïve perception of difference (as was shown by way of many Mediterraneanist occasions in previous chapters) but rather a *truth* which is a procedure that opens up a hole in the knowledge of a fully deployed historical situation. Truth, on the other hand, is possible due to an intervention which remains faithfully connected to a generic multiple and the post-evental occurrences of some unanticipated events. In order to make sense of the subject thus one needs to map the traces that such a truth procedure leaves behind. Put differently, an event occurs, when is named by an intervention and once the subject declares its fidelity to it. Events, according to Badiou, occur in historical situations (love, art, science and politics) and the role of philosophy is to make sense of such conditions, despite the fact that philosophy itself does not chime up, necessarily, with or generates truth procedures.

What the ethnography of the event allows, in other words, is to open up new ways in getting to grips with truth procedures that unfold Rethemnos' identity without wounding or maiming the undecidability, indiscernibility and ambivalence of its manifold and differential calculi of experiences. And yet while Deleuze argues that Badiou's thought is analogical in that it discovers the meaning and means of philosophy outside philosophy – in the historical situations mentioned above – Badiou counterclaims that set theory (the theory of being) is not mystical in that it does not take being as presence, which has to be constantly postponed – a point which also applies to Derrida's deconstruction of metaphysics. Deleuze's and Derrida's works are useful in that they deconstruct but without destroying an already existent body of work – a movement which I have already demonstrated, explained and executed in relation to shame, honour, poetics and friendship – by inhabiting a certain structure from within, destabilizing – not without care – a holding formation on the move, by setting in motion and loosening what appears to be solid, durable and stable, and by rendering apparent what the structure conceals or attempts to hide. It could be argued, accordingly, that Badiou takes up exactly from where Deleuze's and Derrida's becomings and supplements withdraw and hold back, explicating the reinscription of a depersonalized and deindividuated difference on its way back from Mediterraneanism, in an attempt to de-consist the true difference that matters to the Rethemniot subject. The ethnography of the event offers, in short, a chance of grappling with truth procedures by unpacking how innumerable and unnameable

events mark the inconsistent multiplicities that compose the Rethemniot identity. It is through the lens of such a driftwork, based on mathematical ontology and set theory that I set out to map the Rethemniot subject.

Hereinafter, events are neither simply discursive nor immaterial but follow the ethic of becoming-otherwise, sliding past each other as incomprehensible and strange occurrences whose potential remains to be actualized in manifold yet unknown and infinite manners. As was already shown in Chapter 2, Badiou's mathematical ontology includes among other things, the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the matheme of the indiscernible. It is on the basis of these formulas that I will pursue the Rethemniot multiplicity materializing another understanding of difference. But even if the present thesis is not about mathematics, it is still felt that since Badiou's analysis rests heavily on mathematics in order to establish what is-not-being-qua-being, a considerable part of the present exposition should be devoted to the formal logic taken up by Badiou.

The aleatory Rethemniot subject-event will not be defined or decided, but will still have a chance of happening by way of the axioms of set theory in-consisting in what a pure multiple *is*. Set theory can help us to think of being by hinting at the event without, however, naming it for every time the event is explicitly defined, its difference falls under the jurisdiction of the One and the One *is not* according to Badiou; for the task of subtractive ontology is to subtract from all possible forms of Oneness. What *is*, therefore, is always a multiple of multiples, a set of sets, presentation of presentation, in short, pure inconsistent multiplicity. This is why axiomatization is required such as to affirm "the multiple left to the implicitness of its counting rule, be delivered without concept, that is, without implying the being-of-the-one" (Badiou, 2005: 43).

Badiou's theory should be, carefully, therefore, unfolded below in accord especially to the ontological language of the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice, and the matheme of the indiscernible, which are not the only formulas on which Badiou draws, but constitute, as will be explained below, the cornerstone of his entire ontology. Such a theorization, I shall try to demonstrate, resonates, moreover, with the philosophical language of affirmative responsibility, the non-servile servility and the

ambivalent/undecidable multiplicity to whose stimulating effects I will submit the Rethemniot subject. I am not saying that Derrida's and Deleuze's work should be, necessarily, reconciled with Badiou's set theory, but what I am proposing to encounter is whether or not there is something useful in the deconstruction of Mediterraneanism, which can be further disseminated by the de-coupling of being and event, once however the mathematical threads of Badiou's performances are pulled together by way of the thrust of a generic and undecidable truth.

And thus Badiou's subtractive ontology opens up the Rethemniot subject to affirmation/responsibility (the ultra-one), non-servile-servility (the intervention), and the indiscernible (the undecidable). I offer a separate account of each of the above cognitions and demonstrate how each one of them can be grounded in the philosophical language of difference with respect to the theory already deployed in terms of the deconstruction of Mediterraneanism. I equip, moreover, such a writing of difference with a three-fold choreoethnography on the basis of the following occurrences that reflect and irradiate my own experience of Rethemnos: the liar-episode/advice episode, the non-servile servility episode and the discount episode. There is still a need, thereby, to offer a more sustained account of Badiou's philosophy, not only because it is by recourse to his ontology that the Rethemniot subject should be unfolded, but most importantly, because it is such a theorization that will point in the direction of the differences that truly matter to the Mediterranean subjects beyond any poetic fashion.

9.2 Alain Badiou: A Symptom of Difference

Badiou argues that being is multiple and cannot be thought of outside presentation for "the one *is not*" (Badiou, 2005: 23) and thus the ontological situation is the presentation of presentation (Badiou, 2005: 27). It is Cantor's set theory that managed to provide "a theory of the multiple as the general form of the presentation of being" (Badiou, 2005: 42). Set theory is chiefly structured on the basis of relations of *belonging* (written \in); everything is a multiple of multiples or a set of sets. Ontology, by implication, that is, the science of being qua being, begins from void, from a multiple of nothing (written \emptyset , the proper name of being) for if there were a multiple

of something that would have to be the one and the one according to Badiou's ontology *is not*.

A multiple, however, can be thought of not only in terms of *belonging* but also in terms of *inclusion*. The difference between the two is of paramount importance and concerns two ways of counting the multiple and not two different ways of thinking the multiple (Badiou, 2005: 83). In rough terms, inclusion is the second count, that is, a metastructure in that it gathers together all the sub-multiples of the original multiple, while belonging comprises the first count, in that it counts the original, so to speak, presentation – the presented multiples. The difference between belonging and inclusion lies in that the former counts the presentation of being, while the latter counts representation. I will return to the difference between inclusion and belonging in due course. Suffice it to say, for the moment that belonging and inclusion mark the impasse of being, exactly because belonging is still what counts the multiples of a situation, whereas inclusion is what counts the sub-sets of the multiple by way of which there is always something excessive; sub-sets, for example, do not have, necessarily, to belong to the situation. In other words the count of the state, the metastructure and representation are on the side of inclusion, while structure, representation and elements are on the side of belonging. As we will see below, it is such a gap between the two counts that makes an intervention possible, which comes down to saying that makes a subject possible. This is because the multiple of subsets is, essentially, larger than the initial set and the elements that belong to it. In Badiou's words "The non-coincidence of inclusion and belonging signifies that there is an excess of inclusion over belonging; that it is impossible that every part of a multiple belongs to it" (Badiou, 2005: 89). What is crucial to note in the very schematic exposition of being above, is that certain sub-multiples that are included in a situation do not, necessarily, belong to it. Although Badiou's ontology comes to terms with being and event (that which-is-not-being-qua-being), in what follows, I do not take up, at least in any direct manner, on any of the detailed analysis of being, but focus instead on the event – even if this is tremendously difficult, not least because it may not be methodologically or even philosophically proper to isolate, locate or pin down such a break in Badiou's theory. Such a decision, however, is useful for the purposes and scope of the current argument in that the event in the manner presented below

constitutes a means to an end, that is, it seeks to trace the truth-procedure on the side of which the Rethemniot subject will come to reside.

For an event to exist, however, an evental site is necessary. The evental site is a “multiple such that none of its elements are presented in the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 175). The difference between a historical situation and a natural situation lies exactly in the fact that in historical situations an evental site may occur (Badiou, 2005: 177). An event nonetheless is possible only by way of some kind of intervention which can be locally determined and thus an evental site, while being a condition of the event, does not immediately possesses or impregnates an event. An event, moreover, is composed of elements of the site and the signification of itself, yet whether an event belongs to a situation remains deeply undecided. As Badiou (2005: 181) put it “only an *interpretative intervention* can decide that an event *is* presented in a situation; as the arrival in being of non-being, the arrival amidst the visible of the invisible”. And thus if the event belongs to the situation, it “is separated from the void by itself. This is what we will call being ‘ultra-one’” (Badiou, 2005: 182); if it does not belong to the situation then “nothing has taken place except the place” (Badiou, 2005: 182). At this juncture, one may be tempted to ask whether there is a being of the event. Is, in other words, the being of the event possible?

The axiom of foundation, as Badiou demonstrates, prohibits being’s event. What the axiom of foundation states is that there is a halting point in being and that even if presentation is infinite, being “is always marked by finitude, *when it comes to its origin*” (Badiou, 2005: 187). Such a mathematical formulation permits, in other words, that a historical situation can be founded and based on a multiple as long as it is not void. A non-void multiple is what makes a historical situation possible or what allows it to be founded blocking the infinite regression of being. In Badiou’s wording “Deciding that [an event] belongs to the situation is a wager: one can only hope that his wager never becomes legitimate inasmuch as any legitimacy refers back to the structure of the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 201). By implication, then, what is termed intervention is “any procedure by which a multiple is recognized as an event”. Recognition would mean, however, both recognition of the event and deciding over its belonging. Yet if both these conditions were satisfied the event would be annulled. It is exactly such a condition that prompts Badiou (2005: 209) to argue that “An

intervention is what presents an event for the occurrence of another. It is an evental between-two". This is why there is probably no original or radical beginning, for "the intervention is a line drawn from one paradoxical multiple, which is already circulating, to the circulation of another, a line which scratches out. It is a *diagonal* of the first" (Badiou, 2005: 210).

Badiou puts at the service of intervention the axiom of choice. Ontology in itself is not able to think of truth, but it can think the being of truth. "In its final form it posits that given a multiple of multiples, there *exists* a multiple composed of a 'representative' of each non-void multiple whose presentation is assured by the first multiple" (Badiou, 2005: 224). I will have the chance to return to the above formulas in subsequent sections with respect to the choreoethnography of an interruption-without-interruption and the non-servile servility of the Rethemniot identification. Suffice it to note for the moment, that the axiom of choice 'chooses' without actually saying anything about whether there is a rule of how to choose. It does not inscribe, in other words, a rule of choice. What follows is what Badiou calls fidelity, that is, "the set of procedures which discern, within a situation those multiples whose existence depends upon the introduction into circulation (under the supernumerary name conferred by an intervention) of an evental multiple" (Badiou, 2005: 232). But it should be noted at the outset that there is no general type of fidelity, for "Fidelity is a functional relation to the event" (Badiou, 2005: 233). And as Badiou observes, "the closer a fidelity comes, via its operator to the ontological connections – belonging and inclusion, presentation and representation, \in and C – the more statist it is" (Badiou, 2005: 237). Accordingly, *spontaneist* is a fidelity that demands those who invented the event to be the only ones taking part in it; *dogmatic* is a fidelity that demands every multiple to depend on the event; and *generic* is a fidelity that is not assigned to a defined function of the state of the situation.

As mentioned already, in order to decode the process through which a possible Rethemniot subject will come to blossom, I will be focusing on those aspects of identity that fly from egoism and agonistic poetics in favour of an affirmative responsibility; I will be also stretching the need to conceiving of a non-servile servility beyond the submission/servility allegations; and I will incline toward the

suffusion of an indiscernible and undecidable subject that outwits the imagination of a totally complete Mediterranean identity. Such a theorization will make sense when brushed against the mathematical ontologies of the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the matheme of the indiscernible, which in turn will be put at the service of the following episodes from the field: the liar-episode/advice-episode, the non-servile servility, and the discount-episode. I have already argued that in Badiou's theory the one is not, that mathematics is ontology, that being is multiple, void, infinite, and excessive and that that which is not-being-qua-being is the event founded by an intervention to which a subject declares its fidelity through forcing, by affirming the new that happens in being. What is required to take things further is to understand how the indiscernible works in Badiou's ontology, hoping that such a strategy will make it possible to point in the direction of a Rethemniot subject without name, identity, unity, sufficiency and integrity.

The generic multiple, which as Badiou admits constitutes one of the most significant parts of his philosophy, allows ontology to think of the undecidable. Its meaning, however, necessitates further unpacking. Fidelity, as was mentioned above, marks and refers to the manner in which an event named after an intervention, is connected to a multiple. Yet a situation knows nothing of the event. What Badiou terms *veridical* is a situation which is answerable by knowledge, while *truth*, by contrast, is a process, which is related to the event and the intervention – and cannot be discerned or acknowledged by the situation (Badiou, 2005: 332). Knowledge thus has nothing to do with truth. For “A truth (if it exists) must be an infinite part of the situation, because for every finite part one can always say that it has *already* been discerned and classified by knowledge” (Badiou, 2005: 333). What truth manages to do, in other words, is group together “*all the terms of the situation which are positively connected to an event*” (Badiou, 2005: 335). Put differently, if there are multiples connected to an event that are not already determined by the language of the situation, and thus multiples that are unclassifiable and un-assignable to knowledge, then “truth would be irreducible to veridicity” (Badiou, 2005: 338). And thus what is inscribed by a generic truth in a situation is the indiscernible, for even if the discernible, as Badiou argues, is verified, the indiscernible is true (Badiou, 2005: 339). “Of course” as Badiou points out “mathematics cannot think a procedure of truth, because mathematics eliminates the event. But it can decide whether it is compatible with ontology that there be

truths” (Badiou, 2005: 341). Again it can get extremely difficult to follow Badiou’s following of Cohen’s strategy in construing the matheme of the indiscernible. I shall return to the above in a subsequent section by way of the choreoethnographies of Rethemnos. Suffice it to underline for the moment that an indiscernible exists, once a generic procedure, which is included in a situation is forced by a subject to form in a situation to come the true and to which the indiscernible will, from now on, belong (Badiou, 2005: 342). I am now in a position to map how the three planes of difference mentioned above (plane 1: affirmative/responsible multiplicity, interruption-without-interruption, undecidable; plane 2: axiom of foundation, axiom of choice, and matheme of the indiscernible; and plane 3: liar-episode/advice-episode, non-servile servility, and discount-episode) unfold, extend and expand over and onto each other.

To recap, Badiou’s philosophy declares first by way of being, that the one is not, and that being is multiple, infinite, natural, excessive and void; and second by way of event, that the event is not-being-qua-being, prohibiting being’s event (axiom of foundation), while choosing without inscribing a rule of choice (the axiom of choice) by affirming a diagonal intervallic intervention between events and by finally, asserting that a generic multiple will be true for a subject, once it is forced – from a situation within which is included – to form in situation to come a true subject, remaining, however, crucially indiscernible and thus marking in that way the non-place and non-being of the undecidable. I shall argue, accordingly, that by scrutinizing the relationships and interconnections between the three planes of difference mentioned above, will make it possible to de-consist what the true identity of the Rethemniot subject *is* – beyond shame, honour, poetics, spontaneity, friends of the heart, and poetics of womanhood.

The affirmative/responsible subject whose inconsistency is implied by the axiom of *foundation* stipulates that beyond shame, honour and poetics there is always the ultra-one of an original Two. Badiou’s take on set theory, as was already shown, acknowledges that it is “necessary to abandon all hope of explicitly defining the notion of set” (Badiou, 2005: 43). As Badiou (2005: 45) put it “*the theory indicates, without definition, that it does not speak of the one*, and that all *that* it presents, in the implicitness of its rules, is multiple”. I decided to unpack the affirmative and responsible subject with respect to the axiom of foundation, because it is in there that the event starts in-consisting. The axiom of foundation states that “within an existing

one-multiple, there always exists a multiple presented by it such that this multiple is on the edge of the void relative to the initial multiple” (Badiou, 2005: 185). Formulaically,

“given any existing multiple whatsoever (thus a multiple counted as one in accordance with the Ideas of the multiple and the existence of the name of the void), there always belongs to it – if, of course, it is not the name of the void itself in which case nothing would belong to it – a multiple on the edge of the void within the presentation that it is. In other words: every non-void multiple contains some Other” (Badiou, 2005: 186).

The belonging of the event to the situation, as was mentioned, is undecidable. Foundation, however, insists that for every sentiment, word or discourse that implies honour, shame or poeticity, there is always an affirmative and responsible subject that gives considerable pause to the infinite regression of being. It is worth remembering with Badiou (2005: 180) again that “The event is [...] clearly the multiple which both presents its entire site, and, by means of the pure signifier of itself immanent to its own multiple, manages to present the presentation itself, that is, the one of the infinite multiple that it is”. The undecidability of the ultra-one thus is marked, precisely, by the uncertainty of the event’s belonging to the situation, which works as a “double function” (Badiou, 2005: 182). Foundation affirms that every multiple contains and necessitates its other and that beyond or underneath the usual characteristics of the cartography of the Mediterranean personality – shame, honour, poetics etc. – there is always an affirmative and responsible other, which takes flight from the stability, illusory fixity and pointillism of identity. To put it in a nutshell, an event is founded “inasmuch as a multiple always belongs to it which is Other than it” (Badiou, 2005: 186). To that extent the Rethemniot subject inconsistencies in the Two of affirmation and responsibility attaining to the fact that “every existent multiple – besides the name of the void – occurs according to an immanent origin, positioned by the Others which belong to it” (Badiou, 2005: 187). I will have the chance to unfold the axiom of foundation by recourse to the liar-episode and the advice-episode. Let us turn, for the moment, to the non-servile servility that unsettles and undoes the Mediterraneanist suspicion of a servile subject that has allegedly lost its poetic affiliations and has been submitted to the devastated effects of tourism, commodification, corruption, and usurpation.

The difference of such a non-servile servility resonates with what was termed on another occasion an ‘interruption-without-interruption’ (Doel, 1992). I have suggested in Chapter 4, that the subject is always already cracked open, fractured and split and that the question should not be about a docile servant that depends on tourist capital as the poetic model zealously strives to forge by means of informal history. The ontological language on the basis of which the non-servile servility, of which the subject is only a part, can be exemplified, is the axiom of *choice*. Programmatically, the axiom of choice,

“In its final form posits that given a multiple of multiples, there *exists* a multiple composed of *a* ‘representative’ of each non-void multiple whose presentation is assured by the first multiple. In other words one can ‘choose’ an element from each of the multiples which make up a multiple, and one can ‘gather together’ these chosen elements: the multiple obtained in such a manner is consistent, which is to say it exists” (Badiou, 2005: 224).

To put it in a rather formulaic manner as Badiou avers, choice guarantees, “the existence of a set γ composed of a representative of each non-void element of α ” (Badiou, 2005: 224). Yet what such a formula does is simply to stretch the existence of a set of choice, without naming or pinpointing which set is about, and in that way it undoes the allegations over the assumed servility of the Mediterranean subject. Mediterraneanist writings, recall, have claimed that the immense tourist development forced the Rethemniots to abandon their original values and morals, losing all pride and seeking only to make money – ‘we sold our soul to the devil for money’ as an old Rethemniot told me once, expressing his anger against the monumentalization of the town. Yet it is one thing to unfold the meaning and theorize the way in which Rethemnos’ public spaces are transformed and face a rapidly commodified capitalist landscape which is now subject to the logic of the market, and completely another to produce a sort of poetic history that attacks the alleged subjection of local history to tourism and consumption, arguing over some unobtrusive poetic quality which gets involuntarily distorted by an exoteric evil. Put bluntly, usurpation has already begun in Rethemnos and what choice facilitates is a fuller appreciation of the fact that there is no clear-cut boundary between a period of poetic pride and a period of servility and that pride is relentlessly and always already interrupted by the almost absolute proximity of servility, but without actually being interrupted in a linear, chronological

or hierarchical sense, to the extent that both moments are imbricated with and hugely implicated into each other. Thus whilst Mediterraneanist writings seem to be keen to totally separate and distinguish between a poetic period and a period of corrupted Cretan ideals, for my part I propose that corruption and innocence, and servility and non-servility involve irreducible disjoined conjunctures and thus the unprecedented commodification of the Old Town's geohistory need no longer be a problem of choice. For as Badiou has it in terms of such infinite sets "there is something *undellegatable*" (Badiou, 2005: 225) about them.

A non-servile servility is, exactly, the impossibility of choosing between a non servile/poetic period and a corrupted period of mass tourism, which is exactly what the axiom of choice affirms; that is, the existence of a choice-multiple, which without having to choose between a servile period and a non-servile period acknowledges simply that some interventions may *take place*. The existence of the choice-multiple affirms, in other words, the non-inscription of a rule of choice, the unnameable of a delegate and the non-existence of a law of presentation. Having briefly unfolded the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the manner in which these formulas correspond with the affirmative, responsible and non-servile subjectivations, it is time to turn to the matheme of the *indiscernible* and the generic multiple and infinite truth of the non-place and non-being of an undecidable other.

Being indiscernible means that in a situation certain multiples exist that are positively connected to an event and thus are not classified from the standpoint of the encyclopaedia (Badiou, 2005: 336). The indiscernible of truth is not about truth, however, but about the being of truth (Badiou, 2005: 355). Ontology, which is mathematics, is compatible with the being of the indiscernible due to Paul Cohen's work on the continuum hypothesis, of which some of the basic components will be now briefly sketched out. In the quasi-complete situation one constructs names for all multiples and for the indiscernible as well, but without knowing which the indiscernible *is*. A general set of conditions for the indiscernible would involve "a multiple π of the fundamental situation S which is destined to belong to the indiscernible (the function of material) and whatever the case may be, to transmit some 'information' about this indiscernible (which will be a part of the situation S)" (Badiou, 2005: 362). Such a set of conditions, according to Badiou following of

Cohen's thought, is dominated by the principle of information and the principle of compatibility. Without getting into formal logic, a set of conditions would be dominated by the materiality of the indiscernible, the existence of more precise conditions than the ones we already know, the coherency which is required to describe the indiscernible, and the fact that there are real choices in describing the indiscernible (Badiou, 2005: 365). A correct set of conditions, in addition, aims at a correct part (δ) of a set \odot of conditions, but if a correct part δ is discerned by a property λ and obeys Rd_1 and Rd_2 (which are rules of conditions), for every element of δ (every $\pi_1 \in \delta$), two incompatible conditions π_2 and π_3 exist. As Rd_2 prohibits both π_2 and π_3 from belonging to the same correct part δ , one of them should not belong to it. Let us call this π_2 ; δ accordingly will be dominated by a condition π_2 such that $\sim\lambda(\pi_2)$. *Domination* consequently, is "a set of conditions such that any condition outside the domination is dominated by at least one condition inside the domination" (Badiou, 2005: 369). And hence the capital definition of the indiscernible: "*a correct set φ will be generic for S if, for any domination D which belongs to S we have $D \cap \varphi \neq \emptyset$* " (Badiou, 2005: 370).

Cohen's continuum hypothesis, which is what the theorem above vaguely drew upon, in a manner which shall require more coherent explanation, is taken up in more detail in a subsequent section. It deserves to be mentioned though that the manner in which this formula is used is strictly operational, that is, it makes sense in accord with the three planes of difference mentioned above and with reference to the construction of the argument pursued in the present chapter along with the overall scope and aim of the present thesis. Suffice it to note for the moment, that the indiscernible points to the undecidable on condition that such an undecidable subject is always on the side of a generic truth. Put differently, the undecidable Rethemniot individual and the discount-episode to which this truth corresponds owe their existence to a generic multiple that rests on the plane of the indiscernible and can be relayed by what Cohen's mathematical formula above dis-allows.

Having laboured a means to map and unfold the vicissitudes of the Rethemniot subject, it is time to unpack the interleavings and permutations between the three planes of difference and the interconnections and implications of the various multiples

that inhabit each plane. As was already suggested, once such a truth procedure is revealed it will become possible to tell the difference that matters to subjects when truth is at stake. The various aspects of the identity process I am about to map, do not necessarily constitute facets of the same individual or characteristics of a person's behaviour, but form instead folds that compose and orchestrate the lines drawn out by a subject once truth is called forth. The reader therefore, will be probably disappointed if he/she thinks that by way of such a procedure the present thesis will finally pinpoint or associate an individual with a specific, solid or constant identity. I would have hoped, at least, to be able to show how ontology makes space for such a differential subjectivation that despite being confined to the effective spacing of consumption and the restoration project, will still have a chance of telling the truth.

9.3 Affirmation/Responsibility: Axiom of Foundation – Liar-Episode/Advice-Episode

Mediterraneanist accounts of difference, whether discourses and values of shame-and-honour or the poetic model assert that the poetic ability of the subject is linked to some atomistic/egoistic drives of a Mediterranean psyche that seeks to exhibit excellence. What matters to the poetic model, in other words is not an action or a deed, but the verbal rhetoric put forward or being at the service of it in order to explain how and why the duty was carried out. I argued in Chapters 3 and 4 that poststructuralist accounts of difference – differential repetitions, the counterfeit, becoming-woman and the hauntology of use-value – insist on the subject's countless and infinite voyages in place that are not about the return of a poetic person but about a subjectivation process slightly phased. The joy, *ala* Lyotard, of multiplicity, affirmative ex-appropriation and differentiation of such differences are far beyond the integrity of the Mediterranean values of shame, honour and poetics, which are fraught with various sorts of pointillist obsessions failing to think the innumerable spectra and experiments of difference or to decide from the side of the undecidable. The twists and turns of the dialectic and the poetic model, I have argued, in-appropriate, un-become and betray difference according to a digestive logic that yearns for accommodation and identity by means of a solid, fixed, integral and representational aspiration. Mapping the trajectory of the Rethemniot multiplicity beyond shame, honour and poetics, and in line with Badiou's strategy that subtracts from the Oneness

of a fully deployed situation, means not so much to destroy the Mediterranean identities, but rather to invent, intervene and reverse in the middle of things, lending consistency to an affirmative and responsible subject, and setting in motion and destabilizing the domestication of servility.

The axiom of foundation allows to think of a historical ground – responsibility, affirmation – on which when a subject is founded, will manage to remain affirmative and asymmetrical and not closed in on itself like honour, shame and poeicity. A foundational responsibility is both affirmative, in that it is excessive and asymmetrical, and mathematical, in that it resonates precisely for this reason, with Badiou's axiom of foundation. Now, as we have already seen, foundation states that "given any existing multiple whatsoever [...] there always belongs to it a multiple on the edge of the void within the presentation that it is. In other words: every non-void multiple contains some Other" (Badiou, 2005: 186). This is because "The axiom of foundation is the ontological proposition which states that every existent multiple – besides the name of the void – occurs according to an immanent origin, positioned by the Others which belong to it" (Badiou, 2005: 187). What is more, foundation brings "forth that-which-is-not-being-qua-being as a point of impossibility of the discourse on being-qua-being, and it exhibits its signifying emblem: the multiple such as it presents itself, in the brilliance, in which being is abolished, of the mark-of-one" (Badiou, 2005: 190). For if there were a being of the event, it would not necessitate an Other and thus the event would be formalized by the void. Yet according to the axiom of foundation, a set a , should have an element $\{a\}$ whose intersection with a , must not be the void. And thus if being is void (the definition of being in terms of set theory) and the event is composed of elements of its site and itself (the definition of event), there is no formal language of the event. In other words, being is multiple and void whereas the axiom of foundation founds otherness inasmuch as a multiple is not void and by that prevents the eventness of being or assigns to being the prohibition of event.

An affirmative/responsible multiplicity in the light of the above should be, therefore, both foundational (historical and relative) and what goes beyond the void. It should not be represented, calculable, or counted as Lyotard (1993) promulgated, but at the same time, it should be locally determined blocking the infinite regression of being.

The affirmative and responsible other involves an unanticipated and unexpected multiplicity to the extent, of course, that “responsibility is excessive or it is not responsibility” (Derrida, 1995: 286). What the foundational non-void Other in Rethemnos is pure *indecision* – and certainly not the decision of shame, honour or poetics. For “Indecision happens. One grapples with indecision” (Derrida, 1995: 146). This is why it “will always keep within it, and it must do so, this absolutely undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological relation to the to-come of an event and of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated” (Derrida, 1994: 65). Let us further illustrate the above theorization with the following image from the field in an attempt to open up the undecidable Rethemniot subject to a procedure on whose generic truth the subject would be, hopefully, forced, to be faithful.

Once, in the Street of Souliou a shopkeeper was accusing the shopkeepers trading in the street of Arabatzoglou – which is a very popular street at the historical centre of the Old Town – of being ‘liars’. The shopkeeper insisted that the Arabatzoglou shopkeepers ‘pretended not to have customers’ when the case was, in his estimations, the opposite. The complaint did not exclusively involve a moral concern. It was of a pragmatic origin, a general statement about the current situation and the small numbers of visitors that have recently arrived on Rethemnos. The shopkeeper meant that ‘if these people trading in the street of Arabatzoglou complain about the current situation then imagine how bad things are’. The Street of Arabatzoglou is one of the most commercial streets in the Old Town and the tourists that come and go, more often than not, are attracted not so much by the shops but mostly because of the picturesque beauty of the area. To the extent that commercial relations are highly antagonistic and competitive, one should not foreclose the possibility that the statement was made in order to ‘trick’ the Souliou shopkeepers. Yet, the fact remains that the ‘liar accusation’ questions an established state of affairs – the fact that the Arabatzoglou shopkeepers do not attract as many customers as they used to attract in the past. On the other hand, such a statement does not deny the fact that tourists are fewer nowadays. And still one cannot tell whether the liar-episode is a lie or not. For one thing, because it can be determined only locally but was rendered explicit when I overheard it; and yet for another, in that its status is, purely and simply, undecidable inasmuch as one cannot say whether such an accusation, ‘of being liars’, is a lie or

not; and whether it was expected to remain within a restricted social circle, or was meant to be heard; and whether it referred to the shopkeepers or to the fact that tourists are now fewer.

The aporia and Twoness of Badiou's event is now imperceptibly given over to the undecidable depiction of the above incident without necessarily inclining toward the poetic negativity and rhetorical performances of excellence as depicted by Mediterraneanist imaginations. En route from affirmation to responsibility, a careful unfolding of the liar accusation on the back of the theorization of the event is now possible. Affirmation and responsibility constitute processes that hold for a genuine Twoness at the heart of the ultra-one, which is what belongs to the situation and counts itself twice, once as a presented multiple and once as a multiple presented in its own presentation. And thus, while "on the one hand, the subject is a figure of universalization [...] the place to which all human traits indexically refer and defer (I am – subject)" (Doel, 1995: 230) – I am a shopkeeper, in a bad economic situation as the tourists do not spend as much as they used to spend or do not visit as often as they did in the past – on the other hand, "the subject is also a figure of individuation in so far as it can only express itself through bodies and faces" (Doel, 1995: 230). I argue that the liar accusation is a trace of a suspended deindividuation – between these two moments of universalization and singularization – affirming the contested and undecidable nature of the complaint on tourism rather than disclosing a latent poetics. The event, above all, is a space of general relativity affirming the differend of the crisis of tourism (*Is it happening?*) (Lyotard, 1988). The liar-episode is neither poetic, nor honorific but purely differential and affirmative; neither a negative conception of identity nor a positive identification; neither reactionary, nor revolutionary as the forced and illusory stabilizations of poeticity, honour and shame assume or expect from the subject; rather it comprises a double bind, which "affirms the destabilization on the move which Opens (the place of) the subject to that which is wholly Other" (Doel, 1995: 234). Seen through the lens of affirmation, therefore, the liar accusation ought not to be considered in a poetic fashion.

One could probably complain that I am probably producing a whole story out of something that needs no further ado or much thinking (the residents' relationships are complex and contested). However, it is my conviction that philosophy is exactly about

producing something where lay or popular knowledge sees nothing. Hence, such an episode converges with another occurrence, once I was buying cigars from a shop in the Old Town, and the tobacco salesman informed me that the brand I was looking for was available at a shop near the Lozza building. To argue that the information given to me is an equivalent of altruism substituting for an irreducible or pure friendship (of the heart), hospitality and the rest of the Mediterranean values and discourses is one of the possible ways to interpret it. It can be unfolded however, in an altogether differential manner. The relationships among the residents are never crystallized and tied down, as was shown in terms of the liar accusation above, but are instead perpetually kept under suspense, movement and threat, without being simply agonistic or poetic. Such experimental, inventive, conditional, interdependent, indeterminate and undecidable relationships, involve always work-in-progress resisting the forced stabilization and identification policies of integrative poetics. The information given to me in the light of this, is I propose a matter of responsibility, which is infinitely open allowing for something else to come to pass.

Agonistic poetics and hospitable subjects, is not the only way to theorize what is going on among the Rethemniots. Every now and then, the two-fold of affirmation and responsibility interrupt, intervene and block the grid of the rigid lines of poeticity taking flight from the doctrines of any historical situation. The Rethemniot chaosmotic subjectivity is neither about honour nor about shame but, primarily, about a 'way of being' through which the undecidability of an event holds sway. An affirmative responsibility, which I argue should replace the gist of poetics and hospitality, resonates with a multiple which is "both a work-in-progress and a social apparatus, undergoing the continuous variation of Becoming-Other through a motionless voyaging in place. It is therefore both nomadic (without home or refuge) and rhizomatic (without roots or anchorage). In short the subject endures through the continuous variation of ex-appropriation and Becoming-Other. Schizoanalysis" (Doel, 1995: 235). Affirmation and responsibility splay out solidarity, egoism, honour, shame and enmity through a stuttering and interminable difference-producing repetition that knows only of experimentation and unintelligibility. It is not for nothing, therefore, that I argue that the subject leaks in all possible directions – liar, friend, but also poetics, excellence and rhetoric – and not only in terms of agonistic poetics and hospitable aspirations. For the ultra-one of Two is neither poetic nor

honorific, nor anti-poetic – that is a reactionary, negative, and destructive theorization – but pure becoming.

I have started to map the Rethemniot subject through the traces it leaves behind a truth procedure once a haptical *genericity* of Two (affirmation and responsibility) defies the subjectification and signification processes of Mediterraneanist representations, simply by working, exquisitely and remarkably, on another level, which is not, necessarily, superior to the Mediterraneanist positivities, but first and foremost, different to the level of poetics. At the dawn of the ethnography of the event, the liar-episode and the advice-episode are not about two different subjects. The affirmative responsible subject which utters ‘liar’ and the subject which responded to my inquiry, hold true only once a mode of subjectivation is submitted to the effective de-individuation which dwells on the plane of consistency, rather than on the dwindling poetic identification. An affirmative responsibility, in other words, is only too eager to affirm that at stake in subjectivation processes “there is a whole geography in people, with rigid lines, supple lines, lines of flight etc.” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: 10), and not just a metaphysical personality of poetic ideals.

Badiou’s (2005: 180) formula of the event, written $ex \{x/x \in X, ex\}$, will help us to clarify further the above point in what I think is rather even if remotely a plausible translation of the advice episode. An event, we already know, has both to present its entire site and to present the presentation itself. I will argue that the Two of affirmation and responsibility, on the basis of which the liar-episode constitutes the first count of the ultra-one event, posits itself between itself and the void, whose second count is the responsible advice-episode. Now, let us see how the above can be further unfolded. The ultra-one “‘mobilizes’ the elements of its site but it adds its own presentation to the mix” (Badiou, 2005: 182). The liar-episode belongs to the situation, to the extent that it is part of the alleged tourist crisis; and thus “It counts the same thing as one *twice*: once as a presented multiple [the tourist crisis] and once as a multiple presented in its own presentation [liar]” (Badiou, 2005: 182). On the other hand, the advice-episode does not belong to the situation, to the extent that while there is a presented multiple (advices have been given many times) the multiples that compose the presented multiple are not represented in the situation (the brand I was looking for). The advice-episode which holds beyond hospitality would now entail

that “*nothing* is presented by it” (Badiou, 2005: 182). It adds itself to the void, to nothing (the advice given by the shopkeeper) but it is not presented from the standpoint of the situation, “because no presentable multiple responds to the call of such name” (Badiou, 2005: 182) (the brand I was looking for was not on sale). The Two of affirmation and responsibility thus results neither in unity nor in identifying a person with a certain behavioural quality, but in a way which founds (axiom of foundation) an origin, which opens the subject to a wholly Other. The liar-episode affirms the tourist crisis once as a presented multiple (Is the tourist crisis happening?) and once as a multiple presented in its own presentation (liar: the crisis is not happening and even if it is, it does not affect you). The advice-event, by contrast, offers an unlimited and infinite advice (open to the void) being simply and purely dissymmetrical; and hence as Mallarme put it, ‘nothing has taken place except the place’.

To affirm, however, means to create and evoke rather than to divide, compare or draw a segmented line. To affirm is neither about consensus (tourist crisis) nor about contradiction, negation or dispute (there is no tourist crisis: liar). On the contrary, affirmation says ‘yes’ to that which happens – the existence of differences between the various estimations and evaluations on tourism – learning how to let go. The liar-episode of the Street of Arabatzoglou (Fig. 10) challenges the shopkeeper’s evaluation but not simply by opposing rhetorically or poetically the knowledge of a given state of affairs. Rather the liar-episode sets traps in what it thinks of as a mischaracterization of the situation by letting forth “from inconsistent being and the interrupted count, the incandescent non-being of an existence” (Badiou, 2005: 183). It is at this juncture that affirmative deconstruction resonates with Badiou’s foundational axiom, which prohibits being’s event, by founding an origin which is groundless, light, baseless and undecidable.

By the same token, the advice-episode of the Titou Petichaki square (Fig. 11) insinuates an inchoate and yet to-come performance of responsibility. The tobacco salesman, even if he never intended to stock such a brand of cigars or did not reckon having customers asking for this specific brand, responded in a responsible manner trying to be worthy of the request. The subject, in the case of the tobacco, is neither negative (honour/shame), nor catastrophic/suicidal (vendetta subject), nor

antagonistic/creative (poetic). It is not about an individual either or an identity but about the traces a truth procedure leaves behind once the question is no longer posed in terms of hospitality, altruism, or a eudemonistic scenario of the friends of the heart. Responsibility cannot, in other words, be retrospectively, offered as a recipe of morality and goodness, for the responsible person is precisely the person who is always in doubt on whether he/she has been moral enough. This is because “which line of flight to follow in any particular context of forced stabilization can only be determined through a cast of the dice. Shake. Rattle. Roll” (Doel, 1995: 240). Responsibility, accordingly, is a line of flight which one may draw; a latent ability or a potential that remains to be actualized and one which materializes and delivers once the various boundaries of a poetic mapping are finally blocked and have been hitherto crossed. Both episodes are defiant of the unrestrained poetic ability that has occupied a characteristically large place in the sedentary Mediterraneanist imaginary. By contrast, the affirmative/responsible mode of subjectivity I am currently delving in, is undecidable and indiscernible starting, imperceptibly, to hint at a true process on the side of which – if and when is verified by a situation to come – a subject may be found. What is required, therefore, to take things further is an explication of how the openness and dissymmetry of such an affirmative responsibility, forces a choice/intervention to be faithfully connected to a generic multiple, and to point in the direction of a radically undecidable Rethemniot. We already know, however, that if the event is undecidable “deciding that it belongs to the situation is a wager: one can only hope that this wager never becomes legitimate, inasmuch as any legitimacy refers back to the structure of the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 201); and thus an interpretive intervention is required, that is, “any procedure by which a multiple is recognized as an event” (Badiou, 2005: 202).

As I have already stressed, the aetiological reasoning behind the poetic ontologies assume that the identification processes which the Rethemniot multiplicity goes through, has been severely altered by the unrestrained, uncontrolled and ongoing consummation process of the Venetian history. Accordingly, the Rethemniot subjects, lured in and seduced by foreign capital, have abandoned all values and inner-directed motivation with which their lives have been hitherto associated and which made them distinguishingly proud. My proposition and what I have been incessantly struggling to insert in all the preceding pages, is that a subject instead of being servile or

subversive, takes place beyond the space composed of the contradictory features of servility versus non-servility, within a territory which I prefer to call a *non-servile servility* in that it guarantees the non-choice of a choice which ‘fails’ to decide or to preside over the belonging of the event to a situation. Such a chaasmotic subjectivity, hereinafter, being heretofore affirmatively responsible will be neither servile nor non-servile, but will involve a period of interruption without interruption. It is to this task that I now turn.



Figure 11: The Street of Arabatzoglou (top)

Figure 12 Titou Petichaki square (above) (pictures taken by the author)

9.4 Beyond Servility: Axiom of Choice – Interruption without Interruption

Choice, as was briefly exposed in the introduction of the present chapter, refuses to draw a clear-cut line throughout the passage from non-servility to servility, and it goes without saying, to distinguish a period of innocence, integration, embeddedness and poetic transparency, from a period of corruption, commodification, supplementarity, addition, suppletion and simulacra. The commodification of Rethemnos' geohistory prompted many commentators – populist and lay thought and Mediterraneanist writings alike – to agree on a rhetoric which claims that due to the recent intense commodification of the town, its identity is now largely abandoning the traditional system of shared values, namely the pride and honesty of Cretan hospitality. Drawing on the growing disaffection and dissidence created by the monumentalization of the town, this same rhetoric argued that by surrendering the town to the forces perpetuated by tourism, the heretofore undisputed and well-entrenched ideals of the unproblematic and genuine 'Cretan way of life' will be irrevocably lost in the place of which foreign influences will be manufactured. Of that romantic, innocent and homogenous period of a well-established, unthreatened and unchallenged identity building process which should be carefully and by all means and at all costs guarded and preserved, the rhetoric continued, what is now exactly at the edge or in danger of being dissolved, is above all, pride. The restoration project and the concomitant aesthetic domination and gardening of the town, therefore, have all created or contributed to the construction of an identity which is servile and docile, and which is highly irreconcilable and incommensurable with the original poetic denigrations and myths on the back of which many generations of Cretans were bred and acculturated.

What the axiom of choice has come thus to offer is a mathematical formula, that is, the ontological grounds that allows to avoid such a strict and one-dimensional choice between the two periods – servility and non-servility – letting, in other words, a choice to take place without actually choosing or without inscribing a rule of choice. In the light of this, the axiom of choice is at the service of a subject which trembles, stutters, and hesitates before any decision, deforming the integrity of identities and escaping the binary rigidities and oppositions between a spontaneous/poetic subject and a docile servant of foreign capital. The axiom of choice states that from a collection of sets that include at least one element (non-empty), a selection of elements of each set, despite of the infinity of multiples, can be subtracted. As Badiou

(2005: 224) puts it “for every existent multiple a , there corresponds an existent function, which ‘chooses’ a representative in each of the multiples which make up a : $(\forall a) (E_f) [(\beta \in a) \rightarrow f(\beta) \in b]$ ”.

Without having to dip into formal/mathematical logic, suffice it to distinguish the following stages of the thought of intervention. First, there is a multiple x which belongs to the site X , “unpresented element of the presented one of the site” (Badiou, 2005: 204). Second, there is a signifier of x , that is, the e_x , whose only limitation is that “the name of the event must emerge from the void” (Badiou, 2005: 205). Third, since it remains difficult to subtract a name for the event from the situation, the only possibility would be to apply a proper name of the kind ‘it belongs to the site’. Fourth, the choice of intervention interrupts the state of law inasmuch as what is selected as a name for the event is subtracted from the unpresented multiples of the situation. We know, however, that the name belongs to the site (e.g. servility vs non-servility) but the situation (e.g. the broader social context of Rethemnos) does not recognize these terms (we have already seen a dispute of this kind in terms of the liar-episode). There are people, of course, who depend on the situation (e.g. the shopkeepers) but the state of Rethemnos is defiant of such an intervention (e.g. the fact that Rethemniot identity is actually servile, non-poetic, corrupted). The intervention, in other words, can be recognized only by its consequences – that is by the events that follow once a dispute (Is the tourist crisis happening?) takes place. This is why “It will, therefore, always remain doubtful whether there has been an event or not except to those who intervene, who decide its belonging to the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 207). And thus the *differend* (Lyotard, 1988): is the liar accusation about the shopkeepers or about the number of the tourists?

As was already shown, the Twoness of the affirmative/responsible ultra-one was founded upon the prohibition of being when it comes to an event. The interventional choice constitutes also “an originary Two, an interval of suspense, the divided effect of a decision” (Badiou, 2005: 206-207). From the standpoint of the state (the commodification/corruption of Rethemnos) the intervention of the Two of affirmation and responsibility (Is the crisis happening or is it a lie?) remains unacknowledged and hard to encapsulate. The intervention for its part “is a line drawn from one

paradoxical multiple, which is already circulating, to the circulation of another, a line which scratches out [...] a *diagonal* of the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 210). A choice, in other words, does not have necessarily to choose in the strict sense of the term (e.g. one does not have to admit that the tourist crisis is happening). An intervention is pure alterity just like the liar-episode and the advice-episode portrayed above through the ultra-one of the Two of affirmation and responsibility are open from the off to differance and spacing. It is on the back of such a groundless ground that an intervention need no longer be in-scribed by way of a rule of choice in Rethemnos.

That the intervention of the eventual ultra-one of the Two (affirmation/responsibility-liar-event/advice-event) is based upon the fuzziness and undecidability of the servile/non-servile event, which remains to be decided on whether it signals a period of pride (poetics, meaning, shame, honour) or a period of corruption (official time, commodification, monumentalization) is what ontology allows us to think when it comes to an event. The axiom of choice is associated with the irreducible split between servility and non-servility, in exactly the same way the processive origami, taken up in Chapter 6, was about a disjoined split marking in the Old Town a non-dialectical understanding of a place’s identity beyond the anthropological strictures and constancies of history. On the face of the disjunctive logic of such an irreducible and incurable break between a servile subject and a non-servile subject, choice offers the ontological grounds on which an interruption without interruption takes hold.

For every servile or non-servile allegation (multiples), there is an interventional choice which chooses a representative of every multiple. Yet given that multiples refer to differences, prosthetic supplements, traces and unbreachable divisions, choice says nothing on how to choose a delegate, but only affirms the existence of a choice which crucially will not choose between two multiples. In Badiou’s words, “The axiom of choice juxtaposes to the existence of a multiple the possibility of its delegation without inscribing a rule for this possibility that could be applied to the particular form of the initial multiple” (Badiou, 2005: 227). For “there is a representative but it is impossible to know which one it is” (Badiou, 2005: 229). The Rethemniot subjectivity thus neither refers to a docile and servile subject nor to some poetic or revolutionary individual who resists monumental time. It involves, above all, the new that happens in a situation (e.g. the Rethemniots evaluation of tourism) under

the jurisdiction of a genuine Two ('tourist crisis' versus 'liar'), which does not have to decide over an interruption (non-servile servility). The difference a non-servile multiplicity makes is, therefore, irreducible, uncalculated and undecidable for the eventual ultra-one of Two, is not about a decision on whether tourism jeopardizes or not an already established poetic idealism, but about a moment that should be lived, however stressful it may sound, in all its indeterminacy.

When the subject is seen through the structural nostalgia of poetics, it is mistakenly taken as servile and a result of a place's economic dependency on foreign capital, which corrupts the proud and hospitable character of the rebellious and undisciplined Cretans. Anthropological accounts, as was shown, conceive of the Mediterranean subject as being in the middle of such a crisis, between two periods which tirelessly fight each other (the proud and independent period of poetic non-servility and the period of corruption) and which turned the Rethemniot individual into the unbecoming social standing of a servant. In Herzfeld's (1991) pointillistic account of social and monumental time, as was also shown, such a break takes the form of a clash between official and informal understandings of the Venetian past. Inversely, the non-servile servility drawn upon by way of the axiom of choice and through the deconstructive and decompressed event of an interruption-without-interruption, is obliged to refuse to choose between a servile subject and a non-servile subject. The period of servility should be rather taken as a mark that iterates, supplants and recites differences, always returning to the ungroundlessness of a foundational Other that bifurcates into the liar-episode and the advice-episode. The original and foundational ultra-one of affirmation and responsibility stands, therefore, neither for enmity (egoism/atomism) nor sympathy (altruism/friendship), but serves as the backcloth of a particular multiple that twists free of the allegations of servility. Choice, in short, in Badiou's universe, is a mode of intervention through which a multiple exists without having to pick between an innocent period and a corrupted period of mass tourism. As Badiou (2005: 224) put it, "given a multiple of multiples, there *exists* a multiple composed of a 'representative' of each non-void multiple whose presentation is assured by the first multiple". An intervention is required, therefore, in order to name a representative of each of the elements of sets (poetics, monumentalization, etc.), without having to admit or succumb, at the same time, to the logic and rhetoric of a Cretan identity of poetic, or honourific origin and ideals. The axiom of choice

grounds ontologically a decision on the basis of which a subject will emerge that will stand for the unanticipated, uncalculated and unnameable other with reference to an affirmative responsibility that withdraws and resists the forced stabilization of servility. As Badiou (2005: 227) suggests “*within ontology, the axiom of choice formalizes the predicates of intervention*”. But while “*There is a representative, [...]* it is impossible to know which one it is; to the point that this representative has no other identity than that of having to represent the multiple to which it belongs” (Badiou, 2005: 229). To put it in a nutshell, choice simply states that “there are some interventions” (Badiou, 2005: 230).

I have been arguing so far that Rethemniot multiplicity is borne out of chaosmosis and must be subtracted from what is already available rather than represented, scripted, narrated or interpreted in a poetic or ethnographic fashion. On that score, relaying the Rethemniot subject as a docile subject that depends on foreign capital, or as a poetic rebellious individual that opposes formal interpretations and discourses of history, is ill-founded and sterile, because it fails to take into account the true difference that matters to subjects. By contrast, what deconstruction sets in motion, is the affirmation of an incalculable, rhythmical and antigenealogical difference, transgressing the binary determinations and permutations between servility and non-servility in favor of pluralistic, polysemic and affirmative deterritorializations that deform the Mediterraneanist representations of shame, honour, poetics, friends of the heart and the two-fold historical interpretations of social and monumental time. A non-servile servility is beyond such an illusory ambition of accomplishing and administering a comprehensive and durable identity. For identities, as was shown in Chapter 4, are currently swept up by the infinite procrastination and perpetual regret of relations of speed “below and above the threshold of perception” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 281). The period of servility thus is a non-reducible, non-finalized and imperceptible event bound to infinite substitution, and subject to the status of a suspended nomination, which withholds a decision between a servile subject and a poetic subject of non-servility. Servility, in other words, is a non-originary trace inconsisting in a non-dialectical manner that which returns, re-inscribes and reverses differences, that is, the non-being of an intervention amid the innocence of a poetic past and the innocuous stuttering and stammering unfamiliarity of a servile present that is to come and which seems to be strange, unfamiliar and hard to decode. Such is the resonance

of a non-reductive servility, which obeys the deconstructive logic of interruption without interruption, and which is ontologically supported by the interventional formula of choice. Let us further illustrate the point with a snapshot that will span the above theorizations with an experience stemming from the field.

When I hired a taxi in the Old Town, the driver asked me if there was a problem with letting some more people on, as there were many tourists queuing for a taxi. Once a foreign couple waved, the driver got out of the taxi and opened the door for them, though by the moment he was back in his seat he was already explaining to me why he let them in. He went on defending himself, although no comment had been made by me, saying that 'things have changed, and that tourists are only a few nowadays and that some years ago it was the tourists begging for a taxi'. The driver was making an attempt to be excused for adopting an attitude that in all likelihood should be at least considered inappropriate within the general Mediterraneanist problematic, trying to get rid of the burden of servility by making an appeal to the needs and scarcity of the current competitive economic context, and the fact that tourists were fewer in number.

But unlike any dialectical opposition and resolution of difference, en route from non-servility to servility, the driver's story above is constantly situated and reinstated always already before and/or after the servile-non servile boundary. It is neither a theological mark nor a linear or chronological periodization of a history of presence. The driver's remarks intended to recite differences that are already postponed and suspended, subtracting, on the one hand, pride and affluence from the innocent period by explaining the needs of his profession and the discontents it generates, whilst, on the other hand, by reconstructing, re-inscribing and reversing pride in novel ways. For example, to the extent that tourists are fewer nowadays, servility must somehow be excused as the opening of the door was not necessary in the past because of the greater numbers of tourists and not because of the innate and untamed character of the Rethemniots. Seen through this theorization, servility is not a recognizable and discernible space/time break but a trace of non-origin, a difference that ceaselessly destabilizes on the move the absolute proximity of self-presence, domestication, and domesticity.

The non-presence of the trace of servility allows the four-fold movement of difference – the chiasmus (χ) – to hold sway first, by way of a doubly-folded exclusion (reversal: opening the door) and second, by recourse to a doubly-folded affirmation (reinscription: the tourist/crisis-fewer/tourists). Servility thus *is* a mark always already broached by difference, a condition of the non-possibility of choice between interruption and non-interruption. Such is the resonance of the ontology of choice, which comes by means of the ultra-one of Two, and in association with the liar-episode and the advice-episode. The difference between the two periods is neither dialectical nor transitional, nor is it about an economic crisis. Even if it were about a crisis, it would involve a crisis of crisis, a crisis of versus and contradiction, a crisis, in short, folded around other crises. The decision between servility and non-servility is an instance of procrastination “always an undecidable and irreducible double [...] It suspends itself between these two possibilities; as these two possibilities” (Doel, 1992: 166). Neither teleological closure nor ontological presence but the making possible of their dis-articulation, which affirms the experience of the impossible, a radical experience of ‘perhaps’ (Derrida, 1992).

The axiom of choice forms an exemplary basis, therefore, in order to think or reflect on an event named after an intervention, without taking sides, and without naming or subjecting the event to the oneness, void and infinity of being. For the subject, as Badiou argues, is always on the side of truth. In his words, “I term *subject* any local configuration of a generic procedure from which a truth is supported” (Badiou, 2005: 391). Truth, however, is global and infinite while the subject is local and finite. It is not for nothing, therefore, that I preferred to focus on truth procedures rather than on identity and representation, for a subject that deserves such a name, is a process through which a multiple is forced from a current situation to be faithfully connected to the newness of a situation to come. Yet knowledge fails to decide over the truth’s belonging and it is by way of what Badiou calls *forcing* – the fundamental law of the subject – that the connection between subject and truth becomes possible. As Badiou (2005: 406) avers “A subject is a knowledge suspended by a truth whose finite moment it is”.

The ontology of forcing as Badiou (2005: 412) himself admits is too ‘calculatory’ to be exposed here. I shall return to the logic of forcing directly below, but not to its

technique or formal/mathematical writing. Suffice it to note for the moment, that *a* truth is followed by a subject in that it is affirmed by a generic procedure opened up by an event named after an intervention. Accordingly, “A subject is much rather *taken up* in fidelity to the event, and *suspended* from truth; from which it is forever separated by chance” (Badiou, 2005: 406). The subject thus is a militant which decides from the side of the undecidable – whose ontological situation is the indiscernible – over a situation’s generic multiple – which occurs after the event of an intervention – about whether or not it constitutes the true in a situation to come. It should be clear by now why the metaphysical ethnographies of poetics are unbecoming and indifferent; for the chance Badiou talks about, which separates truth and subject, would never had a chance of happening therein.

A non-servile servility which was taken up above due to the undecidability of the interval between the already divided and withheld decision of the liar-event, the advice-event and the servility-event, is now ready to materialize. What is required to take things further is to compose the generic multiple on the side of which the Mediterranean subject is to emerge. Again the strategy would be to expose and carefully unfold Badiou’s laborious following of the mathematician Paul Cohen’s continuum hypothesis, on whose thought I slightly touched in the introduction of the present chapter. I will be then in a position to pick the Rethemniot multiplicity, in a way which will, ultimately, swerve away from the domestic images of Mediterraneanism, bearing always in mind that we are in the middle of process, at the other receiving end of which, a subject may be waiting.

9.5 Undecidability: The Matheme of the Indiscernible – The Discount-Episode

I have argued so far, that the subject is indiscernible and that any poetic or ethnographic inquiry cannot unfold *what really matters to subjects*. The indiscernible, therefore, is not going to represent a subject but must be constructed by way of a generic multiple of a truth, forced after the naming of an event which trembles and stutters before indecision. I have already shown that the event, the ultra-one of Two (affirmation/responsibility: liar-episode/advice-episode: the axiom of foundation) and the stuttering indecision of an interruption without interruption (non-servile-servility: the axiom of choice) potentialize and actualize various multiplicities with respect to

such a wholly other. Of this same process, a variety of other pieces, fragments and occurrences are now to emerge with respect to the undecidable. When it comes to truth ontology can hardly deliver a concept or make space for a true difference; yet it can think of being and to that extent, ontology that is the theory of pure multiple, is crucial in understanding how the experience of the subject is transformed. Accordingly, what needs further unpacking is to construct, though not necessarily to define or name, such an indiscernible place within which a subject can be firmly deposited.

The matheme of the indiscernible allows Badiou to think the way in which, from an already established and fully deployed situation, a truth, that is, a generic extension of a statement-multiple, can be subtracted – by forcing – in order to verify the new in a situation to come. It is Godel's constructible hypothesis (the incompleteness theorem which says that a theory cannot prove its own efficiency) that permits Badiou to move, from the indiscernible to the undecidable. I am not going to refer to this complex mathematical construction despite it being a pivotal step in Badiou's ontology in his attempt to think of the undecidable. It takes, however, a more careful and painful approach to stipulate the mathematical formula of the indiscernible, which arguably points in the direction of the true difference I am engaging in so far. That the Rethemniot subject should be founded – that is its place and the territory it occupies – on the side of truth without having to be interpreted or represented in a poetic fashion, is what I have been striving to establish so far. That the subject, moreover, of shame, honour, friendship, poetics, and womanhood is about differences, does not simply qualify for the true or generic multiple by way of which the *new* will be forced in a situation to come after being named by an intervention, unless it is specified which are the differences that matter to such a process which deserves the name of the subject.

A truth procedure requires "thinking the relation – which is rather a non-relation – between, on the one hand, a post-evental fidelity, and on the other hand, a fixed state of knowledge, or what I term below the encyclopaedia of the situation" (Badiou, 2005: 327). Such an encyclopaedia, can be easily found in Rethemnos in the Archaeology Service, which houses the documentation and the files regarding the Venetian properties and their restoration; it is the encyclopaedia *per se* from which

the generic multiple, according to what I have already presented will, finally, deliver the infinite, un-nameable and bound to a post-evental fidelity, subject. That I take the Archaeology Service as a historical situation and a possible evental site does not, necessarily, mean that it is the only possible way to come to terms with a structured situation in Rethemnos. Given however, that I heavily focused on how the built environment changes with reference to a full-blown consumer society and how the restoration project shapes and reflects the geography of the town, and given, moreover, that the Old Town is pronounced a scheduled monument, which means that any possible information concerning the built environment should be contained in there, the Archaeology Service is a useful site on the back of which the undecidable may be subtracted. It is not a representative site, therefore, and is not meant to constitute the only historical situation within which events, subjects and identities merge. It resonates, however, with the previous theorization and the manner in which the preceding conceptualizations were glued together in accomplishing a differential unfolding of the Old Town problem, exposing in a very formal manner everything one should know of the Old Town problem.

In our effort to construct the indiscernible, it is crucial to be able to ‘distinguish’ in a situation the multiples that are not discerned from the standpoint of the encyclopaedia and which, hopefully, will be those multiples to which a generic fidelity will be ultimately assigned. *Veridical*, as Badiou (2005: 332), has already proposed, is what is controlled by knowledge, whereas *true* is what is controlled by the event and the intervention. The question, accordingly, “is the following: on what condition can one be sure that set of terms of the situation which are positively connected to the event is in no manner already classified within the encyclopaedia of the situation?” (Badiou, 2005: 336). The answer seems to rest on the multiples that given a certain enquiry, avoid determination from the standpoint of the situation, for, “There is no reason, in any case, for an enquiry not to exist which is such that the multiples positively evaluated therein by the operator of faithful connection form a finite part which avoids a determinant; the reason being that an enquiry, in itself, has nothing to do with any determinant whatsoever” (Badiou, 2005: 337). The above comes down to saying that the definition of truth is “*the infinite positive total [...] of a procedure of fidelity which, for each and every determinant of the encyclopaedia, contains at least one enquiry which avoids it*” (Badiou, 2005: 338, italics in original). And thus

“everything hangs on the possibility of the existence of a generic procedure of fidelity” (Badiou, 2005: 339). By picking up on the Archaeology Service I hope to be able to stress the baselessness and undecidability of a generic fidelity of a post-evental occurrence, that hesitates before a non-servile-servility and which will be, finally, true rather than poetic, generic rather than shameful, affirmative rather than honourific, responsible rather than egoistic and genuine rather than hospitable. Before turning to the encyclopaedia of the Archaeology Service, however, the indiscernible should be constructed.

I have established that an intervention, drawn upon the axiom of choice and the non-servile-servility, implies an inconsistent multiplicity founded originally by the ultra-one of Two that is, the liar-event and the advice-event, once affirmation and responsibility take over. What remains to be seen is whether such inconsistent multiplicities are compatible with a generic fidelity bound to a truth procedure in such a manner which will avoid any determination from the standpoint of the encyclopaedia. I have already argued that the Archaeology Service is such an encyclopaedia, but the question remains whether ontology can think a generic multiple, which is to say, an unnameable, un-constructible, and indiscernible multiple. To make sense, therefore, of the manner in which the knowledge of the Archaeology Service nourishes such a multiple that may, depending on the enquiry, produce the undecidable and true difference beyond shame, honour, and poetics is the task of the present section. Again this is not going to be, strictly speaking, an interpretation or a representation of the Rethemniot identity but will only, by way of truth, indicate the real difference that allows and makes space for a generic subject. Moreover, the way Cohen’s mathematics are taken up below, I should stress once again, are far from easy to comprehend, but still I believe worthy of giving it a try and making something of them.

The symbol for this unnamable indiscernible is the symbol \varnothing [generic multiple (G)]. Badiou acknowledges that “the possible filling in of its absence – the construction of its concept – can only be a procedure, a procedure which must operate inside the domain of the nameable of the fundamental situation” (Badiou, 2005: 356). There is thus a multiple, on the basis of which the indiscernible will emerge as part of the situation S, and which is termed a “quasi-complete situation” (Badiou, 2005: 357). In

the quasi-complete situation, certain multiples are conditioned – but not named – by the language of the situation in order “that the multiple thus described and composed cannot be named or discerned in the original quasi-complete situation” (Badiou, 2005: 357). Let us term one of such conditions that transmits information on the indiscernible a multiple π . As Badiou put it “a correct set φ will be generic for S if, for any domination D which belongs to S we have $D \cap \varphi \neq \emptyset$ (the intersection of D and φ is not empty)” (Badiou, 2005: 370). The above needs, however, careful elaboration and further unpacking.

The indiscernible necessitates the existence in a situation (S) of a multiple which functions in a double way, first, as the basic material for the indiscernible and second, as a vector of information of what belongs to it. “The hope is that certain groupings of conditions, conditions which are themselves, conditioned *in the language of the situation*, will make it possible to think that a multiple which counts these conditions as one is incapable, itself, of being discernible” (Badiou, 2005: 357). The indiscernible thus will be found to exist but without having to be named from the standpoint of the situation. Let us call $S\varphi$ the set of values “*for a fixed supposed indiscernible*” (Badiou, 2005: 358). The multiple S should verify the axioms of set theory, separation and replacement, and should be also transitive and infinite (Badiou, 2005: 359, 360). Arguably “the striking paradox of our undertaking is that we are going to try to name the very thing which is impossible to discern. We are searching for a language for the unnameable” (Badiou, 2005: 376).

To the extent that the being of truth exists, truth can be thought. Following Badiou’s take on Cohen’s strategy, as was shown above, we can now agree on the following. There is a situation, called the quasi-complete situation, and which includes the indiscernible; there are conditions that de-limit the quasi-complete situation, determining in a double way the indiscernible once through the material conditions and once again through the information they transmit for the indiscernible; there is also a correct subset or a part δ of the set of conditions that is able to perform such a double function, which will be axiomatically defined by a set of rules that specify it; and there are rules of conditions that determine that a set of conditions does not belong to the correct subset δ .

Now, domination, which holds a key role in the construction of the indiscernible, is “a set of conditions such that any condition outside the domination is dominated by at least one condition inside the domination” (Badiou, 2005: 369). As Badiou (2005: 370) points out “the idea is that, in S , the correct part φ , intersecting every domination, contains, for every property supposed to discern it, one condition (at least) which does not possess this property”. Let us pursue the latter in a more detailed manner. In a quasi-complete situation there exists a multiple S which a) verifies all the axioms of set theory, b) verifies the axioms of infinite sets, c) is transitive and d) is infinite but denumerable. A set of conditions is “a multiple π of the fundamental situation S which is destined to possibly belong to the indiscernible φ (the function of material) and, whatever, the case, may be, to transmit some ‘information’ about this indiscernible which will be a part of the situation S ” (Badiou, 2005: 262). That information is given in terms of an indiscernible multiple means simply that a condition π_1 is stronger than a condition π_2 . The principle of compatibility states that contradictory information cannot be given once we have established that one set is stronger than another. Suffice it to say thus that a set of conditions \odot ($\odot \in S$) comprises “a. A set of sets noted $\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_n, \dots$ [...] b. If π_1 [is an extension of] π_2 , we will say that the condition π_2 *dominates* the condition π_1 [...] c. Two conditions are compatible if they are dominated by the same third condition [...] d. Every condition is dominated by two conditions which are incompatible themselves [...]” (Badiou, 2005: 364). The above four-fold conditioning of the indiscernible reads in the following way: “Statement a formalizes that every condition is material for the indiscernible; statement b that we can distinguish more precise conditions; statement c that the description of the indiscernible admits a principle of coherency; statement d that there are real choices in the pursuit of the description” (Badiou, 2005: 365).

A correct set of conditions will be, accordingly, “a set of conditions which aim at the one-multiple of a part δ of \odot ” (Badiou, 2005: 365). The two rules of correction that define the ‘rightness’ of such a correct set will be Rd_1 stating that “if a condition belongs to this set then all the conditions that the first condition dominates also belong to it” (Badiou, 2005: 366), and Rd_2 declaring that “given two conditions of δ , there exists a condition of δ which dominates both of them” (Badiou, 2005: 366). In Badiou’s (2005: 367) words again, which deserve to be quoted at length,

“Take a correct set of conditions δ . It is part of \odot , it obeys the rules *Rd1* and *Rd2*. Moreover, it is discernible, and it coincides with what is separated, within \odot by a formula λ [...] In particular for a condition $\pi1 \in \delta$, we have two dominating conditions, $\pi2$ and $\pi3$ which are incompatible between themselves. The rule *Rd2* of correct parts prohibits two incompatible conditions from both belonging to the same correct part. It is therefore necessary that either $\pi2$ or $\pi3$ does not belong to δ . Let’s say that it’s $\pi2$. Since the property λ discerns δ , and $\pi2$ does not belong to δ , it follows that $\pi2$ *does not possess* the property expressed by λ . We thus have: $\sim\lambda(\pi2)$. We arrive at the following result, which is decisive for the characterization of an indiscernible: if a correct part δ is discerned by a property λ , every element of δ (every $\pi \in \delta$) is dominated by a condition $\pi2$ such that $\sim\lambda(\pi2)$ ”.

Such a mathematic logic put forward by Cohen and reproduced by Badiou, needs additional and sufficient philosophical unpacking – though I cannot explain any further the formal logic a bit too typologically exhibited above. Herzfeld’s version of Venetian history, as was shown, maintains that there is a distinction between social conceptions of history and bureaucratic interpretations of history; and that a socially embedded poetic history is subversive of the nationalist discourses promoted by the Statist ideology that takes the Venetian history as the only history that matters in town. Yet the bureaucrat (the Statist ideology/identity) whether in Athens or in Rethemnos is ceaselessly involved in a perpetual negotiation of difference; and it is such a multiplication and potentialization of the interimplication between the resident (the poetic identity) and the bureaucrat (the Statist identity) that matter with respect to the undecidable Rethemniot subject (resident of Rethemnos versus Athens-based bureaucrat; Rethemnos-based bureaucrat versus resident of Rethemnos; Rethemnos-based bureaucrat versus Athens-based bureaucrat). While a part-time archeologist told me once that ‘you know you are in Greece’, meaning that I should not expect much from the organization of the Archaeology Service’s files, what I suggest now is that local bureaucracy is always already contaminated, intoxicated and invaginated by the informality, fluidity, sliding and ‘weaknesses’ of the Rethemniot lifeworld. The bureaucrat of Rethemnos, in other words, if this is at stake in terms of the formal history of the town is “always already becoming-other, becoming-undecidable and becoming-imperceptible” (Doel, 2000: 122), for even if bureaucracy is hugely ineffective and problematic in Greece, especially in the manner in which monumental time is construed by the manipulative and proselytizing mechanisms of the Greek state, it nonetheless remains contestable whether the bureaucrat is the rational, absolute and totalitarian figure, the Mediterraneanist imaginary assumes.

It is conceivable, therefore, that a 'good' side of bureaucracy is always implicated in the 'bad' side of it, like a Mobius bands which ploughs, complicates, remarks and reinscribes the inside into the outside and the outside into the inside. What matters, accordingly, in mapping the contested history and trajectory of the manifold multiplicity of Rethemnos "is *the* fissure: the necessity of interval, the harsh law of spacing" (Derrida, 1976: 200). Formal and informal relationships, the bureaucrat and the resident, social and monumental times are always already enmeshed and caught up within a general network of relational flows and innumerable lines of flight that are anonymous, uprooted and unattached. A choreographic ethnography, by implication, is neither poetic, nor domestic. The binary oppositions of the formal/informal rigidities and the grist of typical/atypical dilemmas of social history versus monumental time are unbecoming and indifferent, precisely because they insist on the fixities, constancies and identities of a domestic identity, whereas in the aftermath of deconstruction, schizoanalysis and the ethnography of the event, everything is out of joint (Derrida, 1994). The differential processive subjectivity of the indiscernible subjectivation amid conditions of chaos and osmosis will come to undo and unsettle the politics of separation, negativity and contradiction preventing and blocking them from taking place.

For difference, as was already argued, has nothing to do with identity. Instead "*difference is a process of involution and ex-tension, not a calibration of deviation or distance [...] DIFFERENCE GROWS*" (Doel, 1993: 379). To be worthy of such a formless ground, therefore, on which difference should be written but in a way through which it will allow difference to be simply given over to the fragility of heterology, dedomestication, deconstruction, disintegration and the non-calculation of 'dromology' (from the Greek *dromos*, way/race) (Virilio, 1991) is what I will be construing below. In other words, I will argue that one cannot have an identity without having at the same time a certain speed, vibration, dis-articulation, writing, sliding supplement, differentiation, trace, prosthesis, supplement, and a graphe – be it either the corruption of mass-tourism or the strict official and ethnocentric perceptions of the Venetian past. Failing to acknowledge that alterity, ambivalence and usurpation have already begun, comes down to saying that one leans toward an ontotheoteleological understanding of identity, reducing the metamorphic deformation

of difference to the poetic equivalence, shameful stabilization, pointillistic integration and permanent solidity of Mediterraneanism.

Defamilialization and defamiliarization are the rule rather than a deviance of a standard model that deliberately produces in Rethemnos identities, similarities, homologues and rigidities. The Rethemniot individual is neither about the bureaucrat (one) nor about the resident (other) nor about the masses/tourists (many). It is neither pure good nor ultimate and transparent evil, but that which has been already given over to the affirmative and expressive lines of flight that avoid representation, internalization, crystallization, permanence and sameness. It is worthwhile recalling here with Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 103) that “*You will never find a homogeneous system that is not still or already affected by a regulated, continuous, immanent process of variation*”. Hence the fact that it is hard to tell whether Rethemnos is a bureaucratic space or a domestic place exploited by the recent commodification of the Old Town that ignores and neglects the needs of the inhabitants. The differential repetition and continuous variation of difference whose effective spacing I will try not to be staved off, is now surrendered to becoming-bureaucrat, becoming-resident, becoming-otherwise. For Rethemnos, as was already mentioned, is not what you think; and like a Body without Organs, one may say, it is “what remains when you take everything away. What you take away is precisely the phantasy and significations as a whole” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 151).

The identities of the bureaucrat and the resident are blended, mixed and superimposed and thus rather than representing identities, one should start reckoning with such an identification processes as the one advanced by Badiou, which leads astray and leaks in all possible directions. It is at this juncture that the matheme of the indiscernible resonates with the philosophy of difference. Let me further illustrate the point with a snapshot joggled due to my field experience. On one occasion in the Archaeology Department’s bookshop, I wanted to buy Dimakopoulos’s (1977) book on the Venetian houses of Rethemnos. A 50% discount is usually applied to Archaeology students, but when I complained that Geography students should also have the same discount, the clerk cynically replied that if I wanted the discount I could get it by having someone from the 28th Inspectorate of Byzantine and Postbyzantine Antiquities – which replaced the small and less autonomous branch that existed in

Rethemnos, part of the 13th Inspectorate based on Herakleion – making a call for me. Given that I knew many of the employees of the Archaeology Department, where I spent time searching the files and studying the changes, renovations and restorations of the Venetian properties, I finally, had someone from the Department to make the call. It was then that the clerk insisted that the discount was 40%! Since I was with the person who was making the call, I intervened and reminded the bookseller that the discount was 50% – this was, actually, the discount I finally received.

Ontology can help us to unfold the consequences of the above occurrence. As I have already proposed, the bureaucratic network is not as homogeneous as it is often assumed by theories that overemphasize the embeddedness, domestication, territorialization and transparency of a place's identity. The power-hierarchies, routes, rhizomes, and informal connections between the folds of the resident and the bureaucrat are manifold events of interconnectivity, and this is why there is a need for a careful reconstruction of identity beyond territorial conceptualizations. Making sense of the subject requires, therefore, a rigorous reconsideration of the flows and connections, and the rhizomes and folds that are by and large, non-organizational, non-constant, non-integral and non-originary, but instances or performances that cut across the body of the informal and atypical economy of Greece in a diagonal manner traversing and deconstructing both the inside (rebellious resistance from the side of local history) and the outside (official/bureaucratic conceptions from the side of the state).

Thinking the subject through such a true procedural intervention is possible on the face of what we have already established, that is, the axiom of choice (non-servile servility), and the ultra-one of Two (liar-event/advice-event) which will now consist in the encyclopaedia of Rethemnos. It is worth recalling with Badiou (2005: 355) that “any truth is post-evental” and that it “escapes ontology”, insofar as it “comes from the standpoint of an undecidable supplementation”. Mapping the indiscernible on the grounds of the blended performances of the bureaucrat and the resident in the wake of the conflict over the Venetian history of the town offers, therefore, a more fruitful and productive grasp of the undecidability, fuzziness, and excrescence of the differences and simulacras which emerge with respect to the traces a subject leaves behind. And thus the discount-event is given over now to an undecidable multiple, on whose true

side the Rethemniot multiplicity will comfortably sit. For any straightforward, hierarchical, immediate and linear relationship from the local to the global, from the resident to the bureaucrat or from bottom to top, should be always seen with suspicion. Hence the bureaucratic-apparatus is connected to the informal-apparatus and the official history-apparatus is connected to the poetic imaginary. The indiscernibility and ambivalence of such manifold trajectories and multiplicities curve, complicate, intervene and multiply differences, rather than simply interpret or represent identities in a unitary fashion. The clerk suggested that I should have the discount, after the intervention of the phone-call, but then attempted to reduce it to 40%. Formal agencies get to grips with the current need to adjust to the highly dynamic socio-economic environment by way of exception (it will only happen once), which means that the formality of the bureaucratic-rule (which specifies who is eligible for a discount) is only temporarily disarticulated or disabled. The discount-event, points in the direction of such a disarticulation calling the impasse of ontology when it comes to presentation and representation, belonging and inclusion, being and event and structure and metastructure. The discount that was originally refuted but was finally given on condition and due to the external intervention of the supervisor, seems to be an entry point, through which the count of inclusion surpasses belonging, a multiple of subsets no longer belongs to the initial set, and representation traverses presentation. It is necessary, therefore, to return to Badiou (2005: 362) and what he termed π , a condition of the situation S (the Archaeology Service), which belongs to the indiscernible (the trace the discount-event leaves behind), aiming at the discount-event on the basis of which a multiplicity will allow the undecidable to be subtracted. To draw the fuzzy boundaries within which the true difference that matters to subjects lies, means to follow its traces as it unfolds and deconstructs, in a fully deployed historical situation composed of evental sites, of which the encyclopaedia, knows nothing.

As previously stated, Badiou's (2005: 356) quasi-complete situation should satisfy at least "a multiple which is very rich in properties (it 'reflects' a significant part of general ontology) yet very poor in quantity (it is denumerable)". And as was also mentioned above, a set of conditions assigns the indiscernible to a four-fold conditioning: "every condition is material, [...] we can distinguish more precise

conditions, [...] the description of the indiscernible admits a principle of coherency, [...] there are real choices in the pursuit of the description” (Badiou, 2005: 365).

In the light of the above, the discount-episode can be further unpacked in the following manner. It involves a certain materiality (the body-politic in the form of the personnel of the Archaeology Service), specificity and particularity in terms of the discount (Archaeology students deserve the discount), coherence in terms of what the event stands for (students should be granted affordable access to the encyclopaedia) and last but not least, real choices (one can accept the reduced discount or let it go). The axiomatization of a correct set of conditions, symbolized after Badiou (2005: 366) *Rd*, when brushed against the above background includes two rules of correction. The first rule *Rd1* stating that if “a condition belongs to this set then all the conditions that the first condition dominates also belong to it” (Badiou, 2005: 366), which in our case reads $\pi1$ and will go in the following way: *for every Archaeology student, the 50% discount should be granted*; and the second rule, *Rd2* of a correct set δ stating that “given two conditions of δ , there exists a condition of δ , which dominates both of them” (Badiou, 2005: 366), which in our case will read $\pi2$ and goes as follows: *not all students deserve the discount*. A third condition $\pi3$ is now possible on the face of the above stating the following: *not everyone deserves the discount*.

Let us fix the terminology, but in a linear kind of manner for the sake of convenience. There is a quasi-complete situation *S*, which should obey, according to Badiou, a four-fold conditioning. It should name a set of condition \mathbb{C} constituted by conditions $\pi1$, $\pi2$, and $\pi3$ whose correct part δ may aim at the indiscernible on the basis of *Rd1* and *Rd2*. Given that the principle of choice states that “every condition is dominated by two incompatible conditions” (Badiou, 2005: 367), one of the $\pi2$, $\pi3$ should not belong to the property λ , which is the property that names the discernible, because *Rd2* prohibits incompatible conditions from belonging to the same property. It should be $\pi2$ that does not belong to the property λ and thus points in the direction of the indiscernible. Let us see why. First of all, it is such a statement that does not specify who deserves the discount. Second, en route from the strictest condition $\pi1$ (only Archaeology students are eligible for a discount) to the less strict $\pi2$ and $\pi3$, the last two are dominating but incompatible. They are dominating because they satisfy and obey the first condition, but they are incompatible inasmuch as the second one does

not belong to λ (the property which specifies who is eligible for a discount), and which allows the discernible to exist. Third, the second statement by claiming that *not all students should have the discount* is close to something unknown. Fourth, the third statement in its generality is also discernible, in that it states that *not everyone may appeal for a discount* for it is common sense to know that any given discount is set always and works by discrimination (e.g. only students, only men's wear, only the summer collection etc.). To recap, in an attempt to trace the generic multiple of the indiscernible discount-event, I wanted to come to terms with an event without name or classification. The axiom of choice suggests that for every property λ which discerns a correct set δ for the discernible, there has to be also a statement which is un-determined and does not satisfy the property λ ; for every element of δ , recall, is also dominated by $\sim\lambda$ (the non-satisfaction of λ). The correct part of the indiscernible intervention contains at least one condition that does not contain the property λ (the principle which determines who gets the discount); which partly explains the original refusal of the clerk to offer the discount.

From the standpoint of poetics, the resident and the bureaucrat comprise two separate individuals whose identificatory performances heavily contradict each other. By contrast, from the standpoint of the generic multiple, the a-signifying episode above "*implicates* one in the other, *extends* one into the other, and *radicalizes* each by way of the other" (Doel, 2003: 154). In the wake of such a generic multiple of the undecidable truth on the back of ontology, social histories and poetic individuals are subject to the disembedding and disencumbering mechanisms of a radical deterritorialization. The interventional-phone call says simply *yes* to that, which happens, following, in other words, the rhythmanalysis and differential repetitions of a smooth space of broken boundaries which unsettles and upsets bureaucracy beyond the rigidities, fixities and constancies of the same. Whether in the case of affirmation and responsibility (the ultra-one event of Two) or hesitating and stuttering before indecision (non-servile servility: the axiom of choice), a generic multiple will be ultimately called forth to bear upon the undecidability and becoming-otherwise of an inconsistent multiplicity, amidst the singularized and a-signifying discount that surges, through and due to its adestination, in the Archaeological Encyclopaedia.

It should be clear by now why Mediterraneanist identities and their sedentary, unbecoming and pointillist nature deconstruct once the events of schizoanalysis and the consumer society hold sway. I have attempted to start engaging in such a deconstruction in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 first, by way of the counterfeit, which dismantled the accounts of the friends of the heart; second, by recourse to becoming-woman, which challenged and set in motion the poetics of womanhood; and third, by way of the spectrality of use-value, and the spatial art of origami, which deconstructed spontaneity and the oppositional bureaucratic conceptions of history. What bounds together the instances above with the fidelity of a truth procedure of affirmation/responsibility (rather than the agonistic poetics of animal theft in Glendi) and the non-servile servility (rather than the social and monumental dichotomies) is the indiscernible, that is, the generic devotion and fidelity of a multiple which stubbornly enough remains without name or identity (Is the discount-event happening?). In the light of the above, the Rethemniot subject takes its full form bifurcating in the Twoness of the liar-episode and the advice-episode, on the face of the non-servile servility of a discount-event.

Is that theorization adequate or sufficient in order to explain what a subject is about? No, if the subject is taken up along the lines of representation and interpretation. Yes, if one takes seriously the subtractive universe of Badiou, in which the subject is a process or a “local configuration of a generic procedure from which truth is supported” (Badiou, 2005: 391). That truths exist does not mean, necessarily, that they are discernible from the standpoint of the situation, even if it is only on the basis of and by way of the indiscernible that the subject is attracted to truth; a process which Badiou calls “*confidence*” (Badiou, 2005: 397). Subjectivation, however, is beyond agonistic poetics and social-monumental dilemmas of history. It works chiefly as an operator, faithfully, connected to a discount that takes place in the Archaeology Service, that is, in the gap opened up by an affirmative/responsible ultra-one, which marks an interruption-without-interruption intervening in the middle of a servile/poetic dispute (Is the tourist-crisis happening or is it a lie?).

At this juncture it is worth quoting Badiou once again (2005: 401), and what he calls the necessity of the fundamental law of the subject.

“if a statement of the subject–language is such that it will have been veridical for a situation in which a truth has occurred, this is because *a* term of the situation exists, which both belongs to that truth (belongs to the generic part which *is* that truth) and maintains a particular relation with the names at stake in the statement [...] it suffices to verify the existence of one term linked to the statement in question by a relation that is itself discernible in the situation. If such a term exists, then its belonging to the truth (to the indiscernible part which is the multiple-being of a truth) will impose the veracity of the initial statement within the *new* situation”.

One needs, in other words, to invent a term in order to name the relation between the subject’s statement – post-evental fidelity to the discount-event of truth – and the situation, that is, the Archaeology Service. Such a term will allow the subtraction of the undecidable from the indiscernible. It is such a relationship that Badiou (2005: 403) calls “forcing” and by way of which he means three possible liaisons between the indiscernible and the undecidable: i) The statement cannot be forced, ii) The statement can be forced, iii) The forcing of a statement can be achieved, depending, however, on incalculable conditions and enquiries. One can argue, accordingly, that the truth procedure to which the Rethemniot multiplicity is subject, regarding the discount-event cannot be other than the third possibility. If it were for the first, the discount-event would lose legitimacy (Archaeology students only are eligible for the discount). If it were for the second possibility, all students would be given the discount, something however, which would erode both $\pi 1$, $\pi 3$ which are determined by the property λ , which in turn has given us the indiscernible, that is the $\sim\lambda(\pi 2)$ – the non-satisfaction of λ (the fact that *not all students can appeal for a discount*). In the light of the above, forcing a statement in order to be realized in a situation to come depends on conditions exclusively determined by chance. For it is evidently, only by chance that the ultra-one of the Two hesitates before the stammering non-servile servility, which paves the way for an undecidable discount. The Rethemniot multiplicity, the traces of which I have attempted to map in several occasions in the preceding pages, beyond agonistic poetics, spontaneous spatializations and historical dilemmas, is precisely the subject “which decides the undecidable from the standpoint of an indiscernible” (Badiou, 2005: 407), once however, it is subtracted from the ontological language of the encyclopaedia of the Archaeology Service.

Forcing, as previously stated, is about linking the subject’s indiscernibility to the truth of a post-evental occurrence, in order for the *new* to be verified in a situation to come.

As Badiou himself admits (2005: 412) “Cohen’s presentation of forcing is too ‘calculatory’ to be employed here”. Consequently, I shall only refer to the general meaning of forcing rather than the formal logic of it. Let us see how Badiou reads Cohen’s formula. “Although an inhabitant of the situation does not know anything of the indiscernible and so of the extension, she is capable of thinking that the belonging of such a condition to a generic description is equivalent to the veracity of such a statement within the extension. It is evident that this inhabitant is in the position of a subject of truth: she forces veracity at the point of the indiscernible” (Badiou, 2005: 411). A statement of the kind *all students should be credited with the discount* is not presented in the fundamental situation of the Archaeology Service, for it would be prohibited by π_3 which says that *not everyone should receive the discount*. Yet for a statement such as π_2 which says that *not all students should have the discount* another statement may also hold true, which says this time that *there may be some students that may appeal for a discount*. Let us call it $\lambda (\mu_1)$ for if this is the undecidable from the standpoint of the generic multiple, it should deserve the name $R \varnothing (\mu_1)$. As Badiou (2005: 411) points out “we are looking for [a] statement of the genre: ‘If in the situation, there is such a relation between some condition and the statement $\lambda (\mu_1)$, then the belonging of these conditions to the part \varnothing implies in the corresponding generic extension, the veracity of $\lambda (R \varnothing (\mu_1))$ ’”. It may be said, accordingly, that π_2 is a condition that forces – (written \equiv) – the statement $\lambda (\mu_1)$; and that π_2 belongs to the indiscernible \varnothing (the discount-event) – written $\pi_2 \in \varnothing$ – verifying in such a way a statement which goes like this, *there are some students that may appeal for a discount* in the generic extension – written $S (\varnothing)$.

Without having to follow Badiou’s formal calculation of forcing, I am now in a position to point in the direction of the undecidable (Badiou, 2005: 427, 428), with respect to Rethemnos’ multiplicity and the territory it occupies on the side of a truth procedure *en route* from the affirmative responsibility of Two, through the intervention of a non-servile servility, to the indiscernibility and, ultimately, undecidability of the discount-event. Given a quasi-complete S (the Archaeology Service) there is a set of conditions \odot whose parts π_1 (*archaeology students are eligible for a discount*), π_2 (*not all students are eligible for the discount*) and π_3 (*not everyone is eligible for the discount*) may avoid determination from the standpoint of the situation. What is generic, evidently, in the above encyclopaedia should not be

calculated, predicted, prognosticated or named from the standpoint of the situation. The subject-inhabitant (the clerk) of the situation in the discount-episode is not able to tell which of the conditions-statements above make a hole in knowledge. The undecidable is that which names a subject in a generic extension but is not discerned therein. The statement there *maybe some students that are eligible for the discount* is the undecidable subtracted from the indiscernible discount-event, once it is acknowledged that *not all students should be credited the discount*. The relationship between the two statements above is an instance of forcing. It is clear that the former statement is something totally new, which cannot be predicted from the standpoint of the situation. In the light of the above, the indiscernibility which is evident in π_2 is turned into the undecidability of $\lambda (R \varnothing (\mu_1))$ en route from π_2 to the statement *there may by some students who are eligible for a discount*. In Badiou's words "an undecidable statement of ontology is veridical therein, thus decided" (Badiou, 2005: 428). Accordingly, the true Rethemniot subject bound to a post-evental occurrence (the discount-event) which was initially launched on the face of the ultra-one of Two amidst conditions of a stuttering intervention that hesitates before servility, is decided insofar as from the indiscernible, written $\sim\lambda (\pi_2)$, the undecidable, written, $\lambda (R \varnothing (\mu_1))$, is subtracted: *some students may appeal for a discount* – and they do not have to be Archaeology students.

It should be stated once again, that the discount-event is not an equivalent of an identity or a representation. "As such, subjectivation is that through which a truth is possible" (Badiou, 2005: 393). The episode sketched out above therefore, either affects you or does not affect you. For it is possible to do justice to the ethics of the event once, however, the integrity and stability of poetics, shame, and honour are swept away. The discount-event departs from Mediterraneanist images of thought, and embarks on a form of thought which traverses and deconstructs both the inside and the outside of identity unleashing the spatiality and immanent relations that come between the holding formations of the bureaucrat and the resident, in the same way that an undecidable Mobius band opens up difference to continuous variation, differential repetition and infinite variability. For, a discount works both for and against a situation, without admitting to a hero, or a person and without preventing the possibility of a true intervention by separating and pinning down identities, and

behaviours, that would have to pinch in turn on persons such as the resident, the bureaucrat, the student, etc.

The discount-event is beyond the constant knowledge of the identification processes of Mediterraneanist discourses. The subject, when brushed against the grain of such a subtraction, is a slightly phased differential and affirmative other that trembles, and stutters as it bathes in the indecision of a non-servile servility believing that “there is a truth and this belief occurs in the form of knowledge” (Badiou, 2005: 397). A subject is neither substance, nor point, nor experience, nor presentation, but difference always already displaced. The ethnography of the event thus into which I have been delving in the preceding pages draws upon a ‘way of being’ in which the ultra-one of affirmation and responsibility, the non-servile servility and the indiscernible of the discount-generic multiple deconsist. Hence the need to slacken the hold of Mediterraneanism in order for something else to come to pass. Once Rethemnos, therefore, is set in motion through origami (Chapter 6), and the division between the repressed and the seduced (Chapter 7) and an irreducibly undecidable truth is called forth, the poetic and honourable individuals and the spontaneous and parasitic socio-spatial structures no longer hold sway. The legitimate discount, as was shown above, is undecidable (despite the clerk’s effort to the contrary) and the subject that deserves such a discount (or such a name), however passionately the encyclopaedia refused to be submitted to its seductive sliding and heterogeneity, is a boundary already crisscrossed – and so is identity; and yet one should be confident that truth is still possible (Badiou, 2005: 393). The discount-event is disadjusted and dislocated, an indefinite, incomplete and suspended chaosmos whose hinges are dislodged and led astray by the fierce monumentalization process that sutured the town 40 years ago. The undecidable discount, however, sets in motion the Rethemniot identity, blocking any naïve appeal to social times, monumental restrictions, and poetic excellence insofar as any difference is irreducible, unnameable and unclassified. On the back of the consumer society and the drift of differential repetitions (eternal return), schizoanalysis (becoming-woman), origami, (the folding, unfolding and refolding of social space) and the counterfeit (non-reciprocal exchange) such a discount affirms a truth which remains to come.

Can the above be taken as the true, real and authentic difference that matters in the Mediterranean region? Is it a theory that predicts the manner in which differences should be mapped? Is it the only way to acknowledge how subjects act and perform amidst the highly changing socio-spatial context of Rethemnos? I can only say that it is impossible to define what a subject is once truth is at stake. After all as Badiou acutely (2005: 399) noticed, "It is quite impossible to anticipate or represent a truth, because it manifests itself solely through the course of the enquiries, and the enquiries are incalculable; they are ruled, in their succession, only by encounters with terms of the situation".

As I have established so far the ultra-one of Two, which hesitates before the decision of servility can be ontologically supported by the indiscernible, once the liar-episode and the advice-episode of affirmation and responsibility are led by the effective spacing of an unanticipated language to defy any knowledge presided over or stemming from the encyclopaedia. Prior to that, I have already deconstructed Mediterraneanism because of the way in which it treats difference. I have, moreover, set in motion the shame-and-honour model and the poetic model drawing on differential repetitions, the counterfeit and becoming-woman. And I have set out to loosen the spontaneous and parasitic capitalism without capitalists on the grounds of a non-parasitic consumption by way of the spectrality of use-value, the division between the repressed and the seduced and the spatial art of origami. In addition, I have brought these theoretical peregrinations to bear upon the Old Town problem, and the contested restoration project of the Venetian properties, in an attempt to map first, the trajectory that such a displacement marks in society and space and second, in an effort to explore the way in which the subject experiences such a metamorphosis and deformation unleashed by the irresistible forces of consumerism. I have argued, finally, that what is required to take things further once the changing attitude of the residents is explained as a result of the far-reaching implications the restoration project has for space, place and the subject, is a differential theory of subject formation beyond the banalities of identity, representation, and the prosopopoeia of poetic ontologies. The events drawn upon above were not meant to represent or constitute three separate accounts of a person or even worse three distinguished subjects, but comprise only stages of a truth procedure to which a subject is submitted once it declares its fidelity to the eventness of a generic multiple that remains

indiscernible and undecidable. Ontology supports the ultra-one of Two of affirmation and responsibility not by denying the servility assertions, but by opening up the subject to a totally and wholly indiscernible Other, which in its radical alterity and otherness swerves away from – unbeknownst to the subject – the symmetry, calculation, anticipation, and enumeration of any kind of identification.

Having said that, the true Rethemniot subject is a process whose consequences are revealed, once an event makes a hole in the already established domain of knowledge. It is the individual who follows such an event to whom the name of the subject should be assigned. The events drawn upon above are fractures subtracted from such a procedure that set out to trace an operation through which the ultra-one of a stuttering non-servile-servility will lead to the indiscernible discount-event. Does this mean that the subject is anti-poetic? Does it imply that the true Rethemniot identity is beyond shame and honour? Is it possible to argue that the coffee-shops *parea* should be altogether abandoned along with the monumental-social dichotomies? And are, ultimately, the modes of individuation sketched out above defiant of Mediterraneanist identifications?

As it should be clear by now, Badiou's ontology does not to pinch a subject but only seeks to allow thinking that a subject is possible. What ontology purports and with which I totally agree is simply that the difference a subject makes can be associated with the deconstructive writing of what is performed by way of the counterfeit, becoming-woman, and the spiral Moebius bands of a non-parasitic spontaneity which bifurcates into the repressed-seduced theoretical-practice and the spatial art of origami. The question, therefore, is not about destroying the representations and identities of which the foundational situation of the Mediterranean is composed, or about opposing the poetic itself, but about opposing the opposition on the basis of which the poetic has come to blossom – the meaningful sheep-raid versus massive raids; the innocent hospitality versus the commodified tourism development; the parasitic consumption and spontaneous spatializations versus the capitalism-without-capitalists. I denounced the shame-and-honour model because it fails to make space for a difference without concept or identity and because a radical and differential theory is still required in order to take into account of a differential, repetitive and manifold event, that is, a difference in the Idea beyond any rigidity, stability,

constancy, permanence and calculation. I set out, moreover, to make space for such a differential difference through a four-fold task first, by invoking a non-reciprocal, non-economic and infinite exchange (the counterfeit) beyond gift-exchange and the obligations and power hierarchies of subjects; second, by running aground on becoming-women in order to exorcize the domestication and negative poetics of women's suffering; third, by explicating the systemic nature of consumption, the spectrality of use-value and the repressed-seduced division; and fourth, by taking up on the spatial art of origami, that is, the folding, unfolding and refolding of social space. Finally, I brought the above models to bear upon the Old Town problem and the residents' changing reception of the restoration imperatives in an attempt to reconstruct the meaning of the Old Town problem in accord to the bands and events of postmodernism and poststructuralism. The ethnography of the event, I argued, resonates with such a deconstructive writing of difference in that it performs the necessary reinscription and reterritorialization of the singularity and undecidability of an inconsistent multiplicity, to which the name of the subject may be assigned. And as Badiou (2005: 406) avers "A subject is a knowledge suspended by a truth whose finite moment it is". A true and generic Rethemniot subject thus is faithfully connected to such a radical otherness and inconsistent multiplicity implied by the grafting onto Rethemnos of what the knowledge of the encyclopaedia fails to make sense of when it comes to an undecidable discount.

Truth, in other words, if this is at stake in subtracting the multiple from the encyclopaedia of Rethemnos, is composed of multiples on the side of which a subject maybe found. Truth and subject are not necessarily linked though. They may be associated, however, once a generic extension, emerges. Accordingly, one should not be looking for a charismatic, poetic or rebellious subject in Rethemnos, in some anthropological fashion, but should map instead and explore the traces of a procedure left behind by the event (Two), of *a* non-chosen servility when the indiscernible-discount is decided from the standpoint of the undecidable. In short, with the Two of affirmation/responsibility and its stuttering non-servile-servility that ventures in an indiscernible topology, an undecidable, may be ultimately, *named*. Any truth procedure, in other words, remains indifferent and irreducible to any foundational knowledge. This comes down to saying that a subject is faithfully connected to an event, once it is named after an intervention, affirming the hole that happens in

knowledge. The axiom of foundation, as was shown, prohibits being's event but in that prohibition the liar-event and the advice-event break with the fundamental ontology of a fully deployed historical situation (the tourist crisis) by placing affirmative responsibility in the middle of some agonistic poetics (the alleged Mediterranean antagonism between the shopkeepers) and the alleged Mediterranean hospitality (the pure and authentic place that resists commercialization). In sum, the Rethemniot generic multiple is linked to the Two of affirmative responsibility – which prevents agonistic poetics (the axiom of foundation) – through the intervention of an interruption-without-interruption (the axiom of choice) – once it is forced en route from the indiscernible (*not all students should be credited with the discount*) to the undecidable (*there may be some students that may appeal for a discount*) – and they do not have to be Archaeology graduates!

As was already stated at the outset, the subjectivation process run through in the preceding pages is not about representational identities. I only strived, however, to be worthy of such a truth procedure centred upon incalculable, unnameable and undecidable occurrences on the basis of which a subject will be allowed to emerge. The reader thus who would have probably expected to end up reading a work in which a Mediterranean identity of a particular substance will be firmly defined, may be disappointed. Sadly or otherwise, there is little to say and even less to do about any disappointment the read might feel. In Badiou's universe, however, there is only one possible way to define a subject and that is by judging by his/her confidence and militancy devoted to an event. As it should be clear by now subjects are truly differential multiplicities that are locally decided, within an evental site of a fully deployed historical situation, always in the process of indetermination by means of which the undecidable is subtracted. When everything is said and done, therefore, and the question still remains 'who is actually the true subject of Rethemnos?' as Badiou put it, the answer should be: "that man, in a sense that he invents, [whom] is all of us at once" (Badiou, 2005: xv).

CONCLUSION

My peregrinations in the preceding pages have led me to events and encounters nourished in the wake of deconstruction, schizoanalysis, the consumer society and the choreoethnography of the event. Mediterraneanism, I have argued, is a discourse of the Mediterranean region rather than the Mediterranean itself, which should be altogether abandoned in favour of differential, repetitive, becoming, affirmative, and deconstructive conceptions of difference qua difference. Mediterraneanism, I have also suggested is a sedentary image of thought, which produces a conceptual kind of difference, subjecting it to integration, domesticity, analogy, representation and contradiction. Such an intuition that ultimately subjugates difference to the jurisdiction of a spontaneous and flexible space-economy is fraught with the rationality of political economy, the naturalization of use-value, the idealization of a revolutionary class-struggle, the teleology of history, the mythology of production, the ontotheology of presence and the negativity of parasitism. Parasitism, however, once given over to the Möbius bands of use-value, seduction and symbolic exchange, starts charting even if prematurely, the conditions pertinent to a full-blown consumer society.

Difference as has been argued, is neither positive, nor negative, nor oppositional, nor contradictory but affirmative, multiple, irreducible, joyful and undecidable, manifold, displaced, and disadjusted. A Möbius band of thought, as was also stressed, is the one-sided curved surface which confuses, ploughs and complicates difference, conceiving of it in terms of a displacement, in the manner in which the subject is deformed (from egoism, honour, and poetics to affirmation, responsibility, non-servile-servility and the indiscernible-undecidable) and, a displacement in the manner in which the co-relation of society and space dis-articulates (from spontaneity, repression, and social history to consumerism, seduction, and origami). Such differential writings of difference defy constancy, presence and fixity and lend consistency to the folding, unfolding and refolding of the Mediterranean space, subtracting from the n th dimension ($n-1$), through a chiasmic (χ) deconstructive reading that affirms the redoubled ethics of deconstruction rather than the metaphysics of shame and honour; the responsibility of an infinite other which is relentlessly in the process of becoming rather than the negativity of mourning (the poetics of womanhood); and the indiscernible, and undecidable generic multiplicity,

rather than the rhetorics of excellence (the poetics of manhood) that separate, isolate, oppose, identify and associate a certain subject with consciousness, transcendence and substance.

Mediterraneanists insist that “we do not take the Mediterranean as geographically homogenous but only as coherent in epistemological terms” (Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers, 1992: 6). This is precisely the problem. Writing the Mediterranean on hollow ground by way of a thought that draws on and is driven by excess, destruction and squandering allows letting the illusions of fixity, planning, stability, development and prognostication of such an epistemological unity, go. It means, moreover, to destabilize on the move the reactionary parasitism, capitalism without capitalists, poetic male subjects, shameful, subversive and silent woman and the banal poetics of womanhood. Bauman, Baudrillard, Badiou, Deleuze, Guattari, and Derrida are only symptoms of such a writing that sets out to loosen and deconstruct Mediterraneanism which remains nihilistic, pointillistic and unbecoming, without necessarily being fake or false. It is above all a mode of representation, which is *dialectical* (contradiction: the one versus the other) as in the poetics of manhood; *nihilistic* (subversion, bad conscience) as in the poetics of womanhood; *ethnocentric* (the essentialisation of certain geographical idiomorphies) as in the spontaneous, parasitic and capitalist glosses; and *metaphysical* (the metaphysics of presence, transparent-crystalline society not already broached by difference) as in the shame-and-honour model.

The symptoms exhibited above supplant and supplement a differential play of writing, launching and staging Ideas of difference that are multiple, affirmative, singular and untimely. There is no portable poststructuralist theory, however, which by means of its application will attest to its own validity. The events of deconstruction, consumerism, and schizoanalysis, therefore, simply intervene in the middle of a certain Mediterranean state of affairs, that is, a foundational historical situation within which an event may happen, in order to destabilize difference through repetitions, the counterfeit, becoming-woman, the Body without Organs, the division between the seduced and the repressed, origami and the differential calculi of some unanticipated choreoethnographies. Yet such a strategy is neither about dismantling, nor about destroying/reconstructing the Mediterranean discourses; rather it is about saying ‘yes’ – the affirmative difference of learning to let go – to the joyful solicitation and

iteration of difference *en route* from the strictures and binaries of poetics, shame-and-honour and so on, to the differential and generic multiples of an evental Rethemnos.

The ultra-one of the Two of affirmation and responsibility, the interruption without interruption of non-servile servility and the indiscernible/undecidable discount-event is not the end of the story. Such events refer to de-individuations, which by means of becoming are confronted with the undecidability of an intervention subtracted from a fully deployed historical situation, which nourishes, however inadvertently, the void, excess, and infinity of being and the generic, indiscernible undecidability of the subject. The events that have come to blossom and upon which I drew above can, certainly, be unpacked in innumerable other ways, to the extent that philosophies of difference offer an infinite number of ways to get to grips with episodes that remain to come, breaking with the official language and state of a situation, and engaging in novel truth procedures that may – or may not, but this is precisely the challenge – call forth an unexpected and wholly other. The subject is neither a point, nor a substance but, above all, a process that should be made always by subtracting from an already existent dimension. The subject, moreover, is found on the side of truth when it is faithfully connected to an event, after an intervention is forced by a generic undecidable. It is to that extent that I have found the differential repetitions, becoming-woman, spectral use-values, repressed/seduced theoretical-practice, origami, and the choreoethnographies of the event an exemplary basis for deconstructing Mediterraneanism. Through their irreducible and undecidable status, such snags affirm the crisis of versus, opposing not shame, honour, poetics and spontaneity but their oppositional and contradictory strategy, dialectical sublation, negative reversal and ultimate resolution of difference. In all the events discussed above, I have only tried to be worthy of the affirmation/responsibility, non-servile servility and interminable undecidability of a generic multiple Mediterranean difference. Therefore, the question is no longer about denying the usefulness of poetics, parasitism and so on, but about learning how to let go, during which something wholly other may come to pass.

In the wake of postmodernism and poststructuralism, the ethic of the event of Rethemnos frustrate the Oneness of identity (shame and honour), the Oneness of place (spontaneity) and the Oneness of time (social and monumental histories) by way

of subtraction (the non-poetic, non-presence ontology of set theory, and the historicity, indiscernibility and undecidability of the generic multiples). The essential indecision of the discount-event, as was shown, deconstructs the alleged egoism, self-sufficiency and wholeness of the Archaeology Service and makes a hole in the way in which the Rethemniot multiple conceives of the other. For the subject in the post-evental universe of fidelity is a militant of truth connected to an event named after an intervention, and swept up by motionless trips and voyages in a way that affirms that which is still to come, that is the radical otherness of a discount, which in its unanticipated and unpredicted imminence challenges the knowledge of the Archaeology Service. My sole obsession in unblocking the events above was not, however, interpretation, but a fascination for multiplicity, that is, a fascination for events with a consistency all of their own that cross over into each other. And thus the above unfolding is not complete and does not mean to settle matters once and for all. What future research might proceed to unveil, therefore, is to affirm innumerable and infinite differential and unpredictable becomings that are different to those already anticipated.

No small wonder then, that the systemic role of consumption, deconstruction, schizoanalysis and the ethnography of the event, which set Rethemnos in motion allowing space, place and the subject to take place, escape the forced domestication of identity and stability. For by dwelling on chance, becoming, and consistency, the events drawn upon above de-consist within a zone of immanence and intensity, without opposing Mediterraneanism, mapping thus the folding, unfolding and refolding of the trajectories of the subject in the wake of consumer parasitism, which holds back and withdraws the productivist, rationalist and teleological discourse of political economy, social and monumental histories, spontaneity, the friends of the heart and so on. For events and differential repetitions slide past each other, opening new ways in making sense of the unknown and the unnameable. And thus rather than destroying Mediterraneanism, the double b(l)inds and chiasmus of the four-fold of deconstruction (reversal and reinscription – χ – neither/nor-both/and) affirm that identity, splace and place are always *out of joint*.

I have tried to think and make space for exactly such an idea of difference, which repeats and affirms the eternal return of that which is not already contradiction,

opposition, and poetic presence; a difference, in short, which is not included in any kind of conceptual or identity politics and is not already representation; a difference conforming neither to the Same, nor to the One, nor to the Many, nor to Resemblance. The eternal return of the affirmative-responsible and non-servile servility of an indiscernible-undecidability, one might argue, is exactly about such a difference; it goes hand in hand with the division between the repressed and the seduced and the origamic unfolding of the Old Town; and chimes with the image of thought of Badiou's mathematical ontology, which construed a truth procedure forced by a generic fidelity to be connected to an event making a hole in the subjective knowledge of poetic identities and the restoration project. Finally, such a thought has come to materialize with respect to the events discussed above, regarding the interminable stuttering of a difference-producing repetition through which an experience of an impossible discount-event becomes a radical experience of *perhaps* on the back of the driftwork of indiscernibility and undecidability.

The blocks of becoming are not, therefore, simply oppositional with respect to Mediterraneanist identifications of homology, dialectics and domesticity. Becomings regard incalculable multiplicities and rhythm analyses subtracted from an ineffaceable threshold of affirmation, responsibility, and the generic multiple ex-appropriation of undecidability. The ethnography of the event challenges the authenticity and pointillism of mainstream ethnography and Mediterranean anthropology that dictate, block and suppress everything that swerves away from constancies, binary oppositions and dialectics; and also breaks with and takes flight from Mediterraneanist images of thought; being itself purely submitted to the differential calculus and interval of the events of Rethemnos, affirming manifold *choreo(ethno)graphies* – italicized thus to emphasize the choreographic essence of any ethnography and the difficulty of writing it in a truly differential manner.

Hence the Old Town problem was twice unfolded in a doubly-folded manner. Once, as it was subject to an exhaustive understanding of the systemic structuration of the consumer society, the fetishism and spectrality of utility, the structural organization of needs and the origamic dis-junction of space. And, once again, as it was taken hostage by a theory of the multiple, the irreducible and radical alterity, otherness and difference that are immanent first, to affirmation and responsibility (the ultra-one

event of Two); second, to a non-servile servility (against synthesis and the versus of the poetic dialectic); and third, to becoming-indiscernible, beyond the pointillism of hospitality, and the performative excellence of official history. Admittedly, the residents' shifting attitudes toward the Greek state, from a hostile resistance to a demand for constant and increasing state intervention, is intricately linked to a broader socio-spatial restructuring, which is increasingly related to the emancipation of capital from labour and the spatialization of the division between the repressed and the seduced. And thus the trajectory from the anti-intervention period of the former Old Town Houses Owners Association (OTHOA) to an interventionist period marked by the newly founded housing association (AROOT), which is forcefully set against the Old Town's recent commodification and aesthetization, marks in a profound manner the postmodern transformation and metamorphosis of the urban affairs of the town. No small wonder then that the resident, as I have already argued, should have said 'THERE IS NOTHING TO SEE', nothing to interpret in the Old Town, for every attempt to terminate the interminable Old Town, arguing over its alleged uniqueness, neglects the irreducible conjunctive and infinite ANDs (Old Town AND New Town AND...AND) that come on the back of deconstruction, schizoanalysis and consumerism.

Deconstruction, schizoanalysis and the ethnography of the event, on the other hand, do not form clear-cut theoretical divisions that are easily and unobtrusively pinned down as methodological recipes. An origamic spatial theory which deals with the effective power of space and spacing is not so much about a conflict in historical terms but rather concerns the irreducible split, double bind, and interwoven implication of the Old Town and the New Town. The origami, in short, does not efface the incontestable and irreparable singularity of spatial differentiation and the undecidable split of Rethemnos, but seeks to sophisticate the uninsurable manifold spacing of a decompressed disparate between the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos. Hence the fact that the Mediterranean, and Rethemnos by implication, "can never be always present, it *can be, only, if there is any*, it can be only possible, it must even remain a *can-be* or *maybe* in order to remain a demand" (Derrida, 1994: 33). The Mediterranean, if there is any, "would be a matter of linking an *affirmation* (in particular a political one) [...] to the experience of the impossible, which can only be a radical experience of the *perhaps*" (Derrida, 1994: 35). Yet such

problematizations do not, necessarily, resonate with or are applicable to all Mediterranean formations. My aim and scope, after all, was to establish that the Mediterranean is nothing but a symptom, an analytics of power, governed and forced by a powerful discourse which sought to disclose the truth of the Mediterranean or its secret, in other words, to force the Mediterranean into confessing what makes it so special.

The Moebius bands of thought deployed above reverse, however, not only such a symptomatology of social and monumental history, but also reinscribe the undecidability, imperceptibility and procrastination of the restoration project, and in that redeployment, such confessions and secrets become thin, imperceptible, and noble, rather than oppressive, contradictory, emancipatory or revolutionary. The almost absolute proximity of difference beyond the point of exception (shame-and-honour) and extremity (poetics) work in favour of traces of non-origin that affirm simply that the current grasp of the Mediterranean will not be another traumatic confession. En route from Mediterraneanism to the event of Rethemnos I have only striven to be worthy, and worthy alone, not a voice or a medium, of what the Mediterranean wishes to let go, dislodge or unleash. Accordingly, this is not going to be the end of Mediterraneanism. Moreover, it does not mean, necessarily, that one should work only with the terms or the theory deployed above. What it does mean, however, is that there is a constant need to destabilize Mediterraneanism, first, by reversing shame, honour, the poetic, spontaneity and parasitism, and second, by affirming the reinscription of the counterfeit, becoming-woman, the spatialization of the division between the repressed and the seduced, origami and the affirmative, responsible, non-servile and indiscernibly undecidable Rethemniot subject. Rethemnos, as promised, was ultimately, not what one would have thought. For Rethemnos is always becoming-other than what one thinks; always already differential. At this juncture, in one but doubly-folded stroke, I am done with Rethemnos, once because this is the end of the thesis but not the end of matters and, once again, because everything is still open to re-iteration, soli-citation, experimentation and complication.

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APPENDIX

Table 1: Use of Properties

Use	Frequency	Percent
Shop	45	25,7
Residence	106	60,6
Abandoned	4	2,3
Preserved	1	,6
Monument	1	,6
Public building	4	2,3
Total	161	92,0
Missing 0	14	8,0
Total	175	100,0

Table 2: Type of Reconstruction/Restoration

Type	Frequency	Percent
General	70	40,0
Restoration	13	7,4
Illegal	7	4,0
Permission	8	4,6
No change	57	32,6
Expropriation	1	,6
Tranform to shop	4	2,3
Transform to rent rooms	1	,6
Total	161	92,0
Missing 0	14	8,0
Total	175	100,0

Table 3: Geographical Location of Properties

Area	Frequency	Percent
Historical Centre	67	38,3
Rest of Town	108	62,7
Total	175	100,0

Table 4: Use of Properties before and after 1994

Use	Year		Total
	until 1994	after 1994	
Shop	16	29	45
	35,6%	64,4%	100,0%
Residence	90	16	106
	84,9%	15,1%	100,0%
Abandoned	3	1	4
	75,0%	25,0%	100,0%
Preserved	1	0	1
	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Monument	1	0	1
	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Public building	4	0	4
	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Total	115	46	161
	71,4%	28,6%	100,0%

Table 5: Geographical Location of Properties before and after 1994

Area	Year		Total
	until 1994	after 1994	
Historical Centre	45	22	67
	67,2%	32,8%	100,0%
Rest of Town	84	24	108
	77,8%	22,2%	100,0%
Total	129	46	175
	73,7%	26,3%	100,0%

Table 6: Type of Restoration before and after 1994

Type of Restoration	Year		Total
	until 1994	after 1994	
General	43	27	70
	61,4%	38,6%	100,0%
Restoration	8	5	13
	61,5%	38,5%	100,0%
Illegal	3	4	7
	42,9%	57,1%	100,0%
Permission	3	5	8
	37,5%	62,5%	100,0%
No change	56	1	57
	98,2%	1,8%	100,0%
Expropriation	0	1	1
	,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Tranform to shop	1	3	4
	25,0%	75,0%	100,0%
Transform to rent rooms	1	0	1
	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Total	115	46	161
	71,4%	28,6%	100,0%

Table 7: Use of Property and Geographical Location

Use of Property	Area		Total
	Historical Centre	Rest of Town	
Shop	28 62,2%	17 37,8%	45 100,0%
Residence	27 25,5%	79 74,5%	106 100,0%
Abandoned	4 100,0%	0 ,0%	4 100,0%
Preserved	1 100,0%	0 ,0%	1 100,0%
Monument	1 100,0%	0 ,0%	1 100,0%
Public Building	2 50,0%	2 50,0%	4 100,0%
Total	63 39,1%	98 60,9%	161 100,0%

Table 8: Type of Restoration and Geographical Location

Type of Restoration	Area		Total
	Historical Centre	Rest of Town	
General	27 38,6%	43 61,4%	70 100,0%
Restoration	5 38,5%	8 61,5%	13 100,0%
Illegal	3 42,9%	4 57,1%	7 100,0%
Permission	2 25,0%	6 75,0%	8 100,0%
No change	23 40,4%	34 59,6%	57 100,0%
Expropriation	1 100,0%	0 ,0%	1 100,0%
Tranform to shop	2 50,0%	2 50,0%	4 100,0%
Transform to rent rooms	0 ,0%	1 100,0%	1 100,0%
Total	63 39,1%	98 60,9%	161 100,0%